Democrats significantly more likely than Republicans to rate NATO positively and to say U.S. benefits from membership
BYMoira Fagan, Jacob Poushter and Sneha Gubbala
About Pew Research Center
Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It does not take policy positions. The Center conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, computational social science research and other data-driven research. It studies politics and policy; news habits and media; the internet and technology; religion; race and ethnicity; international affairs; social, demographic and economic trends; science; research methodology and data science; and immigration and migration. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder.
For this analysis, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to March 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.
More than three years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Americans remain divided along partisan lines in their views of the conflict, as well as in their attitudes toward NATO and perceptions of Russia.
Republicans and Republican-leaning independents have become less likely over the past year to say Russia is an enemy of the United States – and more likely to call it a partner or competitor.
Republicans have also become less likely to say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself and to express concern about Russia defeating Ukraine or invading other countries in the region. As a result of this change in opinion, the partisan gap on many of these issues has grown.
For example, when asked whether Russia is an enemy, competitor or partner of the U.S., 40% of Republicans say Russia is an enemy, down from 58% last year. The share of Democrats and Democratic leaners who see Russia as an enemy is down 5 percentage points over the same period. Overall, half of Americans now call Russia an enemy, down from 61% in 2024.
These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted March 24-30, 2025, among 3,605 U.S. adults.
Views of NATO
Americans continue to see NATO in a mostly favorable light, and views among Republicans, Democrats and the public overall have changed little over the past year. As has long been the case, Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to have a positive opinion of the military alliance.
About two-thirds of Americans (66%) say the U.S. benefits from NATO membership, though this share has decreased slightly from 71% in 2021. This drop is reflected among Republicans (down 6 points) while opinion among Democrats has held steady.
Views of Russia and Putin
Few in the U.S. see Russia favorably (13%) or have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs (12%).
Both Democrats and Republicans have generally negative views of Russia and Putin, but these attitudes are more intense among Democrats – who are more likely than Republicans to express very unfavorable views of Russia (62% vs. 41%) and say they have no confidence at all in Putin (72% vs. 43%).
Over the past year, Republicans have become somewhat more likely to see Russia favorably and to express confidence in Putin, while Democratic views are largely unchanged.
Views of the Russia-Ukraine war
Nearly half of Americans (47%) are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading other countries, and 43% are concerned about Russia defeating and taking over Ukraine. Republicans have become less concerned about both possibilities in recent months, while Democrats have become more so.
Majorities of Republicans and Democrats alike see the war between Russia and Ukraine as important to U.S. interests, though Democrats are more likely to hold this view. Most Americans say the war is important to them personally, too, including 47% of Republicans and 66% of Democrats.
When it comes to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 49% have confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Democrats are much more likely to express confidence in Zelenskyy than Republicans (70% vs. 30%).
1. How Americans view Russia and Putin
Here are several key takeaways about Americans’ views of Russia:
Half of U.S. adults see Russia as an enemy of the U.S., down from 61% in 2024. More Republicans see Russia as a competitor than as an enemy for the first time since before the Russia-Ukraine war started.
While most Americans – including majorities of Democrats and Republicans – continue to express negative views of Russia and Putin, smaller shares of Republicans express very unfavorable opinions of Russia and no confidence at all in Putin than in 2024. Opinions among Democrats have not changed much.
Is Russia a competitor, partner or enemy of the U.S?
Half of Americans today label Russia as an enemy of the U.S., while 38% see Russia as a competitor and 9% see it as a partner. This represents an 11-point drop in views of Russia as an enemy since last year and a 20-point drop since March 2022, just weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Still, more Americans see Russia as an enemy now than they did before the invasion (50% vs. 41% in January 2022).
Partisanship
Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to see Russia as an enemy of the U.S. (62% vs. 40%). Republicans are about as likely to see Russia as an enemy now as they were before the current conflict in Ukraine began. In January 2022, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, 39% of Republicans saw Russia as an enemy. This share increased to 69% in the early months of the war and has fallen fairly steadily since.
Republicans are also twice as likely as Democrats to see Russia as a partner of the U.S. (12% vs. 6%).
Favorability of Russia
Americans continue to have negative views of Russia. In the current survey, 13% see Russia very or somewhat favorably, while 85% see it very or somewhat unfavorably. These are generally similar to ratings in 2024.
Strongly negative views of Russia have been declining in recent years. Currently, 51% of Americans have a very unfavorable opinion of the country. As recently as March 2022, 69% had a very unfavorable view of Russia.
Partisanship
There are some differences in views of Russia by party. About four-in-ten Republicans (41%) hold a very unfavorable view of Russia, compared with 62% of Democrats. Inversely, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to have a favorable view of Russia (16% vs. 9%).
Confidence in Putin
Americans’ confidence in the Russian president remains low as well. About one-in-ten (12%) have at least some confidence in Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs, compared with 84% who have little or no confidence in his leadership. In fact, a 57% majority of Americans have no confidence at all in Putin.
Partisanship and views over time
As with views of Russia, attitudes toward Putin have shifted slightly in recent years. In 2024, 67% of Americans had no confidence at all in Putin, including 75% of Democrats and 61% of Republicans. But in the current survey, 43% of Republicans have no confidence at all in Putin, an 18-point decline. Around seven-in-ten Democrats (72%) have no confidence at all in Putin, little changed from last year.
2. How Americans view the Russia-Ukraine war
Here are several key takeaways about U.S. opinion of the war between Russia and Ukraine:
Democrats and Republicans are divided – and this divide has grown wider – when it comes to U.S. responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself and levels of concern over possible conflict outcomes.
The survey asked about how committed four world leaders are to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine: French President Emmanuel Macron, Russian President Vladimir Putin, U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. A majority of Americans say Zelenskyy is committed to lasting peace, while 19% say the same of Putin. Fewer than half (47%) say Trump is committed to peace, and 45% say this of Macron.
U.S. responsibility to help Ukraine
More than four-in-ten Americans (44%) say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia’s invasion, while 53% say the nation does not have this responsibility.
Views on this issue have shifted over recent months. Fewer Americans now believe the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine in its war against Russia than said so in a November 2024 survey fielded after the U.S. presidential election. At that time, 50% held this opinion.
Partisanship and age
Opinion on the United States’ responsibility to Ukraine is divided along partisan lines. Two-thirds of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself, compared with 23% of Republicans and Republican leaners.
The share of Republicans who believe the U.S. should aid in Ukraine’s defense has dropped 13 points since November, while the share of Democrats who say the same is largely unchanged over the same period.
Partisans are also divided by age. Republicans and Democrats ages 50 and older are more likely than their younger counterparts to say the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine.
National and personal importance of the Russia-Ukraine war
Roughly seven-in-ten Americans (69%) view the war between Russia and Ukraine as important to U.S. national interests.
A 56% majority of U.S. adults also say the Russia-Ukraine war is at least somewhat important to them personally.
Partisanship and age
Views of the war’s national and personal importance vary by party. Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say that the war is important on both counts.
Liberal Democrats are especially likely to say the Russia-Ukraine war is important both to U.S. national interests and to them personally: About nine-in-ten liberal Democrats (88%) say this, compared with 72% of conservative or moderate Democrats. Conservative Republicans are more likely than liberal or moderate Republicans to view the war as important to U.S. interests (66% vs. 58%).
The share of Republicans who say the war between Russia and Ukraine is important to them personally has dropped by 9 points since January 2024, and the share who say it is important to U.S. interests has dropped by 6 points. In comparison, views of the war’s personal importance among Democrats remain unchanged over the same period, and the share of Democrats who see the war as important to U.S. interests has declined by only 3 points.
Views also vary by age more generally, with older U.S. adults more likely to consider the Russia-Ukraine war important personally and nationally. About three-quarters of Americans ages 65 and older say the war is at least somewhat important to them personally, while half of adults under 30 say the same. There’s a similar gap in the shares of older and younger Americans who see the war as at least somewhat important to U.S. national interests (81% vs. 61%).
Differences between older and younger adults are evident among both Republicans and Democrats. Older Republicans (those ages 50 and older) are more likely than younger Republicans ages 18 to 49 (70% vs. 56%) to say the Russia-Ukraine war is important to U.S. national interests. And older Democrats are more likely to say this than younger Democrats (84% vs. 73%). This pattern holds on the question of the war’s personal importance.
Views of Russia
Americans who consider Russia an enemy of the U.S. are more likely than those who view Russia as a partner or competitor to see the war as important both to U.S. interests and to themselves personally.
Roughly seven-in-ten of those who see Russia as an enemy (68%) say that the war is at least somewhat important to them personally, compared with 45% among those who see Russia as a competitor and 41% of those who see Russia as a partner. Differences by views of Russia also exist on the question about national importance.
Concerns about possible outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine war
More than four-in-ten U.S. adults (43%) are extremely or very concerned about Ukraine possibly being defeated and taken over by Russia; another 29% are somewhat concerned and 28% are not too or not at all concerned.
Nearly half (47%) are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading other countries in the region, while 26% are somewhat and 26% not too or not at all concerned.
Concerns about both situations have not changed much over the past year, but are lower than when the public was first asked about these outcomes in the early months of Russia’s invasion. In April 2022, 55% were extremely or very concerned about a Ukrainian defeat, and 59% said the same about a wider Russian invasion.
Partisanship
Democrats have long been more likely than Republicans to say they are extremely or very concerned about both a possible Ukrainian defeat and a Russian invasion of other countries in the region.
But the partisan gap on each of these questions has grown wider over the past year. Today, 29% of Republicans are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading other countries in the region, down from 42% in July 2024. Democrats’ opinions have not changed as much.
World leaders’ commitment to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine
A majority of Americans (59%) say that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is committed to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine, while 47% say this about U.S. President Donald Trump and 45% about French President Emmanuel Macron (33% say they are unsure when asked about Macron).
Two-thirds of Americans say that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not committed to lasting peace between the two countries, including 42% who say Putin is not at all committed to this outcome.
Partisanship
Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say that Trump and Putin are at least somewhat committed to lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine. But Democrats are more likely to say this about Zelenskyy and Macron.
Confidence in Zelenskyy
Americans have mixed views of Zelenskyy, just a few weeks after his contentious White House meeting about U.S. support for Ukraine in the war. Roughly half of Americans (49%) have a lot or some confidence in his ability to do the right thing regarding world affairs, compared with 42% who have not too much or no confidence in him. Another 9% say they have never heard of the Ukrainian leader.
Zelenskyy’s rating is mostly unchanged from 2024. But it’s down since 2023, when 56% had a lot or some confidence in him.
Partisanship and age
Zelenskyy receives much higher confidence ratings from Democrats (70%) than from Republicans (30%).
This represents a slight uptick since 2024 among Democrats (+5 points) and a slight decline among Republicans (-4 points) and marks the widest partisan gap on confidence in Zelenskyy since we first asked this question in 2023. Liberal Democrats are especially likely to express confidence in Zelenskyy (81%).
There continue to be age differences on confidence in Zelenskyy. Around four-in-ten Americans ages 18 to 29 (42%) have confidence in the Ukrainian leader, compared with 60% of those ages 65 and older. Younger Americans are also much more likely than older Americans to say they never heard of Zelenskyy (15% vs. 3%).
3. How Americans view NATO and U.S. NATO membership
Here are several key takeaways about Americans’ assessments of NATO:
While a majority of Americans (60%) express a positive view of NATO, there continue to be partisan differences: 77% of Democrats have a favorable view of the international alliance, compared with 45% of Republicans. These views have not moved significantly over the past year.
More Americans say the U.S. benefits from membership in NATO (66%) than say it does not (32%). Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. benefits from NATO membership.
NATO favorability
Six-in-ten U.S. adults have a favorable view of NATO, similar to the share who said this in 2024. Another 37% have an unfavorable view of the alliance.
Partisanship
For several years, there has been a wide partisan gap in U.S. opinions of NATO. About three-quarters of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (77%) express a positive view of the organization, while 45% of Republicans and Republican leaners feel this way. Neither partisan group has shifted significantly in their views over the past year.
There are ideological differences in these views within both partisan coalitions:
Moderate or liberal Republicans (51%) are more likely than conservative Republicans (41%) to express a positive view of NATO.
Liberal Democrats are more likely than conservative or moderate Democrats to have a favorable opinion of the alliance (85% vs. 72%).
Does the U.S. benefit from NATO membership?
About two-thirds of Americans (66%) say the U.S. benefits a great deal or a fair amount from being a member of NATO, while 32% say it does not benefit much or at all.
About eight-in-ten Democrats (83%) believe the U.S. benefits from being a member of NATO, compared with about half of Republicans (49%). Liberal Democrats are particularly likely to say the U.S. benefits from membership in the alliance (90%), while a 57% majority of conservative Republicans say the U.S. does not benefit much or at all.
The share of Republicans who said the U.S. benefits from being part of NATO has dropped since we first asked this question in spring 2021; at that time, 55% saw at least a fair amount of benefit to NATO membership. Democrats’ views have not changed much since then.
Views of international engagement and Russia
U.S. adults who say the country should be active in world affairs (81%) are more likely to think the U.S. benefits from being a member of the alliance than those who prefer the country pay less attention to problems overseas and instead focus on domestic issues (52%).
And those who say Russia is an enemy of the U.S. (72%) are more likely than those who see Russia as a competitor (49%) or partner (44%) to have a favorable view of NATO.
Acknowledgments
This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.
Moira Fagan, Research Associate Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research Sneha Gubbala, Research Analyst
Dorene Asare-Marfo, Senior Panel Manager Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production Janakee Chavda, Associate Digital Producer Laura Clancy, Research Analyst Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher Shannon Greenwood, Digital Production Manager Anna Jackson, Editorial Assistant Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate Jordan Lippert, Research Analyst John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer William Miner, Research Analyst Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods Georgina Pizzolitto, Research Methodologist Andrew Prozorovsky, Research Assistant Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager Maya Pottiger, Communications Associate Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate Kelsey Jo Starr, Research Analyst Brianna Vetter, Administrative Associate Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research
Methodology
The American Trends Panel survey methodology
Overview
Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 24 to March 30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.
The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.
The survey includes oversample of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.
SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.
Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.1 Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.2 Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.
A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.
Sample design
The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.
Questionnaire development and testing
The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.
Incentives
All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.
Data collection protocol
The data collection field period for this survey was March 24 to March 30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.
For panelists who take surveys online:3 Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.4 Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.
Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.
For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.
Data quality checks
To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.
Weighting
The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.
Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.
The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.
Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.
