Pew Research Center

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How People Around the World View AI

More are concerned than excited about its use, and more trust their own country and the EU to regulate it than trust the U.S. or China

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How we did this

This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on public opinion of artificial intelligence – including awareness of the technology and concern or excitement about its use – in 25 countries across the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East-North Africa region, North America and sub-Saharan Africa. The report also explores respondents' trust in their own country, the European Union, the United States and China to regulate the use of AI.

Countries included in this report

Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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For non-U.S. data, this analysis draws on nationally representative surveys of 28,333 adults conducted from Jan. 8 to April 26, 2025. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surveys were conducted face-to-face in Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey. In Australia, we used a mixed-mode probability-based online panel.

In the U.S., we surveyed 3,605 adults from March 24 to 30, 2025, and 5,023 adults from June 9 to 15, 2025. Everyone who took part in these surveys is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The surveys are weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

In the U.S., questions about trust in various countries or institutions to regulate AI were asked on ATP Wave 166 in March, while questions about awareness of AI and reactions to it were asked on ATP Wave 173 in June. As we are not able to directly compare the two samples, the U.S. is excluded from some elements of this analysis.

For the purpose of comparing educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the United Nations' International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The lower education category is lower secondary education or below and the higher category is upper secondary or above in middle-income countries (as defined by the World Bank). The lower education category is upper secondary education or below and the higher category is postsecondary or above in high-income countries.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and the survey methodology.

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How People Around the World View AI

More are concerned than excited about its use, and more trust their own country and the EU to regulate it than trust the U.S. or China

As the use of artificial intelligence (AI) increases rapidly, most people across 25 countries surveyed say they have heard or read at least a little about the technology. And on balance, people are more concerned than excited about its growing presence in daily life.

A median of 34% of adults across these countries have heard or read a lot about AI, while 47% have heard a little and 14% say they've heard nothing at all, according to a spring 2025 Pew Research Center survey.

But many are worried about AI's effects on daily life. A median of 34% of adults say they are more concerned than excited about the increased use of AI, while 42% are equally concerned and excited. A median of 16% are more excited than concerned.

Most people in surveyed countries have heard or read at least a little about AI ...

Median % who say they have heard or read ___ about artificial intelligence



... and public concern about its increased use outweighs excitement

Median % who say the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life makes them feel ...



Note: Percentages are medians based on 25 countries. Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Concerns about AI are especially common in the United States, Italy, Australia, Brazil and Greece, where about half of adults say they are more concerned than excited. But as few as 16% in South Korea are mainly concerned about the prospect of AI in their lives.

In fact, in many countries surveyed, a larger share of people are equally excited and concerned about the growing use of AI. In no country surveyed do more than three-in-ten adults say they are mainly excited.

What is a median?

In this analysis, median scores are used to help readers see overall patterns in the data. The median percentage is the middle number in a list of all percentages sorted from highest to lowest.

The survey also finds a strong correlation between a country's income – as measured by gross domestic product per capita – and awareness of AI. **People in higher-income nations tend to have heard more about AI than those in less wealthy economies.** For example, around half of adults in the comparatively wealthy countries of Japan, Germany, France and the U.S. have heard *a lot* about AI, but only 14% in India and 12% in Kenya say the same.

Trust in governments to regulate AI

The survey also asked whether people trust their own country, the European Union, the U.S. and China to regulate the use of AI effectively.

Most people trust their own country to regulate AI. This includes 89% of adults in India, 74% in Indonesia and 72% in Israel. At the other end of the spectrum, only 22% of Greeks trust their country to regulate AI effectively.

Americans are almost evenly divided between trust in their country to regulate AI (44%) and distrust (47%).

How do people around the world feel about the rise of AI in daily life?

% who say the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life makes them feel ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Generally, people who are more enthusiastic about AI are more likely to trust their country to regulate the technology. And in many countries, views on this question are related to party affiliation or support for the governing coalition.

In the U.S., for example, a majority of Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party (54%) trust the U.S. to regulate AI effectively, compared with a smaller share of Democrats and Democratic Party leaners (36%).

Related: *How Americans View AI and Its Impact on People and Society*

When it comes to other regulating entities**, more people globally tend to trust the EU to regulate AI than trust the U.S. or China.**

A median of 53% of adults in the surveyed countries trust the EU to regulate AI, while 37% trust the U.S. and 27% trust China.

More people trust their own country and the EU to regulate AI than trust the U.S. or China

Median % who have ___ in each of the following to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively



Note: Percentages are medians based on 25 countries. Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Trust in the EU varies widely among the organization's member nations: Adults in Germany and Netherlands are the most trusting, while their counterparts in France, Greece, Italy and Poland are the least trusting. Overall, a median of 54% across the nine member nations surveyed trust the EU to regulate AI, while 48% across the nonmember nations surveyed say the same.

Public trust in various actors to regulate AI is closely tied to how people view them overall. Generally, people with a more positive view of the EU, the U.S. and China are more likely to trust them to regulate AI effectively.

For instance, in countries like Indonesia and South Africa – where views of China are more positive than views of the U.S. – people are more likely to trust China to regulate AI than to trust the U.S.

There are other interesting demographic and political differences on these questions of trust:

- There is stronger trust in the U.S. as an AI regulator among people on the ideological right and among Europeans who support right-leaning populist parties.
- There is stronger trust in China as an AI regulator among younger adults in 19 countries surveyed.
- There is stronger trust in the EU as an AI regulator among people with more education in 19 countries. Additionally, Europeans who support right-wing populist parties are less likely than nonsupporters to trust the EU on this matter.

Demographic differences in awareness, perceptions of AI

Awareness and perceptions of AI differ along many demographic lines.

Age

Young adults in virtually every country surveyed are more aware of AI than their older counterparts. For instance, 68% of Greek adults under 35 have heard or read a lot about the technology, compared with 20% among those ages 50 and older.

Young adults also tend to be more enthusiastic about AI. For example, 46% of Israeli adults under 35 are more excited than concerned about its increased use in daily life, compared with 15% of those ages 50 and older. Conversely, older adults are more concerned than excited relative to younger adults in 18 of the 25 countries surveyed.

Gender

In more than half of the countries polled, men are more likely than women to have

Young adults are more likely than older people to have heard a lot about AI

*% who say they have heard or read **a lot** about artificial intelligence, by age*



Note: Only statistically significant differences are shown. Adults ages 50 and older were less likely to provide a response than adults under 35 in India, Indonesia, Kenya, South Korea and Turkey.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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heard a lot about AI. And in many countries, women are more likely than men to be mainly concerned about the increasing use of AI.

Education

Among people with less education, there is generally more concern than excitement about AI and less awareness of the technology overall, relative to people with more education.

Internet use

There is also a connection between internet use and views of AI. **People who say they use the internet almost constantly are more likely than others to be mainly excited about the growing use of AI in everyday life.** And in every country surveyed, these near-constant internet users are also more likely to have heard a lot about AI.

Related: *Most adults across 24 countries are online at least several times a day*

Jump to further analysis:

- AI awareness around the world
- Concern and excitement about AI
- Trust in own country to regulate use of AI
- Trust in the EU, U.S. and China to regulate use of AI

1. AI awareness around the world

Key findings

- A median of 34% of adults across 25 countries say they have heard or read a lot about artificial intelligence; 47% have heard a little about it and 14% have heard nothing at all.
- In all surveyed countries except India and Kenya, at least half of the public has heard at least a little about AI.
- Internet use is related to awareness of AI: People who say they are online almost constantly are more likely than others to have heard a lot about it.
- Young adults, men and people with more education are more likely than other groups to have heard a lot about AI.

The share of adults who have heard or read a lot about AI varies widely by country. Consider Europe: In France, 52% report a high level of awareness, compared with 30% in Spain.

How much have people heard or read about AI?

% who say they have heard or read ___ about artificial intelligence



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Across all the countries included in the survey, as many as 53% in Japan to as few as 12% in Kenya have heard a lot about AI. Overall, though, most people in these countries have heard at least a little about the technology.

By country's GDP per capita

People in wealthier countries tend to be more likely than those in less wealthy countries to have heard or read a lot about AI. At one end of this spectrum is the U.S., where GDP per capita is about $86,000 and 47% of adults have heard a lot about AI. By comparison, in Kenya, GDP per capita is about $2,200 and 12% of adults say they have heard a lot about AI.

In wealthier countries, more people have heard a lot about AI

*% who say they have heard or read **a lot** about artificial intelligence*



Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey. GDP data comes from World Bank, "How People Around the World View AI"

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By age

In most surveyed countries, adults under 35 are more likely than those ages 50 and older to have heard or read a lot about AI. For example, 77% of young Japanese adults have heard a lot about it, compared with 39% of their older counterparts. There are double-digit age differences across almost all of these countries.

By internet use

In every surveyed country, people who use the internet almost constantly are more likely those who use the internet less frequently to have heard a lot about AI.

For example, Polish adults who are online almost constantly are more than twice as likely as those who are online less often to have heard a lot about AI (68% vs. 26%).

By gender

In about half of the countries surveyed, men are more likely than women to have heard a lot about AI. One particularly large gender divide is in Hungary, where 49% of men and 27% of

Young adults are more likely than older people to have heard a lot about AI

*% who say they have heard or read **a lot** about artificial intelligence, by age*



Note: Only statistically significant differences are shown. Adults ages 50 and older were less likely to provide a response than adults under 35 in India, Indonesia, Kenya, South Korea and Turkey.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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women report this level of awareness.

By education

Across most of the countries surveyed, people with more education are more likely than those with less education to say they have heard a lot about AI. (In some of these countries, people with less education were less likely to provide a response.)

2. Concern and excitement about AI

Key findings

- A median of 34% of adults across 25 countries are more concerned than excited about the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life. A median of 42% are equally concerned and excited, and 16% are more excited than concerned.

- Older adults, women, people with less education and those who use the internet less often are particularly likely to be more concerned than excited.

Roughly half of adults in the U.S., Italy, Australia, Brazil and Greece say they are more concerned than excited about the increased use of AI in daily life.

But in 15 of the 25 countries polled, the largest share of people are equally concerned and excited.

In no country surveyed is the largest share more excited than concerned about the increasing use of AI in daily life.

How do people around the world feel about the rise of AI in daily life?

% who say the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life makes them feel ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Views by age

In most countries polled, adults ages 50 and older are more likely than those ages 18 to 34 to say they are mainly concerned about the growing use of AI in daily life. For example, 59% of older Greeks are more concerned than excited, compared with 18% of younger Greeks. (In many of these countries, older adults were less likely to provide a response.)

In the U.S., the age gap is relatively small but still significant.

Views by gender

In some countries, women are more likely than men to be mostly concerned about the increased use of AI in daily life. In the United Kingdom, for instance, about half of women (47%) are more concerned than excited, compared with about a third of men (32%).

Views by education

In about half of the countries polled, people with less education are more likely than those with more education to be mainly concerned about AI in daily life. (In several of these places, people with less education were less likely to provide a response.)

Older adults are more likely than younger adults to express concern about AI in daily life

% who say the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life makes them feel ***more concerned than excited,*** *by age*



Note: Only statistically significant differences are shown. Adults ages 50 and older were less likely to provide a response than adults under 35 in Brazil, Canada, France, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Poland and South Africa.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Views by internet use

Opinion about increased AI use in daily life varies by internet usage. In many countries, concern about AI is more common among people who are online several times a day or less often than it is among those who are online almost constantly.

There is a particularly large divide in Greece, where about half of those online less often (52%) are more concerned than excited about AI, while 20% of those who are online almost constantly feel this way. (In several countries, people who are online less often were less likely to provide a response.)

Views by AI awareness

In many countries, people who have heard a lot about AI are more likely to be *mainly excited* about the technology. For example, 39% of South Koreans who have heard a lot about AI are more excited than concerned about its increased use, compared with 19% among those who have heard a little. (In a few countries, people who are less aware of AI were less likely to offer a response.)

3. Trust in own country to regulate use of AI

Key findings

- Across 25 countries surveyed, a median of 55% of adults have at least some trust in their nation's ability to regulate AI, while 32% do not.
- About nine-in-ten adults in India (89%) trust their country to regulate AI – the highest share in the survey. This includes 71% who have a lot of trust.
- About two-thirds or more in Indonesia, Israel, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia and South Africa trust their nation to regulate AI.
- Trust is lowest among Greeks: 22% trust their country to regulate AI.

Many around the world trust their own country's ability to regulate the use of AI effectively

% who have ___ in their country to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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By views of AI

In 19 countries, people who are more excited than concerned about the increased use of AI in daily life are more likely to trust their nation to regulate the technology effectively, compared with those who are more concerned than excited.

In Greece, for example, people who are mainly excited about AI are 35 percentage points more likely than those who are mainly concerned to trust their country to effectively regulate AI use.

By support for governing party

Trust in a country's ability to regulate AI is also related to support for its governing party or parties.

Across most of the countries polled, supporters of the governing party are more likely than nonsupporters to trust that their nation can regulate AI effectively. (In a handful of these countries, people who do not support the governing party were less likely to provide a response.)

People who are excited about AI are more trusting in their country's ability to regulate its use effectively

*% who have **a lot of/some** trust in their country to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively, among those who say they are ___ about the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life*



Note: Only statistically significant differences are shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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(Read Appendix B for more information on how we categorize political parties.)

4. Trust in the EU, U.S. and China to regulate use of AI

Key findings

- Across 25 countries surveyed, a median of 53% of adults trust the European Union to regulate AI effectively, while 34% do not.
- A median of 54% across the nine EU member nations surveyed trust the organization to regulate AI, while 48% across the non-EU countries surveyed say the same.
- A median of 37% trust the U.S. to regulate AI effectively, while 48% do not.
- A median of 27% trust in China to regulate AI effectively, while 60% do not.

Trust varies by several factors. For example, people who hold favorable views of the EU, the U.S. and China are more likely to trust they can regulate AI effectively. And people who are more excited than concerned about the increased use of AI also tend to have more trust in these actors to regulate it.

Trust in the EU, U.S., China and own country to regulate AI varies across 25 nations

*% who have **a lot of/some** trust in each of the following to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively*



Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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Younger adults tend to express higher levels of trust in China – and, to a lesser extent, in the U.S. – to regulate AI when compared with older adults.

Trust in the EU to regulate use of AI

Across the 25 countries surveyed, a median of 53% of adults trust the EU to regulate AI use, while a median of 34% do not.

Trust in the EU varies widely among member nations. Adults in Germany and Netherlands are the most trusting: Around seven-in-ten express some or a lot of trust in the EU to regulate AI effectively. In Greece and Italy, by comparison, only around four-in-ten share this view.

Views vary in nonmember nations as well. Majorities of adults in Nigeria, Australia, Indonesia, Kenya and Canada trust the EU to regulate AI effectively. By contrast, roughly a third or fewer in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil say the same.

In the U.S., 43% trust the EU on AI regulation and 40% do not.

Many trust the EU to regulate AI effectively

% who have ___ in the EU to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
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By opinion of the EU

In nearly all countries surveyed, people with a favorable view of the EU are more likely than those with an unfavorable view to trust the organization on AI regulation. In Poland, for example, 61% of adults with a favorable view of the EU trust it to regulate AI, compared with just 17% of those who have an unfavorable view of the EU.

By ideology

In some countries, people on the ideological right are less likely than those on the left to trust the EU to regulate AI. One of the largest ideological gaps is in the Netherlands, where 85% of those on the left trust the EU on this matter, compared with 61% on the right.

By support of right-wing populist parties

In Europe, people with a favorable opinion of some right-wing populist parties are less likely to trust the EU to effectively regulate AI. For example, 43% of Alternative for Germany (AfD) supporters trust the EU on this matter, compared with 78% of nonsupporters. (Read Appendix A for more information on how we classify populist parties.)

In Europe, supporters of right-wing populist parties tend to have less confidence in the EU to regulate AI

*% who have **a lot of/some** trust in the EU to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively, by right-wing populist party favorability*



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant. We classify populist parties using three external measures and define a party as populist when at least two of these sources classify it as such. Read Appendix A for more information.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
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By views of AI

People who are more excited than concerned about the growing use of AI in daily life are generally more likely to trust the EU to regulate the technology effectively, compared with those who are more concerned than excited. In Greece, for example, 62% of those who are mainly excited about AI trust the EU to regulate it, compared with 30% of those who are mainly concerned.

By education

In 19 countries, adults with more education are more likely than those with less education to trust the EU to regulate AI. In the UK, for instance, 67% of people with a postsecondary education have at least some trust in the EU to regulate AI, compared with 49% of those with less education.

Trust in the U.S. to regulate use of AI

Across the 25 countries surveyed, a median of 37% of adults trust the U.S. to regulate the use of AI effectively, while a median of 48% do not.

People in Nigeria, Israel, India and Kenya stand out for their relatively trusting views, with six-in-ten adults or more reporting some or a lot of trust in the U.S. to regulate AI effectively. Half or more in South Korea, Hungary, Indonesia and South Africa also trust the U.S. to regulate AI effectively.

Americans themselves are split: 44% trust their country to regulate AI, while 47% do not. This partially reflects a partisan division, with Republicans and Republican-leaning independents more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to express a high level of trust (54% vs. 36%).

In the other 14 countries surveyed – including most of those in Europe – people broadly distrust the U.S. to regulate AI effectively.

Trust in U.S. to regulate AI varies across 25 countries

% who have ___ in the U.S. to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
"How People Around the World View AI"

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By opinion of the U.S.

In every non-U.S. country surveyed, people with a favorable view of the U.S. are more likely than those with an unfavorable view to trust it on AI regulation. For example, in Turkey, 57% of those with a favorable view of the U.S. trust it to regulate the technology, compared with just 12% of those with an unfavorable view.

By views of AI

In 19 countries, people who are more excited than concerned about the increased use of AI in daily life are more likely to trust the U.S. to regulate it, compared with those who are more concerned than excited. In Brazil, for example, 58% of those who are mainly excited about increased AI use trust the U.S. to regulate it effectively, compared with 30% of those who are mainly concerned.

A similar pattern appears when respondents are asked about China, the EU and their own country: Those who are mostly excited about AI are generally more trusting about regulation.

By ideology

In 15 countries, people who place themselves on the ideological right express more trust in the U.S. to regulate AI effectively than those on the left.

This pattern appears in eight of the 10 European countries surveyed, with Spain showing one of the largest gaps (45% vs. 21%).

Outside of Europe, ideological divides emerge in eight countries. In Australia, for example, 53% of those on the right trust the U.S. to regulate AI, compared with 15% of those on the left. (For more on how we measure ideology in our cross-national surveys, read the report methodology.)

Adults on the right more trusting of U.S. to regulate AI

*% who have **a lot of/some** trust in the U.S. to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively, by ideology*



Note: Only statistically significant differences are shown. In the U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
"How People Around the World View AI"

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By support of right-wing populist parties

People who support right-wing populist parties in Europe are generally more trusting of the U.S. to regulate AI, compared with nonsupporters.

There are gaps on this question between supporters and nonsupporters of AfD in Germany, Brothers of Italy and Forza Italia, Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary, Greek Solution, Law and Justice in Poland, National Rally in France, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Reform UK, and Vox in Spain.

By age

In 10 countries, adults ages 18 to 34 are more likely than those ages 50 and older to trust the U.S. to regulate AI. For example, 82% of young Nigerians trust the U.S. on this issue, compared with 65% of older Nigerians.

Trust in China to regulate use of AI

There is relatively little trust in China to effectively regulate AI across the 25 countries surveyed. A median of 27% trust China to regulate the technology, while a median of 60% do not.

People in Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are more likely than not to trust in China's handling of AI regulation. Adults in Indonesia also express more trust than distrust.

Elsewhere, views are much less trusting. Aside from Hungary and Italy, majorities of adults in all the European countries surveyed express little or no trust in China's ability to regulate AI.

Americans are among the least trusting: Just 13% trust China to regulate AI effectively, while 76% do not. And only 7% of Japanese adults trust China to regulate AI.

Majorities in many countries don't trust China to regulate AI

% who have ___ in China to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
"How People Around the World View AI"

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By opinion of China

Across all 25 countries surveyed, people who hold a favorable view of China are more likely to express trust in the country's ability to effectively regulate AI, compared with people who have an unfavorable view. In Turkey, for example, 55% of adults with a favorable opinion of China trust it on AI regulation, compared with 21% of those with an unfavorable opinion.

By views of AI

In 15 countries, people who are more excited than concerned about the growing use of AI in daily life tend to be more trusting of China to regulate the technology, compared with those who are more concerned than excited. In Mexico, for instance, 56% of those who are mainly excited about AI trust China on this matter, compared with 32% among those who are mainly concerned.

By age

In 19 countries surveyed, adults under 35 are somewhat more trusting than those ages 50 and older on China's ability to regulate AI. One of the larger age gaps is in Spain, where 54% of younger adults trust China on this issue, compared with 21% of older adults.

In several of these countries, adults ages 50 and older are more likely than those under 35 to say they are unsure if they trust China to regulate AI.

Beyond AI regulation, the survey also shows that, in most countries, younger people have more favorable views of China in general than older people.

Younger adults are more trusting than older adults of China's ability to regulate AI

*% who have **a lot of/some** trust in China to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively, by age*



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
Source: Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey.
"How People Around the World View AI"

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Appendix A: Classifying European political parties

Classifying parties as populist

Although experts generally agree that populist political leaders or parties display high levels of anti-elitism, definitions of populism vary. We use three measures to classify populist parties: anti-elite ratings from the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), Norris' Global Party Survey and The PopuList. We define a party as populist when at least two of these three measures classify it as such.

CHES, which was conducted from February to May 2020, asked 421 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration to evaluate the 2019 positions of 277 European political parties across all European Union member states. CHES results are regularly used by academics to classify parties with regard to their left-right ideological leanings, their key party platform positions and their degree of populism, among other things.

We measure anti-elitism using an average of two variables in the CHES data. First, we used "PEOPLE_VS_ELITE," which asked the experts to measure the parties with regard to their position on direct versus representative democracy, where 0 means that the parties support elected officeholders making the most important decisions and 10 means that "the people," not politicians, should make the most important decisions. Second, we used "ANTIELITE_SALIENCE," which is a measure of the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for that particular party, with 0 meaning not at all salient and 10 meaning extremely salient. The average of these two measures is shown in the table below as "anti-elitism." In all countries, we consider parties that score at or above a 7.0 as "populist."

The Global Party Survey, which was conducted from November to December 2019, asked 1,861 experts on political parties, public opinion, elections and legislative behavior to evaluate the ideological values, issue position and populist rhetoric of parties in countries on which they are an expert, classifying a total of 1,051 parties in 163 countries. We used "TYPE_POPULISM," which categorizes populist rhetoric by parties. We added only "strongly populist" parties using this measure. In Italy, experts were asked to categorize the entire center-right coalition instead of individual parties within the coalition. The coalition includes Lega, Forza Italia and Brothers of Italy. For all three parties, we applied the coalition rating of "strongly populist."

The PopuList is an ongoing project to classify European political parties as populist, far right, far left and/or euroskeptic. The project specifically looks at parties that have "been represented in their country's national parliament at least once" since 1989. It is based on collaboration between

academic experts and journalists. The PopuList classifies parties that emphasize the will of the people against the elite as populist.[1] This appendix uses The PopuList 3.0.

Classifying parties as left, right or center

We can further classify these traditional and populist parties into three groups: left, right and center. When classifying parties based on ideology, we relied on the variable "LRGEN" in the CHES dataset, which asked experts to rate the positions of each party in terms of its overall ideological stance, with 0 meaning extreme left, 5 meaning center and 10 meaning extreme right. We define left parties as those that score below 4.5 and right parties as those above 5.5. Center parties have ratings between 4.5 and 5.5.

[1] Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The Populist Zeitgeist." Government and Opposition.

European populist party classifications

Party	Country	2019 Left-right	2019 Anti-elitism	2019 Global Party Survey	2023 PopuList
Populist parties on the left					
La France Insoumise	France	1.3	8.3	Strongly populist	Populist
Podemos	Spain	1.9	7.7	--	Populist
Syriza	Greece	2.3	7.0	--	Populist
Populist parties in the center					
Five Star Movement (M5S)	Italy	4.8	9.2	Strongly populist	Populist
Populist parties on the right					
Forza Italia	Italy	6.9	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
Law and Justice	Poland	7.6	6.9	Strongly populist	Populist
Jobbik	Hungary	7.7	6.1	Strongly populist	Populist
Reform UK*	UK	8.2	5.3	Strongly populist	--
Fidesz	Hungary	8.3	6.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	8.5	7.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Party for Freedom (PVV)	Netherlands	8.7	9.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Lega	Italy	8.8	7.6	Strongly populist	Populist
Greek Solution	Greece	9.0	7.5	--	Populist
Brothers of Italy	Italy	9.1	7.3	Strongly populist	Populist
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Germany	9.2	9.0	Strongly populist	Populist
Vox	Spain	9.7	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
National Rally	France	9.8	8.6	Strongly populist	Populist

* Previously named the Brexit Party.
Note: Left-right indicates the average score CHES experts gave each party on an 11-point left-right scale. Scores for anti-elitism are an average of party position on direct versus representative democracy and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric within the party.
Source: CHES (2019); Global Party Survey (2019); The PopuList (2023).

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Appendix B: Political categorization

For this analysis, we grouped people into two political categories: those who support the governing political party (or parties) in their country, and those who do not. These categories were coded based on the party or parties in power at the time the survey was fielded and on respondents' answers to a question asking which political party, if any, they identify with in their country.[2]

In countries where multiple political parties govern in coalition (as is the case in many European countries), survey respondents who indicate support for any party in the coalition were grouped together. In Germany, for example, where the Social Democratic Party governed with Alliance 90/The Greens at the time of the 2025 survey, supporters of either party were grouped together. In countries where different political parties control the executive and legislative branches of government, the party holding the executive branch was considered the governing party.

Survey respondents who did not indicate support for any political party, or who refused to identify with one, were categorized as *not* supporting the government in power.

The table below outlines the governing political parties in each survey country.

[2] Governing parties were not updated to account for elections that occurred after the survey was fielded and resulted in a new party (or parties) serving in government. Language used to measure party identification varied from country to country.

Political categorization

Country	Governing political party (or parties)
Argentina	La Libertad Avanza/Libertarian Party
Australia	Australian Labor Party (ALP)
Brazil	Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Democratic Labour Party (PDT), Green Party (PV), Labour Party of Brazil (Avante), Social Democratic Party (PSD), Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), Solidarity (SD), Sustainability Network (REDE), Workers' Party (PT)
Canada	Liberal Party
France	Democratic Movement (MoDem), Horizons, Radical Party, Renaissance, The Republicans (LR), Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI)
Germany	Alliance 90/The Greens, Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Greece	New Democracy (ND)
Hungary	Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), Fidesz
India	Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Janata Dal (Secular) (JD(S)), Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), Nationalist Congress Party, Shiv Sena, Telegu Desham Party (TDP)
Indonesia	Democratic Party, Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN), Party of Functional Groups (Golkar)
Israel	Guardians of the Sephardim (Shas), Likud, New Hope, Noam, Religious Zionist Party, United Torah Judaism (Yahadut Ha'tora)
Italy	Brothers of Italy, Forward Italy, Lega, Us Moderates (NM)
Japan	Komeito, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Kenya	Amani National Congress (ANC), Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya (FORD-Kenya), United Democratic Alliance (UDA)
Mexico	Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), Labor Party (PT), National Regeneration Movement (Morena)
Netherlands	Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB), New Social Contract (NSC), Party for Freedom (PVV), People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)
Nigeria	All Progressives Congress (APC)
Poland	Civic Platform (PO), The Greens (PZ), The Left, Modern (Nowoczesna), Poland 2050, Polish Initiative (iPL), Polish People's Party (PSL)
South Africa	African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Freedom Front Plus (FF+/VF+), United Democratic Movement (UDM), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)
South Korea	People Power Party (PPP)
Spain	Catalunya en Comú, Commitment Coalition (Compromís), Movimiento Sumar (SMR), Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), United Left (IU)
Sweden	Christian Democrats, Liberals, Moderate Party
Turkey	Justice and Development Party (AKP)
United Kingdom	Labour Party
United States	Republican Party

Note: Only parties represented in the federal government are shown.

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Methodology

About Pew Research Center's Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on a mix of telephone, face-to-face and online interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup, Langer Research Associates and Social Research Centre. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. Read more about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs.

Some, but not all, of our international analyses and reports use demographic variables or categorizations based on external data. We explain these more below:

Ideology

We analyze respondents' attitudes based on where they place themselves on an ideological scale. We asked about political ideology using several slightly different scales and categorized people as being on the ideological left, center or right.

- In most countries, we asked people to place themselves on a scale ranging from "Extreme left" to "Extreme right." The question was asked this way in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK.

- In Japan and South Korea, ideology was measured on a scale from "Extremely progressive" to "Extremely conservative."

- In the U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).

- Ideology was not asked about in India, Indonesia or Kenya.

Education

To compare educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the United Nations' International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

High- and middle-income countries

Countries are classified as either high or middle income based on categories from the World Bank that rely on per capita gross national income. This is a classification we have used in other

Pew Research Center analyses, including when looking at global views of China, satisfaction with democracy, globalization and national identity.

The American Trends Panel survey Wave 166 methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center's nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted March 24-30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read "About the American Trends Panel."

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.[3] Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.[4] Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an "oversample") to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the

[3] AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."
[4] Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24-30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:[5] Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.[6] Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents, ATP Wave 166

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 24, 2025	March 25, 2025
First reminder	March 27, 2025	March 27, 2025
Final reminder	March 29, 2025	March 29, 2025

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

[5] The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.
[6] Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed) Age x Gender Education x Gender Education x Age Race/Ethnicity x Education Race/Ethnicity x Gender Race/Ethnicity x Age Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans Years lived in the U.S. Census region x Metropolitan status	2023 American Community Survey (ACS)
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2020 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity Party affiliation x Age Party affiliation among registered voters	2024 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 166

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,605	1.9 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,586	2.7 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,909	2.7 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim, and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 166

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,605
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	65
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	25
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	346
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other noninterview	2.30	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	3
Total panelists sampled for the survey		**4,045**
Completed interviews	I	3,605
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	90
Noncontact	NC	346
Other	O	4
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		**4,045**
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		89%

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Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 166

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	73%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 166	35%
Response rate to Wave 166 survey	89%
Cumulative response rate	**3%**

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The American Trends Panel survey Wave 173 methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 173 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center's nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from June 9 to 15, 2025. A total of 5,023 panelists responded out of 5,737 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 88%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 5,023 respondents is plus or minus 1.6 percentage points.

The survey includes an oversample of non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of this smaller demographic subgroup. Oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=4,842) and live telephone (n=181) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read "About the American Trends Panel."

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.[7] Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.[8] Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an "oversample")

[7] AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling."
[8] Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was June 9-15, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:[9] Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on June 9.[10] Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on

[9] The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.
[10] Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

June 9. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on June 10.

Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents, ATP Wave 173

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	June 9, 2025	June 10, 2025
First reminder	June 12, 2025	June 12, 2025
Final reminder	June 14, 2025	June 14, 2025

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on June 6. Soft launch took place on June 9 and involved dialing until a total of seven interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed) Age x Gender Education x Gender Education x Age Race/Ethnicity x Education Race/Ethnicity x Gender Race/Ethnicity x Age Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans Years lived in the U.S. Census region x Metropolitan status	2023 American Community Survey (ACS)
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Frequency of internet use Religious affiliation Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity Party affiliation x Age	2024 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Validated 2024 presidential election turnout and vote choice	Candidate vote share is based on official results from the Federal Election Commission. Turnout is based on estimates from the Election Lab at the University of Florida. The size of the voting-eligible population is based on the 2023 ACS.

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. For weighting to the 2024 presidential election results, panelists are considered validated voters if their self-report of having voted was confirmed after matching to a national voter registry.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 173

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	5,023	1.6 percentage points
Men	2,355	2.4 percentage points
Women	2,621	2.1 percentage points
Ages 18-29	761	4.2 percentage points
30-49	1,785	2.6 percentage points
50-64	1,261	3.1 percentage points
65+	1,196	3.1 percentage points
Postgraduate	887	3.6 percentage points
College graduate	1,213	3.1 percentage points
Some college	1,452	2.9 percentage points
High school or less	1,458	3.0 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. Refer to the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 173

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	5,023
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	117
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	46
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	548
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other noninterview	2.30	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	3
Total panelists sampled for the survey		**5,737**
Completed interviews	I	5,023
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	163
Noncontact	NC	548
Other	O	3
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		**5,737**
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		88%

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Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 173

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	73%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 173	34%
Response rate to Wave 173 survey	88%
Cumulative response rate	**3%**

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Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey
October 15, 2025 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the Methodology section and our international survey methods database.

- Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. The topline "total" columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.

- Not all questions included in the Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports

		Q30. Artificial intelligence, also known as AI, is designed to learn tasks that humans typically do, for instance recognizing speech or pictures. Have you heard or read a lot, a little, or nothing at all about artificial intelligence?				
		A lot	A little	Nothing at all	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	June, 2025	47	48	5	0	100
Canada	Spring, 2025	41	51	8	0	100
France	Spring, 2025	52	40	8	0	100
Germany	Spring, 2025	51	45	4	0	100
Greece	Spring, 2025	34	49	17	1	100
Hungary	Spring, 2025	38	53	8	0	100
Italy	Spring, 2025	45	46	9	0	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2025	46	44	10	0	100
Poland	Spring, 2025	34	53	13	0	100
Spain	Spring, 2025	30	56	14	0	100
Sweden	Spring, 2025	46	45	8	0	100
UK	Spring, 2025	41	49	10	0	100
Australia	Spring, 2025	44	53	3	0	100
India	Spring, 2025	14	32	35	19	100
Indonesia	Spring, 2025	18	36	43	3	100
Japan	Spring, 2025	53	36	11	0	100
South Korea	Spring, 2025	21	57	21	1	100
Israel	Spring, 2025	36	44	18	2	100
Turkey	Spring, 2025	19	50	25	7	100
Kenya	Spring, 2025	12	36	49	4	100
Nigeria	Spring, 2025	17	44	32	6	100
South Africa	Spring, 2025	30	31	34	6	100
Argentina	Spring, 2025	24	48	28	0	100
Brazil	Spring, 2025	22	47	30	1	100
Mexico	Spring, 2025	19	53	27	1	100

		Q31. Overall, how would you say the increased use of artificial intelligence in daily life makes you feel?				
		More excited than concerned	More concerned than excited	Equally concerned and excited	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	June, 2025	10	50	38	1	100
Canada	Spring, 2025	9	45	45	1	100
France	Spring, 2025	15	35	49	2	100
Germany	Spring, 2025	17	29	53	1	100
Greece	Spring, 2025	10	47	39	3	100
Hungary	Spring, 2025	18	33	47	2	100
Italy	Spring, 2025	12	50	37	2	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2025	16	34	48	1	100
Poland	Spring, 2025	15	37	42	6	100
Spain	Spring, 2025	19	39	38	3	100
Sweden	Spring, 2025	22	31	45	2	100
UK	Spring, 2025	13	39	46	2	100
Australia	Spring, 2025	13	49	38	0	100
India	Spring, 2025	16	19	39	26	100
Indonesia	Spring, 2025	14	32	49	5	100
Japan	Spring, 2025	16	28	55	1	100
South Korea	Spring, 2025	22	16	61	1	100
Israel	Spring, 2025	29	21	34	16	100
Turkey	Spring, 2025	19	26	35	20	100
Kenya	Spring, 2025	17	31	43	10	100
Nigeria	Spring, 2025	20	24	36	20	100
South Africa	Spring, 2025	18	30	42	10	100
Argentina	Spring, 2025	13	39	41	6	100
Brazil	Spring, 2025	10	48	37	5	100
Mexico	Spring, 2025	13	35	47	6	100

		Q32a. How much trust do you have in each of the following countries and organizations to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively – a lot of trust, some trust, not too much trust, no trust at all or are you not sure? a. The United States								
		TOTAL A lot of/Some trust	TOTAL Not too much/No trust	A lot of trust	Some trust	Not too much trust	No trust at all	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	March, 2025	44	47	8	37	32	15	9	0	100
Canada	Spring, 2025	33	56	6	27	24	32	10	1	100
France	Spring, 2025	21	71	6	15	31	39	7	1	100
Germany	Spring, 2025	33	56	6	26	29	28	11	0	100
Greece	Spring, 2025	37	58	10	28	29	29	4	0	100
Hungary	Spring, 2025	56	32	12	43	21	12	11	1	100
Italy	Spring, 2025	32	52	19	14	37	15	15	0	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2025	35	56	6	30	26	30	9	0	100
Poland	Spring, 2025	37	52	6	31	33	19	11	1	100
Spain	Spring, 2025	34	56	12	22	24	31	10	1	100
Sweden	Spring, 2025	25	58	3	22	37	21	16	1	100
UK	Spring, 2025	37	48	8	30	26	22	14	0	100
Australia	Spring, 2025	30	67	3	26	32	35	3	0	100
India	Spring, 2025	64	17	24	40	6	12	11	8	100
Indonesia	Spring, 2025	54	33	15	39	23	10	12	1	100
Japan	Spring, 2025	41	32	4	37	27	5	27	0	100
South Korea	Spring, 2025	58	26	13	44	21	5	16	0	100
Israel	Spring, 2025	70	22	39	31	15	7	7	1	100
Turkey	Spring, 2025	23	66	8	15	24	42	9	2	100
Kenya	Spring, 2025	62	18	19	43	10	9	19	1	100
Nigeria	Spring, 2025	79	11	47	32	7	4	8	2	100
South Africa	Spring, 2025	50	35	19	30	16	19	15	0	100
Argentina	Spring, 2025	35	41	19	16	21	20	24	1	100
Brazil	Spring, 2025	35	45	17	18	28	16	18	2	100
Mexico	Spring, 2025	24	60	5	19	33	28	14	1	100

		Q32b. How much trust do you have in each of the following countries and organizations to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively – a lot of trust, some trust, not too much trust, no trust at all or are you not sure? b. China								
		TOTAL A lot of/Some trust	TOTAL Not too much/No trust	A lot of trust	Some trust	Not too much trust	No trust at all	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	March, 2025	13	76	2	11	26	49	11	0	100
Canada	Spring, 2025	17	70	4	12	23	47	13	1	100
France	Spring, 2025	17	74	6	11	29	45	8	1	100
Germany	Spring, 2025	23	65	4	19	28	37	12	0	100
Greece	Spring, 2025	34	60	10	25	30	30	5	0	100
Hungary	Spring, 2025	43	46	12	31	20	26	10	1	100
Italy	Spring, 2025	33	50	23	10	34	16	17	0	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2025	25	65	6	18	25	40	10	0	100
Poland	Spring, 2025	13	75	3	10	34	41	12	1	100
Spain	Spring, 2025	31	55	12	19	21	34	13	0	100
Sweden	Spring, 2025	15	65	4	11	31	34	19	1	100
UK	Spring, 2025	24	62	7	17	25	36	15	0	100
Australia	Spring, 2025	15	82	2	13	31	51	3	0	100
India	Spring, 2025	27	51	8	19	10	41	14	8	100
Indonesia	Spring, 2025	64	24	20	44	19	5	11	1	100
Japan	Spring, 2025	7	73	0	7	34	39	20	0	100
South Korea	Spring, 2025	21	62	6	15	33	29	17	0	100
Israel	Spring, 2025	22	67	11	11	20	47	10	1	100
Turkey	Spring, 2025	32	52	8	24	24	28	14	2	100
Kenya	Spring, 2025	61	19	19	42	8	11	19	1	100
Nigeria	Spring, 2025	79	11	44	35	8	3	7	3	100
South Africa	Spring, 2025	57	29	30	27	14	14	14	0	100
Argentina	Spring, 2025	39	37	25	14	18	18	24	0	100
Brazil	Spring, 2025	32	46	16	16	26	19	21	2	100
Mexico	Spring, 2025	38	44	14	24	29	15	17	1	100

		Q32c. How much trust do you have in each of the following countries and organizations to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively – a lot of trust, some trust, not too much trust, no trust at all or are you not sure? c. The European Union								
		TOTAL A lot of/Some trust	TOTAL Not too much/No trust	A lot of trust	Some trust	Not too much trust	No trust at all	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	March, 2025	43	40	6	36	25	15	16	0	100
Canada	Spring, 2025	57	24	16	41	13	11	18	1	100
France	Spring, 2025	47	46	14	32	29	17	7	0	100
Germany	Spring, 2025	71	21	22	48	12	9	8	0	100
Greece	Spring, 2025	38	58	7	31	37	21	4	0	100
Hungary	Spring, 2025	56	34	14	42	20	15	9	1	100
Italy	Spring, 2025	42	42	20	22	34	8	15	0	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2025	68	23	20	48	13	9	9	0	100
Poland	Spring, 2025	44	45	8	36	31	14	10	1	100
Spain	Spring, 2025	61	29	23	38	16	12	10	0	100
Sweden	Spring, 2025	54	27	9	45	20	7	18	0	100
UK	Spring, 2025	56	28	12	45	17	11	16	0	100
Australia	Spring, 2025	59	35	12	47	23	12	6	0	100
India	Spring, 2025	44	25	9	35	8	17	17	14	100
Indonesia	Spring, 2025	58	27	12	46	23	4	13	2	100
Japan	Spring, 2025	43	21	6	37	17	4	37	0	100
South Korea	Spring, 2025	53	24	8	45	20	3	24	0	100
Israel	Spring, 2025	54	35	21	32	25	10	10	1	100
Turkey	Spring, 2025	36	49	10	26	27	22	13	2	100
Kenya	Spring, 2025	58	19	16	43	10	9	22	1	100
Nigeria	Spring, 2025	72	13	35	37	9	4	12	3	100
South Africa	Spring, 2025	42	36	11	31	16	21	20	1	100
Argentina	Spring, 2025	31	35	12	19	20	15	34	0	100
Brazil	Spring, 2025	26	48	9	17	29	19	24	2	100
Mexico	Spring, 2025	35	41	7	27	28	13	21	4	100

		Q32d. How much trust do you have in each of the following countries and organizations to regulate the use of artificial intelligence effectively – a lot of trust, some trust, not too much trust, no trust at all or are you not sure? d. (survey country)								
		TOTAL A lot of/Some trust	TOTAL Not too much/No trust	A lot of trust	Some trust	Not too much trust	No trust at all	Not sure	Refused	Total
U.S.	March, 2025	44	47	8	37	32	15	9	0	100
Canada	Spring, 2025	64	23	18	45	14	9	13	1	100
France	Spring, 2025	47	45	17	30	31	13	8	1	100
Germany	Spring, 2025	70	20	22	48	14	6	10	0	100
Greece	Spring, 2025	22	73	4	18	40	33	5	0	100
Hungary	Spring, 2025	56	33	14	42	18	15	10	0	100
Italy	Spring, 2025	37	48	16	21	37	11	15	0	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2025	68	21	20	48	12	8	11	0	100
Poland	Spring, 2025	53	34	9	43	24	10	12	1	100
Spain	Spring, 2025	55	35	19	36	19	16	10	0	100
Sweden	Spring, 2025	55	29	11	43	23	6	16	0	100
UK	Spring, 2025	57	30	12	44	20	10	13	0	100
Australia	Spring, 2025	65	32	14	51	24	8	3	0	100
India	Spring, 2025	89	4	71	19	2	2	3	3	100
Indonesia	Spring, 2025	74	16	28	46	13	3	10	0	100
Japan	Spring, 2025	41	39	7	34	32	7	21	0	100
South Korea	Spring, 2025	55	29	11	44	25	4	15	0	100
Israel	Spring, 2025	72	19	39	33	15	5	7	2	100
Turkey	Spring, 2025	60	27	29	30	18	9	12	1	100
Kenya	Spring, 2025	54	28	17	37	13	14	18	0	100
Nigeria	Spring, 2025	46	37	17	30	20	17	15	2	100
South Africa	Spring, 2025	64	24	30	34	14	10	12	0	100
Argentina	Spring, 2025	33	43	13	20	29	14	23	0	100
Brazil	Spring, 2025	36	45	16	20	31	14	19	1	100
Mexico	Spring, 2025	50	37	19	31	30	8	12	1	100