{"id":69503,"date":"2024-01-24T09:50:02","date_gmt":"2024-01-24T14:50:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/alpha.pewresearch.org\/pewresearch-org\/2024\/01\/24\/are-nones-less-involved-in-civic-life-than-people-who-identify-with-a-religion\/"},"modified":"2024-12-20T13:40:34","modified_gmt":"2024-12-20T18:40:34","slug":"are-nones-less-involved-in-civic-life-than-people-who-identify-with-a-religion","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/alpha.pewresearch.org\/pewresearch-org\/religion\/2024\/01\/24\/are-nones-less-involved-in-civic-life-than-people-who-identify-with-a-religion\/","title":{"rendered":"3. Are \u2018nones\u2019 less involved in civic life than people who identify with a religion?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Survey data shows that religious \u201cnones\u201d are, on average, less civically and politically engaged than people who identify with a religion. But the differences are often modest and tend to be concentrated among the subset of \u201cnones\u201d who describe their religion as \u201cnothing in particular.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, by several measures, atheists and agnostics are about as civically and politically engaged as U.S. adults who identify with a religion. It\u2019s often just the \u201cnothing in particular\u201d group that stands out for having relatively low levels of civic behavior, such as voting and volunteering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why is this important? Traditionally, people who are involved with U.S. religious congregations have tended to be involved with all sorts of other organizations and activities \u2013 from PTAs and community groups to voting in elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has led some observers to wonder: Could the rise of religious \u201cnones\u201d in the United States effectively diminish Americans\u2019 participation in civic and community life? Put another way, could the decline of religion leave the U.S. with fewer volunteers, community activists and civic leaders?[3. numoffset=”3″ For more on the link between religion, civic engagement and social trust, refer to Smietana, Bob. 2022. \u201cReorganized Religion: The Reshaping of the American Church and Why it Matters.\u201d<\/a> Also refer to Stewart, Evan. 2023. \u201cNot religious, not voting? The \u2018nones\u2019 are a powerful force in politics \u2013 but not yet a coalition.\u201d<\/a> The Conversation; Campbell, David E., Geoffrey C. Layman and John C. Green. 2021. \u201cSecular Surge: A New Fault Line in American Politics\u201d<\/a>; Schwadel, Philip. 2020. \u201dThe Politics of Religious Nones.\u201d<\/a> Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion; Pew Research Center. 2019. \u201cReligion\u2019s Relationship to Happiness, Civic Engagement and Health Around the World\u201d<\/a>; Frost, Jacqui and Penny Edgell. 2018. \u201cRescuing Nones From the Reference Category: Civic Engagement Among the Nonreligious in America.\u201d<\/a> Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly; Jansen, Jim. 2011. \u201cThe Civic and Community Engagement of Religiously Active Americans.\u201d<\/a> Pew Research Center; and Putnam, Robert D. and David E. Campbell. 2010. \u201cAmerican Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us.\u201d<\/a>] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Others have contended that the causal arrow may point in the other direction \u2013 that the decline of religion may itself be a symptom of a broader American disengagement from institutions and organizations. According to this line of reasoning, the decline of religion is just one manifestation of disaffection from (and loss of trust in) fellow citizens and institutions of all kinds.[4. For more on how politics might be driving the growth of the \u201cnones,\u201d refer to Margolis, Michele F. 2018. \u201cFrom Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity\u201d<\/a>; Campbell, David E., Geoffrey C. Layman and John C. Green. 2021. \u201cSecular Surge: A New Fault Line in American Politics\u201d<\/a>; Putnam, Robert D. and David E. Campbell. 2010. \u201cAmerican Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us\u201d<\/a>; and Hout, Michael and Claude S. Fischer. 2002. \u201cWhy More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations.\u201d<\/a> American Sociological Review.] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It’s beyond the scope of this report to definitively answer these big questions about the impact of the decline of organized religion on U.S. civic life, or to sort out how much of religion\u2019s decline is explained by a broader rejection of institutions and organizations. But we have collected lots of data in recent years on the connections between religion and civic engagement, and this chapter briefly reviews it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On many measures, religious \u2018nones\u2019 are less involved in civic life<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Overall, 17% of religious \u201cnones\u201d say they volunteered for an organization or association in the past year \u2013 10 percentage points lower than the share of religiously affiliated people who say this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And religious \u201cnones\u201d are 12 points less likely than religiously affiliated citizens to have turned out to vote in the 2022 midterm elections (39% vs. 51%). (These estimates are based on an analysis<\/a> that uses publicly available official state records to verify voter turnout.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Chart<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Compared with religiously affiliated people, religious \u201cnones\u201d are also somewhat less satisfied with various aspects of their lives, including their local community and their social lives. And in a September 2022 survey, religious \u201cnones\u201d were more likely than other U.S. adults to say they\u2019d felt lonely in the preceding week, and less likely to say they\u2019d felt hopeful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But differences between \u2018nones\u2019 and the religiously affiliated are often modest<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

For example, religious \u201cnones\u201d are only slightly less likely than religiously affiliated people to say they are currently involved in a nonreligious <\/em>volunteer or community service group, as well as to say that they\u2019ve recently contacted an elected official or attended a government meeting \u2013 all of which are standard measures of civic engagement. And the percentage of religious \u201cnones\u201d who say most people can be trusted is virtually identical to the percentage of religiously affiliated people who take that position \u2013 a classic measure of social trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And although \u201cnones\u201d are somewhat less satisfied than religiously affiliated people, most \u201cnones\u201d say they are<\/em> satisfied with their family lives, social lives and local communities. Most \u201cnones\u201d do not <\/em>say they are lonely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among \u2018nones,\u2019 those describing their religion as \u2018nothing in particular\u2019 (not atheists and agnostics) often tend to be the least civically engaged<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In terms of political engagement, for example, atheists and agnostics are about as likely as religiously affiliated Americans to have voted in the 2022 midterm elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Atheists are actually more<\/em> likely than religiously affiliated Americans to say they follow government and public affairs closely. Furthermore, atheists and agnostics are more likely than religiously affiliated people to say most people can be trusted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

U.S. adults who say their religion is \u201cnothing in particular,\u201d however, are less likely than atheists, agnostics and people who identify with a religion to say they have volunteered in the past year, to have voted in the 2022 midterms, and to say they follow government or public affairs all or most of the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On some measures, there is little difference between \u2018nones\u2019 and religiously affiliated people who don\u2019t regularly attend religious services<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Overall, 41% of religiously affiliated people say they go to services at least once or twice a month. Very few \u201cnones\u201d attend religious services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On several key indicators of civic engagement, religiously affiliated people who regularly attend services stand out for their high levels of involvement. For example, they are far more likely to have volunteered in the last year than either \u201cnones\u201d or religiously affiliated people who don\u2019t<\/em> attend religious services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, \u201cnones\u201d are about as likely as religiously affiliated people who don\u2019t<\/em> attend religious services to say they volunteered in the past year or that they are involved in a nonreligious community service group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cNones\u201d are also about as likely as religiously affiliated people who don\u2019t attend religious services to express satisfaction with their social lives and to have felt hopeful lately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Voter turnout among the \u2018nones\u2019<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In the 2022 midterm election, atheists and agnostics turned out to vote at higher levels than \u201cnones\u201d who describe their religion as \u201cnothing in particular,\u201d and at similar levels to U.S. adults who identify with a religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Older \u201cnones\u201d voted at higher levels than younger ones, and higher shares of White \u201cnones\u201d than Black or Hispanic \u201cnones\u201d turned out to vote. In addition, \u201cnones\u201d with more education turned out at a higher rate than those \u201cnones\u201d with less education. These differences within the religiously unaffiliated population mirror broader patterns in the U.S. public as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, \u201cnones\u201d who are men turned out to vote at a higher clip than \u201cnones\u201d who are women. This partly reflects the fact that men who are religiously unaffiliated are more likely than women to identify as atheist or agnostic, and atheists and agnostics turn out to vote at higher rates than \u201cnones\u201d who describe their religion as \u201cnothing in particular.\u201d (Among \u201cnones\u201d in the July 31-Aug. 6, 2023, survey who are men, 22% are atheists, 24% are agnostics and 54% describe their religion as \u201cnothing in particular.\u201d Among \u201cnones\u201d who are women, 12% are atheists, 15% are agnostics and 73% are \u201cnothing in particular.\u201d)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

But the data also shows that among those whose religion is \u201cnothing in particular,\u201d men turned out to vote at a higher clip than women (40% vs. 27%). Among atheists and agnostics, roughly equal shares of men and women turned out to vote in 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Volunteerism among \u2018nones\u2019<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Religious \u201cnones\u201d are somewhat less likely than U.S. adults who are religiously affiliated to have volunteered in the last year. That said, atheists and agnostics are slightly more likely than people who report their religion is \u201cnothing in particular\u201d to have volunteered lately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

White and Asian \u201cnones\u201d are slightly more likely than Hispanic \u201cnones\u201d to have volunteered in the last year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And \u201cnones\u201d who graduated from college are more likely to have volunteered in the last year than are \u201cnones\u201d with less education.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following government and public affairs<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Among \u201cnones,\u201d 36% say they follow \u201cwhat\u2019s going on in government and public affairs\u201d most of the time, while 34% follow public affairs some<\/em> of the time. Another 29% say they do so only now and then or hardly at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Atheists and agnostics are more likely than U.S. adults reporting their religion as \u201cnothing in particular\u201d to follow government and public affairs most of the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Some 44% of religiously unaffiliated men report they follow public affairs most of the time, compared with 28% of religiously unaffiliated women who say they do this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Older \u201cnones\u201d are much more likely than younger \u201cnones\u201d to follow public affairs. And \u201cnones\u201d with college degrees are more likely than those with less education to keep up with government and public affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Satisfaction with family life, local communities, social life<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

About eight-in-ten religious \u201cnones\u201d are very or somewhat satisfied with their family lives. Around seven-in-ten are satisfied with the quality of life in their local community. And 65% are satisfied with their social lives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the religiously unaffiliated are somewhat less likely than Americans who identify with a religion to be satisfied in these ways, majorities in both groups report satisfaction on each of these measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Older \u201cnones\u201d tend to be more satisfied with their family lives, communities and social lives than younger \u201cnones.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cNones\u201d who have graduated from college express higher levels of satisfaction with their family lives and their local communities compared with \u201cnones\u201d who have not completed college.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Table<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Return to the report\u2019s Overview<\/a>.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Find answers to other questions: <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n