How we did this

This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on public perceptions of global threats in 25 countries across the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East-North Africa region, North America and sub-Saharan Africa. Views of global threats are examined in the context of long-term trend data.

For non-U.S. data, this analysis draws on nationally representative surveys of 28,333 adults conducted from Jan. 8 to April 26, 2025. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surveys were conducted face-to-face in Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey. In Australia, we used a mixed-mode probability-based online panel.

In the United States, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and the survey methodology.

In a world facing a range of difficult issues, adults across 25 countries see the spread of false information online, the condition of the global economy and terrorism as major threats today.

And while many people remain concerned about climate change and the spread of infectious diseases, fewer view these as major threats now than did in recent years.

These findings come from the latest Pew Research Center analysis of perceived global threats, which follows similar studies conducted in 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020 and 2022.

Overall, a median of 72% of adults across 25 nations surveyed in spring 2025 say that the spread of false information online is a major threat to their country. A further 21% say it is a minor threat, while 5% say it is not a threat at all.

In seven countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and South Korea – more people view the spread of false information as a threat than any other issue asked about.

Germans and Poles, who voted in competitive national elections within the last year, see this as the top threat by a considerable margin.

Related: Widespread global public concern about made-up news

A median of 70% of adults across the countries surveyed view the condition of the global economy as a major threat. Another 27% say it’s a minor threat, and 4% say it is not a threat. People in two countries – Greece and Australia – view the global economy as the top threat of those included in the survey.

Meanwhile, the share of adults who see global economic conditions as a major threat has increased in 21 countries since 2017.

Concerns about the world economy are generally tied to views of national economic conditions. In 23 countries, people with a more negative view of their nation’s economy are more likely to say that the condition of the global economy is a major threat.

A 25-country median of 69% of adults view terrorism as a major threat, while 26% characterize it as a minor threat and 6% say it is no threat at all. People in four countries – India, Israel, Nigeria and Turkey – see terrorism as the top threat of the five issues asked about.

In Israel, concerns about terrorism especially outweigh concerns about the other issues. And Jewish Israelis are far more likely than Arab Israelis to see terrorism as a major threat to their country (96% vs. 61%). The survey was fielded about a year and a half after Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

People in middle-income countries are generally more likely than those in high-income countries to see terrorism as a major threat (79% median vs. 60% median). Concerns about terrorism also tend to be higher among older adults, people with less education and those on the ideological right, including supporters of right-leaning populist parties. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify high- and middle-income countries, and read Appendix B for more information on how we classify populist parties.)

A median of 67% of adults across the nations surveyed see global climate change as a major threat. Another 24% say it is a minor threat, and 9% say it is no threat. In no survey country is climate change the single greatest perceived threat.

On balance, however, concerns about climate change are higher than in 2013, both in advanced economies and middle-income countries. The share of people who view it as a major threat has increased sizably in France (+24 percentage points since 2013), Turkey (+23), Mexico (+22), the UK (+18), Kenya (+15), Nigeria (+13), Israel (+12), Australia (+11), the U.S. (+11), Germany (+11) and Poland (+10). 

As in previous years, people on the ideological left are more concerned than those on the right about climate change.

Meanwhile, just a few years after the COVID-19 pandemic, a median of 60% adults across the countries surveyed view the spread of infectious diseases as a major threat. Another 30% see it as a minor threat, and 5% say it is no threat at all.

In three countries – Argentina, Brazil and South Africa – disease is seen as the top threat of the five issues asked about. And around eight-in-ten adults or more view it as a major threat in Kenya (88%), Turkey (87%), Indonesia (86%) and Mexico (82%).

Generally, people in middle-income countries are more concerned than those in advanced economies about the spread of infectious diseases. In fact, in the nine advanced economies we have surveyed since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the share of people who view disease as a major threat has dropped from 74% in 2020 to 61% in 2022 and 50% this year.

On the other hand, the shares of people who view global economic conditions as a major threat have increased substantially over the longer term across many high- and middle-income countries.

Jump to further analysis about the perceived threat posed by:

• Spread of false information online
• Condition of the global economy
• Terrorism
• Global climate change
• Spread of infectious diseases  
• Appendix A: Economic categorization of high- and middle-income countries
• Appendix B: Classifying European political parties

• A median of 72% of adults across 25 nations say the spread of false information online is a major threat to their country. A median of 21% consider it a minor threat, and a median of 5% say it is not a threat.
• Concern about false information on the internet is widespread in both high- and middle-income countries, and has remained relatively stable over time. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify high- and middle-income countries.)
• Older people and those on the ideological left are particularly likely to see false information online as a major threat.

Majorities in 24 of the 25 countries surveyed see the spread of false information online as a major threat. Only in Israel do fewer than half of adults (43%) hold this view. An additional 27% of Israelis say false information is a minor threat, and 20% do not consider it a threat to their country.

Related: Widespread global public concern about made-up news

Views over time

We last asked about the threat posed by false information online in 2022. Since then, public perceptions in most places have not moved much. Of the 16 countries where this trend data is available, we see significant changes in six.

The share of adults who say false information is a major threat has grown in Poland (+20 points), Sweden (+10), Hungary (+9), France (+6) and Germany (+6). (In 2022, the Hungary and Poland surveys were conducted face-to-face; they are now conducted over the phone.) In Greece, the share with this view has shrunk 7 points, from 79% in 2022 to 72% today.

Views by age

In several countries, adults ages 50 and older are more likely than those ages 18 to 34 to see the spread of false information online as a major threat. This is the case in Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, Kenya, Poland, Sweden and the U.S.

But in Brazil and Turkey, the opposite is true: Older adults are less likely than younger adults to consider false information a major threat. In both countries, however, older adults are also slightly less likely to answer the question.

Views by ideology

In most countries, majorities across all ideological groups consider the spread of false information online a major threat. But in nine countries, people who place themselves on the ideological left are more likely than those on the right to say this.

Some of the biggest differences are in Germany and the U.S. For example, 82% of liberal Americans say the spread of false information on the internet is a major threat, compared with 60% of conservatives.

Here, too, Israel is an exception. It is the only country surveyed where people on the left are less likely than those on the right to see the spread of false information online as a major threat.

Views by support for populist parties

In several European countries, concern about the spread of false information online is considerably lower among supporters of right-wing populist parties than among nonsupporters. (Read Appendix B for more information on how we classify populist parties.)

For example, 55% of Germans with a favorable view of Alternative for Germany (AfD) say the spread of false information is a major threat, compared with 89% of those who have an unfavorable view of AfD.

We find similar gaps between supporters and nonsupporters of right-wing populist parties in Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK. But Spanish supporters of Podemos – which is classified as a left-leaning populist party – are more concerned than nonsupporters about the threat of false information online (83% vs. 71%).

• A median of 70% of adults across 25 countries say global economic conditions pose a major threat to their country, while 27% say they pose a minor threat. Only 4% say global economic conditions do not pose a threat.
• About half of adults or more in all countries surveyed say global economic conditions are a major threat. These shares range from 85% in Greece to 49% in India (where respondents are less likely to offer an opinion).

Concern is higher in middle-income countries than high-income ones. A median of 75% across the nine middle-income countries surveyed say global economic conditions are a major threat, while a median of 65% say the same across 16 high-income countries. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify high- and middle-income countries.)

Views over time

Since we first asked this question in 2017, the share of adults who say global economic conditions are a major threat has gone up significantly in 21 countries. One of the largest changes is in Germany, where the share of adults who see this as a major threat has risen 38 points.

There have also been increases of 30 points or more in Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland over this period.

Views by opinion of national economic conditions

In most countries, people with a negative view of national economic conditions are more likely to consider global economic conditions a major threat to their country.

In the U.S., for example, seven-in-ten adults who say the domestic economic situation is bad also say the state of the global economy poses a major threat to their country. This compares with 42% among those who say the U.S. economy is in good shape.

Related: Americans’ views of global threats differ by party, age

Views by education and age

Views on this question also differ by age and educational background.

In 11 countries, respondents with more education tend to perceive global economic conditions as a greater threat. In Brazil, for instance, 86% of people with more education view global economic conditions as a major threat to their country, compared with 65% among Brazilians with less education. However, in many countries, people with less education are also less likely to answer the question.

In eight countries, younger respondents (ages 18 to 34) are more likely than their older counterparts (ages 50 and older) to view global economic conditions as a major threat. In Hungary, for example, these younger adults are 25 points more likely than those in the older group to say global economic conditions are a major threat (83% vs. 58%). There are differences of 15 points or more in Brazil, Canada and Indonesia. (In Brazil, older adults were less likely to provide a response.)

CORRECTION (Aug. 21, 2025): A previous version of this report included an incorrectly labeled chart. This has been updated, and none of the report’s findings are affected.

• Across 25 nations, a median of 69% of adults say terrorism is a major threat. Another 26% say it is a minor threat, and 6% say it is not a threat to their country.
• People in middle-income countries are more likely than those in high-income countries to see terrorism as a major threat. A median of 79% across nine middle-income countries surveyed say terrorism is a major threat, compared with 60% across 16 high-income countries. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify high- and middle-income countries.)
• Concern about terrorism is highest among older adults and people on the ideological right, including supporters of right-leaning populist parties. And in some countries, people with less education are more likely to be concerned than those with more education.

Many people view terrorism as a major threat to their nation, including large majorities in almost all of the middle-income countries surveyed. About nine-in-ten adults in Kenya, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey express this view, as do roughly eight-in-ten in Argentina, Brazil, India and Mexico.

These views of terrorism are also common in some high-income countries such as France, Japan and South Korea: About three-quarters of adults or more in each of these nations call it a major threat. In Israel, 89% see terrorism as a major threat to their country. 

Views over time

In 12 high-income countries, we last asked people about their views of terrorism as a threat in 2020. The share of Americans who say terrorism is a major threat has declined 9 points since March 2020. Fewer Australians also see terrorism as a major threat to their country today than in June 2020 (-7 points).

But in South Korea and Sweden, people are somewhat more likely to see terrorism as a major threat today than five years ago.

Views by age

In about half of the countries surveyed, older people are more likely than younger people to see terrorism as a major threat.

For instance, three-quarters of Americans ages 50 and older say terrorism poses a major threat to their country, compared with 44% of U.S. adults under 35.

Views by education

In 10 mostly high-income countries, people with less education are more likely than those with more education to see terrorism as a major threat. For instance, 58% of Greeks without a postsecondary education hold this view, compared with 40% among those who have a postsecondary education.

Views by ideology

In 15 nations, people who place themselves on the ideological right are particularly concerned about the threat terrorism poses to their country.

Almost half of right-leaning Australians (47%) say terrorism is a major threat. This is more than double the share of left-leaning Australians (20%) who take this stance.

Similarly, in Canada, roughly half of those on the right (49%) and a similar share of those in the center (46%) see terrorism as a major threat, compared with about a quarter of those on the left (28%).

Other large differences by ideology are found in the U.S., Israel and many of the European countries surveyed. 

Views by support for right-wing populist parties

Across Europe, supporters of right-wing populist parties are more likely than nonsupporters to see terrorism as a major threat to their country. (Read Appendix B for more information on how we classify populist parties.)

For example, French adults with a favorable view of the right-wing National Rally party are more likely than those with an unfavorable view of the party to call terrorism a major threat. This is also the case among supporters and nonsupporters of Alternative for Germany (AfD), Fidesz in Hungary, Forza Italia and Brothers of Italy (FdI), Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, Vox in Spain, Sweden Democrats, and Reform UK.

Conversely, supporters of centrist and left-leaning populist parties in France, Italy and Spain are less likely than nonsupporters to be concerned about the threat posed by terrorism. The only exception is left-wing Syriza in Greece: People with a favorable view of that party are more likely than those with an unfavorable view to see terrorism as a major threat to their country.

• A median of 67% of adults across 25 nations say global climate change is a major threat to their country. Another 24% say it is a minor threat, and 9% say it is not a threat.
• In many of the high-income countries we surveyed in both 2022 and 2025, the share of adults who see climate change as a major threat has decreased significantly.

Majorities in all but three countries – Israel, Nigeria and the U.S. – see climate change as a major threat. Around eight-in-ten hold this view in Argentina, Brazil, France, Japan and South Korea.

About a quarter of Israelis (24%) say climate change is not a threat – the largest share to take this stance across the countries surveyed. In the U.S., about a fifth of adults (19%) say the same.

Views over time

The share of adults who say climate change is a major threat has increased in many places since 2013, when we first asked this question internationally. In Turkey, for example, 47% of adults thought of climate change as a major threat in 2013. This year, 70% of Turks express this view.

However, since 2022, the share of people who view climate change as a major threat has decreased in many of the 16 high-income countries surveyed. This is especially the case in Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, where people are 11 points less likely today than in 2022 to see climate change as a major threat. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify high- and middle-income countries.)

Views by ideology

In 15 surveyed countries, people who place themselves on the ideological left are much more likely than those on the right to view climate change as a major threat.

The largest difference is in the U.S., where liberals are more than four times as likely as conservatives to say this (84% vs. 20%).

People on the right have become less likely since 2022 to call climate change a major threat in several countries. In Poland, for example, 40% of those on the right say this today, down from 63% three years ago.

Views by support for right-wing populist parties

Europeans who support right-wing populist parties tend to be much less likely than nonsupporters to say climate change is a major threat. This is the case across all right-wing populist parties we analyzed. (Read Appendix B for more information on how we classify populist parties.)

For example, a quarter of Germans with a favorable view of Alternative for Germany (AfD) say climate change is a major threat, compared with 78% of those who have an unfavorable view of AfD.

Views by age

In several countries – including Australia, France, Turkey and the U.S. – adults under 35 are more likely than those ages 50 and older to see climate change as a major threat. But the reverse is true in Argentina, Japan, South Korea and Sweden.

• A median of 60% of adults across 25 nations say the spread of infectious diseases is a major threat to their country. A median of 30% say this is a minor threat, and 5% say it is not a threat.
• Concern about the spread of infectious diseases is generally higher in middle-income countries than high-income ones. A median of 85% across nine middle-income countries say this is a major threat, while a much smaller median share (53%) say this across 16 high-income countries. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify high- and middle-income countries.)

In 16 of the 25 countries surveyed, majorities believe the spread of infectious diseases poses a major threat. This is the case in all nine middle-income countries included in the survey, but also in several high-income countries: France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, South Korea and Spain.

Views over time

The share of people who say the spread of diseases poses a major threat has decreased since 2022 across nearly all the high-income countries included in the survey.

For example, 28% of Germans now view the spread of infectious diseases as a major threat to their country, down from 49% in 2022. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, an even larger share of Germans (55%) held this view.

Views by gender

In 10 countries, women are more likely than men to say the spread of infectious diseases is a major threat to their nation.

In Sweden, for example, women are 12 points more likely than men to see this as a major threat (39% vs. 27%).

Gender differences also appear in Hungary, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain and the U.S.

For this report, we grouped countries into high-income and middle-income categories based on definitions from the World Bank.

Classifying parties as populist

Although experts generally agree that populist political leaders or parties display high levels of anti-elitism, definitions of populism vary. We use three measures to classify populist parties: anti-elite ratings from the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), Norris’ Global Party Survey and The PopuList. We define a party as populist when at least two of these three measures classify it as such.

CHES, which was conducted from February to May 2020, asked 421 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration to evaluate the 2019 positions of 277 European political parties across all European Union member states. CHES results are regularly used by academics to classify parties with regard to their left-right ideological leanings, their key party platform positions and their degree of populism, among other things.

We measure anti-elitism using an average of two variables in the CHES data. First, we used “PEOPLE_VS_ELITE,” which asked the experts to measure the parties with regard to their position on direct versus representative democracy, where 0 means that the parties support elected officeholders making the most important decisions and 10 means that “the people,” not politicians, should make the most important decisions. Second, we used “ANTIELITE_SALIENCE,” which is a measure of the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for that particular party, with 0 meaning not at all salient and 10 meaning extremely salient. The average of these two measures is shown in the table below as “anti-elitism.” In all countries, we consider parties that score at or above a 7.0 as “populist.”

The Global Party Survey, which was conducted from November to December 2019, asked 1,861 experts on political parties, public opinion, elections and legislative behavior to evaluate the ideological values, issue position and populist rhetoric of parties in countries on which they are an expert, classifying a total of 1,051 parties in 163 countries. We used “TYPE_POPULISM,” which categorizes populist rhetoric by parties. We added only “strongly populist” parties using this measure. In Italy, experts were asked to categorize the entire center-right coalition instead of individual parties within the coalition. The coalition includes Lega, Forza Italia and Brothers of Italy. For all three parties, we applied the coalition rating of “strongly populist.”

The PopuList is an ongoing project to classify European political parties as populist, far right, far left and/or euroskeptic. The project specifically looks at parties that have “been represented in their country’s national parliament at least once” since 1989. It is based on collaboration between academic experts and journalists. The PopuList classifies parties that emphasize the will of the people against the elite as populist.¹ This appendix uses The PopuList 3.0.

Classifying parties as left, right or center

We can further classify these traditional and populist parties into three groups: left, right and center. When classifying parties based on ideology, we relied on the variable “LRGEN” in the CHES dataset, which asked experts to rate the positions of each party in terms of its overall ideological stance, with 0 meaning extreme left, 5 meaning center and 10 meaning extreme right. We define left parties as those that score below 4.5 and right parties as those above 5.5. Center parties have ratings between 4.5 and 5.5.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate
Andrew Prozorovsky, Research Assistant

Dorene Asare-Marfo, Senior Panel Manager
Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production
Janakee Chavda, Associate Digital Producer
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst
Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher
Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher
Shannon Greenwood, Digital Production Manager
Sneha Gubbala, Research Analyst
Sofia Hernandez Ramones, Research Assistant
Anna Jackson, Editorial Specialist
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate
Jordan Lippert, Research Analyst
John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer
William Miner, Research Analyst
Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
Georgina Pizzolitto, Research Methodologist
Maya Pottiger, Communications Associate
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Jonathan Schulman, Research Associate
Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Brianna Vetter, Administrative Associate
Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research

About Pew Research Center’s Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on a mix of telephone, face-to-face and online interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup, Langer Research Associates and Social Research Centre. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. Read more about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs.

Some, but not all, of our international analyses and reports use demographic variables or categorizations based on external data. We explain these more below:

Ideology

We analyze respondents’ attitudes based on where they place themselves on an ideological scale. We asked about political ideology using several slightly different scales and categorized people as being on the ideological left, center or right.

• In most countries, we asked people to place themselves on a scale ranging from “Extreme left” to “Extreme right.” The question was asked this way in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK.
• In Japan and South Korea, ideology was measured on a scale from “Extremely progressive” to “Extremely conservative.”
• In the U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).
• Ideology was not asked about in India, Indonesia or Kenya. 

Religious identification

In each country surveyed, people were asked about their current religious identification. We then analyzed religious groups with sample sizes large enough to be reliable. Respondents of other religious backgrounds are still included in the national totals, even if we were not able to analyze their religious group separately.

Education

To compare educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the United Nations’ International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

High- and middle-income countries

Countries are classified as either high or middle income based on categories from the World Bank that rely on per capita gross national income. This is a classification we have used in other Pew Research Center analyses, including when looking at global views of China, satisfaction with democracy, globalization and national identity.

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted March 24-30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “About the American Trends Panel.”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.² Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.³ Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24-30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing. 

For panelists who take surveys online:⁴ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.⁵ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates