Executive Summary

By all accounts, pentecostalism and related charismatic movements represent one of the fastest-growing segments of global Christianity. According to the World Christian Database, at least a quarter of the world’s 2 billion Christians are thought to be members of these lively, highly personal faiths, which emphasize such spiritually renewing “gifts of the Holy Spirit” as speaking in tongues, divine healing and prophesying.

Even more than other Christians, pentecostals and other renewalists believe that God, acting through the Holy Spirit, continues to play a direct, active role in everyday life.

Despite the rapid growth of the renewalist movement in the last few decades, there are few quantitative studies on the religious, political and civic views of individuals involved in these groups.

To address this shortcoming, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, with generous support from the Templeton Foundation, recently conducted surveys in 10 countries with sizeable renewalist populations: the United States; Brazil, Chile and Guatemala in Latin America; Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; and India, the Philippines and South Korea in Asia. In each country, surveys were conducted among a random sample of the public at large, as well as among oversamples of pentecostals and charismatics.

In this report, the term pentecostal is used to describe individuals who belong to classical pentecostal denominations, such as the Assemblies of God or the Church of God in Christ, that were founded shortly after the famous Azusa Street Revival in the early 20th century, as well as those who belong to pentecostal denominations or churches that have formed more recently, such as the Brazil-based Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.

Charismatics, by contrast, are a much more loosely defined group. The term generally refers to Christians who have experienced the “in-filling” of the Holy Spirit but who are not members of pentecostal denominations. Indeed, most charismatics are members of mainstream Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox denominations. In the surveys, respondents were categorized as charismatic if they met one of three criteria: (1) they describe themselves as “charismatic Christians”; or (2) they describe themselves as “pentecostal Christians” but do not belong to pentecostal denominations; or (3) they say they speak in tongues at least several times a year but they do not belong to pentecostal denominations.

“Renewalist” is used as an umbrella term throughout the report to refer to pentecostals and charismatics as a group.

How Many Renewalists?

The surveys find that the size and composition of the renewalist population varies substantially from country to country, ranging from a low of 5% in the areas of India surveyed to a high of 60% in Guatemala. In every nation surveyed except India, at least 10% of the population can be described as renewalist; in three countries (Brazil, Guatemala and Kenya) membership in the renewalist movement approaches or exceeds 50%. In two countries (Kenya and Nigeria), pentecostals outnumber charismatics. In every other country, by contrast, the renewalist movement is primarily charismatic in character, with charismatics outnumbering pentecostals by a margin of at least twoto-one. Pentecostals are more concentrated in Latin America and Africa (where they range from 9% of the population in Chile to 33% in Kenya) than they are in the United States or Asia (where they range from 1% of the population in the areas of India surveyed to 5% in the U.S.).

The largest charismatic populations are in Brazil (34% of the population), Guatemala (40%) and the Philippines (40%). In several other countries, including the U.S., Chile, Kenya and South Africa, approximately one-in-five people are charismatic. Taken together, these findings confirm that members of renewalist movements can be found in sizeable numbers throughout the world.

In six of the 10 countries, the surveys find that renewalists account for a majority of the overall Protestant population. Indeed, in five nations (Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Kenya and the Philippines) more than two-thirds of Protestants are either pentecostal or charismatic. In Nigeria, renewalists account for six-in-ten Protestants.

Renewalist Distinctives

The surveys find that there are certain religious experiences and practices that differentiate pentecostals, and, to a lesser degree, charismatics, from other Christians. In seven of the 10 countries surveyed, for instance, at least half of pentecostals say that the church services they attend frequently include people practicing the gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as speaking in tongues, prophesying or praying for miraculous healing. These types of services are less common, but still relatively prevalent, among charismatics. By contrast, in most of the countries surveyed, only small numbers of non-renewalist Christians report attending religious services where these sorts of religious experiences occur.

While many renewalists say they attend religious services where speaking in tongues is a common practice, fewer tend to say that they themselves regularly speak or pray in tongues. In fact, in six of the 10 countries surveyed, more than four-in-ten pentecostals say they never speak or pray in tongues.

In all 10 countries surveyed, large majorities of pentecostals (ranging from 56% in South Korea to 87% in Kenya) say that they have personally experienced or witnessed the divine healing of an illness or injury. In eight of the countries (India and South Korea are the exceptions) majorities of pentecostals say that they have received a direct revelation from God.

Pentecostals around the world also are quite familiar with exorcisms; majorities in seven of the 10 countries say that they personally have experienced or witnessed the devil or evil spirits being driven out of a person. Generally, fewer charismatics, and even fewer other Christians, report witnessing these types of experiences.

Intensity of Belief

In addition to their distinctive religious experiences, renewalists also stand out for the intensity of their belief in traditional Christian doctrines and practices. For instance, in eight of the 10 countries surveyed (all except the U.S. and Chile), majorities of nonrenewalist Christians believe that the Bible is the word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word; but this view is even more common among pentecostals than among non-renewalist Christians. Similarly, large majorities of all Christians, renewalists and nonrenewalists alike, believe that miracles still occur today as in ancient times. But this belief tends to be even more intense among pentecostals and, to a lesser extent, charismatics than among nonrenewalist Christians.

Pentecostals also stand out, especially compared with nonrenewalist Christians, for their views on eschatology, or “the end times.” In six countries, at least half of pentecostals believe that Jesus will return to earth during their lifetime. And the vast majority of pentecostals (more than 80% in each country) believe in “the rapture of the Church,” the teaching that before the world comes to an end the faithful will be rescued and taken up to heaven. This belief is less common (though still widely shared) among charismatics, who in turn tend to express higher levels of belief in the rapture than do other Christians.

Pentecostals also make a concerted effort to share their faith with non-believers. In eight of the 10 countries surveyed, majorities of pentecostals say they share their faith with non-believers at least once a week. And relatively few pentecostals say this is something they never do. Charismatics tend to be somewhat less likely than pentecostals to share their faith on a weekly basis.

Pentecostals’ frequent attempts to spread the faith are consistent with their widespread belief that faith in Jesus Christ represents the exclusive path to eternal salvation; in every country surveyed except South Korea, at least 70% of pentecostals completely agree that belief in Jesus is the only way to be saved from eternal damnation.

Renewalists and Politics

Renewalist Christians’ strong focus on the supernatural has led to the widespread perception that the movement is largely apolitical in outlook. Although renewalists are focused on spiritual matters, many also say there is a role for religion in politics and public life. In nine of the 10 countries surveyed, for instance, at least half of pentecostals say that religious groups should express their views on day-to-day social and political questions; support for this position is equally widespread among charismatics. In every country surveyed, furthermore, renewalists are at least as likely as others to express this view.

Majorities of renewalists in every country surveyed say that it is important to them that their political leaders have strong Christian beliefs. In six of the 10 countries, at least three-quarters of pentecostals share this view; in the other four countries, at least two-thirds of pentecostals agree with this position. Charismatics, as well, share the conviction that political leaders should have strong Christian beliefs.

In seven of the 10 countries surveyed, majorities or pluralities of pentecostals say there should be a separation between church and state. But in each of these countries, sizeable minorities of pentecostals say that their government should take special steps to make their country a Christian country. And in three countries, including the U.S., pentecostals who favor separation of church and state are at least slightly outnumbered by pentecostals who say that the government should take special steps to make their nation a Christian country.

Regionally, support for this position is particularly strong among pentecostals in Africa, where 48% of Kenyan pentecostals. 58% of Nigerian pentecostals and 45% of South African pentecostals say the government should take steps to make their nation a Christian nation. In every country, fewer than half of charismatics express support for the idea that their government should take steps to make their country a Christian nation.

In many of the 10 countries surveyed, large majorities of the general population hold quite conservative positions on several social and moral issues. But even in these generally conservative countries, pentecostals often stand out for their traditional views on a wide range of social and moral issues, from homosexuality to extra-marital sex to alcohol consumption. Majorities of pentecostals in nine countries (all except the U.S.), for example, say that drinking alcohol can never be justified. In six of the 10 countries, majorities of pentecostals say the same thing about divorce.

In most of the countries surveyed (all except the U.S. and South Korea), large majorities of the general population say that abortion can never be justified, and renewalists tend to share this view. The percentage of pentecostals who say that abortion can never be justified ranges from 64% in the U.S. to 97% in the Philippines. Similarly, the percentage of charismatics who say that abortion is never justified ranges from 57% in the U.S. to 96% in the Philippines.

Renewalists in the U.S.

The patterns of religious belief and practice that set renewalists apart from other Christians around the world also apply to pentecostals and charismatics in the United States. In the U.S., for instance, roughly two-thirds of pentecostals and charismatics report attending church at least weekly, compared with less than half for the population as a whole. And the religious services attended by U.S. renewalists tend to be quite different from the ones attended by others; more than half of U.S. pentecostals who report attending church say that the services they attend frequently include people speaking in tongues and manifesting other signs of the Spirit; the same is true for roughly three-in-ten charismatic church attenders in the U.S. Other U.S. Christians are much less familiar with this type of church service.

U.S. renewalists, like renewalists around the world, also often stand out for their moral conservatism. Eight-in-ten U.S. pentecostals say that homosexuality is never justified, for instance, and nearly six-in-ten charismatics share this view. Among the public as a whole, by contrast, roughly half say homosexuality can never be justified. Renewalists in the U.S. also are more likely than others to oppose drinking alcohol.

And just as renewalists around the world favor a role for religion in public life, the same holds true for renewalists in the U.S. For instance, nearly eight-in-ten American pentecostals (79%) say that religious groups should express their views on day-to-day social and political questions, compared with 61% of the public as a whole. And more than half (52%) of American pentecostals say that the government should take special steps to make the U.S. a Christian country, compared with only 25% among Christians overall.

Other Findings

In addition to these results, the 10-nation survey also finds:

• In most countries, pentecostals tend to be somewhat more hopeful than nonrenewalist Christians about their future financial prospects.
• Pentecostals are divided on the question of whether or not AIDS is a punishment from God; majorities in three of the countries surveyed (Guatemala, Kenya and South Korea) believe that AIDS is a punishment from God for immoral sexual behavior, but majorities of pentecostals in five other countries explicitly reject this point of view.
• In most countries, pentecostals are somewhat more likely than nonrenewalist Christians to sympathize more with Israel than with the Palestinians.
• Pentecostals in six of the countries surveyed are more willing than the public overall to allow women to serve as pastors or church leaders. This pattern, however, does not generally extend to other gender issues, where there is no consistent pattern differentiating pentecostals from others.
• Majorities of pentecostals in all 10 countries surveyed agree that God will grant good health and relief from sickness to believers who have enough faith, and in nine of the countries most pentecostals say that God will grant material prosperity to all believers who have enough faith.
• Opinions about the U.S.-led war on terror vary substantially from country to country. In South Korea, for instance, only 16% of pentecostals and 10% of charismatics say they favor U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism. In the U.S. and the Philippines, by contrast, at least seven-in-ten pentecostals (and nearly as many U.S. and Filipino charismatics) support U.S. efforts to fight terrorism.

Roadmap to the Report

These and many more findings are presented and discussed in more detail below. This report is divided into four main sections. Section I describes the religious experiences and beliefs of renewalists. The moral values and social attitudes of renewalists are presented and analyzed in Section II. Section III reports on their personal and social outlooks. Finally, Section IV describes the political views of renewalists, comparing them with the views held by other Christians in each of the 10 countries surveyed.

When the day of Pentecost came, they were all together in one place. Suddenly a sound like the blowing of a violent wind came from heaven and filled the whole house where they were sitting….All of them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other tongues as the Spirit enabled them….’In the last days, God says, I will pour out my Spirit on all people. Your sons and daughters will prophesy, your young men will see visions, your old men will dream dreams. Even on my servants, both men and women, I will pour out my Spirit in those days, and they will prophesy.’ Acts 2:1-2, 4, 17-18 (NIV)

by Luis Lugo Director, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life

Religion, in ways both obvious and subtle, is reshaping the world’s social and political landscape. Despite predictions of religion’s demise, since the late 1970s we have been witnessing the growing power of religion in shaping people’s public identity. Talk of “secularization” and of a “post-religious” society has given way to a renewed recognition of religion’s influence in people’s social and political lives. This re-emergence of “public religion” is happening throughout the world and across religious traditions – from Islam and Hinduism to Buddhism and Judaism. Christianity, the world’s largest religion, is no exception.

Within Christianity, pentecostal and related renewalist or Spirit-filled movements are by all accounts among the fastest growing. The major strands of pentecostalism now represent at least one quarter of all Christians, according to the World Christian Database, ranking second only to Catholicism in the number of followers. In direct and indirect ways, pentecostal beliefs and practices are remaking the face of world Christianity. In Latin America, for example, pentecostals now account for approximately three-in-four Protestants.

Despite the large and growing influence of the pentecostal movement, there is relatively little research available that gauges its influence on global public life. To help gain a better understanding of the nature and dynamics of global pentecostalism and related renewalist movements, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life has conducted a pathbreaking, cross-national survey of the views of pentecostal publics on a range of political, social and economic issues, as well as their religious beliefs and practices.With generous support from the John Templeton Foundation, the Forum conducted surveys in the United States and nine countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America with sizable renewalist populations: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, India, the Philippines and South Korea. The results of the surveys begin to paint a rich portrait of the views of adherents in these renewalist movements.

Pentecostals take their name from the biblical feast of Pentecost (in Judaism, the harvest festival of Shavuot), which took place 50 days after Passover. Early followers of Jesus who had gathered for the festival, as described in the New Testament Book of Acts, were said to be “filled with the Holy Spirit” and able to “speak in other tongues.” Although closely resembling evangelical Protestants in many of their doctrinal beliefs, pentecostals part ways with their evangelical cousins by strongly affirming that such practices as speaking in tongues, prophesying, divine healing and other miraculous signs of the Spirit are as valid today as they were in the early church.

This diverse and dynamic branch of Christianity is difficult for even religious scholars to describe.Most agree, however, that it includes two major groups: pentecostals and charismatics. Together, they are sometimes referred to as “renewalists” because of their common belief in the spiritually renewing gifts of the Holy Spirit. Pentecostals belong either to one of the historical pentecostal denominations, such as the Assemblies of God and the Church of God in Christ, that have their roots in the American religious revivals of the early 20th century, or to newer, largely independent indigenous churches. These newer churches, sometimes labeled “neopentecostal” or “neo-charismatic,” number in the tens of thousands and are especially prevalent in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Charismatics share many of the experiences that are distinctive to pentecostalism but remain members of mainstream Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox denominations. This movement, sometimes referred to as “second wave” pentecostalism, emerged in significant numbers in the 1960s as part of what its members considered to be a much-needed spiritual renewal within these older churches.

The roots of the modern pentecostal movement are in the American Midwest. In 1901, Charles Parham, the leader of a Bible school in Topeka, Kan., came to believe that the speaking in tongues that he observed there occurred as the direct result of the working of the Holy Spirit. He then spread that theological message during travels through Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas. In 1905, William Seymore, an African-American preacher who heard him speak, was soon himself preaching about the baptism of the Spirit and the gift of tongues at a revival meeting on Los Angeles’ Azusa Street.

“Breathing strange utterances,” the Los Angeles Daily Times reported on its front page of April 18, 1906, “and mouthing a creed which it would seem no sane mortal could understand, the newest religious sect has started in Los Angeles.”

News of the events on Azusa Street quickly spread across the United States, then across the world. Believing that the return of Jesus was imminent, hundreds of new converts began preaching the gospel, speaking in tongues and performing healings, which they considered proof of the Holy Spirit’s workings.

Our report – prepared a century after the Azusa Street revival – does not attempt to quantify the number of renewalists worldwide. However, we have assembled religious demographic profiles for the 10 countries surveyed, including the United States. The profiles, published as an appendix to this report, include religious population estimates based on national censuses and similar surveys.

We also have prepared a companion report that provides background on the pentecostal movement in Latin America, Africa and Asia, including a chronology of the political involvement of pentecostals in the nine countries we surveyed in those regions. This report is available on our website at https://alpha.pewresearch.org/pewresearch-org/religion.

One of the reasons the renewalist movement has only rarely received close study in the past is because pentecostals have often been considered as being out of the mainstream, not only distinct in their religious practices but also largely apolitical in their outlook. Our survey findings suggest, however, that the widespread perception of pentecostals as basically apolitical in outlook might need rethinking. If so, then pentecostalism’s growing numbers will almost certainly guarantee that the movement will be a major force in shaping the political as well as the religious landscape of the 21st century.

Contrary to widespread perceptions, pentecostalism does not always draw disproportionately from the lower socioeconomic sectors of society. Whether pentecostals and charismatics have higher or lower income levels than the general population very much depends on the country in question.

In some countries, including the U.S., the survey finds that renewalist groups do tend to have lower income and educational levels. However, they are not necessarily poorer or less educated than the general population in the majority of the countries surveyed. In South Korea, for instance, people with high incomes are more highly represented among renewalists than in the general population. And in Nigeria, there are a higher proportion of well-educated people among pentecostals than in the population as a whole.

Another misconception is that renewalism appeals disproportionately to women. Although at least half of the renewalist population in all the countries surveyed indeed is female, the gender composition of renewalists in most countries closely resembles that of the country as a whole.

The survey finds that in some countries, including the U.S., certain ethnic or racial minorities are more highly represented among renewalists than in the general population, although the degree to which this is true varies from case to case.

With respect to another demographic characteristic, the survey finds that the number of children born to renewalists closely resembles the numbers among the general populations surveyed; the only exception is in Nigeria, where pentecostals have significantly fewer children than the general population. In none of the countries does the survey find that the average age of renewalists differs significantly from that of the general population.

Income

Income levels among pentecostals and other renewalists vary considerably by country. In the U.S., for instance, 58% of pentecostals have a household income that places them in the bottom two income categories, compared with 41%for the population overall, according to this survey. The differences between pentecostals and the general population are smaller but still notable in Chile (44% vs. 35%) and Guatemala (48% vs. 40%).

In most of the countries surveyed, however, those with lower incomes are not necessarily more prevalent among pentecostal and other renewalist groups. For example, in Brazil, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, the regions of India surveyed, the Philippines and South Korea, renewalist populations do not include a disproportionately high number of lower-income people.

In two places – South Korea and the regions of India surveyed – the survey finds that there is a notably larger percentage of higher-income people among pentecostals than in the general population. In South Korea, for example, 63% of pentecostals are in the upper two income categories, compared with only 49% of the general population. Similarly, in the regions of India surveyed, 59%of pentecostals fall into the two higher-income groups, compared with only 39% of the general population. And in South Africa, there is a higher percentage of pentecostals (29%) in the highest income bracket than among the general population (20%).

In this survey, pentecostals have somewhat lower income levels than charismatics in the U.S., but they have higher income levels in the regions of India surveyed. In the other countries, differences in the income levels of pentecostals and charismatics tend to be less pronounced.

Education

In most countries surveyed, renewalists have at least as much schooling as the general population; in fact, in Nigeria, pentecostals are much more likely than the public as a whole to have obtained at least some post-secondary education. In the U.S., however, renewalists, especially pentecostals, tend to be less educated than the population as a whole. In Chile, too, pentecostals have considerably lower educational levels than the overall population, though there is virtually no education gap when it comes to charismatics.

The survey also finds that charismatics and pentecostals tend to have comparable levels of education. Other Christians generally have similar levels of education as the general population.

Gender

In nine of the 10 countries surveyed, more than half of pentecostals are women, and in India half are women. In four of these countries – the U.S., Kenya, South Africa and the Philippines – women account for more than 55%of pentecostals. However, in most of the countries, renewalists are not substantially more likely to be female than the general population. Only in Kenya, South Africa and the Philippines is the pentecostal population substantially more female than the general population; and only in Kenya and South Korea is the charismatic population substantially more female than the population as a whole.

Race

According to the survey, in many of the countries there is no clear majority racial or ethnic group. And in South Korea and the regions of India surveyed, there is essentially no racial or ethnic diversity among survey respondents. However, in three of the four countries surveyed where there is a majority race – the U.S., Chile and South Africa – racial minorities are more highly represented among pentecostals than in the general population, although the degree to which this is the case varies by country. In the U.S. and Chile, charismatics are also more likely to come from minority racial groups as compared with the general population.

Kenya and Nigeria, where tribal rather than racial distinctions are important, manifest starkly different breakdowns in terms of renewalist communities. In Kenya, the distribution of pentecostals and charismatics among tribal groups closely resembles that seen among the general population. In Nigeria, however, the situation is quite different. There pentecostals are disproportionately represented among the Ibo, not at all represented among the Hausa, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, and represented among the Yoruba at about the same percentage as in the general population.

Age

The average age of renewalist populations is not very different from that of the general population, or from other Christians, in any of the countries surveyed.

Number of Children

The survey finds that in most countries, renewalists on average have roughly the same number of children as the general population. Only in one country, Nigeria, do pentecostals have considerably fewer children than the general population.

Pentecostalism has become a significant part of Latin America’s religious and political landscape in recent years. Especially since the 1960s, the region has witnessed dramatic growth in the number of pentecostals. According to 2005 figures from the World Christian Database, pentecostals represent 13%, or about 75 million, of Latin America’s population of nearly 560 million. Charismatic members of non-pentecostal denominations, who in Latin America are overwhelmingly Catholic, number an additional 80 million or so, or 15% of the population. As recently as 1970, pentecostals and charismatics combined represented no more than 4% of the region’s population.

Pentecostals & Charismatics in Latin America

Pentecostals are not Latin America’s only “evangélicos,” as Protestants are normally called in the region. The Protestant community also includes mainline churches such as Presbyterian, Lutheran and Anglican, which were established by European immigrants in the 19th and early 20th centuries. But pentecostals represent the most rapidly growing sector of Latin American Protestantism. For example, in Brazil, which has by far the region’s largest Protestant population in absolute terms, the national census shows that pentecostals grew from less than 50% of Protestants in 1980 to 68% in 2000. In Central America, pentecostals grew from 37% of Protestants in 1965 to more than half by the 1980s (Freston 2004a: 228). Today, according to the World Christian Database, pentecostals make up some 73% of all Latin American Protestants.

Pentecostal growth varies significantly from country to country. At the upper end are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, in all of which pentecostals represent more than 10% of the national populations, according to the World Christian Database. At the lower end are Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, where pentecostals represent well below 10% of the population. However, some of the countries with small pentecostal populations, such as Mexico, Colombia and Peru, also are currently witnessing significant pentecostal growth (Freston 2004a: 229).

The impact of pentecostalism on Latin America’s religious landscape has been profound. It has led, for example, to a dramatic increase in the number of pentecostal churches in important urban centers. A major 1992 survey of religious institutions in the Greater Rio area of Brazil found that 61% of all existing churches were pentecostal. It also found that this proportion was rapidly increasing, with pentecostal churches accounting for roughly nine-in-ten congregations registered in the preceding two years (1990-1992). In one Catholic diocese in Greater Rio, Protestant places of worship outnumbered Catholic ones by two-to-one, and in the poorest districts the ratio climbs to almost seven-to-one (Freston 2004a: 231).

Since the early 1980s, Latin America’s rapidly expanding pentecostal community has exercised an increasingly important role in public life. Guatemala, for instance, has seen two pentecostal presidents. Brazil has witnessed the formation of an evangelical congressional caucus that consists largely of pentecostals and includes about 10% of the country’s parliamentarians. Chile’s pentecostals host an annual independence day celebration attended by the president. And Nicaragua’s pentecostals founded a political party that has fielded presidential candidates and won seats in congress.

Several factors have stimulated the recent spate of pentecostal politics:

• DemographicsAs pentecostals have approached from a quarter to a third of the population in some Latin American countries, they have sought a greater share of public influence and political representation.
• DemocratizationIn 1976, according to Freedom House, only nine countries in Latin America and the Caribbean were considered free, while 18 were considered partly free or not free. In 2006, 22 countries in the region are considered free, while only 11 are partly free or not free. Widespread and enduring democratization has given many groups in Latin America – pentecostals included – a greater opportunity to organize politically and influence their governments.
• Catholic political privilegeUntil recently, many Latin American governments have provided special benefits to the Catholic Church, including direct subsidies, control over religious education in government schools and a monopoly on hospital and military chaplaincies. In a few cases, such privileges continue (Sigmund 1999: 1-8). Pentecostals have entered politics partly to abolish these benefits or to insist that they be made available to the region’s growing Protestant communities as well.
• “Mini-culture wars.”In Latin America, moral issues such as abortion and homosexuality have not ignited the kinds of “culture wars” seen in the U.S., partly because much of the region remains fairly conservative on these and similar issues. However, left-of-center groups in some countries have floated serious, and occasionally successful, proposals to liberalize government policies on abortion, divorce and homosexuality. These proposals have helped spur pentecostal political mobilization. For example, it was partly in order to block the proposed liberalization of constitutional provisions concerning abortion and homosexuality that pentecostals in Brazil increased their political involvement after the country’s post-junta political “opening” (abertura) in 1986. (The effort to block liberalization succeeded on homosexuality but failed on abortion.)

Pentecostalism’s growing presence in Latin American society and politics is attracting the attention of some of the region’s most prominent politicians. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva openly courted pentecostal and other evangelical voters in the runoffs of the October 2002 elections. For the October 2006 elections, Lula’s Workers Party forged an alliance with the Brazilian Republican Party, which the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, one of Brazil’s largest pentecostal churches, helped organize in 2005. Responding to the concerns of pentecostals and other Protestants, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, elected in December 2005, has established a new religious affairs office to equalize government treatment of the country’s diverse religious groups.

At the same time, pentecostalism’s growing societal presence and political clout have attracted criticism and fueled political conflict. Catholic leaders, including the late John Paul II, have described the growth of pentecostal churches as an “invasion of the sects” that is robbing Latin America of its Catholic culture and destroying its social cohesion. After all, the region remains a Catholic stronghold, with an estimated 490 million Roman Catholics, more than any other region in the world and nearly twice the Catholic population of Europe. For their part, prominent pentecostal leaders, including former Guatemalan president and pentecostal church elder Efraín Ríos Montt, have attacked Catholicism as a source of corruption and backwardness. Leftists have joined the fray, frequently attacking pentecostals as agents of North American economic and political interests who perpetuate unjust social conditions by diverting the poor from focusing on their economic misery.

Because of the great variety characteristic of Latin American pentecostalism, its political activism and impact defy simple categorization. Some observers and analysts argue that pentecostal politics follows a clear and essentially monolithic pattern. They claim that Latin American pentecostals exhibit a tendency either toward political quiescence and passivity or toward right-wing and authoritarian politics. But as the following profiles of pentecostal political activism in Brazil, Chile and Guatemala demonstrate, Latin America’s pentecostals have had very different growth patterns and theological emphases, and have also experienced very different political contexts. The result has been a great diversity of pentecostal political styles and forms of activism. This diversity continues to evolve in ways that bear important long-term consequences for Latin American society and politics.

Origins and Growth

• 1910s-1930s: An Italian missionary establishes the pentecostal Christian Congregation in 1910 among immigrants in São Paulo; in 1911, Swedish missionaries establish a church in Belém that becomes the Assemblies of God (AG) (Anderson 2004: 70-71). The AG begins ordaining indigenous pastors in 1921, and transfers leadership to Brazilians in 1930. The total number of pentecostals reaches 40,000 by 1930, including 13,000 members of the AG (Wilson 2003: 39).

• 1950s-1960s: Brazil experiences a second wave of pentecostal expansion, represented by three large groups originating in São Paulo: Church of the Foursquare Gospel (1951), Brazil for Christ (1955) and God is Love (1962). Manoel de Mello is the first Brazilian to found a large pentecostal church, Brazil for Christ (Freston 2001: 13-14).

• 1970s-1980s: A third wave of pentecostal growth occurs, led by the formation of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Universal Church) by Edir Macedo in 1977. By 1990, the Universal Church has 14 radio stations and a TV station, while the AG also continues to expand (Ireland 1998: 123). Estevam and Sonia Hernandes found the neo-pentecostal church Reborn in Christ in 1986.

• 1990s-present: According to the 1991 census, Protestants make up 9% of the population, over half of whom are pentecostal. By the 2000 census, the number of Protestants grows to over 15% of the population, or about 26 million people, and 68% of the Protestant community is pentecostal. New pentecostal groups continue to grow rapidly; the Universal Church, for example, has over 2 million members in 2000, an increase of 1.8 million new members between 1991 and 2000 and a six-fold increase in their share of the Brazilian population.

• In June 2006, organizers claim that an estimated 3 million evangelicals join the 14th annual “March for Jesus” in São Paulo, headed by the leaders of the pentecostal church Reborn in Christ (Agencia Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Comunicación [ALC], June 15, 2006).

• The findings of the Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey suggest that Brazil’s expanding Protestant population is increasingly pentecostal, with approximately eight-in-ten Protestants interviewed indicating they were either pentecostal or charismatic. Survey results suggest that the AG is the single largest pentecostal church, accounting for four-in-ten pentecostals. Roughly half of Brazilian Catholics interviewed can be classified as charismatic.

Religion and Politics

• An 1881 election law permits non-Catholics to serve as parliament members and the 1891 constitution separates church and state (Freston 2001: 18; Serbin 1999: 206). However, pentecostals in the early 20th century are largely apolitical. The Christian Congregation effectively bans its members from participating in political activities, and a common slogan among AG members and other pentecostals until 1986 is “believers do not mess with politics” (Freston 2001: 12-14). Of the 50 Protestants elected to congress between 1933 and 1987, 47 are mainline Protestants and only three are pentecostals (Freston 2001: 19).

• As an exception to pentecostals’ apolitical tendency, in the 1960s the Brazil for Christ church affiliates with the World Council of Churches and its leaders strongly criticize the military dictatorship (1964-1985) during its most repressive period (Freston 2001: 15).

The Constituent Assembly and Pentecostal Mobilization, 1986-1989

• In the post-junta elections of 1986, voters select a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution. Attracted by the chance to recreate Brazilian politics, more pentecostals abandon their apoliticism. Achieving legal equality with the Catholic Church and maintaining restrictions on abortion and same-sex unions become major pentecostal goals (Freston 2001: 21-23).

• Of the 36 Protestants who serve in the Constituent Assembly during this period, 20 are pentecostal, compared with 17 in the preceding congress (Fonseca forthcoming). Most join an evangelical caucus, the only religious one in the Assembly, which receives property and funds from José Sarney’s government to secure its support for government stances (Freston 2001: 20-29).

• The Constituent Assembly, with support from pentecostals, puts the name of God in the constitution, augments religious freedom, maintains religious teaching in public schools and bars homosexual “orientation” as a category protected from discrimination. The Assembly fails to pass restrictions on abortion, divorce and artistic expression (Freston 2001: 29).

Pentecostals and Electoral Politics, 1989-1994

• In 1989, Agriculture Minister Iris Rezende, a non-pentecostal Protestant, attracts pentecostal support in his bid to become the presidential nominee of Brazil’s largest party, the centrist Party of the Democratic Movement of Brazil. When his bid fails, leaders of the AG, Universal Church and other pentecostal churches help swing Protestant support behind Fernando Collor de Mello of the centrist National Reconstruction Party against Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the leftist Workers Party. Many pentecostals oppose Lula as Marxist and anti-religious; the Universal Church’s Macedo attacks him as pro-Catholic (Freston 2001: 29-32). A survey shows that Protestants may decide the runoff for Collor, which he wins (Freston 1993: 83; Ireland 1998: 124).

• The AG votes as a bloc to elect 13 AG members to congress in 1990, while the Universal Church uses bloc voting to elect three of its members (Fonseca forthcoming; Freston 2001: 17). The Universal Church wins greater political clout in subsequent elections, electing six of its members to congress in 1994 and 16 in 1998 (Fonseca forthcoming).

• In 1994, after Collor’s impeachment, presidential elections again pit Lula against a more centrist candidate, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party. Although many pentecostals, including Macedo, still oppose Lula, some pentecostal leaders and evangelical groups such as the newly formed Progressive Evangelical Movement support him. Analysis by Prandi and Pierucci (1994) suggests that pentecostals favor Cardoso, the ultimate winner. In 1998, Cardoso easily wins re-election against Lula, again with significant pentecostal support (Freston 2001: 34-48).

Pentecostals and the Left, 1994-2002

• After the return to democracy, Brazil’s evangelical left becomes the largest in Latin America (Freston 2001: 33). Its most well known representative is Benedita da Silva, who becomes a Workers Party activist and city councilor in Rio after joining the AG. She is elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1986 and in 1994 becomes Brazil’s first black woman senator (Fonseca forthcoming).

• With support from some pentecostal politicians and businessmen, Benedita da Silva allies with populist Anthony Garotinho of the Democratic Labor Party, who becomes an evangelical Presbyterian in 1994. In 1998, Garotinho and da Silva are elected as governor and vice-governor of Rio state, having actively courted and received evangelical support (Freston 2001: 49; Fonseca forthcoming). After Garotinho steps down as governor to seek the presidency in 2002, his wife Rosinha Matheus and da Silva, who serves as interim governor, oppose each other for the governorship. This creates a contest between two left-wing evangelical women for a major political office, unprecedented in Catholic-majority Brazil (Fonseca forthcoming). Matheus wins and da Silva becomes Minister of Social Action in Lula’s government in 2003, a post she holds until January 2004.

• In the 2002 presidential elections, Garotinho runs on the Brazilian Socialist Party ticket, and his campaign features visits to pentecostal churches and appearances on evangelical radio. He wins 18% of the vote in the first round, with support from 37% of evangelical voters, narrowly missing qualifying for the runoff (Fonseca forthcoming).

Pentecostals and Lula, 2002-2006

• Garotinho then endorses Lula in the runoff, helping him secure the endorsement of some 500 evangelical leaders (Guilherme, Nov. 15, 2002). Among pentecostal churches, Universal Church and Reborn in Christ leaders throw their support to Lula in 2002, while the Assemblies of God and the Church of the Foursquare Gospel support government candidate José Serra (Oro 2005: 12). The center-right Liberal Party, heavily influenced by the Universal Church since the 1999 elections, also joins with Lula in the 2002 elections, and its leader, businessman José Alencar, becomes Lula’s running mate. Lula and Alencar win the second round with 61% of the vote (Hunter 2006: 17-18, 22).

• Of the 17 Universal Church members elected to congress in 2002, eight are in the Liberal Party, nearly half of the Universal Church’s representation and more than 25% of the Liberal Party’s congressional delegation (Freston 2004c: 147).

• As of 2004, more than 60 Protestants are serving in congress, 10% of Brazil’s nearly 600-member congress. Two-thirds are official candidates of the Universal Church, AG and Church of the Foursquare Gospel. Of the approximately 160 Protestants serving in congress between 1987 and 2006, about 100 are pentecostals (Freston 2001: 19; Freston 2004b: 34). In September 2003, pentecostals and other Protestant members form the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, similar to previous evangelical lobbies and caucuses organized since 1986 (Chu, June 7, 2004).

• In the wake of corruption allegations implicating Universal Church and AG politicians as well as members of Lula’s Workers Party, a new Universal Church-supported political party officially registers in August 2005 and is ultimately named the Brazilian Republican Party, headed by Universal Church pastor Vitor Paulo dos Santos. Those joining the new party include Vice President José Alencar, former head of the Liberal Party and Lula’s running mate for the October 2006 presidential elections, and senator and Universal Church bishop Marcelo Crivella, nephew of Universal Church founder Macedo (ALC, Oct. 3, 2005). Crivella is the first elected Universal Church senator and he places third for the governorship of the state of Rio de Janeiro in the October 2006 elections. Among a disproportionately large number of pentecostal and evangelical congress members under investigation since early 2006 for a contract kickback scandal, many are not reelected to office.

• In the 2006 presidential campaign, both Lula and his primary rival, Geraldo Alckmin, seek pentecostal support. The two largest AG conventions in Brazil split their support for Lula and Alckmin shortly before the first round of elections (Kerr, Sept. 12, 2006; Khalip, Sept. 21, 2006). After Lula fails to win a first round majority, Garotinho endorses Lula, potentially boosting Lula’s evangelical support (EFE News Service, Oct. 3, 2006).

Origins and Growth

• 1909-1910: American Methodist missionary Willis Hoover encourages his fellow Methodists to seek charismatic gifts. Hoover reports that his congregations in Valparaíso and Santiago soon began to sing, shout and speak in tongues (Cleary and Sepúlveda 1998: 99). Hoover’s fellow pentecostals break away from the American-founded Methodist church in 1910 to form a new church that eventually becomes known as the Methodist Pentecostal Church (Anderson 2004: 65).

• 1930s: A schism over leadership in the Methodist Pentecostal Church leads a group of Hoover’s followers to form what becomes known as the Evangelical Pentecostal Church, while the majority remain in the earlier church under the leadership of Manuel Umaña (Freston 2001: 214; Anderson 2004: 66).

• 1940s-50s: The Pentecostal Church of Chile breaks off from the Methodist Pentecostal Church in 1947 and the Pentecostal Mission Church breaks off from the Evangelical Pentecostal Church in 1952. These two new churches seek greater social activism and cooperation with other Protestants, and in 1961 they join the World Council of Churches (Freston 2001: 215-216). Other, non-Chilean pentecostal denominations, such as the Assemblies of God, establish churches in the 1940s (Fediakova 2004: 256).

• Starting in the 1940s, pentecostalism grows rapidly in the Central Valley countryside as well as in the lower-class districts of Valparaíso and Santiago (Cleary and Sepúlveda 1998: 100). Overall, national censuses show that Protestants grow from 1.5% of the population in 1930 to 5.6% in 1960 and to 6.2% in 1970 (Cleary and Sepúlveda 1998: 106).

• According to the Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey, this growing Protestant population is one of the most “pentecostalized” in Latin America. Roughly two-thirds of all Protestants are either pentecostal or charismatic, and approximately one quarter of all Catholics are charismatic.

Religion and Politics

• In 1925 Chile formalizes the constitutional separation of church and state (Poblete 1999: 223). Before that time, pentecostals faced some persecution by the government “at the behest of the Catholic Church” (Bundy 2003: 55).

• During the 1940s, 50s and 60s, Bishop Umaña of the Methodist Pentecostal Church directs members to vote in a bloc in order to attract political attention (Freston 2001: 215). Some pentecostals become leaders in rural labor unions and neighborhood social service associations organized by Eduardo Frei Montalva’s Christian Democratic government in the 1960s (Freston 2001: 217; Cleary and Sepúlveda 1998: 103).

Allende Period, 1970-1973

• In the 1970 elections, which pitted the Christian Democrats against the left-wing Unidad Popular coalition of Salvador Allende, support for Allende may have been higher among pentecostals than non-pentecostals (Freston 2001: 218; Cox 1995: 170). In the 1971 municipal elections, a survey in Santiago finds that 77% of pentecostal respondents voted for Unidad Popular, compared with 66% of non-pentecostal respondents. The same survey finds that pentecostal respondents were more likely than non-pentecostal respondents to consider left-wing parties trustworthy (83% vs. 69%) (Freston 2001: 218).

• One possible reason for pentecostalism’s apparent affinity with the left is the historical association between the Christian Democratic Party and the Catholic Church, which alienates some Protestants and inclines them toward anti-clerical parties such as the Radical Party, a key ally in Allende’s Unidad Popular coalition (Freston 2001: 216-217).

• Possibly in response to Protestant support, Allende asks that the annual Te Deum prayer service held in honor of Chilean independence be no longer exclusively Catholic but also include Protestants (Freston 2001: 218).

• According to one survey, Protestantism in Santiago experiences a faster growth rate during Allende’s three years in office (1970-73) than in any previous three-year period, going from 5.5% to 8% of the city’s population (Freston 2004a: 229).

• As opposition to Allende mounts in 1973, some pentecostals express strong support for Allende but most who take a public position are less favorable (Freston 2001: 219).

Pinochet Period, 1973-1990

• After a September 1973 coup installs a military junta under Augusto Pinochet, some Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants, as well as some pentecostals, form the Committee of Cooperation for Peace to defend human rights (Freston 2001: 219).

• As relations between the junta and the Catholic bishops deteriorate in mid-1974, Pinochet invites Protestants, including pentecostals, to forge a close relationship with the government. The bishop of the Methodist Pentecostal Church responds by inviting Pinochet to the inauguration of its new cathedral and helps organize a gathering of 2,500 Protestants in December 1974 to show support for the junta (Freston 2001: 219-220).

• In September 1975, the Methodist Pentecostal Church takes over the Catholic Church’s traditional role of hosting the Te Deum service (Anderson 2004: 67). The evangelical Te Deum service is held in its cathedral each year, and is attended by the president and other political and military leaders (Agencia Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Comunicación [ALC], June 28, 2003).

• While some leaders of the Methodist Pentecostal Church reach out to Pinochet, other pentecostals demonstrate against the regime and are sent into exile or killed (Bundy 2003: 57). In a 1990 survey by Chile’s Centro de Estudios Públicos, a majority of observant pentecostal respondents express a negative opinion of Pinochet and identify themselves as politically independent, with less than 15% expressing sympathy for the political right (Cleary and Sepúlveda 1998: 114).

Redemocratization and the Campaign for Legal Equality, the 1990s to the Present

• After an opposition coalition wins the 1989 election, the new president, Patricio Aylwin, responds to complaints of discrimination by pentecostals by sending a law on religions to Congress in 1994, providing for equality of all religions. The bill stalls in the Senate, in part because the Catholic Church opposes changes in its legal status (Poblete 1999: 233). In October 1999, President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle signs the bill into law (U.S. Department of State, 2005). A pentecostal bishop heads the committee of Protestants that advocates for the law during the 1990s (Quintero, Nov. 18, 2004).

• Pentecostal Bishop Salvador Pino Bustos runs for president as an independent candidate in the 1999 elections but fails to receive enough pentecostal and evangelical support to achieve a place on the ballot (Freston 2004c: 142).

• During the annual evangelical Te Deum service in September 2005, attended by Socialist President Ricardo Lagos and other presidential candidates, Bishop Bernardo Cartes of the Methodist Pentecostal Church calls on the government to support evangelical church construction as a “sign of equality” with the Catholic Church (ALC, Sept. 12, 2005).

• In December 2005 President Lagos signs a decree instituting October 31 as the “National Day of the Evangelical Churches.” Pentecostal Bishop Emiliano Soto represents the evangelical churches at the signing ceremony (Ministry of the Secretary General of the Presidency, Dec. 26, 2005).

• At a January 2006 meeting between evangelical leaders and newly-elected President Michelle Bachelet, a pentecostal pastor calls on the government to support evangelical religious education in public schools and evangelical chaplains (ALC, Jan. 16, 2006). In a March 2006 ceremony at the Methodist Pentecostal Church cathedral in Santiago, Bishop Cartes offers evangelicals’ support for the Bachelet government (Noticia Cristiana, March 27, 2006).

• In April 2006 President Bachelet announces a new executive Office of Religious Affairs to promote an “equalizing effect” between the different religions, as promised in her election campaign (ALC, April 19, 2006).

• President Bachelet invites two pentecostal bishops to serve as the evangelical representatives on a presidential advisory council on education organized in June 2006, following mass student demonstrations during the spring (Radio Antillanca, Aug. 17, 2006).

• Although some pentecostals urge President Bachelet not to attend the annual evangelical Te Deum service at the Methodist Pentecostal Church cathedral in protest against Bishop Cartes, who has been accused of corruption, the service proceeds as scheduled in September 2006 with the president in attendance (Radio Cooperativa, Sept. 2, 2006; Ossa, Sept. 12, 2006).

Origins and Growth

• 1910s-1940s: In 1882, an anti-Catholic, liberal president, Justo Barrios, escorts an American Presbyterian minister to Guatemala to encourage Protestant growth. Other Protestant missionaries, with the Central American Mission, Quakers, Primitive Methodists, and Nazarenes, arrive in the late 1890s and early 1900s (Garrard-Burnett 2001: 2-3). Pentecostal missionaries with the United and Free Gospel Society arrive in 1916. The churches they plant eventually affiliate with the pentecostal Church of God (Cleveland) in the mid-1930s. In 1936, Assemblies of God (AG) missionaries arrive (Garrard-Burnett 2001: 14-19). By 1937, a study estimates that all Protestants make up almost 2% of the population (Wilson 1998: 142).

• 1950s-1960s: Evangelization combined with urbanization and economic decline facilitates pentecostal growth (Steigenga 1999: 160). Guatemalans establish churches such as Church of the Prince of Peace in 1955, which breaks off from the Assemblies of God, and Elim in 1962, which becomes pentecostal after breaking off from the Baptist and Nazarene churches (Anderson 2004: 76). Stoll (1990: 337) estimates that nearly 3% of the population is evangelical by 1960, but pentecostals represent only a small proportion of evangelicals. In the late 1960s, some elites join pentecostal churches (Freston 2001: 265-266).

• 1970s-1980s: The disruptions caused by the civil war starting in the 1960s and an earthquake in 1976 stimulate pentecostal growth, which is encouraged in part by U.S. missionaries distributing earthquake aid in Guatemala. Aid volunteers from the neo-pentecostal, California-based Gospel Outreach establish worship services that become the Church of the Word (Stoll 1990: 184). By 1994 the Church of the Word has an estimated 15,000 members in 25 congregations (Wilson 1998: 147). Guatemalan evangelicals start other neo-pentecostal churches, such as Christian Brotherhood in 1978 and El Shaddai in 1983, which attract members from the middle and upper classes (Freston 2001: 266). As the civil war intensifies between the government and guerilla groups, Catholics face government attacks because of suspected ties to the guerrillas (Stoll 1990: 193-196). This leads some to consider pentecostalism a “safer” option, contributing to rapid growth in the countryside (Garrard-Burnett 1996: 104; Steigenga 1999: 160).

• 1990-present: By the 1990s, classical pentecostal and neo-pentecostal churches constitute the majority of Guatemala’s Protestants (Freston 2001: 265). A nationwide Gallup survey in 1991 finds that 19% of respondents are Protestant. In Guatemala City, 23% are Protestant; among those with higher education, 31% are Protestant (Freston 2001: 265).

• The Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey also suggests that Guatemala’s Protestant population is highly pentecostal, with more than eight-in-ten affiliated with pentecostal or charismatic churches. The survey also finds that approximately six-in-ten Guatemalan Catholics can be considered charismatic.

Religion and Politics

• Between Guatemala’s independence in 1823 and the 1940s, successive anti-clerical governments severely restrict the Catholic Church (Garrard-Burnett 1996: 98). Though some Catholic leaders support the overthrow of the leftist regime of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, later anti-communist governments in the 1960s suppress Catholicism because of its suspected Marxist sympathies (Garrard-Burnett 1996: 98, 104). Catholicism’s perceived leftist politics alienates some conservative urban elites, enhancing pentecostalism’s appeal (Stoll 1990: 181).

Ríos Montt’s Regime and the Transition to Democracy, 1974-1990

• In 1974, General Efraín Ríos Montt becomes the presidential candidate for the opposition Christian Democrats. Election returns show him in the lead, but the government declares its candidate the winner. Ríos Montt is sent to a diplomatic post in Spain, returning in 1977 to seek the Christian Democratic nomination again. The bid fails, and he joins the Church of the Word, becoming head of a Word day school (Stoll 1990: 186-187; Steigenga 1999: 158).

• In 1982, Ríos Montt considers a second presidential run. The coalition offering him a candidacy collapses, and fraudulent elections bring the government candidate to power (Steigenga 1999: 159). Army officers stage a coup and Ríos Montt accepts their offer to lead the new junta, declaring that the Lord has placed him in power (Stoll 1990: 187-189). Ríos Montt’s key advisers include two Word elders, Francisco Bianchi and Álvaro Contreras, who become his influential personal secretaries. Ríos Montt dissolves congress and appoints Jorge Serrano Elías, a leader in the neo-pentecostal Elim church, as head of the new Council of State (Freston 2001: 268-273; King, Nov. 13, 1990).

• Ríos Montt begins Sunday-evening televised addresses to the nation that are infused with religious rhetoric. In his speeches, he calls on Guatemalans to resist communism and uphold morality in family life and politics. His campaigns against crime and government graft openly equate Catholicism with corruption, and his response to John Paul II during his 1983 visit further offends Catholics (Garrard-Burnett 1996: 106; Freston 2001: 269).

• Ríos Montt forges ties to U.S. evangelical leaders, including Pat Robertson, who flies to Guatemala five days after Ríos Montt comes to power to show his support (Brouwer et al 1996: 56). U.S. evangelicals pledge funds for Montt’s pacification program, through efforts such as “International Love Lift,” administered by Gospel Outreach (Stoll 1990: 191-192).

• In November 1982, about 250,000 Protestants gather in the capital to celebrate 100 years of Guatemalan Protestantism. Some evangelicals see the convergence of the centennial with the country’s first Protestant leader as a sign that God has appointed Ríos Montt to save Guatemala from communism and lead it to Christ (Stoll 1990: 1-3, 189-190).

• In August 1983, a military coup overthrows Ríos Montt. The head of the new junta states that saving the country from fanaticism is one reason for the coup, which pleases the Catholic hierarchy. In 1985, the military reinstitutes democracy. Jorge Serrano places third in the subsequent elections, won by Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo of the Christian Democrats. In 1986, Serrano founds the conservative Solidary Action Movement (Freston 2001: 272-274).

Jorge Serrano’s Presidency, 1990-1993

• In 1989, Ríos Montt founds a new party, the Guatemalan Republican Front, and leads the polls for the 1990 elections, but the Constitutional Court declares him ineligible because of his involvement in the 1982 coup. Serrano then emerges as the major challenger to National Centrist Union candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle, a Catholic. The campaigns trade accusations about Serrano’s alleged involvement in international Protestant plots to destroy Guatemala’s Catholic identity. Serrano wins the runoff with 67% of the vote, becoming the first elected Protestant president in Latin America. Surveys suggest that the Serrano vote is not disproportionately Protestant, with Catholics favoring Serrano over Carpio by two-to-one (Steigenga 1999: 162; Freston 2001: 275).

• Serrano begins asserting civilian control over the military and helps initiate talks with the guerillas. But when Mayan social activist Rigoberta Menchú receives the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992, Serrano fails to stop a wave of reprisals against her associates (Freston 2001: 275). In 1993, Serrano faces corruption charges, revelations of immorality and protests over his economic policies. After his unsuccessful “self-coup,” the congress rejects an attempt by Vice President Gustavo Espina Salguero of the neo-pentecostal Christian Brotherhood to succeed Serrano, and elects as president the human rights ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio (Steigenga 1999: 162).

Neo-Pentecostal Politicians and Christian Political Parties, 1994-2006

• The Guatemalan Republican Front wins a majority in the 1994 congressional elections, and Ríos Montt becomes president of congress until he again runs for president in 1995. The courts again deny Ríos Montt’s presidential bid, and center right candidate Alvaro Arzú of the National Advancement Party wins the election.

• In the 1999 presidential election, Francisco Bianchi, a Word leader and former secretary to Ríos Montt, organizes a new party, the Democratic Reconciling Action, which is widely understood to be an evangelical party. Bianchi runs for president with the support of the Church of the Word, but receives only 2% of the vote in the first round and the new party loses its registration (Freston 2004c: 132-133; Samson forthcoming). Alfonso Portillo of the Guatemalan Republican Front wins the 1999 presidential election, and Ríos Montt is again elected congress president.

• Bianchi joins El Shaddai in 2001 and registers a new political party in 2003 based on Christian values, called the Movement of Principles and Values. After an unsuccessful attempt to field a coalition presidential candidate, with Bianchi as vice-president, the party does not field any candidates (Barahona 2003: 6; ASIES 2003: 2; OAS 2005: 43).

• With court permission to run, Ríos Montt finishes third in the 2003 elections with less than 20% of the vote, while Óscar Berger Perdomo, Catholic candidate of the coalition Grand National Alliance, wins the presidency (Samson forthcoming). While Ríos Montt’s party remains the largest in congress, it fails to win a majority, ending Ríos Montt’s term as congress president. He continues as spokesperson for the party through early 2006 (Joynes, Mar. 22, 2006). In July 2006, a Spanish judge issues an international warrant for the arrest of Ríos Montt for human rights abuses committed by the Guatemalan military during his presidency (Watts, July 7, 2006).

• In May 2006, Harold Caballeros, pastor of El Shaddai, calls on evangelicals to reform Guatemala, which some see as an indication of his presidential aspirations for the November 2007 elections (Otzoy, May 11, 2006).

Agencia Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Comunicación (ALC). 2003. “Strife in Pentecostal Methodist Church after Bishop President Passes Away.” June 28. Accessed at www.wfn.org/2003/08/msg00056.html.

ALC. 2005. “Evangélicos piden señal de igualdad al gobierno chileno.” September 12. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=3621&lanCode=2.

ALC. 2005. “Aplauden afiliación de obispo y políticos a partido auspiciado por la IURD.” October 3. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=3702&lanCode=2.

ALC. 2006. “Líderes evangélicos se reunieron hoy con presidenta electa Michelle Bachelet.” January 16. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=4042&lanCode=2.

ALC. 2006. “Bachelet alista oficina de Asuntos Religiosos que prometió en su campaña.” April 19. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=4382&lanCode=2.

ALC. 2006. “Más de tres millones de evangélicos marchan para Jesús en calles paulistas.” June 15. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=4566&lanCode=2.

Anderson, Allan. 2004. An Introduction to Pentecostalism: Global Charismatic Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Associated Press (AP). 2006. “Brazilian President Urges Closer Links with Churches to Speed Reforms.” February 17.

ASIES (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales). 2003. “Guatemala: Caracterización de los principales partidos politicos y aproximación a sus estrategias electorales.” Análisis Mensual 7/8 (August-September). Accessed at www.asies.org.gt/analisis%20mensual/2003/analisis08-2003.pdf.

Barahona, Marco Antonio. 2003. “Seguimento del proceso político-electoral.” ASIES, Departamento de Investigaciones Sociopolíticas. July 9. Accessed at www.url.edu.gt/VAcademica/INGEP/pae/conte/PAE/doctos/odoctos01.doc.

Bixler, Mark. 2004. “Evangelical Divergence: Protestantism Surges in Catholic Brazil, but it Differs from U.S. Kind.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. August 4.

Brouwer, Steve, Paul Gifford, and Susan D. Rose. 1996. Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism. New York: Routledge.

Bundy, David D. 2003. “Chile.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 55-58.

Burgess, Stanley M. and Eduard M. van der Maas, eds. 2003. The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements. Rev. ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.

Chu, Henry. 2004. “Moved by the Spirit to Govern.” Los Angeles Times. June 7.

Cleary, Edward L. and Juan Sepúlveda. 1998. “Chilean Pentecostalism: Coming of Age.” In Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1998, 97-121.

Cleary, Edward L. and Hannah W. Stewart-Gambino, eds. 1998. Power, Politics, and Pentecostals in Latin America. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cox, Harvey. 1995. Fire from Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-first Century. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.

Downie, Andrew. 2002. “Political Influence Growing for Evangelicals in Brazil.” The Christian Science Monitor. October 25.

EFE News Service. 2006. “Brazil’s Alckmin Picks Up Big Endorsement.” October 3.

Fediakova, Evguenia. 2004. ” ‘Somos parte de esta sociedad’: Evangélicos y política en el Chile post autoritario.” Politica (Universidad de Chile) 43 (Spring): 253-284.

Fonseca, Alexandre Brazil. Forthcoming. “Religion and Democracy in Brazil (1998-2002): A Study of the Leading Evangelical Politicians.” In Freston forthcoming.

Freston, Paul. 1993. “Brother Votes for Brother: The New Politics of Protestantism in Brazil.” In Garrard-Burnett and Stoll 1993, 66-110.

Freston, Paul. 1995. “Pentecostalism in Brazil: A Brief History.” Religion 25 (2): 119-133.

Freston, Paul. 2001. Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Freston, Paul. 2004a. “Contours of Latin American Pentecostalism.” In Lewis 2004, 221-270.

Freston, Paul. 2004b. “Evangelical Protestantism and Democratization in Contemporary Latin America and Asia.” Democratization 11 (4): 21-41.

Freston, Paul. 2004c. Protestant Political Parties: A Global Survey. Hampshire, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Freston, Paul, ed. Forthcoming. Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press.

Garrard-Burnett, Virginia. 1996. “Resacralization of the Profane: Government, Religion, and Ethnicity in Modern Guatemala.” In Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics, ed. David Westerlund, 96-116. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Garrard-Burnett, Virginia. 1998. Protestantism in Guatemala: Living in the New Jerusalem. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Garrard-Burnett, Virginia. 2001. “Tounges People and Convolutionists: Early Pentecostalism in Guatemala, 1915-1940.” Paper presented at a meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, September.

Garrard-Burnett, Virginia, and David Stoll. 1993. Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Guilherme, George. 2002. “Evangelicals Grow as Political Force.” Christianity Today, November 15. Accessed at www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/013/18.22.html.

Hennigan, Tom. 2006. “Opposition Presidential Candidate Sparks Brazil Ethical Crisis.” Irish Times. October 6.

Hunter, Wendy. 2006. “Growth and Transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, 1989-2002.” Working Paper #326, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame. August. Accessed at www.nd.edu.

Ireland, Rowan. 1998. “Pentecostalism, Conversions, and Politics in Brazil.” In Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1998, 123-137.

Joynes, Kate. 2006. “Guatemala Seeks European Support, Sets Implementation Date for Colombian FTA.” Global Insight Daily Analysis, March 22.

Kerr, Juliette. 2006. “Election 2006: Powerful Evangelical Group Backs Brazilian President’s Re-Election Bid.” Global Insight Daily Analysis, September 12.

Khalip, Andrei. 2006. “HalleLula! Brazil Leader Invokes Evangelical Votes.” Reuters News. September 21.

King, Katherine. 1990. “Rightist Serrano Surges from Obscurity in Guatemala Election.” Reuters News, November 13.

Lehman, Stan. 2005. “1.5 Million Protestants Rally in Brazil.” Associated Press. May 26, 2005. Accessed at www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=17027&sec=20&cont=8.

Lewis, Donald M., ed. 2004. Christianity Reborn: The Global Expansion of Evangelicalism in the Twentieth Century. Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge: William B. Eeerdmans.

Ministry of the Secretary General of the Presidency, Chile. 2005. “Gobierno instaura día nacional de las iglesias cristianas evangelicas y protestantes de Chile.” December 26. Accessed at www.segpres.gov.cl/portal/noticias/2005-12/dia_nacional_iglesias.

Noticia Cristiana. 2006. “Presidenta Bachelet asiste a Catedral Evangélica con su gabinete.” March 27. Accessed at www.noticiacristiana.com/news/newDetails.php?idnew=81975.

OAS (Organization of American States). 2005. “Informe de la misión de observación electoral en Guatemala: Elecciones generales 2003.” Department of Democratic and Political Affairs. April 1. Accessed at scm.oas.org/doc_public/SPANISH/HIST_05/CP14138S04.DOC.

Oro, Ari Pedro. 2005. “The Politics of the Universal Church and Its Consequences on Religion and Politics in Brazil.” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais (São Paulo) 18 (53): 53-69.

Ossa, Sara. 2006. “Evangélicos renuevan Acción de Gracias por la Patria.” Agencia Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Comunicación (ALC). September 12. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=4811&lanCode=2.

Otzoy, Antonio. 2006. “Harold Caballeros dice que en Guatemala fracasaron las elites.” Agencia Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Comunicación (ALC). May 11. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=4455&lanCode=2.

Poblete, Martín. 1999. “Chile: From the Patronato to Pinochet.” In Sigmund 1999, 220-234.

Prandi, Reginaldo, and Antônio Flávio Pierucci. 1994. “Religiões e Voto no Brasil,’ Paper presented at the congress of the National Association for Research in the Social Sciences, Caxambu, Brazil. November.

Quintero, Manuel. 2004. “La igualdad de cultos: Una conquista de la iglesia evangélica.” Agencia Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Comunicación (ALC). November 18. Accessed at www.alcnoticias.org/articulo.asp?artCode=2756&lanCode=2.

Radio Antillanca. 2006. “Los Obispos Bernardo Cartes y Emiliano Soto fueron invitados.” August 17. Accessed at www.radioantillanca.cl/Noticioso/noticia.php?id=158.

Radio Cooperativa. 2006. “Pastor pentecostal pidió a Bachelet no asistir a Te Deum evangélico.” September 2. Accessed at www.cooperativa.cl.

Samson, C. Mathews. Forthcoming. “From War to Reconciliation: Guatemalan Evangelicals and the Transition to Democracy, 1982-2001.” In Freston forthcoming.

Serbin, Kenneth P. 1999. “Brazil: Religious Tolerance, Church-State Relations, and the Challenge of Pluralism.” In Sigmund 1999, 204-219.

Sigmund, Paul E., ed. 1999. Religious Freedom and Evangelization in Latin America: The Challenge of Religious Pluralism. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Steigenga, Tim. 1999. “Guatemala.” In Sigmund 1999, 150-174.

Stoll, David. 1990. Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2005. “Chile: International Religious Freedom Report 2005.” Accessed at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51631.htm.

Watts, Simon. 2006. “Orden de arresto contra Ríos Montt.” BBC Mundo, July 7. Accessed at news.bbc.co.uk/.

Wilson, Everett. 1998. “Guatemalan Pentecostals: Something of Their Own.” In Cleary and Stewart-Gambino 1998, 139-162.

Wilson, Everett A. 2003. “Brazil.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 35-42.

Pentecostalism has become an increasingly prominent feature of Africa’s religious and political landscape. The movement’s growth has been particularly dramatic since the era of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. According to recent figures from the World Christian Database, pentecostals now represent 12%, or about 107 million, of Africa’s population of nearly 890 million people. This includes individuals who belong to classical pentecostal denominations, such as the Assemblies of God or the Apostolic Faith Mission, that were founded in the early 20th century, as well as those who belong to pentecostal denominations or churches that have formed more recently, such as the Deeper Life Bible Church in Nigeria. Charismatic members of non-pentecostal denominations, who in Africa are drawn mainly from Catholic and Protestant churches and African Instituted Churches (AICs), number an additional 40 million, or approximately 5% of the population. As recently as 1970, pentecostals and charismatics combined represented less than 5% of Africans.

Pentecostals are not the only Christian group in Africa to have experienced significant growth in recent decades. According to the World Christian Database, Christianity as a whole increased from about 10 million adherents in 1900 to about 144 million by 1970. Today the continent’s Christians are estimated at around 400 million, or 46% of the population. Catholics grew from 13% of Africa’s population in 1970 to 17% in 2005. Protestants, including Anglicans and independents, constituted about 15% of Africa’s population in 1970 but nearly doubled, to 29%, by 2005.

Even by African standards, the pentecostal boom stands out, and many of Africa’s most populous and politically significant countries reflect this trend. In South Africa, for example, the pentecostal Apostolic Faith Mission is now as numerically strong as the Dutch Reformed Church, the traditional mainstay of the country’s Protestantism. In Zimbabwe, the Assemblies of God has almost as many adherents as the Catholic Church. In Ghana, the largest Christian church is the Church of Pentecost. A survey of Nairobi, Kenya, in the early 1990s showed that the Assemblies of God was the fastest growing denomination (Maxwell 2000). More recently, The Economist noted that nearly one million Kenyans – one out of every 30 people in the country – attended a revival conducted by American preacher T. D. Jakes in Nairobi (The Economist, July 20, 2006). And recent reports suggest that in Africa’s most populous country, Nigeria, pentecostals now equal the combined numerical strength of its long dominant Catholic and Anglican churches (Murphy 2006).

Though pentecostalism’s dramatic expansion has left almost no part of sub-Saharan Africa unaffected, the extent of its growth varies across the region. At the upper end, according to the World Christian Database, are Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ghana, Congo-Zaire, Nigeria, Kenya, Angola, Zambia and Uganda, in all of which pentecostals and charismatics represent more than 20% of the national populations. At the lower end are Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Madagascar and Sudan, where pentecostals and charismatics make up less than 10% of the population. Countries where the pentecostal and charismatic population is between 10% and 20% include Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Malawi, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Mozambique.

With pentecostalism’s demographic explosion has come the sudden expansion of its efforts to shape politics and public life. While nationalist movements drove African politics during the era of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, and mainline church leaders were deeply involved in the continent’s efforts at democratization in the 1980s and early 1990s (Gifford 1995), pentecostals have become increasingly important political actors in the last 15 years. This political awakening is becoming increasingly visible, as illustrated in the following:

• In 1991, Zambia became the first former British colony in Africa to change a president through democratic multiparty elections – and the winner, Frederick Chiluba, was an avowed pentecostal who claimed to have received the gift of tongues at a crusade conducted by pentecostal evangelist Reinhard Bonnke. After taking office, Chiluba invited a group of pentecostal ministers to “cleanse” the presidential palace of evil spirits and publicly dedicated Zambia and its government to “the Lordship of Jesus Christ” (Freston 2001: 156-59).
• In Nigeria, pentecostals and other evangelicals began a concerted effort beginning in 1993 to field candidates for political office at all levels. In 1999, an Assemblies of God member, Anyim Pius Anyim, was elected to the Senate and later became Senate president, the most powerful political position in Nigeria after the president and vice-president. In July 2006, Jerry Gana, a pentecostal layperson and former information minister for President Olusegun Obasanjo, announced he would compete in Nigeria’s presidential elections scheduled for May 2007. Gana, who hails from northern Nigeria, immediately attracted considerable pentecostal support (see Nigeria profile).
• In Kenya, pentecostals actively campaigned against and helped defeat President Mwai Kibaki’s draft constitution in November 2005, largely because it provided for the establishment of Muslim personal law courts (Ranger forthcoming).

Beyond electoral politics, pentecostalism has penetrated important sectors of African public life. In Uganda and Kenya, for example, pentecostals and other evangelicals control numerous radio and TV stations (Bengali 2006). In Nigeria, the pentecostal Redeemed Christian Church of God produces Christian-themed movies that have beaten secular rivals at the box office (Murphy 2006). In 2003, Ghana’s national airline, Ghana Airways, invited a Ghanaian-born, London-based pentecostal evangelist to conduct a “deliverance service” to save the organization from its recurring financial failures (Asamoah-Gyadu 2005).

In addition to the movement’s sheer demographic growth, several factors have stimulated pentecostalism’s recent surge of public activism:

• DemocratizationAccording to Freedom House, in 1976, only three African countries were considered free, while 18 were considered partly free and 28 not free. By 2006, the number of African countries considered free had nearly quadrupled, to 11, while 24 are now considered partly free and 14 not free (numbers compiled from Freedom House 2006a and 2006b). Although the democratization process has been decidedly uneven, it has given many Africans – pentecostals included – a greater opportunity to organize politically and influence their governments. In eight of the 11 countries Freedom House classifies as free, pentecostal and charismatic communities represent more than 10% of the national populations.
• “Top-down” mobilizationAs some African heads of state have faced deepening political crises and increasing criticism from mainline church leaders, they have turned to pentecostals for religious and moral legitimation – which some pentecostal leaders have been eager to provide. In the early 1990s, for example, as Gerry Rawlings of Ghana and Daniel arap Moi of Kenya faced criticism from abroad as well as from their countries’ mainline churches, pentecostal and other evangelical church leaders helped make up the legitimacy deficit by praising their “godly leadership” and urging followers to support them (Gifford 1998: 86; Freston 2001: 146-47). More recently, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, despite being a Roman Catholic, has sought closer ties with some pentecostal and evangelical leaders, in which he has been assisted by the fact that his second wife and sister are members of the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA). On June 26, 2006, Mugabe presided at a Zimbabwe National Day of Prayer in Harare. The event was boycotted by prominent Catholic and Anglican leaders but it featured members of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, which both include pentecostal members.
• Muslim activismActivism by Muslim politicians and groups in parts of sub-Saharan Africa has proven another stimulant to pentecostal and evangelical public involvement. For example, Nigeria’s entry into the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 and the spread of Sharia law in northern Nigeria in the late 1990s prompted greater pentecostal and evangelical participation in national debate and decision-making (Ojo 2004: 6; Amadi 2004: 3). As noted above, Kenyan pentecostals joined other Christians in 2005 in opposing a draft constitution because it provided for personal law courts for Muslims. In several countries, including Nigeria, Zambia, Kenya and Uganda, pentecostals have organized public evangelistic campaigns to counter the perceived ascendancy of Muslims. For example, a pentecostal minister in Zambia is organizing an effort he dubs “operation checkmate” to promote Christianity and contain Islam in the eastern part of the country (Kristof 2005).

It is clear that pentecostalism is a growing force in Africa at a time when foreign policymakers in the United States are becoming more conscious of the strategic importance of the continent (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). If pentecostal churches continue to grow in numbers and activism, the long-range political impact of Africa’s vibrant pentecostal community will become increasingly difficult to ignore.

Origins and Growth

• 1910s-1920s: In 1912, the first pentecostal missionary arrives from Finland. In the same year, a charismatic movement known as Roho (“Spirit”) emerges in the Anglican Church. In 1918, North Americans establish a mission that later affiliates with the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada. The churches resulting from this mission become independent in 1965 and are renamed the Pentecostal Assemblies of God. By 2002, East Africa is home to some 5,000 of these churches (Anderson 2004: 111-12; Garrard 2003: 150-51).

• 1930s: In the 1930s, missionary opposition to female circumcision spurs the creation of indigenous churches, including the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa. The East African Revival, which began in Rwanda, reaches Kenya by 1937, drawing many Protestants toward evangelical and charismatic Christianity (Karanja forthcoming: 113, 138; Morgan 2006; Droz 2001: 25-27; Kimani, Feb. 27, 2006).

• 1940s-1950s: In 1942, a pentecostal evangelist founds the African Israel Church Nineveh after breaking with the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada. Two significant pentecostal denominations emerge, the Pentecostal Evangelical Fellowship of Africa, started by U.S. missionaries in 1944, and the Full Gospel Churches of Kenya, started by Finnish missionaries in 1949. In 1957, American evangelist T.L. Osborn sets up a healing mission on the Kenyan Coast. Osborn’s movement, with its emphasis on healing and its readiness to confront issues like witchcraft, attracts many followers (Anderson 1977: 168-69; Anderson 2004: 112-13).

• 1960s-1970s: After independence in 1963, indigenous churches grow rapidly and many foreign missionaries arrive. In 1967, American pentecostal Dale Brown founds the Kenya Assemblies of God, which joins with the Assemblies of God U.S in 1972. A survey in the early 1990s finds that the Assemblies of God is Nairobi’s fastest growing denomination, with an annual growth rate of 38% (Garrard 2003: 153; Maxwell 2000).

• In 1970, Joe Kayo establishes the pentecostal Deliverance Church of Kenya, an indigenous ministry that attracts urban youth. The Deliverance Church becomes an important member of the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya, an umbrella body formed in 1976 of mostly pentecostal and charismatic churches (Anderson 1977: 165; Karanja forthcoming: 110).

• 1980s-present: Between 1972 and 1986, the number of pentecostal churches in Nairobi doubles (Droz 2001: 27). Televangelism, prosperity theology and crusades by Western preachers become more prevalent (Ombuor and Ayieko 2004). In early 2006, American pentecostal preacher T. D. Jakes draws nearly one million people to Uhuru Park in Nairobi (The Economist 2006). In 2003, Kenya’s population is approximately 63% Protestant and 26% Catholic (Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey 2003).

• The Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey suggests that renewalists — including charismatics and pentecostals — account for more than half of Kenya’s population. The survey also finds that approximately seven-in-ten Protestants in Kenya are either pentecostal or charismatic, and about one third of Kenyan Catholics surveyed can be classified as charismatic.

Religion and Politics

• In 1952, the anti-colonial Mau Mau uprising is launched largely by members of the Kikuyu tribe. The African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa supports the Mau Mau and encourages its members to join the armed struggle. The colonial government responds by imposing a state of emergency and closing down its churches and schools. Churches affiliated with the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa are not reopened until independence in 1963 (Karanja forthcoming: 113-14).

• In 1964, Jomo Kenyatta becomes independent Kenya’s first president. Relations between Kenyatta and the dominant mainline churches, such as the Presbyterian Church and the Anglican Church, are relatively amicable during his presidency. Kenyatta is Kikuyu, as are most mainline church leaders, and his brother-in-law is the first African bishop of the Kenyan Anglican Church (Freston 2001: 147).

Pentecostals and President Daniel arap Moi, 1978-2002

• When Kenyatta dies in 1978, Daniel arap Moi becomes president. Moi is a member of the Kalenjin tribe, and he reduces Kikuyu influence in government. He is also an active member of the African Inland Church, a non-pentecostal evangelical church founded in 1895. State media portray Moi as a God-fearing leader, and he bases his one-party politics partly on Christianity. The only legal party is the government party, the Kenya African National Union (Karanja forthcoming: 129-30; Freston 2001: 147).

• In the 1980s, mounting opposition to Moi comes from the mainline church leaders of the National Council of Churches of Kenya. Member churches tend to be mainline in denomination, evangelical in theology and Luo-Kikuyu in ethnicity, though the Council also includes some pentecostal churches. Outspoken Council critics of Moi include Anglican bishops David Gitari, John Henry Okullu and Alexander Muge, along with Presbyterian leader Timothy Njoya. In contrast, the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya, whose churches tend to be evangelical and pentecostal in denomination and theology and Kalenjin in ethnicity, largely supports Moi (Karanja forthcoming: 109-10; Freston 2001: 148-49).

• In 1986, the ruling party proposes to abolish the secret ballot and replace it with public “queue” voting. The Council, under the chairmanship of Bishop Gitari, leads the opposition, while Fellowship leaders remain silent. Gitari’s vocal anti-government stance prompts some less established Council churches, including the Full Gospel Church, the United Pentecostal Church, the African Inland Church and the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa, to leave the Council and join the Fellowship (Karanja forthcoming: 118-25).

• As opposition to one-party rule intensifies in the early 1990s, the Fellowship more openly supports Moi and in the process wins government favor. One of Moi’s strongest and most vocal supporters is Arthur Kitonga of the pentecostal Redeemed Gospel Church of Kenya. The government increasingly uses Kitonga to attract the support of other Fellowship leaders. As Moi faces increasing pressure to lift the ban on opposition parties, he attends a Redeemed Gospel Church of Kenya service in which the preacher delivers a forceful pro-Moi sermon (Karanja forthcoming: 125-27; Freston 2001: 146).

• Beginning in 1999, the ruling Kenyan African National Union and the interfaith Ufungamano Initiative, which includes Muslim, Hindu and mainline church leaders, establish rival constitutional review committees. The ruling party appeals to pentecostal and evangelical churches for support, and in January 2000, the Fellowship organizes a pro-government rally in Nairobi attended by pentecostal Archbishop Samson Gaitho, but it generates little support (Karanja forthcoming: 131-34). In January 2002, in a possible bid for pentecostal backing, Moi orders that schools seized from the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa during the Mau Mau rebellion be returned to the church (U.S. Department of State, 2003).

Post-Moi Politics, 2002-Present

• In December 2002, Kenyan African National Union candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo, is defeated by Mwai Kibaki of the opposition National Rainbow Coalition. With the exception of the African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa, which publicly supports Kenyatta, most pentecostal and charismatic churches oppose direct participation in the campaign (Ranger forthcoming: 365; Miring’uh, Aug. 30, 2002).

• After the 2002 election, pentecostals push for the rejection of a draft constitution proposed by President Kibaki because it permits abortion under certain conditions and provides for Islamic Kadhis courts. Kadhis courts, known elsewhere as Sharia courts, adjudicate cases pertaining to Muslim personal law and have no jurisdiction over non-Muslims. In alliance with Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants, pentecostals form a new body called the Kenya Church to oppose the establishment of the Kadhis courts. While most pentecostals argue that the constitution should be secular, the Pentecostal Assemblies of God is among the few who respond to the Kadhis courts provision by supporting a proposal for Christian courts (The East African Standard, Aug. 25, 2005; Ranger 2004: 365; Amran, Aug. 30, 2005).

• In 2003, the interfaith Ufungamano Initiative launches an independent constitutional drafting process. After Christians in the initiative oppose the Kadhis courts provision in the new constitution, Muslims leave in protest. In May 2004, 34 Protestant churches threaten to take legal action to expunge the Kadhis courts provision (U.S. Department of State, 2004).

• In early 2004, mainline Christian leaders spearhead the call for a referendum on Kibaki’s draft constitution. After Kibaki schedules a referendum for November 2005, the Kenya Church launches a “No” campaign. In June 2005, a coalition of Christian churches unveils an alternative draft constitution, supported by most pentecostal leaders, which excludes Kadhis courts (Openda, March 25, 2004; The East African Standard, Aug. 25, 2005; U.S. Department of State, 2005; Kivuitu, Nov. 21, 2005; Kanina, Nov. 26, 2005).

• In the November 2005 referendum, 58% of the public votes against the draft constitution. Following the constitutional defeat, opposition leaders hold a breakfast meeting with the Kenya Church bishops to celebrate. At an opposition rally in Nairobi, pentecostal pastors lead the crowd in prayer (Daily Nation, Nov. 26, 2005; Kanina, Nov. 26, 2005).

• In August 2006, a Kenyan newspaper reports that a group of evangelical activists calling itself the “People’s Movement” is recruiting Christian politicians to run in parliamentary elections scheduled for December 2007. The most significant face of the movement is Parliament member Onesmus Kihara Mwangi, who enters the political limelight in 2005 by strongly criticizing Muslim influences on the draft constitution. Mwangi claims that 20 “born-again” Christians already serve in parliament and that more than 100 will seek election in 2007 (Ndirangu, Aug. 24, 2006).

• Also in August 2006, top representatives of Kenyan African National Union and the Liberal Democratic Party officially register the Orange Democratic Movement, composed of those who oppose the Kadhis courts, as a new political party to compete in the 2007 general elections (Kenya Times, Aug. 25, 2006).

Origins and Growth

• 1910s-1920s: Around 1910, an Anglican deacon launches an indigenous prophetic movement that later becomes the Christ Army Church. Following an influenza epidemic in 1918, revivals flare within the mission churches and the Christ Army Church. Spirit-filled groups also expand, including those known by the Yoruba word Aladura (“praying people”). Early Aladura churches include the Eternal Sacred Order of the Cherubim and Seraphim Society, founded in 1925, and the Church of the Lord (Aladura), founded in 1930. Around 1918, an Anglican forms a prayer group known as the Precious Stone (Diamond) Society to heal influenza victims. The group leaves the Anglican Church in the early 1920s and affiliates with Faith Tabernacle, a church based in Philadelphia (Anderson 2001: 80-82; Gaiya 2002: 5).

• 1930s-1940s: During the 1930s, Joseph Babalola of Faith Tabernacle leads a revival that converts thousands. In 1932, his movement initiates ties with the pentecostal Apostolic Church of Great Britain after coming into conflict with colonial authorities, but the association dissolves over the use of modern medicine. In 1941, Babalola founds the independent Christ Apostolic Church, which is estimated to have over a million members by 1990 (Anderson 2001: 86-87). Foreign pentecostal denominations such as the Welsh Apostolic Church (1931), the Assemblies of God (1939) and the Foursquare Gospel Church (1954) are also introduced during this period.

• 1950s: In the 1950s the Celestial Church of Christ arrives in western Nigeria from Benin. The church rapidly expands into northern Nigeria and becomes one of Africa’s largest Aladura churches. In 1952, a former member of the Cherubim and Seraphim society, Pa Josiah Akindayomi, founds the Redeemed Christian Church of God. Under Enoch Adejare Adeboye, the church becomes increasingly pentecostal in theology and practice and grows from an estimated 42 congregations in 1980 to around 7,000 in 2004, with followers in more than 90 countries, including the U.S. (Anderson 2001: 85: Murphy, March 25, 2006; Mahtani, April 26, 2005; Ojo 2004: 4).

• 1960s-1970s: Originating in evangelical student revivals, a wave of pentecostal expansion spawns new churches in the 1960s and 1970s. A leader of this expansion is Benson Idahosa, one of Africa’s most influential pentecostal preachers. Idahosa establishes the Church of God Mission International in 1972. In 1974, the pentecostal umbrella organization Grace of God ministry is founded in eastern Nigeria. The Deeper Life Bible Church is founded in 1975, and soon becomes one of Nigeria’s largest neo-pentecostal churches, with an estimated 350,000 members by 1993 (Ojo 2004: 3; Olupona 2003: 16; Gaiya 2002: 15).

• 1980s-present: New charismatic churches grow throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1986, David Oyedepo founds Living Faith Outreach Worldwide, popularly known as “Winners’ Chapel.” It opens a “Faith Tabernacle” in the suburbs of Lagos in 1999 that seats 50,000 people (Phillips, Nov. 30, 1999; Ojo 2004: 4).

• The Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey suggests that renewalists – including charismatics and pentecostals – account for approximately three-in-ten Nigerians. The survey also finds that roughly six-in-ten Protestants in Nigeria are either pentecostal or charismatic, and three-in-ten Nigerian Catholics surveyed can be classified as charismatic.

Religion and Politics

• Pentecostal political activism originates with the founding of the Christian Students’ Social Movement of Nigeria in 1977. The emphasis of this early activism is on the spiritual forces that govern politics and on bringing about reform through prayer (Freston 2001: 185-86).

• In the 1980s, pentecostals become active in the Christian Association of Nigeria. Founded in 1976, the Association initially includes only Catholic and mainline Protestants, but by 1988 it incorporates churches associated with the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, a pentecostal umbrella group, and the Organization of African Instituted Churches (Freston 2001: 184).

The Period of Islamization, 1979-1999

• Under a succession of Muslim military dictators, the Association becomes increasingly political and functions almost as “an unofficial opposition to the regime” (Freston 2001:184). In 1979, the government proposes the creation of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal, and in the 1988-89 Constituent Assembly, efforts are made to extend the jurisdiction of Sharia courts. Evangelicals and pentecostals in the Youth Wing of the Christian Association of Nigeria organize prayer sessions and pamphleteering campaigns against the Sharia proposal. By 1988, most Association publications challenging the policies of General Ibrahim Babangida’s pro-Islamic administration are produced partly by its Youth Wing (Freston 2001: 182-83; Ojo 2004: 6).

• In 1986, under General Babangida, Nigeria becomes a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, triggering numerous pentecostal protests. Benson Idahosa, the popular pentecostal preacher, threatens to call for a Christian boycott of newspapers favoring Islamization. In 1987, Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, a leading Muslim cleric, stokes further controversy by publicly declaring that Muslims will never allow non-Muslims to assume political leadership in Nigeria. In response, pentecostal leaders ally with other Christians in Kaduna state and launch a campaign to field candidates in the 1988 local government elections (Ojo 2004: 6; Amadi 2004: 3).

• In 1993, both government-sanctioned parties field Muslim candidates for the presidency. Christians vote mostly for M. K. O. Abiola, the candidate of the Social Democratic Party, the southern, Christian-leaning party. When it becomes clear that Abiola will win, the government cancels the result and Christians appeal to the military to relinquish power (Freston 2001: 188).

• Pentecostals and other evangelicals compete at various levels in the 1993 elections, with “priests, deacons, prophets, apostles and evangelists emerg[ing] as governors, deputy governors, local government chairmen and councilors.” In the 1990s, Benson Idahosa encourages Christians to push for political reform (Freston 2001: 185-88).

The Presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999-present

• In the 1999 elections, pentecostals support Olusegun Obasanjo of the People’s Democratic Party. For many Protestant leaders, he symbolizes the restoration of Christian control over government. A Baptist, Obasanjo had served as military ruler from 1976-79. In 1995, while in prison, Obasanjo claims that he is “born again.” Once elected, Obasanjo calls for national prayer and fasting to assure a successful transition. In 1999, pentecostal leaders conduct an all-night prayer meeting for the new president (Freston 2001: 188-89; Ojo 2004: 2, 9).

• Also in the 1999 elections, Assemblies of God member Anyim Pius Anyim of the People’s Democratic Party is elected to the Senate and later becomes Senate president, Nigeria’s most powerful political position after the president and vice-president. After falling out with Obasanjo, he steps down as Senate president in 2003 (Imo forthcoming: 73).

• On Sept. 7, 2001, precipitated in part by the declaration of Sharia in the northern states, violence breaks out in northern Plateau state, which results in the destruction of mosques and churches, including the church of the president of the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria’s Plateau chapter, Reverend Bright O. Ndu. Reverend Ndu, along with the president and superintendent of a Winners’ Chapel congregation, calls for retaliation and self-defense, a departure from an earlier, more passive stance (Imo forthcoming: 96-98).

• In 2002, with presidential elections approaching, Obasanjo claims a divine mandate to win a second term. One of his opponents, Chris Okotie of the Justice Party, also claims a divine mandate to lead Nigeria. Okotie first enters the national limelight in the 1980s as a pop star but later becomes a pentecostal preacher. He seeks the nomination of the National Democratic Party but loses, then switches to the Justice Party, which nominates him. Okotie has announced he will compete in the 2007 elections under the banner of the newly registered Fresh Democratic Party, which he chairs (Ojo 2004: 2; IRINnews.org 2003).

• In the 2003 elections, Obasanjo wins an overwhelming but nevertheless controversial victory, beating his main opponent, Muhammadu Buhari, by two-to-one. EU observers pronounce the elections flawed, and opposition parties reject the results. Before the election, the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria encourages all Nigerians to vote, and its national president, Mike Okonkwo, supports Obasanjo, as does the Christian Association of Nigeria’s president and primate of the Methodist Church of God, Sunday Mbang. At the thanksgiving service closing the inauguration ceremonies, Enoch Adeboye, head of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, likens Obasanjo to the prophet Elisha (Nwachukwu, June 10, 2002; Akinsuyi, Nov. 26, 2001; Olobondiyan and Ohadoma, June 2, 2003).

• In 2005, the Christian Association of Nigeria threatens to boycott the national census scheduled for November if religion is not included in census forms. In a January 2006 meeting with Association leaders, President Obasanjo asks the organization to support the national census, insisting that citizens of all religions are equal under Nigeria’s secular constitution (Okafor and Shiklam, July 5, 2005; Lohor, Jan. 20, 2006).

• In February 2006, the Danish cartoon controversy sparks religious riots. Churches, including pentecostal ones, are destroyed in Borno State, and some pentecostal pastors are killed. Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria president Ayo Oristejafor demands that the federal government guarantee the safety and property of Christians (Eyoboka, Feb. 27, 2006).

• In April 2006, pentecostal evangelist Uma Ukpai expresses dismay over the absence of credible opposition to Obasanjo’s bid for a third term. However, Fellowship president Ayo Oritsejafor argues in May 2006 that a third term in office is not a crime and is a matter for all Nigerians to decide (Isiguzo, April 18, 2006; Ehiremen, May 8, 2006).

• In July 2006, pentecostal layperson Jerry Gana, former information minister for Obasanjo, announces he will compete in the May 2007 presidential elections. Gana, who hails from northern Nigeria, immediately attracts the support of some pentecostal leaders, but he also attracts criticism because he was an adviser in both the Babangida and Abacha military governments (Haruna, July 12, 2006; Ologbondiyan and Okocha, July 5, 2006).

Origins and Growth

• 1890s-1905: In 1895, a former Baptist preacher establishes a church in Johannesburg, which eventually joins the Christian Catholic Church in Zion founded by faith healer John Alexander Dowie in Zion City, Chicago. In 1904, Dowie sends a missionary to oversee his growing South African flock, which by 1905 has about 5,000 members, mostly Zulus (Anderson 2001: 95).

• In 1908, pentecostal missionaries establish the Apostolic Faith Mission in Johannesburg. Many members of Dowie’s church join the Apostolic Faith Mission, but racial segregation creates breakaway churches, including the Catholic Apostolic Holy Spirit Church in Zion, founded around 1910, and the Zion Apostolic Faith Mission, founded in 1920. In 1925, Engenas Lekganyane splits from the latter group to form the Zion Christian Church, which today is South Africa’s largest church. By 1990, the country has more than 6,000 independent African pentecostal churches (Anderson 2000; Anderson 2001: 95-97).

• In 1909, missionaries establish what becomes the Assemblies of God (AG). In 1932, the South African branch separates from its American counterpart. AG churches are unique in apartheid-era pentecostalism in that they eschew racial segregation, although the denomination is divided into autonomous associations that reflect racial differences. In 2002, the church’s branches reunite, making the AG one of the country’s largest classical pentecostal denominations (Anderson 2000; Anderson 2004: 109-10; Hexham and Poewe-Hexham 2003: 228).

• 1960s-1980s: In 1962, Michael Cassidy founds African Enterprise, an evangelical, multiracial organization “open to charismatic experiences” that is modeled on the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association. Cassidy considers apartheid anti-Christian, and he organizes major multiracial Christian events during the apartheid era. In the 1970s and 1980s, neopentecostal churches, such as the Rhema Church and the Durban Christian Center, experience rapid growth. Ray McCauley, who founds Rhema Church in 1979, emerges as one of the country’s most important white neopentecostal leaders, becoming president in 1985 of the newly created International Fellowship of Christian Churches, South Africa’s largest association of charismatic and neopentecostal churches (Hexham and Poewe-Hexham 2003: 231-34).

• 1990s-present: By the late 1990s, pentecostals comprise 10% of the population, with the largest denominations being the Apostolic Faith Mission, Assemblies of God and the Full Gospel Church of God. The mostly black Zionist and Apostolic churches, which constitute a majority of South Africa’s African Instituted Churches (AICs), account for an additional 30% or so of the population (Anderson 2000; Anderson 2001: 93).

• In the Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey, approximately one-in-ten urban respondents in South Africa indicate that they belong to a pentecostal denomination, and more than two-in-ten identify as charismatic, bringing the total for renewalists to roughly one-third of the urban population. Nearly half of Protestants surveyed indicate that they are pentecostal or charismatic, and roughly one-third of South African AIC members identify as charismatic.

Religion and Politics

Pentecostals and Apartheid, 1948-1994

• Most white pentecostals either support apartheid or remain apolitical. The Apostolic Faith Mission, one of the country’s largest pentecostal denominations, is led by an all-white council. Many white church leaders serve in the apartheid government, including Gerrie Wessels, who becomes a National Party senator in 1955 and serves as the Apostolic Faith Mission’s vice-president until 1969 (Anderson 2000).

• Black pentecostal leaders generally show apathy toward political involvement. Nicholas Bhengu, who rises to prominence as a black Assemblies of God leader in the 1950s, condemns political participation as un-Christian and resists nationalist pressure to fight apartheid. In 1950, he launches the “Back to God Crusade” with an emphasis on restoring black dignity and fighting crime while remaining nonpolitical. A November 1959 Time article celebrates Bhengu as “[o]ne of the strongest Christian influences in Africa” (Anderson 2005: 73; Balcomb 2001: 322-29; Anderson 2000).

• The Zion Christian Church also adopts a neutral or apolitical stance, but occasionally appears to legitimate apartheid. In 1985, Bishop Barnabas Lekganyane invites President P. W. Botha to attend the church’s Easter Festival in honor of its 75th anniversary. In the early 1990s, however, Lekganyane builds bridges with the African National Congress (ANC). In 1992, he invites the nation’s three most important political leaders — Nelson Mandela, F. W. de Klerk and Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi — to address his congregation at the church’s Easter Festival. In 1994, the church offers its official support to the ANC (Anderson 2000; Anderson 2001: 104-5; Freston 2001: 173-74).

• Some black pentecostals, including Frank Chikane of the Apostolic Faith Mission, join the anti-apartheid movement. In the 1970s, Chikane joins the Student Christian Movement, which he helps steer toward political activism. In 1975, he joins Reinhard Bonnke’s Christ for All Nations evangelistic ministry. Between 1977 and 1982, the police detain Chikane four times; on one occasion, he is interrogated and tortured by a white deacon of his own church. In 1981, the Apostolic Faith Mission suspends Chikane from the ministry and does not reinstate him until 1990. After becoming general secretary of the South African Council of Churches in 1987, Chikane serves as a mediator between the government and the ANC (Freston 2001: 171; Anderson 2000; Anderson 2004: 109).

• Black pentecostal Cyril Ramaphosa, a member of the Assemblies of God, also actively opposes apartheid and with Chikane leads the Students Christian Movement. When church leaders judge his political activities un-Christian, he leaves the Assemblies of God. Ramaphosa then becomes head of the National Union of Mineworkers and secretary general of the ANC, heading the ANC team that negotiates the end of apartheid. Ramaphosa is elected chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly in 1994, and plays a key role in the ensuing national unity government (Balcomb forthcoming: 329; Anderson 2005: 72).

• In 1985, Chikane and other anti-apartheid church leaders found Concerned Evangelicals, a group opposed to the more conservative Evangelical Fellowship of South Africa. Concerned Evangelicals publishes major statements critiquing apartheid, including the 1985 Kairos Document and the 1986 Evangelical Witness in South Africa. At least half the signatories of the latter are pentecostals. In 1988, a pentecostal group called the Relevant Pentecostal Witness publishes its own anti-apartheid statement. In 1994, the two evangelical organizations merge to form The Evangelical Alliance of South Africa (Anderson 2000; Balcomb 2001: 334; Freston 2001: 171).

• Ray McCauley’s mostly white, neopentecostal Rhema Church becomes politically engaged shortly before the end of apartheid. McCauley eschews politics until 1990 when representatives of 97 churches, including Rhema and Apostolic Faith Mission, sign the anti-apartheid Rustenburg Declaration. At the signing, McCauley apologizes for not taking a stance against apartheid earlier. In 1991, McCauley serves on the steering committee for the National Peace Accord with Frank Chikane; he also serves as a behind-the-scenes negotiator for the ANC (Freston 2001: 172; Balcomb forthcoming: 311-12).

• In 1992-1993, a survey conducted in Soshanguve, north of Pretoria, shows that many black pentecostals support the ANC and other nationalist organizations, despite their churches’ apolitical stance. It also suggests that many black pentecostals believe that their churches should more actively oppose apartheid (Anderson 2000).

The Post-Apartheid Era, 1994-Present

• In 1994, pentecostals and evangelicals found the African Christian Democratic Party, with opposition to abortion and homosexuality as key planks of its platform. In 1994, the party’s leader, Kenneth Meshoe, pastor of the pentecostal Hope of Glory Tabernacle, is elected to parliament, along with another party candidate. In 1999, the party’s parliamentary representation increases to seven. Pentecostal leaders such as McCauley, Chikane and Moss Nthla, the general secretary of The Evangelical Alliance of South Africa, criticize the party’s focus on conservative morality (Anderson 2000; Anderson 2005: 72; Freston 2004: 94-95).

• Post-apartheid South Africa sees the formation of smaller Christian parties, such as the Simunye in Christ Organization and the United Christian Democratic Party. The latter is led by Lucas Mangope, an AG member and former president of Bophuthatswana, one of the four “bantustans” the apartheid regime created and considered independent. The party is more regional than religious, with support heavily concentrated in the Northwest Province. It wins three seats in 1999 and in 2004 (Anderson 2000; Freston 2004: 97-99).

• In 1996, the divisions of the Apostolic Faith Mission officially unite. At the highly publicized unity celebration, newly elected president Isak Burger embraces Chikane and apologizes for the sins of the church during the apartheid era. In the same year, Chikane is elected vice president of the denomination. In 1997, Chikane is elected to the National Executive of the ANC, and in 1999, he becomes director-general in the office of President Thabo Mbeki (Anderson 2004: 109; Anderson 2000; Freston 2001: 171).

• In 1997, representatives of pentecostal and Zionist churches are invited to address the Truth and Reconciliation Commission chaired by Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu. McCauley confesses the failures of white pentecostals during apartheid (Anderson 2005).

• In 2000, the Rhema Church complex is used for the funeral of Alfred Nzo, who had served as the secretary general of the ANC between 1969 and 1991 and as South Africa’s minister of foreign affairs from 1994 to 1999 (Balcomb forthcoming: 314).

• In 2006, four members of the African Christian Democratic Party hold seats in parliament, including pentecostal pastor and party founder Meshoe.

Akinsuyi, Yemi. 2001. “Election 2003 Shall Be Well, Says Mbang.” This Day. November 26.

Amadi, Sam. 2004. “Theological Ambivalence and Democratic Accountability.” Summary of presentation given for the Pentecostal-Civil Society Dialogue, Lagos, Nigeria. October 18.

Amran, Athman. 2005. “Christians Urged to Be Sincere on Vote.” The East African Standard. August 30.

Anderson, Allan. 2005. “New African Initiated Pentecostalism and Charismatics in South Africa.” Journal of Religion in Africa, 35 (1): 68-92.

Anderson, Allan. 2004. An Introduction to Pentecostalism: Global Charismatic Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, Allan. 2001. African Reformation: African Initiated Christianity in the 20th Century. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc.

Anderson, Allan. 2000. “Pentecostals and Apartheid in South Africa during Ninety Years 1908-1998.” Cyberjournal for Pentecostal-Charismatic Research.

Anderson, W.B. 1977. The Church in East Africa 1840-1974. Dodoma: Central Tanganyika Press.

Ayieko, Francis and Joe Ombuor. 2004. “Making Money in God’s Name.” The Nation. June 11.

Balcomb, Anthony. Forthcoming. “Evangelicals and the Democratization of South Africa.” In Granger (ed.) forthcoming, 297-347.

Burgess, Stanley M., and Eduard M. van der Maas, eds. 2003. The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements. Rev. ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.

Daily Nation. 2005. “Orange Movement Warn President Kibaki Over New Cabinet.” November 26.

Droz, Yvan. 2001. “The Local Roots of the Kenyan Pentecostal Revival: Conversion, Healing, Social and Political Mobility.” Les Cahiers de l’IFRA. Number 20, 23-44.

Economist. 2006. “Halleluja! The Rise of Pentecostalism Could Change the Face of Kenya.” July 20.

The East African Standard. 2005. “Churches Group Says ‘No’ as Kibaki Endorses Bill.” August 25.

Ehiremen, Napoleon. 2006. “3rd Term, Matter for All Nigerians – Oritsejafor.” Daily Champion. May 8.

Eyoboka, Sam. 2006. “Okogie, Oritsajefor, Others Warn: Those Who Killed Our People Must Not Go Scot Free.” Vanguard. February 27.

Freston, Paul. 2004. Protestant Political Parties: A Global Survey. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Freston, Paul. 2001. Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gaiya, Musa A.B. 2002. “The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria.” Occasional Paper of the Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen. July.

Garrard, D.J. 2003. “Kenya.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 150 – 155.

Haruna, Mohammed. 2006. “Why Jerry Gana Will Not Be President.” Daily Trust. July 12.

Hexham and Poewe-Hexham. 2003. “South Africa.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 227-238.

Imo, Cyril. Forthcoming. “Evangelicals, Muslims, and Democracy: With Particular Reference to the Declaration of Sharia in Northern Nigeria.” In Granger forthcoming, 56 – 103.

IRINnews.org. 2003. “IRIN Web Special on Nigeria.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Isiguzo, Christopher. 2006. “Cleric Decries Absence of Credible Opposition.” This Day. April 18.

Karanja, John. Forthcoming. “Evangelical Attitudes Toward Democracy in Kenya.” In Ranger (ed.) forthcoming, 104 – 145.

Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey. 2003. The Central Bureau of Statistics.

Kenya Times. 2006. “ODM Kenya Born.” August 25.

Kimani, Peter. 2006. “Moi Succession: Insights into the Past and the Future.” The Nation. February 27.

Kivuitu, Samuel. 2005. “Give Peace a Chance.” The Nation. November 21.

Lazarus, Sule. 2004. “Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria Declares Interest in Politics.” Vanguard. November 17.

Lohor, Josephine. 2006. “Obasanjo Tasks Christian Leaders On National Census.” This Day. January 20.

Mahtani, Dino. 2005. “Vast market for Salvation Superstars.” Financial Times. April 26.

Maxwell, David. 2000. “African Gifts of the Spirit: Fundamentalism and the Rise of the Born-Again Movement in Africa.” In Martyn Percy (ed.), Fundamentalism, Church and Society. London: SPCK.

Miring’uh, Eliud. 2002. “Wamae Dismisses Defection Remarks.” The East African Standard. August 30.

Morgan, Timothy. 2006. “Africa’s Azusa Street.” Christianity Today. March 28.

Murphy, Brian. 2006. “African Christians a Growing Dynamic Force.” Associated Press. March 25.

Ndirangu, Irungu. 2006. “Church Leaders Eye State House.” The People. August 24.

Nwachukwu, Onyinyechi. 2002. “2003 – Pentecostal Leaders to Embark on Enlightenment Campaign.” Vanguard. June 10.

Ojo, Matthews A. 2004. “Pentecostalism, Public Accountability and Governance in Nigeria.” Paper presented for the Pentecostal-Civil Society Dialogue, Lagos, Nigeria. October 18.

Okafor, Ndidi and John Shiklam. 2005. “Beware, Bishop Warns Obasanjo.” Daily Champion. July 5.

Ologbondiyan, Kola and Chikas Ohadoma. 2003. “Obasanjo – I’m A Brand New President.” This Day. June 2.

Ologbondiyan, Kola and Chuks Okocha. 2006. “Northern Christians Rally Behind Gana.” This Day. July 5.

Olupona, J.K. 2003. “West Africa.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 11 – 21.

Openda, Francis. 2004. “Church Leaders Call for Referendum.” The East African Standard. March 25.

Phillips, Barnaby. 1999. “Church of the 50,000 Faithful.” BBC News. November 30.

Ranger, Terence O., ed. Forthcoming. Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2005. “Kenya: International Religious Freedom Report 2005.”

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2004. “Kenya: International Religious Freedom Report 2004.”

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2003. “Kenya: International Religious Freedom Report 2003.”

Pentecostals represent a very small proportion of Asia’s population of nearly 4 billion people. This contrasts sharply with pentecostalism’s share of the population in parts of Africa and Latin America, which often exceeds 10-20 percent. According to 2005 figures from the World Christian Database, pentecostals represent 3.5% of Asia’s population, or about 138 million people. This total includes individuals belonging to classical pentecostal denominations such as the Assemblies of God that were founded in the early 20th century, as well as those belonging to neo-pentecostal denominations or churches that were formed more recently, such as the Jesus is Lord Church in the Philippines. Charismatic members of non-pentecostal denominations number 25 million, or less than 1% of the population. As recently as 1970, pentecostals and charismatics combined represented no more than 0.5% of the region’s population.

Christians in general are a small, and sometimes embattled, minority in many Asian nations. In most countries – including China, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam – Christians comprise no more than 10% of the population and face varying degrees of political and societal pressures. The two major exceptions to this pattern are the Philippines, where the population is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, and South Korea, where Christians represent about 26% of the population, according to the 1995 census.

While still a relatively small fraction of the population, the number of Christians in Asia has grown significantly in the 20th century, outpacing Asia’s rapid population growth. According to the World Christian Database, the number of Christians in Asia increased from approximately 22 million adherents in 1900 to 101 million in 1970. Today, according to these estimates, Christians comprise 9% of the continent’s population, or nearly 351 million people. Protestants, including Anglicans and independents, made up 0.5% of Asia’s population in 1900, but grew to 6% by 2005. Some experts believe that the World Christian Database estimates for Christian and Protestant adherence in Asia may be too high, due to overestimates in China, India and Indonesia (Jenkins 2001: 223-224; Hsu, et al. 2006: 22-23). But even if these estimates were reduced by half, they would still yield a Protestant population of more than 100 million.

Pentecostals and charismatics are a minority among Asia’s Protestants. While many of Korea’s Protestant churches have adopted pentecostal beliefs and worship styles, charismatic influences have been minimal in some major Protestant churches in Asia, such as the 2-million-member Church of South India (Bergunder forthcoming; Satyavrata 1999: 207). Still, pentecostal and charismatic movements are gaining ground. According to one expert on global pentecostalism, “at least a third” of Asia’s Christian population is now charismatic or pentecostal, and the proportion is ‘steadily rising” (Anderson 2004: 123).

Although Asia’s pentecostal growth has been modest in comparison with pentecostal growth in Africa or Latin America, the continent played a crucial role in pentecostalism’s beginnings. Influential pentecostal revivals began in Asia before the Azusa Street Revival took off in Los Angeles in April 1906.

Revivals in southern India in the 1860s and 1870s featured charismatic gifts, including glossolalia, or speaking in tongues. These revivals set the stage for pentecostal revivals in India at the turn of the century (McGee and Burgess 2003: 118-119). In January 1905, missionaries and indigenous Christians, under the leadership of Brahmin convert Pandita Ramabai, gathered in western India (present-day Maharashtra) to pray “for a special outpouring of the Holy Spirit on all Christians of every land.” Inspired by revivals that occurred in Wales and Australia in 1904, Ramabai’s mission soon witnessed numerous charismatic manifestations, including speaking in tongues. Some of these manifestations occurred before reports of the Azusa Street Revival reached India, and many of those caught up in the revival were veteran missionaries who quickly carried what they experienced to other parts of India and the world (Anderson 2006: 37-39; McGee and Burgess 2003: 121).

Reports of the Indian revival soon spread throughout Asia. In 1906, an American missionary brought reports of the pentecostal revivals in India and Wales to a revival meeting in Seoul, Korea. The Seoul meeting grew out of a series of revivals that began in 1903 in Wonsan, Korea. These revivals placed a heavy emphasis on the Holy Spirit and helped set the stage for a major revival in Pyongyang in 1907 that involved more than a thousand people, some of whom reported receiving charismatic gifts. These events in turn influenced revivals in China, including the Manchurian revival in 1908 (Y. Lee 2001: 73-76; Anderson 2005: 182).

As early as 1906, the Asian revivals were featured in the pages of the official chronicle of the Azusa Street Revival, The Apostolic Faith, published in Los Angeles. Reports of the Asian revivals helped persuade early pentecostals that they were part of a worldwide movement (Bergunder 2005: 182-183). American missionary Minnie Abrams, a key participant in the Indian revival, sent a booklet about the revival to her friend and former Moody Bible Institute classmate Mae Hoover, then a Methodist missionary in Chile with her husband, Willis Hoover. After reading Abrams’s account, the Methodist churches in Chile organized a similar pentecostal revival, which began in 1909. Chilean pentecostalism thus has its roots in India rather than in Los Angeles (Anderson 2006: 39-40, 47).

Since these early beginnings, the growth of pentecostalism has varied significantly across Asia. The Philippines and South Korea have particularly high percentages of pentecostals and charismatics; adherents make up more than 15% of the population in both countries, according to the World Christian Database. In China, Indonesia, India, Lebanon, Malaysia and Singapore, pentecostals and charismatics combined represent between 2-6% of the national population. At the lower end are Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam, as well as many other countries in Central Asia and the Middle East, where pentecostals and charismatics represent less than 2% of the population.

Despite their minority status, pentecostals have become an increasingly visible presence in much of Asia. Korean pentecostals boast the world’s largest church, Yoido Full Gospel Church, which is located in Seoul’s equivalent of Manhattan and claims a membership of more than 700,000. In the Philippines, the neopentecostal Jesus is Lord Church, founded in 1978, has quickly built a membership of 300,000. As in Latin America, pentecostalism’s sudden expansion in the Philippines has led some to see it as a challenge to the dominant Catholic Church, though the largest expression of Philippine pentecostalism is taking place inside the Church, in the form of El Shaddai, a Catholic charismatic group with more than 7 million adherents (Anderson 2004: 1, 131-132). India, which has an overwhelmingly Hindu majority, has seen the dramatic growth of pentecostal mega-churches, including New Life Fellowship in Mumbai and Assemblies of God churches in Chennai and Bangalore (Hedlund 2005; McGivering, Dec. 6, 2002). Muslim-majority Indonesia has also experienced rapid pentecostal growth since the mid-1960s. The country’s largest pentecostal denomination, the Pentecostal Church of Indonesia, had an estimated 2 million members in 2001, and pentecostal mega-churches have appeared in Jakarta and Surabaya (Robinson 2005: 335-340).

The expansion of the pentecostal population has brought increased involvement in Asian politics and public life. For example, David Yonggi Cho, the pastor of Korea’s Yoido Full Gospel Church, has forged close ties with former Korean president and Presbyterian elder Kim Young Sam, and he has hosted pro-American and pro-Israel gatherings and rallies. Yoido church members have been among the country’s most vocal advocates of human rights and religious freedom for North Korea (Marquand, June 11, 2003). In the Philippines, Jesus is Lord founder Eddie Villanueva openly endorsed Fidel Ramos, the country’s first Protestant president, before running for president himself in 2004. Villanueva and Catholic charismatic leader Mario Velarde continue to be prominent players in Philippine politics.

At the same time, the relatively small population of pentecostals in most of Asia has meant that pentecostal political activism has been less sustained, less organized and less influential than in Latin American and Africa. Christians in general, and pentecostals in particular, are usually too few in number to launch major political movements or to secure significant political representation.

Despite these low levels of direct political activism, pentecostal and other evangelical communities in Asia have been the focus of intense and often violent public controversy. Muslim groups in Indonesia, Hindu groups in India and Buddhist groups in Sri Lanka have accused pentecostals and other evangelicals of undertaking aggressive “proselytization” campaigns, aided by Western personnel and funding (Baviskar, Nov. 26, 2005; Bartholomeusz 1999; Robinson 2005). In several Asian countries, such efforts to convert non-Christians have generated a vociferous political reaction, including:

• Government suppression of pentecostal churches in China, such as the True Jesus Church (Zhaoming 2005).
• The passage of anti-conversion laws in several Indian states, including Tamil Nadu in 2002 (rescinded in 2004), Gujarat in 2003 and Rajasthan in 2006 (U.S. Department of State 2006a).
• The proposal of a national anti-conversion law in Sri Lanka, under consideration by a special parliamentary committee since April 2006 (U.S. Department of State 2006c).
• Numerous physical attacks on pentecostal and evangelical churches and pastors in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and other Asian countries, particularly since the mid-1990s (Human Rights Watch 1999; Robinson 2005; U.S. Department of State 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).

In some Asian countries, such as India and Sri Lanka, majority religious communities regard pentecostal expansion as a threat to religion-based national identities. In these countries, as well as others, including Myanmar and Vietnam, Protestantism has historically been associated with separatist ethnic movements (among the Montagnard and Karen peoples, for example) and is thus seen as a threat to national unity and territorial integrity. Throughout Asia, the perception of Christians as “foreign,” “anti-national” and “neo-colonial” is far more entrenched and pervasive than in Africa or Latin America (Jenkins 2001: 175-177, 182-185).

In this context, the growth of pentecostalism in Asia almost inevitably causes public debate and political controversy. Given Asia’s growing strategic and economic importance, these religiously charged conflicts are likely to become increasingly consequential for the future of the region and the world.

Origins and Growth

• 1700-1900: In the 1700s, German Lutherans and British Baptists establish Protestant missions in southern and western India (Frykenberg 2003). In 1860, revivals in the U.S. and Europe inspire an Indian Anglican to lead a pentecostal revival in southern India (Burgess 2001: 87-88). In the 1860s and 1870s, Protestant churches in southern India attract many Dalits (or “untouchables,” Indians outside of the caste system). Beginning in the 1880s, Protestantism also grows in Punjab, in northern India. Christian conversions inspire Hindu counter-movements, including the Arya Samaj, founded in 1875 (Forrester 1991: 65-93; Jordens 1991: 215-230).

• 1900-1910: Inspired by revivals in Wales and Australia, a 1905 revival in Welsh Presbyterian missions in present-day Meghalaya helps spark Christian growth among tribal peoples (Bergunder forthcoming; Downs 1994: 170-171). Charismatic manifestations, such as glossolalia, or speaking in tongues, occur in present-day Maharashtra at the Mukti Mission run by Brahmin convert Pandita Ramabai, and soon spread to present-day Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, Gujarat and Bengal. In 1907, an American missionary couple who had participated in the Azusa Street Revival arrives in present-day Kolkata claiming the gift of speaking in “missionary” tongues, including Bengali. Though their claim is disproved, they propound the “initial evidence” teaching that glossolalia is an essential mark of the Spirit, and many people across India subsequently claim to speak in tongues (Wacker 2001: 49; McGee and Burgess 2003: 119, 120-121).

• 1910-1960: An American woman is the first Assemblies of God (AG) missionary to India, settling in southern India in 1915. In 1918, the Indian AG is formally established, and in 1927, an American missionary establishes the first permanent AG Bible college outside the U.S. in present-day Kerala. Indian pastor K. E. Abraham leaves the AG in 1929 and founds the Indian Pentecostal Church, one of India’s largest pentecostal denominations. The denomination splits in 1953, leading to the creation of the Sharon Fellowship Church (McGee and Burgess 2003: 122-124; Satyavrata 1999: 205; Bergunder forthcoming). Between 1900 and independence in 1947, thousands of Hindus in southern India convert to Anglican and Baptist forms of Protestantism. According to the Indian census, the Christian growth rate between 1881 and 1931 is 338 percent, compared with 27 percent for Hindus (Oddie 1991a; 1991b: 2-3).

• 1960-present: This period sees the rapid growth of neo-pentecostal churches, such as the New Life Fellowship, founded in 1968, which has about 1,500 house churches in Mumbai and 3,000 nationwide by 1996. By the late 1970s, the leadership of the AG and other pentecostal churches becomes indigenous. A 1988 study finds that more than 3,000 indigenous pentecostal and charismatic missionaries work among non-Christians (Satyavrata 1999: 206-207, 218 nn. 16-17; Bergunder forthcoming). By 1995, the Assemblies of God becomes India’s largest pentecostal denomination, claiming 300,000 members. The Indian Pentecostal Church has more than 50,000 members, concentrated in southern India. Pentecostals in southern India are estimated to total about 1 million in 1994. The AG church in Chennai becomes one of India’s largest churches, growing to some 20,000 members by 2002 (McGivering, Dec. 6, 2002).

• Between 1971 and 2001, census figures show a decline in the percentage of the Christian population, from 2.6% to 2.3% (Oddie 1991b: 2-3). However, Christianity continues to grow rapidly in northeast India. Of seven northeast states, Nagaland is majority-Christian by 1961 and two more, Mizoram and Meghalaya, are majority-Christian by 1991 (Fernandes forthcoming).

• The Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey of localities in three Indian states with relatively high percentages of Christians – Meghalaya, Kerala and Tamil Nadu – found that more than one-in-ten Christians interviewed consider themselves charismatic or pentecostal.

Religion and Politics

Politics under British Rule, to 1947:

• Between 1909 and 1935, British reforms divide the Indian population into a general electorate and separate electorates representing Dalits and minority religions (Christians, Muslims and Sikhs). Dalit Christians are placed in the Christian electorate. Most Protestants, including evangelical leaders such as Bishop V. S. Azariah, criticize the policy of separate electorates for politicizing Christian conversion and alienating Christians from the national mainstream (Webster 1992: 77-85; Mallampalli 2004: 121-156).

• In 1914, Protestants organize the All-India Conference of Indian Christians partly to enhance their influence with provincial governments and British administrators (Webster 1992: 85-86).

• After Dalit leader B. R. Ambedkar declares in 1935 that Dalits should abandon Hinduism for a more egalitarian religion, nationalist leader Mohandas Gandhi strongly condemns Christian efforts to convert Dalits and instead urges the removal of untouchability from Hinduism (Harper 2000: 291-353). In 1936, Christian Dalits are ruled ineligible to receive government benefits otherwise reserved for Dalits, including educational quotas and legislative seats (Webster 1992: 116). Between 1936 and 1946, many independent princely states in northern India institute anti-conversion laws (S. C. H. Kim 2003: 23-39).

Post-Independence Debates on Religious Conversion, 1947-1996:

• During debates between 1947 and 1949 in the post-independence Constituent Assembly, Christians strongly support a draft article that protects the right to profess, practice and “propagate” religion. Key Congress Party leaders support the Christian position, and in 1950 the Assembly ratifies the Constitution with protection for the right of religious propagation. Jawaharlal Nehru helps to defeat subsequent attempts, in 1955 and 1960, to limit this right by restricting conversion (Webster 1992: 133).

• A 1950 presidential order excludes non-Hindus from legislative, educational and professional positions reserved for Dalits. Amendments in 1956 and 1990 allow Sikhs and Buddhists to be eligible for such positions, but not Christians (Freston 2001: 86).

• While many mainline Protestants are actively involved in Indian politics before and after independence, many pentecostals conform to strict “holiness” teachings that condemn secular pursuits like politics. Interviews with southern Indian pentecostal leaders in the 1990s suggest that most believe that active political involvement is incompatible with holy living, though many pentecostals vote in elections (Bergunder forthcoming).

• In the 1960s, Christian growth in northeastern and central India generates unease among some Hindus. The National Volunteer Corps, India’s main Hindu nationalist organization, established in 1925, founds a revivalist organization, the World Hindu Council, in 1964. One of its main purposes is to counter Christian conversions among tribal groups (Katju 2003: 11).

• In 1967 and 1968, two tribal-belt states, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, seek to discourage Christian conversion by passing “freedom of religion” acts that criminalize coerced or fraudulent religious conversion. The Supreme Court upholds these laws in 1977, and Arunachal Pradesh passes a similar law in 1978. Later in 1978, a national anti-conversion bill is introduced in the Indian Parliament but it fails when the government in power collapses in 1979 (S. C. H. Kim 2003: 76-84). Some pentecostals in Bangalore decline to join open protests against the legislation and instead organize special prayer sessions, later claiming that the bill failed because of divine intervention (Bergunder forthcoming).

The Rise of Hindu Nationalist Politics and Violence against Christians, 1996-present:

• In the 1996 elections, the Congress Party suffers a defeat at the hands of the Hindu nationalist Indian People’s Party (Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP), which wins the most seats in parliament. The BJP fails to consolidate a majority coalition and loses control of the parliament, but in the 1998 elections, it wins the most seats and successfully assembles a coalition government under Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.

• In 1998, the New Delhi-based United Christian Forum for Human Rights records more than 120 attacks against Christians in India, including the torching of 30 churches in Gujarat (The Christian Century, Feb. 24, 1999). In Gujarat, Hindu militants storm a pentecostal school, injuring one student and seizing 300 Bibles, and a mob burns a pentecostal prayer hall (The Christian Century, Jan. 6, 1999). The head of the World Hindu Council advocates that all Christian missionaries be removed from the country (Marquand, Oct. 5, 1998).

• In early 1999, three parties threaten to leave the coalition government if the BJP does not help curb violence against Christians (The Christian Century, Feb. 24, 1999). In the fall 1999 elections, the BJP coalition retains its control of parliament.

• In 2000, the Indian Supreme Court rules that a pentecostal church may not use loudspeakers or instruments that violate noise pollution rules, stating that the right to free religious practice must be balanced with other civic rights (Supreme Court of India, Aug. 30, 2000).

• In 2001, pentecostals and other Christians found the Punjab Christian Peoples Party, headed by a Catholic priest. The party joins an opposition coalition for the 2002 Punjab state elections but it fails to win seats in the state’s legislative assembly (Freston 2004b: 72-73).

• Anti-conversion laws pass in the state assemblies of Tamil Nadu in 2002 and Gujarat in 2003 (Overdorf, Sept. 18, 2003). A January 2003 poll finds that 54% of eligible Indian voters believe that the government should ban religious conversions (Dasgupta, Feb. 10, 2003). During the 2004 elections, Congress Party chief Sonia Gandhi, a Catholic by background, campaigns against the maltreatment of Christians and Muslims under the BJP (Keys, June 13, 2004). The Congress-led coalition forms a majority in parliament, and Manmohan Singh becomes the country’s first Sikh prime minister, promising that violence against Christians will cease (AsiaNews, July 1, 2004). Tamil Nadu’s chief minister, Jayaram Jayalalithaa, repeals the state’s anti-conversion law after her party, which is allied with the BJP, loses all of its seats in the national parliamentary elections (Arun, May 18, 2004).

• In 2005, Pentecostal Council of India Vice President N. M. Raju urges more pentecostals to run for political office (Hindustan Times, July 17, 2005).

• In September 2006, the Gujarat legislature amends the state’s anti-conversion law to define conversion as making someone give up their religion for another but not changing denominations within the same religion. The law groups Jains, Hindus and Buddhists under one religion, Protestants and Catholics under another, and Shiites and Sunnis another, with no mention of Sikhs (Hindustan Times, Sept. 21, 2006). The state of Rajasthan also passes an anti-conversion law in 2006, but the law remains inactive, pending approval by the governor (U.S. Department of State 2006a).

• In October 2006, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of a mass conversion to Buddhism led by B. R. Ambedkar, hundreds of Dalits convert to Buddhism and Christianity (The Australian, Oct. 16, 2006).

Origins and Growth

• 1920s-1940s: In 1921, missionaries from the pentecostal United Free Gospel Church, headquartered in Pennsylvania, arrive in the Philippines. An American Assemblies of God (AG) missionary arrives in 1926, followed by Filipinos converted in the U.S. The first resident missionary from the Church of God (Cleveland, Tenn.) establishes the church in the Philippines in 1947. Filipinos who attend pentecostal services in Los Angeles establish the Church of the Foursquare Gospel in the Philippines in the late 1930s and 1940s (Benavidez 2005; Seleky 2001; Ma 2003: 201-3; Suico 1999; Anderson 2004: 131).

• 1950s-1960s: Pentecostal missionary activity and revivals increase after the Philippines gains independence in 1946. In 1965, major evangelical denominations form what becomes the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches, which includes the AG, the Church of the Foursquare Gospel and the Church of God. By this time, the AG and the Church of the Foursquare Gospel are two of the largest evangelical denominations in the Philippines (Ma 2003; Lim forthcoming; Harper 2000: 239; E. Kim 2005).

• 1970s-present: In the 1970s and 1980s, neo-pentecostal and charismatic prayer “fellowships” grow among the urban middle-class. Major neo-pentecostal groups include Jesus is Lord, founded by Eddie Villanueva in 1978, and Bread of Life, founded in 1982 by Cesar “Butch” Conde. In 1983, a network of independent neo-pentecostal and charismatic churches forms the Philippines for Jesus Movement, currently under the leadership of Villanueva (Lim forthcoming).

• In the early 1980s, Mariano “Mike” Velarde starts a radio program in Manila that becomes El Shaddai, a Catholic charismatic ministry, which claims 7 million members by 2000. Couples for Christ is founded in 1981 as a charismatic evangelism program in a Catholic community in Manila; it incorporates separately in 1994 (Ma 2003: 204-7; Anderson 2004: 131-32).

• According to the 2000 census, 81% of the population is Catholic and more than 7% is Protestant. A 2003 survey finds that 15% of Philippine Catholics are charismatic, while more than a third of non-Catholic Christians are pentecostal or charismatic. The survey also finds that Filipinos with higher education are overrepresented in the pentecostal and charismatic population (Kessler and Rüland 2006).

• In the Forum’s 2006 survey, fewer than one-in-twenty respondents indicate they belong to a pentecostal denomination. Four-in-ten identify as charismatic, including more than four-in-ten Catholics. Nearly seven-in-ten Protestants interviewed indicate they are either pentecostal or charismatic.

Religion and Politics

Marcos Period and People Power 1, 1965-1986

• In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declares martial law. In 1983, Senator Benigno Aquino, an opposition leader, is assassinated while in government custody. The Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches issues a statement criticizing public protest rallies, endorsing only dialogue and the media as legitimate outlets for activism (Lim forthcoming).

• In 1985, Marcos calls for elections to be held in February 1986. The Catholic Church supports Corazon Aquino, the wife of the assassinated senator. Two neo-pentecostal candidates, businessman Narciso Padilla and radio preacher Roger “Bomba” Arienda, form a new party, the Movement for Truth, Order and Righteousness, to run against Marcos and his party’s vice-presidential candidate. Marcos claims victory in the flawed election and the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches endorses the results. When Marcos threatens to attack protesting government officials, Catholic Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin urges people to join a “People Power” uprising. This becomes known as the first “EDSA” revolution, after Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the location where this uprising and future demonstrations take place (Lim forthcoming).

• When the EDSA uprising begins, the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches calls for prayer meetings and its secretary general, Reverend Agustin “Jun” Vencer, sends supplies to evangelical groups operating barricades. Jesus is Lord founder Eddie Villanueva urges people to go as “peacemakers.” An evangelical radio station, in which Villanueva serves as an anchor, provides backup when the government forces Catholic Radio Veritas off the air. At the height of the uprising, the Council issues a statement questioning the Marcos regime’s legitimacy. After four days of protests, Marcos steps down and Aquino becomes president (Lim forthcoming).

Aquino and Ramos Presidencies, 1986-1998

• In 1987, the Alliance for Democracy and Morality, headed by charismatic Baptist Gavino Tica, organizes anti-communist Value Formation Courses in the armed forces with the support of several neo-pentecostal and charismatic churches (Rose 1996: 341-43).

• In the 1992 and 1998 election campaigns, pentecostals and charismatics organize media campaigns, voter education drives and prayer rallies. Though the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches officially refuses to endorse specific candidates, it devotes an issue of Evangelicals Today to electoral education and organizes prayer rallies with the Philippines for Jesus Movement in support of honest elections (Lim forthcoming).

• A week before the 1992 presidential elections, Villanueva claims divine guidance to endorse Fidel Ramos, a member of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and a former official in the Marcos administration. Neo-pentecostal leaders such as Bishop Dan Balais also endorse Ramos. When Ramos wins, becoming the country’s first Protestant president, Villanueva becomes his private chaplain and Movement leaders hold an “anointing ceremony” for Ramos (Lim forthcoming).

• Many evangelicals run in the 1992 elections, including four for the Senate, 12 for the House, four for governorships and 15 for mayoralties. Most lose, though evangelicals win seats in local councils. The senatorial candidates run under the Nacionalista Party and include neo-pentecostal televangelist Ramon Orosa of Lord of Glory Ministries and Catholic charismatic Vincent Crisologo (Freston 2001: 72; Lim forthcoming).

• In 1997, Ramos unsuccessfully lobbies to amend the constitution and lift the single six-year presidential term limit. Mass demonstrations follow, known as “Cha-cha 1997” (charter change). Villanueva leads the Philippines for Jesus Movement in petitioning for the change, while neo-pentecostal pastor Cesar Conde opposes the change (Lim forthcoming).

Estrada Presidency and People Power 2, 1998-2001

• In the 1998 elections, the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches suggests electoral criteria that may imply support for Jose de Venecia, a Catholic and speaker of the House. Villanueva and the Philippines for Jesus Movement actively endorse de Venecia. Villanueva invites more than a thousand evangelical leaders to a meeting in which de Venecia declares that he will support efforts to make the Philippines “born again,” convincing leaders such as Council general secretary Bishop Efraim Tendero that de Venecia is “God’s anointed” (Lim forthcoming).

• Presidential candidate Joseph “Erap” Estrada’s populism and his endorsement from El Shaddai and Iglesia ni Cristo help him win with 40% of the vote. Mike Velarde of El Shaddai becomes President Estrada’s official spiritual advisor (Montinola 1999: 67; Lim forthcoming).

• In 1999, the Philippines for Jesus Movement, Jesus is Lord and the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches, along with Cardinal Sin and ex-President Aquino, strongly oppose Estrada’s efforts to amend the constitution (Lim forthcoming).

• In 2000, Governor Luis Singson levels corruption charges against Estrada. Former President Aquino and Cardinal Sin call for Estrada’s immediate resignation, and Catholic bishops organize a large anti-Estrada rally. Villanueva also leads rallies against Estrada. Estrada taps El Shaddai, Jesus Miracle Crusade and the Iglesia ni Cristo to hold a counter-rally, which attracts a million people. Despite pressure from the Catholic Church and charismatic organizations, Velarde stands by Estrada (Lim forthcoming; Pimentel, Dec. 5, 2000).

• In January 2001, 11 senators refuse to examine evidence against Estrada during his impeachment trial. Sin and a coalition of activists lead a protest until Estrada resigns. Catholic renewal groups are active in these “People Power 2” demonstrations, along with some evangelicals and neo-pentecostals. On Jan. 20, 2001, the Armed Forces and the Supreme Court transfer presidential power to Arroyo (Lim forthcoming).

Arroyo Presidency, 2001-Present

• In April 2001, Estrada is arrested on plunder charges, prompting his loyalists to demonstrate. El Shaddai backs the pro-Estrada demonstrators, who are largely poor and uneducated. Evangelicals and neo-pentecostals, including Villanueva and Balais, join Catholic leaders and Couples for Christ in condemning the rally. In the May 2001 senatorial elections, El Shaddai supports pro-Estrada candidates. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva, Eddie Villanueva’s son, wins a seat in congress (Lim forthcoming).

• In the 2004 election, Eddie Villanueva runs for president, campaigning for “national moral renewal” with the support of members of the Jesus is Lord Church, the Philippines for Jesus Movement and some leaders of Couples for Christ. President Arroyo runs as the candidate of the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats, gaining the support of El Shaddai, and she wins the election, while Villanueva comes in last. He rejects Arroyo’s overtures to join her administration. Pentecostal and evangelical church leaders who supported Villanueva meet with Arroyo in July 2004 to express support for her administration and for her decision to withdraw Philippine troops from Iraq (Gulane, Feb. 13 and Feb. 23, 2004; Hookway, April 8, 2004; Manila Standard, May 7, 2004; Labog-Javellana, Jul. 24, 2004).

• In July 2005, Arroyo calls for constitutional changes amid accusations of corruption and election manipulation. The Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches supports Arroyo during impeachment investigations, while Villanueva calls for Arroyo to resign. In December 2005, a commission created by Arroyo recommends changing to a parliamentary system. Tendero, of the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches, serves on the commission. Velarde supports Arroyo’s proposal for constitutional change, though he favors a congressional assembly rather than a petition to make the change (Salazar, Feb. 6, 2006; Calumpita and Ocampo, July 12, 2005; Esguerra, April 20, 2006; Labog-Javellana and Celino, April 27, 2006; Dolor and Dolor, May 17, 2006).

• In June 2006, immediately prior to an official visit to the Vatican, Arroyo signs a bill abolishing the death penalty, and leaders of the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches denounce the decision as “unbiblical” (Ortiz and Esguerra, June 14, 2006).

• Arroyo speaks at El Shaddai’s 22nd anniversary service in August 2006, thanking Velarde and his group for supporting her administration. A second effort to impeach Arroyo fails in the House the following week (Panares, Aug. 21, 2006; Reyes, Aug. 25, 2006).

Origins and Growth

• 1880s-1910s: American Presbyterians and Methodists establish the first resident Protestant missions in the mid-1880s. A 1907 revival in Pyongyang involves more than a thousand adults and children, some of whom receive charismatic gifts, fueling nationwide evangelism. By 1910, there are more than 150,000 Protestants in the country (I. Kim 2003: 34, 41; Y. Lee 2001: 75-79).

• 1920s-1945: In 1932, an American missionary who attended the Azusa Street revival in Los Angeles establishes the first pentecostal congregation in Seoul with Huh Heong, a Salvation Army secretary. By 1937, missionaries and Korean preachers establish six pentecostal churches. Restrictions imposed by the Japanese occupation government in the late 1930s force missionaries to leave, and the number of pentecostal churches decreases to four by 1941. Ra Woon Mong’s preaching on Spirit baptism and healing in the 1940s begins the “prayer mountain movement,” also called the “Holy Spirit movement,” which kindles the development of charismatic Protestantism in South Korea (Eim 2003: 240-44; Anderson 2004: 137).

• 1945-1950s: After Korea’s partition in 1945, Protestantism expands in the South. In 1948, Park Gui Im founds the Suncheon Pentecostal Congregation, and in 1950 Korean ministers organize the Korean Pentecostal Church. After a U.S. Army chaplain invites Assemblies of God (AG) missionaries to Korea, eight churches organize in 1953 as the Korean AG; in 1957 Huh Heong becomes the first Korean chairperson. In 1958, AG pastor Cho Yonggi (later “David”) and Choi Jashil begin a tent church, now known as the Yoido Full Gospel Church (Freston 2001: 64, 69; Eim 2003: 244; Anderson 2004: 137-38).

• 1960s-1980s: By the early 1980s, the Korean AG is one of the largest Korean Protestant groups, with more than half a million members. By 1988, the Yoido Full Gospel Church becomes the world’s largest congregation, with more than 500,000 members. Gallup surveys in the 1980s and 1990s find that Protestant denominations have a higher percentage of young, urban, educated and female members than other Korean religious groups (Anderson 2004: 137; Hong 2000: 105; Hiatt, Sept. 4, 1988; Hong forthcoming).

• 1990s to present: By 1991, the Korean AG splits into four denominations. The largest are the Korean AG, including the Yoido Full Gospel Church, and the Jesus AG, led by Cho Yongmok, pastor of the world’s second largest congregation, Grace and Truth. In 1999, the Korean AG becomes the first pentecostal denomination to join the Korean National Council of Churches. Pentecostals make up only 2% of the population in 1993, but many mainline Protestant churches incorporate charismatic theology and worship. By 2000, nine of the 15 largest megachurches in South Korea are charismatic or pentecostal (Eim 2003: 239, 244; Anderson 2004: 138-39; Hong 2000: 101, 104; Freston 2001: 62).

• According to the Forum’s 2006 pentecostal survey, renewalists–including charismatics and pentecostals–account for approximately one-in-ten of South Korea’s urban population. Approximately four-in-ten Korean Protestants are either pentecostal or charismatic, and roughly one-in-ten Korean Catholics can be classified as charismatic.

Religion and Politics

Christian Nationalism under Japanese Colonization, 1884-1945

• The Korean monarchy signs a treaty with the U.S. in 1882 that opens the door to American Protestant missionaries. Japan gains control of Korea in 1895 following a war with China. In 1896, Christians help form an “Independence Club” to push for Korean sovereignty. Soon after, one of the club’s co-founders, Syngman Rhee, converts to Methodism (Freston 2001: 63-65; Martin 1990: 139).

• As Japanese control of Korea strengthens in the early 1900s, Protestant revivals coincide with anti-Japanese nationalist movements. Foreign missionaries promote an apolitical stance to avoid Japanese interference in church affairs. In 1910, Japan formally annexes Korea and the government refuses to employ Protestant intellectuals. Kil Sun Chu, head of the Central Presbyterian Church of Pyongyang and a leader of the 1907 revival, is active in the 1919 independence movement. Though Christians make up only 1% of the population, 16 of the 33 signers of the 1919 Declaration of Independence are Christians. In 1919, nationalist leaders, including seven Christians, form a provisional government in exile with Syngman Rhee as president (T. Lee 2003: 154; Y. Lee 2001: 82; Hong forthcoming; Freston 2001: 63-65).

• In the mid-1930s, many Protestants resist Shinto worship practices imposed by the Japanese, though all denominations are ultimately forced to comply (Kang 1997: 62-66).

A Protestant President in Divided Korea, 1945-1960

• After Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Syngman Rhee becomes chairman of the U.S.-mandated Representative Democratic Council, in which 35 of 50 Korean officials are Christians. In 1948, Rhee is elected president of the Republic of Korea and 38 of 190 members elected to the Legislative Assembly are Christians (Freston 2001: 64-65).

• In North Korea, two Presbyterian pastors organize the Christian Social Democratic Party to promote Christian political principles, but the North Korean government soon suppresses it. Many Christians are persecuted and flee to the South (Kang 1997: 156-58).

• Rhee and his Christian running mate are re-elected during the Korean War (1950-53), with Christian support, and Rhee remains in office until 1960, when protests about allegedly rigged national elections force his resignation. Yun Boseon, a Presbyterian, is elected president under a new parliamentary system, while Jang Myeon, a Catholic, becomes prime minister (Freston 2001: 65; Kang 1997: 92).

Authoritarian Rule, 1961-1987

• Park Chung Hee leads a military coup in 1961 and remains president until his assassination in 1979. Most evangelical and pentecostal churches cooperate with Park’s government, and Park, though not religious, permits major evangelical revivals during his rule. In 1968, conservative Protestants in the National Assembly organize the pro-government Breakfast Prayer Meeting (Martin 1990: 150-51; T. Lee 2002; Park 2003: 184; Hong forthcoming).

• A minority of Protestants, joined by Catholics, oppose the authoritarian regime. Protestants in the Korean National Council of Churches develop the minjung (“people”) theology of dissent. Political opposition leaders include Kim Dae Jung, a Catholic, and Kim Young Sam, an elder in a major Presbyterian church (Martin 1990: 151; Freston 2001: 66).

• General Chun Doo Hwan establishes military rule after an uprising in the city of Kwangju in 1980. A Gallup poll in 1984 shows that only 19% of Protestants approve of “Christian participation in political, economic and social demonstrations.” By the mid 1980s, however, Chun’s harsh policies alienate many evangelicals and pentecostals (Hong forthcoming).

• In early 1987, a student’s death and President Chun’s decision to retain the restrictive 1972 constitution prompt demonstrations that include evangelicals and pentecostals. In June, Roh Tae Woo, a Buddhist and chairman of the ruling party, announces reforms. In October, Cho Yonggi leads a “Prayer Crusade for the Nation and the People,” attracting more than a million participants. Roh wins the December 1987 election after Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam split the opposition vote (Hong forthcoming; FGTV.com 2006).

Democratic Elections and Kim Young Sam’s Presidency, 1987-1997

• In 1988, the Yoido Full Gospel Church establishes a daily newspaper, the Kookmin Ilbo or “people’s paper,” which facilitates pentecostal involvement in the public sphere, gaining a circulation of 1 million by 1996 (Hong forthcoming; I. Kim 2003: 170).

• After his party merges with Roh’s, Kim Young Sam wins the 1992 election with support from evangelical leaders, becoming the first civilian president in more than 30 years. Some National Assembly candidates visit the Yoido Full Gospel Church, and Cho shows his preference for some candidates who are church members. Of the 299 members of Congress in 1992, 90 are Protestants (T. Lee 2006: 338; Hong forthcoming).

• President Kim invites evangelical and pentecostal pastors to lead prayer services at the president’s house and receives prayers by telephone from Cho Yonggi before important meetings. However, Kim’s political fortunes decline due to corruption charges and the Asian financial crisis. Candidates for the presidential election in 1997 court evangelical support, with particular attention to leaders such as Cho Yonggi. Kim Dae Jung wins the election (Hong forthcoming; Freston 2001: 67; T. Lee 2006: 339).

Pentecostal Activism in National Politics, 2000-present

• In 2000, 107 of 273 members of Congress are Protestants, including five who attend the Yoido Full Gospel Church (T. Lee 2006: 338; Hong forthcoming).

• After the 9/11 attacks, the Yoido Full Gospel Church hosts a prayer rally attended by 120,000, including most major political leaders. President Kim Dae Jung sends a video appeal for intercessory prayer (Hong forthcoming).

• Following anti-U.S. rallies in January 2003, Cho Yonggi organizes a rally in Seoul with 30,000 demonstrators who support the U.S. military presence in Korea. Cho signs a resolution with other leaders, including Kim Young Sam, calling for North Korea to reenter the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and for U.S. forces to stay in South Korea. Members of the Yoido Full Gospel Church call for greater human rights and religious freedom in North Korea, and Cho’s sermons frequently refer to the flight of North Koreans (Marquand, June 11, 2003; J. H. Han, Jan. 17, 2003).

• For the 2004 national assembly elections, Cho Yonggi supports the creation of the conservative Korean Christian Party, but it fails to attract enough support to field its 23 candidates (Freston 2004b: 68; J. H. J. Han 2005: 14; Yoon, April 9, 2004).

• In 2005, Cho Yonggi and the mayor of Seoul host the second Jerusalem Summit Asia, a pro-Israel gathering of more than 1,000 Asian Christians (Lefkovits, July 28, 2005).

• The conservative Christian Council of Korea, which includes several pentecostal denominations, organizes demonstrations in the fall of 2006 demanding sanctions against North Korea and protesting government plans to transfer control of South Korean troops during wartime from the U.S. to Korea (Shin, Oct. 11, 2006; Yonhap English News, Sept. 2, 2006).

Age, The. 2006. “India Low-caste Hindus Convert en Masse.”October 15.

Anderson, Allan. 2004. An Introduction to Pentecostalism: Global Charismatic Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, Allan. 2005. “The Origins of Pentecostalism and its Global Spread in the Early Twentieth Century.” Transformation 22 (3): 175-185.

Anderson, Allan. 2006. “Pandita Ramabai, the Mukti Revival and Global Pentecostalism.” Transformation 23 (1): 37-48.

Anderson, Allan, and Edmond Tang, eds. 2005. Asian and Pentecostal: The Charismatic Face of Christianity in Asia. Oxford: Regnum.

Arun, K. N. 2004. “State Leader in Southern India Repeals Law against Religious Conversions.” Associated Press Newswires. May 18.

AsiaNews. 2004. “Singh to the Bishops: ‘With My Government Attacks Against Christians Shall Stop.'” July 1.

Australian, The. 2006. “Untouchables Caste off Creed for Better Deal.” October 16.

Barrett, David B., George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson. 2001. World Christian Encyclopedia. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bartholomeusz, Tessa. 1999. “First Among Equals: Buddhism and the Sri Lankan State.” In Harris 1999, 173-193.

[Madhya Pradesh]

BBC News. 2006. “Country Profile: South Korea.”

Benavidez, Doreen Alcoran. 2005. “The Early Years of the Church of God in Northern Luzon (1947-1953): A Historical and Theological Overview.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 8 (2): 255-69.

Bergunder, Michael. 2005. “Constructing Indian Pentecostalism: On Issues of Methodology and Representation.” In Anderson and Tang 2005, 177-214.

Bergunder, Michael. Forthcoming. The South Indian Pentecostal Movement in the Twentieth Century. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.

Brouwer, Steve, Paul Gifford, and Susan D. Rose. 1996. Exporting the American Gospel: Global Christian Fundamentalism. New York: Routledge.

Burgess, Stanley M. 2001. “Pentecostalism in India: An Overview.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 4 (1): 85-98

Burgess, Stanley M., and Eduard M. van der Maas, eds. 2003. The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements. Rev. ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.

Calumpita, Ronnie E., and Wilfredo Ocampo. 2005. “Protestant Group Wants Arroyo to Keep Post.” The Manila Times. July 12.

Christian Century, The. 1999. “Christian Facility Torched in India.” 116 (1): January 6.

Christian Century, The. 1999. “Religious Attacks Divide India.” 116 (6): February 24.

Dasgupta, Swapan. 2003. “BJP’s Finest Hour.” India Today International. February 10.

Deats, Richard L. 1967. Nationalism and Christianity in the Philippines. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press.

Dempster, Murray W., Byron D. Klaus, and Douglas Petersen, eds. 1999. The Globalization of Pentecostalism: A Religion Made to Travel. Oxford: Regnum.

Dolor, Jade Ceres, and Beting Laygo Dolor. 2006. “Miriam, Bro. Mike Throw Support behind Cha-Cha.” Philippine News. May 17.

Dow Jones International News. 2003. “India’s New Anti-Conversion Laws Rouse Christian Unease.” April 21.

Downs, Frederick S. 1991. “Christian Conversion Movements among the Hills Tribes of North-East India in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” In Oddie 1991c, 155-174.

Downs, Frederick S. 1994. Essays on Christianity in North-East India. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company.

Eim, Yeol Soo. 2003. “South Korea.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 239-246.

Encyclopædia Britannica. 2006. “Korea, History of.” Encyclopædia Britannica Online.

Encyclopædia Britannica. 2006. “Korea, South.” Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Accessed on September 18, 2006.

Esguerra, Christian V. 2006. “Key Christian Bloc Hops on to Charter Change Train.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. April 20.

Fernandes, Sujatha. Forthcoming. “Ethnicity, Civil Society and the Church: The Politics of Evangelical Christianity in Northeast India.” In Lumsdaine forthcoming.

Fernando, Leonard, and G. Gispert-Sauch. 2004. Christianity in India: Two Thousand Years of Faith. London and New Delhi: Penguin Books.

Fitzgerald, Timothy. 1999. “Politics and Ambedkar Buddhism in Maharashtra.” In Harris 1999, 79-104.

Forrester, Duncan B. 1991. “The Depressed Classes and Conversion to Christianity, 1860-1960.” In Oddie 1991c, 65-93.

Freston, Paul. 2001. Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Freston, Paul. 2004a. “Evangelical Protestantism and Democratization in Contemporary Latin America and Asia.” Democratization 11 (4): 21-41.

Freston, Paul. 2004b. Protestant Political Parties: A Global Survey. Hampshire, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Frykenberg, Robert Eric. 2003. “Christians in India: An Historical Overview of Their Complex Origins.” In Christians and Missionaries in India: Cross-Cultural Communication since 1500, ed. Robert Eric Frykenberg, 33-61. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans; and London: RoutledgeCurzon.

FGTV.com (Full Gospel Television). 2006. “Yoido Full Gospel Church: History.”

George, A. C. 2001. “Pentecostal Beginnings in Travancore, South India.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies, 4 (2).

Giry, Stéphanie. 2004. “Chennai Dispatch: Sol.” The New Republic. April 26.

Gulane, Judy T. 2004. “Villanueva Cleared to Run by Comelec.” BusinessWorld (Manila). January 28.

Gulane, Judy T. 2004. “Evangelist to Spread ‘Righteousness.'” BusinessWorld (Manila). February 13.

Gulane, Judy T. 2004. “Religious Groups Gather to Support Villanueva.” BusinessWorld (Manila). February 23.

Han, Jae-hyun. 2003. “Former President Kim Warns on Anti-US Sentiment.” Chosun Ilbo. January 17.

Han, Ju Hui Judy. 2005. “Missionary Destinations and Diasporic Destiny: Spatiality of Korean/American Evangelism and the Cell Church.” Institute for the Study of Social Change, ISSC Fellows Working Paper. University of California, Berkeley.

Harper, George W. 2000. “Philippine Tounges of Fire? Latin American Pentecostalism and the Future of Filipino Christianity.” Journal of Asian Mission 2 (2): 225-59.

Harper, Susan Billington. 2000. In the Shadow of the Mahatma: Bishop V. S. Azariah and the Travails of Christianity in British India. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.

Harris, Ian, ed. 1999. Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia. London and New York: Continuum.

Hedlund, Roger. 2005. “Indigenous Pentecostalism in India.” In Anderson and Tang 2005, 215-244.

Hiatt, Fred. 1988. “Seoul-Dynamic Capital; Korean Energies Always at Full Throttle.” The Washington Post. September 4.

Hindu, The. 2001. “U.N. Apprised of ‘Discriminations’ in India.” September 6.

Hindu, The. 2002. “Anti-conversion Laws.” December 17.

Hindustan Times. 2005. “Kerala’s Pentecostal Churches Nurse Political Ambitions.” July 17.

Hindustan Times. 2006. “Kerala to Launch Another Gospel Channel.” February 3.

Hindustan Times. 2006. “Pope Condemns India’s Ban on Religious Conversion.” May 19.

Hindustan Times. 2006. “State Assembly Adopts Anti-Conversion Law in Gujarat.” September 21.

Hong, Young-gi. 2000. “The Backgrounds and Characteristics of the Charismatic Mega-churches in Korea.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 3 (1): 99-118.

Hong, Young-gi. Forthcoming. “Evangelicals and the Democratization of South Korea since 1987.” In Lumsdaine forthcoming.

Hookway, James. 2004. “The Philippines-Power of Prayer.” Far Eastern Economic Review. April 8.

Hudson, D. Dennis. 2000. Protestant Origins in India: Tamil Evangelical Christians, 1706-1835. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.

Human Rights Watch. 1999. “India – Politics by Other Means: Attacks Against Christians in India.” 11 (6): October.

Hsu, Becky, Amy Reynolds, Conrad Hackett, and James Gibbon. 2006. “Estimating the Religious Composition of All Nations: An Empirical Assessment.” Department of Sociology, Princeton University. Unpublished paper.

Iyer, Sriya. 2002. Demography and Religion in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1996. The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jenkins, Philip. 2001. The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jordens, J. T. F. 1991. “Reconversion to Hinduism: The Shuddhi of the Arya Samaj.” In Oddie 1991c, 215-230.

Kang, Wi Jo. 1997. Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Katju, Manjari. 2003. Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics. New Delhi, India: Orient Longman.

Kessler, Christl and Jürgen Rüland. 2006. “Response to Rapid Social Change: Populist Religion in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 79 (1): 73-96.

Keys, Laurinda. 2004. “Will India’s Religious Minorities Gain from Having Sikh Prime Minister?” Associated Press. June 13.

Khan, Mumtaz Ali. 1991. “Mass Conversions of Meenakshipuram: A Sociological Inquiry.” In Oddie 1991, 47-63.

Kim, Elijah Jong Fil. 2005. “Filipino Pentecostalism in a Global Context.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 8 (2): 235-254.

Kim, Ig-Jin. 2003. “History and Theology of Korean Pentecostalism: Sunbogeum (Pure Gospel) Pentecostalism.” PhD diss., Utrecht University. Zoetermeer, Netherlands: Boekencentrum Publishing House.

Kim, Ki-tae. 2006. “Megachurch Pastor Faces Leadership Challenge.” Korea Times. January 7.

Kim, Sebastian C. H. 2003. In Search of Identity: Debates on Religious Conversion in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kim, Sun-Woo. 2003. “Seoul in Crisis Because of Anti-Americanism and Pyongyang Nukes.” Dong-A Ilbo Daily. June 22.

Labog-Javellana, Juliet. 2004. “Bro. Eddie Leaders Now Backing Arroyo.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. July 24.

Labog-Javellana, Juliet, and Felipe V. Celino. 2006. “El Shaddai Mobilized vs. Signature Campaign.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. April 27.

Labog-Javellana, Juliet, and Christian V. Esguerra. 2005. “El Shaddai Leader Slams CPR Policy.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. October 18.

Lee, Timothy S. 2002. “Two Aspects of an Evangelical Quest to Christianize Korea: Mammoth Crusades and Sectarian Incivility.” Acta Koreana 5 (2): 27-43.

Lee, Timothy S. 2003. Review of Protestantism and Politics in Korea, by Chung-Shin Park. Korean Studies 27: 153-57.

Lee, Timothy S. 2006. “Beleaguered Success: Korean Evangelicalism in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century.” In Christianity in Korea, ed. Robert Buswell, Jr. and Timothy S. Lee, 330-350. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.

Lee, Young-Hoon. 2001. “Korean Pentecost: The Great Revival of 1907.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 4 (1): 73-83.

Lee, Young-Hoon. 2004. “The Life and Ministry of David Yonggi Cho and the Yoido Full Gospel Church.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 7 (1): 3-20.

Lefkovits, Etgar. 2005. “Jerusalem Summit Heads to Seoul.” The Jerusalem Post. July 28.

Lim, David. Forthcoming. “Consolidating Democracy: Filipino Evangelicals between People Power Events, 1986-2001.” In Lumsdaine forthcoming.

Lumsdaine, David, ed. Forthcoming. Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Asia. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ma, Wonsuk. 2003. “Philippines.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 201-7.

Maggay, Melba Padilla. 2003. “Early Protestant Missionary Efforts in the Philippines: Some Intercultural Problems.” Journal of Asian Mission 5 (1): 119-131.

Mallampalli, Chandra. 2004. Christians and Public Life in Colonial South India, 1863-1937: Contending with Marginality. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Manila Standard. 2004. “El Shaddai Picks GMA.” May 7.

Marquand, Robert. 1998. “Anti-Christian Violence in India Build on Fear of Conversions.” The Christian Science Monitor. October 5.

Marquand, Robert. 2003. “Evangelicals in Korea Poised to Move North.” The Christian Science Monitor. June 11.

Martin, David. 1990. Tounges of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

McGee, Gary B., and Stanley M. Burgess. 2003. “India.” In Burgess and van der Maas 2003, 118-126.

McGivering, Jill. 2002. “India’s Row over Conversions.” BBC News. December 6.

Montinola, Gabriella R. 1999. “The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity amid Crisis.” Asian Survey 39 (1): 64-71.

Oddie, G. A. 1991a. “Christian Conversion among Non-Brahmins in Andhra Pradesh: With Special Reference to Anglican Missions and the Dornakal Diocese, c. 1900-1936.” In Oddie 1991c, 95-124.

Oddie, G. A. 1991b. “Introduction.” In Oddie 1991c, 1-17.

Oddie, G. A., ed. 1991c. Religions in South Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in Medieval and Modern Times. Revised and Enlarged Edition. New Delhi: Manohar.

Ortiz, Margaux C., and Christian V. Esguerra. 2006. “Death Penalty is OK While Popular.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. June 14.

Overdorf, Jason. 2003. “Criminal Conversions.” Far Eastern Economic Review. September 18.

Pachuau, Lalsangkima. 2001. “Ecumenical Church and Religious Conversion: A Historical-Theological Study with Special Reference to India.” Mission Studies 17 (1-35): 181-202.

Panares, Joyce Pangco. 2006. “GMA Urges Foes Make Peace, Not War.” Manila Standard. August 21.

Park, Chung-shin. 2003. Protestantism and Politics in Korea. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Pimentel, Benjamin. 2000. “Battle of Prayers: With Philippine President Fighting Impeachment, Faith Emerges as Political Weapon.” San Francisco Chronicle. December 5.

Reuters News. 2006. “Indian Groups Raise Alarm over Anti-conversion Laws.” July 19.

Reyes, Michelle Syonne M. 2006. “Arroyo-allied Solons Urge Unity After Striking Down Impeach Bid.” BusinessWorld (Manila). August 25.

Robinson, Mark. 2005. “The Growth of Indonesian Pentecostalism.” In Anderson and Tang 2005, 329-344.

Rose, Susan. 1996. “The Politics of Philippine Fundamentalism.” In Questioning the Secular State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics, ed. David Westerlund, 323-55. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Salazar, Lorraine Carlos. 2006. “Philippines: Charter Change in Full Steam, Once Again.” Institute of South Asian Studies Viewpoints (Singapore). February 6.

Satyavrata, Ivan M. 1999. “Contextual Perspectives on Pentecostalism as a Global Culture: A South Asian View.” In Dempster, Klaus and Petersen, 203-221.

Seleky, Trinidad E. 2001. “Six Filipinos and One American: Pioneers of the Assemblies of God in the Philippines.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 4 (1): 119-29.

Seleky, Trinidad E. 2005. “The Organization of the Philippine Assemblies of God and the Role of Early Missionaries.” Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies 8 (2): 271-87.

Shin, Hae-in. 2006. “Civic Groups Split on North Korea.” The Korea Herald. October 11.

Smith, D. E. “India as a Secular State.” In Secularism and its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, 177-233. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.

Suico, Joseph R. 1999. “Pentecostalism: Towards a Movement of Social Transformation in the Philippines.” Journal of Asian Mission 1 (1): 7-19.

Supreme Court of India. 2000. “Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare Association and Others.” Judges M. B. Shah and S. N. Phukan. Judgment dated August 30, 2000.

Synan, H. Vinson. 1997. “The Yoido Full Gospel Church.” Cyberjournal for Pentecostal-Charismatic Research 2 (July).

Thomas, George. 2006. “Where it is a Criminal Offence to Convert to Christianity.” October 23

Thukral, Naveen. 1999. “Focus-Prayer Hall Set Ablaze in Western India” Reuters News. January 3.

The Times of India. 2006. “Anti-conversion Law Puts Priest under Lens.” July 27.

Torres, Tetch. 2006. “SC declares Calibrated Preemptive Response Unconstitutional.” Philippine Daily Inquirer. April 25.

Tunarosa, Andrea. 2006. “Houses of Worship: Spreading the Word-Fast.” The Wall Street Journal. July 28.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2006a. “India: International Religious Freedom Report 2006.”

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2006b. “Pakistan: International Religious Freedom Report 2006.”

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2006c. “Sri Lanka: International Religious Freedom Report 2006.”

Wacker, Grant. 2001. Heaven Below: Early Pentecostals and American Culture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Webster, John C. B. 1992. The Dalit Christians: A History. Delhi: Indian Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (IPCK).

Yonhap English News. 2006. “S. Korean Veterans, Christian Activists Rally Against Wartime.” September 2.

Yoon, Won-sup. 2004. “Small Parties Struggling to Get Message Out.” Korea Times. April 9.

Zelliot, Eleanor. 1991. “Psychological Dimensions of the Buddhist Movement.” In Oddie 1991c, 191-214.

Zhaoming, Deng. 2005. “Indigenous Chinese Pentecostal Denominations.” In Anderson and Tang 2005, 437-466.

Results for the surveys are based on telephone interviews in the U.S. and face-to-face interviews in all other nations, conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. The surveys in Guatemala, Nigeria, the Philippines and the U.S. are based on national samples. The survey in Chile is based on a national sample but excludes non-continental and remote areas, and the survey in Kenya is based on a national sample but excludes the largely Muslim North Eastern Province. In Brazil, South Africa and South Korea, the surveys are based on urban samples.

In India, the survey was conducted in three states believed to have among the highest percentage of Christians in India: Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Meghalaya. Within the three selected states, districts with the highest proportion of Christians were first selected, and then sampling points were randomly selected from these districts. This survey is NOT representative of the general population of India, nor is it representative of the population of the three Indian states in which it was conducted.

In each country, interviews were conducted among the general public and among oversamples of renewalists. The information below details the number of interviews conducted among the general public in each country, as well as the total number of interviews conducted among pentecostals and charismatics.

The country information also shows the margin of sampling error based on all interviews conducted among three groups – the general population, pentecostals and charismatics. For results based on the full sample in a given country, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus the margin of error indicated for each group. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Brazil Survey Firm: Research International Brazil Sample design: Probability sample of urban cities Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Language: Portuguese Fieldwork dates: May 13 – May 30, 2006 Data processing: June 1 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 700; Pentecostals – 313; Charismatics – 329 Margin of Error: General public 4%, Pentecostals 6%, Charismatics 5%

Chile Survey Firm: MORI Chile Sample design: National probability sample, excluding non-continental and remote areas Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Language: Spanish Fieldwork dates: May 12 – May 28, 2006 Data processing: June 28 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 600; Pentecostals – 276; Charismatics – 286 Margin of Error: General public 4%, Pentecostals 6%, Charismatics 6%

Guatemala Survey Firm: MERCAPLAN Sample design: National probability sample Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Language: Spanish Fieldwork dates: May 5 – May 31, 2006 Data processing: June 26 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 1,005; Pentecostals – 410; Charismatics – 487 Margin of Error: General public 3%, Pentecostals 5%, Charismatics 4%

India Survey Firm: TNS India Sample design: Probability sample of disproportionately Christian districts of three states–Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Meghalaya Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Languages: Hindi, Tamil and Malayalam Fieldwork dates: May 16 – June 9, 2006 Data processing: July 5 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 726; Pentecostals – 409; Charismatics – 125 Margin of Error: General public 4%, Pentecostals 5%, Charismatics 9%

Kenya Survey Firm: Research Path Associates Sample design: National probability sample, excluding North Eastern Province Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Languages: English and Kiswahili Fieldwork dates: May 17 – May 26, 2006 Data processing: June 29 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 655; Pentecostals – 403; Charismatics – 306 Margin of Error: General public 4%, Pentecostals 5%, Charismatics 6%

Nigeria Survey Firm: Research International Nigeria Sample design: National probability sample Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Languages: Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa and English Fieldwork dates: May 15 – July 27, 2006 Data processing: July 31 – August 4, 2006 Sample size: General public – 650; Pentecostals – 483; Charismatics – 67 Margin of Error: General public 4%, Pentecostals 4%, Charismatics N/A (Due to the small number of Nigerian charismatics surveyed, results for Nigerian charismatics are not presented in this report.)

Philippines Survey Firm: TNS Philippines Sample design: National probability sample Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Languages: Tagalog, Cebuano and Ilonggo Fieldwork dates: May 6 – May 29, 2006 Data processing: June 19 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 1,000; Pentecostals – 309; Charismatics – 433 Margin of Error: General public 3%, Pentecostals 6%, Charismatics 5%

South Africa Survey Firm: Markinor Sample design: National probability sample of urban areas Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Languages: Afrikaans, Pedi, Sotho, Tswana, Xhosa, Zulu and English Fieldwork dates: May 11 – May 27, 2006 Data processing: June 26 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 800; Pentecostals – 259; Charismatics – 344 Margin of Error: General public 3%, Pentecostals 6%, Charismatics 5%

South Korea Survey Firm: Gallup Korea Sample design: National probability sample of urban cities Mode: Face-to-face with adults 18+ Language: Korean Fieldwork dates: May 8 – May 26, 2006 Data processing: June 18 – July 25, 2006 Sample size: General public – 600; Pentecostals – 131; Charismatics – 333 Margin of Error: General public 4%, Pentecostals 9%, Charismatics 5%

United States Survey Firm: Princeton Survey Research Associates International Sample design: National probability sample Mode: Telephone Languages: English and Spanish Fieldwork dates: July 20 – September 7, 2006 Data processing: September 8 – September 12, 2006 Sample size: General public – 739; Pentecostals – 119; Charismatics – 421 Margin of Error: General public 4%, Pentecostals 9%, Charismatics 5%

Baptism in (or of) the Holy Spirit, in-filling of the Holy Spirit The primary experience in the pentecostal and charismatic movements, in which the believer receives spiritual gifts and empowerment, often through the laying on of hands.

Charismatic Those who practice the gifts of the Holy Spirit but are not members of historical pentecostal denominations. Most belong to Catholic, Orthodox, mainline Protestant or evangelical Protestant denominations.

Evangelicals Members of Protestant denominations who hold traditional religious beliefs but are neither pentecostal nor fundamentalist. Evangelicals do not stress the gifts of the Holy Spirit (as pentecostals do), but they are not hostile to them (as fundamentalists are). All three groups share certain basic religious doctrines, such as the need for believers to have a conversion experience (i.e., be “born again”) and to convert non-believers. As a consequence, they all can be thought of as belonging to a broader evangelical Protestant tradition.

Fundamentalists Protestants who believe the Bible is to be read literally and who maintain ecclesiastical separation from those who believe differently. They generally are hostile to the “gifts of the Spirit,” believing they were bestowed only during the early church period described in the New Testament.

Gifts of the Holy Spirit Listed in 1 Corinthians 12:4-14, these gifts include speaking in tongues, healing, prophecy, spiritual discernment and the performing of miracles. Some Christians contend the Holy Spirit gave these gifts or “charisms” only during the New Testament period, but pentecostals and charismatics believe such gifts are still manifested today among believers.

Health & wealth gospel A teaching that has emerged in recent decades in some pentecostal and charismatic circles that emphasizes biblical verses on health and wealth to make the point that God wants believers to prosper; to release intended blessings, believers must have unwavering faith and practice certain principles, such as donating one-tenth of their income (tithing) to a church. Some critics say the movement is too simplistic and overlooks biblical verses on hardship and suffering.

Holy laughter Seemingly uncontrollable laughter believed to be a Spirit-led expression of joy.

Laying on of hands An action intended to invoke the Holy Spirit, conferring power and blessing on the recipient. Often used during prayer for healing and for the baptism of the Holy Spirit.

Mainline Protestants Members of the once-dominant Protestant denominations. Although affirming many traditional beliefs, these churches are known for their generally progressive theology and openness to new ideas and societal changes. These denominations do not stress the gifts of the Holy Spirit but are often tolerant of such practices, and thus include charismatics in their ranks.

Pentecostals Members of denominations that emphasize the gifts of the Holy Spirit, including the belief that speaking in tongues is necessary evidence of the baptism of the Holy Spirit. Pentecostals belong either to one of the historical denominations, such as the Assemblies of God and the Church of God in Christ, that originated in the religious revivals of the early 20th century, or to newer, largely independent churches, sometimes labeled as neo-pentecostal churches.

Prophecy A spontaneous utterance spoken in worship settings believed to be inspired by the Holy Spirit; not necessarily a prediction of future events as the term is commonly understood. One of the spiritual gifts listed in 1 Corinthians 12.

Renewalists An umbrella term used to refer to pentecostals and charismatics.

Speaking in tongues Ecstatic worship or prayer using unintelligible speech that is considered a gift of the Holy Spirit; also called prayer language or glossolalia.

Spiritual discernment A spiritual gift to recognize and differentiate the workings of the Holy Spirit and the devil.

Primary source: Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements (Regency Reference-Zondervan, 1988), edited by Stanley M. Burghess and Gary B. McGee.

Pentecostalism and related charismatic movements represent one of the fastest-growing segments of global Christianity. At least a quarter of the world’s 2 billion Christians are thought to be members of these lively, highly personal faiths, which emphasize such spiritually renewing “gifts of the Holy Spirit” as speaking in tongues, divine healing and prophesying. Even more than other Christians, pentecostals and other renewalists believe that God, acting through the Holy Spirit, continues to play a direct, active role in everyday life.

Pentecostalism, and its related “renewalist” or “spirit-filled” movements, was one of the most influential developments in global Christianity in the 20th century, and it is poised to have an even greater influence in the 21st century. Nowhere is this more evident than in the “global South,” where pentecostalism is reshaping the social, political and economic landscape of many countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.

The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life has assembled a variety of resources on pentecostalism, including reports, event transcripts and recent news clips.

Pew Forum and Pew Research Center Resources | Major Pentecostal Groups in the U.S. | Other Resources | Recent News

Pew Forum and Pew Research Center Resources

Poll Report: “Spirit and Power: A 10-Nation Survey of Pentecostals” Despite the rapid growth of the renewalist movement in the last few decades, relatively little is known about the religious, political and civic views of individuals involved in these groups. To address this shortcoming, the Pew Forum recently conducted surveys in 10 countries with sizeable renewalist populations: the United States; Brazil, Chile and Guatemala in Latin America; Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; and India, the Philippines and South Korea in Asia.

Event Transcript: “Moved by the Spirit: Pentecostal Power & Politics after 100 Years” The Pew Forum held an event in April 2006 to examine pentecostalism’s impact on global politics and its relevance to U.S. foreign policy concerns. The event, which was co-sponsored by the USC Annenberg Knight Program in Media and Religion and the USC Center for Religion and Civic Culture, featured speakers Anthea Butler of the University of Rochester, Paul Freston of Calvin College, and Donald Miller of the University of Southern California.

Q&A: “The New Face of Global Christianity: The Emergence of ‘Progressive Pentecostalism'” In an April 2006 Pew Forum interview, Donald Miller, Firestone Professor of Religion at the University of Southern California, explained the definition of pentecostalism and the social, economic and political implications of the movement’s growth.

Event Transcript: “Christianity and Conflict in Latin America” In an April 2006 panel discussion sponsored by the Pew Forum, Paul Frestin of Calvin College and Virginia Garrard-Burnett of University of Texas – Austin, discussed the political mobilization of Christian movements in Latin America, including recent social and political conflicts between evangelical Protestants and traditional Catholics and implications for U.S. security policy in the region. The panelists also examined case studies in Brazil, Mexico and Guatemala.

Event Transcript: “Faith and Conflict: The Global Rise of Christianity” The Pew Forum and the Council on Foreign Relations co-hosted a roundtable on changes in global Christianity, including the growth of pentecostalism and evangelical Christianity in Asia and Africa.

Major Pentecostal Groups in the U.S. (Source: Yearbook of American & Canadian Churches 2006, Nashville: Abingdon Press)

Apostolic Faith Church Assemblies of God Assemblies of God International Fellowship The Bible Church of Christ, Inc. Bible Way Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ World Wide, Inc. Christian Church of North America, General Council Church of God (Cleveland, TN) The Church of God in Christ Church of God Mountain Assembly, Inc. Church of God of Prophecy Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. Congregational Holiness Church Elim Fellowship The Foursquare Church Full Gospel Fellowship of Churches and Ministers International International Pentecostal Church of Christ International Pentecostal Holiness Church Open Bible Churches Pentecostal Assemblies of the World, Inc. Pentecostal Church of God United Holy Church of America, Inc. United Pentecostal Church International

Other Resources

Azusa Street Centennial Website Azusa Street Centennial (ReligionLink, 1/30/06) Asian Journal for Pentecostal Studies European Pentecostal Charismatic Research Association (EPCRA) European Research Network on Global Pentecostalism (GloPent) Hartford Institute for Religion Research Pentecostal-Charismatic Theological Inquiry International (PCTII) Religious Movements Homepage Project at the University of Virginia Into All the World: Black Pentecostalism in Global Contexts, Conference at Harvard Divinity School, March 2005

Recent News

Rapid Growth Can Be a Double-Edge Sword (Salt Lake Tribune, 9/9/06) Hallelujah! Kenya (Economist, 7/22/06) Latino Catholics Increasingly Drawn to Pentecostalism (Wash Post, 4/30/06) Overcome With The Spirit (Toronto Star, 4/29/06) Not All Charismatics Are Pentecostals (Toronto Star, 4/29/06) More than 20,000 Celebrate Pentecostalism (RNS, 4/26/06) Second Chance (Wall St Journal, 4/25/06) Pentecostalism at 100: A Major Religious Force (CS Monitor, 4/24/06) The Pentecostal Promise (NY Times, 4/23/06) Pentecostals Praise God in Many Tongues (LA Times, 4/23/06) Church Battles to Break Gang Cycle, With a Flock for All (NY Times, 4/16/06) Weeklong Affair Celebrates 100 Years of Pentecostal Revival (AP, 4/20/06) Faith Shapes Views at a Church of Immigrants (LA Times, 4/19/06) Pentecostal Movement Celebrates Humble Roots (Wash Post, 4/15/06) San Francisco’s Quake Still Felt, 100 Years Later (Phil Inquirer, 4/15/06) Rite of Baptism Trickles Away (USA Today, 4/13/06) 100 Years After Azusa Street, Revival Continues at a Michigan Church (RNS, 4/13/06) Many Faiths Join Unity Organization (Chicago Tribune, 4/7/06) Assemblies of God Fastest Growing Faith (Chicago Tribune, 4/7/06) Proposed Ban on “Tongues” Prayer Divides Baptists (USA Today, 4/5/06) Pentecostals: The Sequel (Christianity Today, April 2006) Grading the Movement (Christianity Today, April 2006) “Latino Giant” Awakens: Demonstrations Gaining Strength (NY Daily News, 3/28/06) Boom in African Christianity Spills Over to America (AP, 3/27/06) A Look at the Beliefs and Worship Styles of African Christians (AP, 3/27/06) African Christians a Growing Dynamic Force (AP, 3/25/06) Not if, It’s When: Waiting for the End, With Trepidation and Joy (NY Times, 3/26/06) The New Missionaries (AP, 3/23/06) Hispanic Catholics Celebrate Faith in Harmony (Wash Post, 3/19/06) Rules Raise Churches’ Fears (Miami Herald, 3/11/06) Puritans or Pornographers? (Economist, 2/25/06) Christians Mull Ways to Reach Out, Touch More (Chicago Tribune, 2/24/06) Mainline Christianity Facing New Challenges (Miami Herald, 2/13/06) Religious, Civic Leaders Push Pentecostal Memorial (AP, 2/6/06) Pentecostal Memorial Is Poised for a Revival (LA Times, 2/6/06) The House of the Spirit (LA Times, 1/8/06) Praise the Lord and Raise the Curtain (NY Times, 12/25/05) One Faith Fits All — or Else (LA Times) Stern Words from the Preacher at the President’s Side (NY Times, 9/19/05) Pentecostals: A Passionate Voice and a Moral Vision (Newsweek, 8/29/05) In Search of the Spiritual (Newsweek, 8/29/05) Four Women Become Pentecostal Bishops (Chicago Tribune, 6/30/05) Where Faith Thrives (NY Times, 3/26/05) How A Humble Preacher Ignited the Pentecostal Fire (Austin-American Statesman, 2/18/05) The Fight for God: Traditional Churches Are in Trouble. But Christianity Is Doing Rather Well (Economist, 12/19/02)