{"id":69913,"date":"2023-08-30T09:38:24","date_gmt":"2023-08-30T14:38:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/alpha.pewresearch.org\/pewresearch-org\/2023\/08\/30\/christianity\/"},"modified":"2025-05-19T11:15:11","modified_gmt":"2025-05-19T15:15:11","slug":"christianity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/alpha.pewresearch.org\/pewresearch-org\/religion\/2023\/08\/30\/christianity\/","title":{"rendered":"4. Christianity"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Members of an underground \u201chouse church\u201d meet for Sunday service in 2011 in Beijing, China. (Jonathan Saruk\/Getty Images)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

There is a range of estimates for the number of Christians in China, partly because different researchers use varying sources and methods, and partly because some analyses make adjustments to account for limitations in survey and government data.[53. numoffset=”53″ In this report, government data refers to statistics and estimates published by the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, state-controlled agencies and organizations directly supervised by the State Council of China.] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

One perspective is provided by responses to the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) question \u201cWhat is your religious belief (zongjiao xinyang<\/em> \u5b97\u6559\u4fe1\u4ef0)?\u201d In 2018, the CGSS found that roughly 2% of Chinese adults, or about 20 million people, self-identify with Christianity in this way.[54. The 2018 CGSS was conducted in 28 of mainland China\u2019s 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. The 2021 CGSS was conducted in 19 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. In the 2021 CGSS, about 1% of respondents identified with Christianity.] According to this survey, Protestants account for roughly 90% of Chinese Christians, or about 18 million adults, while the remainder are mostly Catholics. Smaller groups, which include Orthodox Christians<\/a>, are fewer than 1% of Christian adults in China.[55. In Chinese vernacular and in some surveys, the blanket term \u201cChristianity\u201d (Jidujiao<\/em> \u57fa\u7763\u6559) is often used to refer to Protestantism (Jidu xinjiao<\/em> \u57fa\u7763\u65b0\u6559), while Catholicism (Tianzhujiao<\/em> \u5929\u4e3b\u6559) and other branches of Christianity are typically referred to by their specific names. In this report, Christianity is used inclusively to refer to Protestant, Catholic and other varieties of Christian faith.] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other national surveys, which use slightly different question wording, report similar shares. In the 2018 World Values Survey, 2% of Chinese adults said they believe in (xinyang<\/em> \u4fe1\u4ef0) Christianity, and in the 2016 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) survey, 3% said they belong to (shuyu<\/em> \u5c5e\u4e8e) Christianity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Some media reports and academic papers have suggested the Christian share may be larger, with estimates as high as 7% (100 million<\/a>) or 9% (130 million<\/a>) of the total population, including children. No national surveys that measure formal Christian affiliation \u2013 by asking people which religion (zongjiao) they identify with \u2013 come close to these figures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, survey questions that measure Christian beliefs and practices<\/em> provide evidence that the number of people with some connection to Christian faith is greater than zongjiao measures reveal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, the cumulative share of Chinese adults who say they \u201cbelieve in\u201d (xiangxin) Jesus Christ and\/or Tianzhu<\/em> (\u5929\u4e3b, the word Chinese Catholics use for God) is 7%, or roughly 81 million adults, according to the 2018 CFPS survey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\"Chart<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Some scholars argue that this measure may be a better alternative than zongjiao xinyang, citing a core Christian teaching that one should never deny belief in God (including Jesus Christ or Tianzhu) regardless of the circumstances.[56. Lu, Yunfeng, Yue Wu, and Chunni Zhang. 2019. \u201cHow Many Protestants are There in China: An Estimate Based on China Family Panel Studies<\/a>\u201d (in Chinese). Open Times.] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But these figures encompass those who also believe in one or more non-Christian deities, such as Buddha and\/or a bodhisattva, immortals (Taoist deities) or Allah. The share of Chinese adults who say they believe in Jesus Christ and\/or Tianzhu and do not believe in these other deities is about 3%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Challenges of measuring Christianity in China<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Political sensitivity<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Counting Christians in China is difficult for several reasons. Officially, only churches authorized by the government are allowed to operate. But, in reality, many Christians worship in unauthorized venues known as \u201cunderground churches\u201d (dixia jiaohui<\/em> \u5730\u4e0b\u6559\u4f1a) or \u201chouse churches\u201d (jiating jiaohui<\/em> \u5bb6\u5ead\u6559\u4f1a). These Christians may be reluctant to reveal their identity. Likewise, members of the Chinese Communist Party, who are prohibited from holding a religious affiliation, might not disclose their Christian affiliation.[57. A 2011 study<\/a> by researchers at Baylor University found that Christians who attended house churches in China were more likely than others to refuse to participate in a survey. Among house church participants who agreed to be interviewed, roughly one-in-ten did not admit to being Christian in the survey. For more discussions on surveying Christians in China, read the China methodology of our 2011 Global Christianity report.<\/a>]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, the government has tightened control over Christian activities outside of registered venues, banned unauthorized evangelization online<\/a>, and intensified its crackdown<\/a> on unauthorized Protestant meeting points and underground Catholic churches, making Christianity a very sensitive topic in China. In addition, President Xi Jinping has called for the \u201cSinicization of religions<\/a>,\u201d a strategy that particularly affects non-traditional belief systems, including Christianity<\/a> and Islam<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

(For more, read the Methodology section \u201cExploring the underreporting of zongjiao affiliation in Chinese surveys\u201d<\/a> and discussion of Xi Jinping\u2019s Sinicization campaign<\/a>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Self-identification versus belief and practice<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Measuring Christianity in China is also difficult because, as discussed in other chapters, conventional measures of self-identification based on zongjiao do not fully capture the breadth of religious experience in China. And even though Christianity and Islam, unlike Buddhism or folk religions, emphasize exclusivity in belief and practice, many Chinese who engage in Christian practice or even consider themselves to be worshippers of Jesus Christ or Tianzhu may not necessarily identify with Christianity when asked about their zongjiao xinyang.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking cumulatively at the broadest, most inclusive survey measures of Christian affinity, as many as 8% of Chinese adults have some degree of connection to Christianity because they formally identify as Christian, believe in the Christian God or report a type of worship attendance common to Christians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, a broad approach to measuring Christian affinity generates a considerably larger estimate of the number of people with some connection to Christianity than the much smaller share who say Christianity is their zongjiao.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sampling issues<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Sampling coverage, which is tied to the geographic concentration of China\u2019s Christians, may affect the accuracy of Christian estimates. Roughly a quarter of China\u2019s Catholics live in the northern province of Hebei<\/a>, and they tend to cluster in rural \u201cCatholic villages,\u201d where the vast majority of residents follow Catholicism.[58. Madsen, Richard. 2003. \u201cCatholic Revival during the Reform Era<\/a>.\u201d The China Quarterly.] As a result, Catholic survey estimates may vary depending on how many such villages are included in the sample. Similarly, it is consequential whether Protestants are proportionately represented. For example, surveys may yield a slightly lower Protestant estimate if Wenzhou \u2013 said to be the most Christian city in China<\/a> \u2013 is excluded from the sample.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some researchers argue that surveys that undersample ethnic minority groups may undercount Christians. However, the minority groups in question are relatively small in proportion to China\u2019s population, and Bible distribution figures suggest they make up a small fraction of all Chinese Christians.[59. Research suggests that due in part to Protestant missionary activity<\/a> in the southwestern provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou in the early 20th century, several ethnic minority groups, such as Lisus and Miaos<\/a>, are disproportionately Protestant Christians. As of 2016, the Amity Printing Company \u2013 the printing arm of the China Christian Council and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (CCC and TSPM) \u2013 had distributed 74 million Bible copies<\/a> in China, including around 640,000 <\/a>in ethnic minority languages.] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent change in Christian measures<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\"Chart<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Some scholars<\/a> and journalists<\/a> have argued in recent decades that Christianity in China<\/a> is growing rapidly. Indeed, Christianity flourished after China entered an era of economic reforms and \u201copening up\u201d to the world in the 1980s. But recent surveys that measure zongjiao affiliation do not offer much evidence that Christian growth continued after 2010.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the CGSS, about 2% of adults (23.2 million) in China self-identified as Christian in 2010, versus 2% (19.9 million) in the 2018 survey \u2013 a gap that is not statistically significant.[60. Estimates for self-identified Christians are calculated using unrounded numbers.] (In the 2021 CGSS, 1% of respondents identified as Christian. However, this wave did not cover as many regions as previous waves of the CGSS, so the results may not be directly comparable.[61. The 2021 CGSS data was collected in fewer provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions (19) than in previous waves (28-31) and therefore may not be directly comparable to earlier waves.])<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since measures of Christian belief and practice have not been repeated consistently in surveys, we cannot track how beliefs and practices associated with Christianity have changed since 2010 in the Chinese public. We don\u2019t know, for example, whether overall belief in Jesus Christ or attendance at Christian worship services (zuo libai<\/em> \u505a\u793c\u62dc) has risen, declined or remained stable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the few repeated survey measures of religious commitment is the broad measure of zongjiao activity, which has been included in all recent CGSS waves. Among those who identify as Christian, reports of zongjiao activity levels are roughly stable. In 2010, 38% of Christians said they engaged in zongjiao activities at least once a week, while in 2018, 35% said so \u2013 a difference that is not statistically significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unfortunately, we cannot be certain how survey patterns are affected by political circumstances. There could be a real increase in the share of Chinese adults who identify with Christianity that is hidden from survey measurement. For example, it is possible there has been growth in Christian affiliation that is offset in surveys by growing reluctance among respondents to identify as Christian due to the government\u2019s intensifying scrutiny of Christian religious activity<\/a>. While that is a hypothetical possibility, there is no way to know from the available survey data whether it is actually the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is also possible that the share of Christians who do not reveal their identity in surveys may have remained roughly stable since 2010. In that case, the apparent leveling off (\u201cplateau\u201d) in Christian identification in recent surveys could be an accurate reflection of the overall pattern, even if surveys fail to capture the full number of Chinese Christians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Traits associated with formal Christian affiliation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

While survey questions that ask about formal zongjiao affiliation have limitations, they capture a subset of Christians who are more religious by several measures than those who say they believe in Jesus Christ and\/or Tianzhu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to data from the 2016 and 2018 CFPS surveys, 68% of adults who self-identify as Christians believe in Jesus Christ and\/or Tianzhu exclusively (i.e., without believing in other deities, including Buddha and\/or a bodhisattva, immortals or Allah).[62. This analysis is based on data collected among the same adult respondents (about 28,000) in the 2016 and 2018 waves of the CFPS to obtain information on each respondent\u2019s religious identity, practice and belief. This is because the 2016 survey asks about religious identity and practice, while the 2018 survey asks only about religious belief. For more about the CFPS, read the Methodology<\/a>.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By contrast, among all those who say they believe in Jesus Christ and\/or Tianzhu, only 40% indicate they hold this belief exclusively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Adults who formally identify with Christianity also are more likely to say religion (zongjiao) is very important in their lives than are those who say they believe in Jesus Christ and\/or Tianzhu but do not necessarily formally identify with Christianity (61% vs. 29%), according to the CFPS. And they are more likely to say they attend worship services once a week or more (55% vs. 21%).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the 2018 CGSS, respondents who choose Christianity as their zongjiao xinyang are older and have lower educational attainment than the average Chinese adult. The majority (72%) are women.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Christian houses of worship<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

There are two types of officially sanctioned Protestant places of worship in China: churches (jiaotang<\/em> \u6559\u5802) and meeting points (juhuidian <\/em>\u805a\u4f1a\u70b9). A meeting point is not different from a church functionally, but it may not look like a church building; it can be an apartment or office space and usually holds fewer congregants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For instance, Haidian Church<\/a> in Beijing hosts an average of roughly 7,000 people for worship services, while its affiliated meeting points<\/a> each hold between 150 and 500 people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2009, Protestant venues totaled 55,000 (including roughly 24,000 registered churches and 31,000 meeting points), according to the China Christian Council (CCC) and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM). Since then, China\u2019s Protestant supervisory agencies have not broken out churches and meeting points separately.[63. The Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) Committee, together with the China Christian Council (CCC), manage Protestant religious affairs. These two organizations are often abbreviated as the \u201cTwo Committees\u201d (lianghui <\/em>\u4e24\u4f1a) and referred to as \u201cCCC and TSPM.\u201d] According to China\u2019s State Council Information Office, there were roughly 60,000 legal Protestant venues in 2018, largely unchanged from a total of 58,000<\/a> venues in 2009.[64. Chinese government agencies customarily report figures rounded to 10,000 (wan<\/em> \u4e07). It is unclear why the CCC and the TSPM reported a total of about 55,000 venues in 2009 (24,000 churches, plus 31,000 meeting points) while the SCIO says there were about 58,000.] These do not include Protestant house churches or unauthorized meeting points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Chart<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Not all registered meeting points are included in the official statistics of formally registered Protestant venues, a discrepancy that might be explained, at least in part, by the ambiguous meaning of the Chinese words for \u201cregister\u201d (dengji<\/em> \u767b\u8bb0 or zhuce<\/em> \u6ce8\u518c). These words can mean either \u201cgranted formal registration\u201d or \u201cput on local government record.\u201d The latter may not appear in official statistics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For instance, Haidian Church<\/a> in Beijing has more than 50 authorized meeting points<\/a>, but the CCC and TSPM consider none of the affiliated meeting points a registered venue<\/a>, even though some of them function much like independent churches<\/a>, hosting their own worship services and baptisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The number of registered Protestant venues, which increased substantially between 1997 and 2008, has roughly leveled off since then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After 2013, some Protestant churches in Zhejiang \u2013 the province with China\u2019s highest concentration of officially registered Christian venues \u2013 were affected by the \u201cThree Rectifications and One Demolition\u201d<\/a> campaign which led to the demolition of some officially sanctioned churches that violated zoning regulations<\/a>. News reports indicate that officially registered churches later also were demolished in other provinces, including Anhui<\/a>, Fujian<\/a>, Henan<\/a> and Shanxi<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 2017, following an update of the \u201cRegulation on Religious Affairs<\/a>,\u201d authorities have been more strictly implementing policies on unauthorized religious activity. Their strategy has included putting more pressure on venues to affiliate with the TSPM and submit to government oversight, while cracking down<\/a> on those that resist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government\u2019s plan for unauthorized Protestant meeting points has not necessarily led to an increase in official venues, due in part to the ambiguous meaning of \u201cregister.\u201d For example, in Tianjin<\/a>, less than 10% of the total 643 authorized TSPM Protestant meetings have been granted a certificate of registration as of 2019. Similarly, Hohhot<\/a>, the capital city of Inner Mongolia, has 480 authorized Protestant meeting points, but only 67 of them have been formally registered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, some scholars believe<\/a> that local officials in China tend to underreport evidence of religious activity in order to appear compliant with the state\u2019s goal to contain religion. For example, in the Fengxian district of Shanghai, local officials continued to refer to just 24 registered Christian worship sites in 2019<\/a>, even though in 2018, they reported having accepted 73 (out of 86) unauthorized Christian sites<\/a> into the official system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For similar reasons, the trend in the number of registered Protestant clergy seems to conflict with recent government policy pushing for registration<\/a>. Between 2009 and 2018, the number of official Protestant clergy (pastors, ministers and ordained elders) declined slightly from around 37,000<\/a> to 36,000<\/a>. This trend also appears to conflict with the CCC and TSPM\u2019s emphasis on training Protestant clergy for the official system; around 6,300 students<\/a> graduated from theological seminaries between 2013 and 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Catholic churches and relations with the Vatican<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Government statistics on the numbers of officially registered Catholic venues and personnel \u2013 which include only those affiliated with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) \u2013 point in slightly different directions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the one hand, the number of official Catholic personnel (bishops, priests and nuns) declined from 8,800 in 2009 to 8,000 in 2018. On the other hand, according to official statistics, the number of Catholic venues has grown slightly. In 2022, there were 6,440 officially registered venues<\/a> (including 4,202 churches and 2,238 sites of worship), up from 6,000 in 2009<\/a>. (Estimates of churches and worship sites for other years are unavailable.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Like Protestantism, there are two branches of the Catholic Church in China: the official church and underground churches (dixia jiaohui<\/em> \u5730\u4e0b\u6559\u4f1a). The former refers to churches that have joined the CPA, which is controlled by the National Religious Affairs Administration<\/a>, formerly known as the State Administration for Religious Affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Chinese government has always been wary of underground Catholic churches. Local authorities usually closely monitor covert Catholic activities<\/a> and pressure priests and bishops<\/a> to join the CPA as part of an ongoing program to \u201ceducate and convert underground Catholic forces.\u201d<\/a>

This division dates back to the 1950s purge of foreign influence, when the government expelled missionaries and urged Catholic churches to cut ties with the Vatican. Many Catholic laity and clergy who remained loyal to the Vatican carried their faith in secret. During that period, the government recruited several Vatican-ordained bishops to form the CPA and appoint bishops based on the principle of \u201cself-election and self-ordination\u201d (zixuanzisheng<\/em> \u81ea\u9009\u81ea\u5723) independently of the Vatican.<\/p>\n\n\n

History of Christianity in China<\/div>