By a wide margin, voters most want candidates running for Congress to talk about economic issues – with many specifically mentioning prices and affordability.

But with the November elections on the horizon, neither party is seen as having an advantage on these issues. Americans are now almost evenly split over which party they most agree with on economic policies: 37% say the Democratic Party, while 36% say the Republican Party.

At this early stage, Democrats have both an edge in voters’ congressional candidate preferences and an engagement advantage among their coalition. Among registered voters:

• 43% say they would back a Democratic candidate for Congress if the election were held today, while 37% would back a Republican. Two-in-ten say they are not sure or would back another candidate.
• 70% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say “it really matters” which party controls Congress in November, while 60% of Republicans and Republican leaners say the same.
• 39% of Democrats have thought a lot about the election, compared with 22% of Republicans.

At a similar stage of the 2022 midterm campaign, Republicans held a modest edge on both engagement measures.

These are among the key findings of a new Pew Research Center survey conducted from July 6 to 12 among 3,554 U.S. adults, including 2,779 registered voters. The survey also finds that President Donald Trump looms large in the campaign. Most voters say the president is a factor in their vote – though by roughly two-to-one, voters are more likely to say they think of their vote this fall as a vote against Trump (42%) than to say they think of it as a vote for him (22%).

Views of Trump are a bigger factor for voters today than views of then-President Joe Biden were at a similar point four years ago.

Democrats overwhelmingly say they consider their vote for Congress this fall a vote against Trump – 81% view their vote this way.

In contrast, half of Republicans say Trump is not much of a factor in their vote, while 44% say their vote is a vote for him.

Views of the parties on key issues

Before the start of Trump’s second term, Americans were more likely to agree with the Republican Party than the Democratic Party on economic policy. Continuing a trend since Trump took office, the public is now about evenly split (37% say they agree with Democratic Party, 36% the Republican Party).

Similarly, Republicans no longer hold an advantage on policies to deal with the budget deficit.

For more on Americans’ economic views, including views of the impact of Trump’s economic policies on the economy, jump to “Americans’ evaluations of the economy remain negative.”

Neither party has an advantage on foreign policy or policies related to the use of military force, or on policies related to lesbian, gay or transgender people – a Democratic strength in 2022 and 2023.

And when it comes to policies to deal with artificial intelligence, 51% of adults say they agree with neither party.

Areas where Republicans hold an advantage

Americans continue to be more likely to agree with the Republican Party (43%) than the Democratic Party (29%) on policies to deal with crime.

Republicans also hold a 5 percentage point edge on immigration policy. This compares with a 9-point Republican advantage in September.

Areas where Democrats hold an advantage

Democrats hold 14-point advantages on both healthcare and environmental policy, a 10-point advantage on abortion policy, and a 9-point advantage on education policy.

Other key findings

Trump’s approval rating stands at 34%, while 64% of Americans say they disapprove of his job performance – unchanged since April. About seven-in-ten Republicans (69%) currently approve of his performance, while roughly three-in-ten (29%) disapprove. Democrats continue to overwhelmingly disapprove of his performance (93% disapprove, 6% approve).

The narrow slice of registered voters who disapprove of Trump, but not strongly (12%), are split in their midterm preferences: 31% back Republicans, 31% back Democrats. And many (28%) say they are not sure, while 10% back “another candidate.” In contrast, voters who approve of Trump back Republican candidates in the fall by an overwhelming margin, while those who strongly disapprove of Trump largely back Democrats.

Demographic differences in voters’ midterm preferences largely track patterns familiar to past elections. Today, Republican candidates have a 10 percentage point edge among White voters, while Democrats hold wider advantages among Hispanic, Black and Asian voters.

For more on demographic differences in candidate support, jump to “Midterm voting preferences by race and ethnicity, age, and other demographics” and explore the detailed tables.

Just a quarter of Americans now hold favorable views of Congress. Current ratings are near record lows and down from 32% last August. Republicans (35%) remain more likely than Democrats (16%) to view Congress positively.

Americans remain in a sour mood about the economy – roughly a quarter (24%) rate economic conditions in the country today as excellent or good, while 41% say they are “only fair” and 35% describe them as poor.

Positive ratings are slightly lower than in January, when 28% rated the economy as excellent or good. Still, Americans’ economic ratings have hovered around this level for the last few years.

The recent drop is primarily driven by a shift among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents: 41% now rate the economy as excellent or good, down from 49% in January. Just 10% of Democrats and Democratic leaners rate the economy positively, essentially unchanged since early in President Donald Trump’s term.

A new Pew Research Center survey, conducted July 6-12 among 3,554 U.S. adults, also findsthat Americans are less likely than they were in January to expect the economy to improve over the course of the next year.

• 23% now say they expect economic conditions to be better a year from now, down from 31% in January.
• 36% say they expect conditions to be worse a year from now, little changed from January (38%).

These views come as Americans remain concerned about the costs of healthcare, housing, food and energy. Concerns about gas prices, in particular, have risen sharply since January (before the U.S. military action against Iran). Note: U.S. gas prices had declined somewhat prior to the survey’s field period, but have risen steadily in recent weeks as military actions have escalated in the region and the price of crude oil has risen.

The economy is also front and center in many voters’ minds as the 2026 midterm elections approach. For more on views of the midterms, read the accompanying key findings.

Trump’s economic policies

Six-in-ten Americans now say that Trump’s economic policies have worsened economic conditions in the country. This is up from the 52% who said this in January and the 53% who held this view last fall.

Most Republicans continue to say Trump’s policies have either improved economic conditions (42%) or not had much of an effect (29%).

But GOP views have become less positive since January. The share of Republicans who say Trump’s policies have worsened conditions has risen from 18% to 28%, while the share saying they have improved conditions has fallen from 57% to 42%.

The vast majority of Democrats continue to say Trump’s economic policies have made the economy worse (89% say this today).

Americans’ economic concerns

Large majorities of Americans remain very concerned about the cost of healthcare, food and consumer goods, and housing. And concern about gas prices has risen sharply: 56% now say they are very concerned about this, up from 34% in January.

A narrower majority (54%) of adults say they are very concerned about the price of electricity, while 49% say they are very concerned about the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in the economy.

More than four-in-ten (44%) express a high level of concern about people who want to work not being able to find employment.

In contrast, relatively few Americans (18%) say they are very concerned about how the stock market is doing.

Partisan differences on economic concerns

As has been the case since the start of Trump’s second term, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to express concern about most of the economic issues asked about in the survey.

The widest partisan gaps are on unemployment and the costs of healthcare, housing, and food and other goods.

On other issues – like the price of gasoline, electricity and the role of AI in the economy – Democrats express more concern than Republicans, but by smaller margins.

Roughly equal shares of Democrats (17%) and Republicans (18%) say they are very concerned about how the stock market is doing.

For full trends on economic concerns by party, refer to Additional charts.

Additional charts

This is part of a larger report on Americans and the 2026 midterm elections.

Several months ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, Democrats hold a 6 percentage point edge over Republicans among registered voters on the generic ballot for Congress (43% vs. 37%). Two-in-ten voters say they are not sure (14%) or support another candidate (5%).

Differences in preferences across demographic groups follow patterns that are similar to other recent elections.

This is an early look at voters’ views. With congressional primaries still ongoing and several months to go until the general election, preferences can change. And turnout in midterm elections tends to be relatively low – much lower than in presidential elections – so the subset of people who actually cast ballots may look different from all registered voters.

Candidate preferences by race and ethnicity

As has been the case in the past several elections, White registered voters say they would choose the Republican congressional candidate over the Democratic candidate if the election were held today (46% vs. 36%).

Among Hispanic voters, 49% say they would vote for the Democratic candidate, 26% for the Republican and 24% say they are not sure (18%) or support another candidate (6%).

Hispanic voters have supported Democrats by sizable margins in the last several midterm elections, and in presidential elections prior to 2024 – but Hispanic voters in the 2024 presidential election were nearly evenly split in their vote preference.

Black voters support Democratic candidates over Republicans by a wide margin in the current survey: 68% vs. 8%, with 25% saying they are not sure or would support another candidate.

Democratic candidates also hold an advantage among Asian voters – 56% vs. 21% who would vote for a GOP candidate. Asian voters have supported Democratic candidates by sizable margins in recent years.

Candidate preferences by age

In recent midterm and presidential elections, voters under 50 have preferred Democratic candidates over Republican ones – though the size of the Democratic advantage has fluctuated. Voters 50 and older have tended to prefer Republican candidates, though that edge has also shifted.

Today, registered voters under 30 prefer a Democrat for Congress over a Republican by nearly two-to-one (47% vs. 24%). These voters are also far more likely than older adults to say they prefer another candidate or are not sure who they will support in November.

Voters 30 to 49 also prefer Democratic candidates by 42% to 35%. While in most recent elections voters in this age group have tended to back Democratic candidates, those who turned out in the 2024 presidential election split their votes about evenly between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris.

Among those 50 to 64, 44% prefer a Republican candidate, while 39% prefer a Democratic candidate.

Candidate preferences by education

Paralleling patterns in partisan identification, college graduates are much more likely than those without a bachelor’s degree to back Democratic candidates.

By about two-to-one, those with a graduate degree prefer Democratic candidates over Republicans (59% to 29%). By a more modest margin, those with a bachelor’s degree but without a higher degree also back Democrats (48% to 35%).

Voters with some college experience are roughly divided in their preferences (42% prefer Democrats, 39% prefer Republicans), while those with no college experience prefer Republican candidates (41% to 31%).

Candidate preferences by party identification

Very few voters who identify with – or lean toward – one of the two major parties say they would vote for the other party’s congressional candidate if the election were held today. But Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to say they aren’t sure.

• 79% of Republicans and Republican leaners say they would support the Republican candidate, compared with 3% for the Democrat, 4% for another candidate and 15% who are not sure.
• 86% of Democrats and Democratic leaners say they’d pick the Democrat, while 2% would choose the Republican, 5% another candidate and 7% aren’t sure.

Overall, those who identify as independents or with another party are more likely to say they are “not sure” about their choice for Congress than those who identify as Republicans or Democrats. 

But most independents lean to a party, and Republican leaners are currently more than twice as likely to say they are not sure about their vote preference than their Democratic-leaning counterparts (28% vs. 12%).

As a result:

• Republican candidates enjoy a 53 percentage point edge over Democratic candidates among Republican leaners (58% support GOP candidates, 5% support Democrats, 10% back other candidates and 28% say they are not sure).
• Democratic candidates enjoy a far wider 73-point edge over Republican candidates among Democratic leaners (75% support Democratic candidates, 2% support Republicans, 11% back others and 12% aren’t sure).

This difference in the preferences of leaners is the primary driver of Democratic candidates’ 13-point advantage among all voters who identify as independent or with another party. 

For more information on groups’ congressional vote preferences, please refer to the detailed tables.

This is part of a larger report on Americans and the 2026 midterm elections.

With congressional primaries already underway and the midterm elections coming up this fall, voters in both partisan coalitions are fairly split over whether they are looking for candidates who prioritize seeking common ground with the opposing party or for candidates who would push hard for the policies their voters want.

Among registered voters who support Republican candidates for Congress:

• 58% say it’s more important that a candidate focuses on pushing hard for policies Republicans want – even if it makes it harder to get things done.
• 41% place more importance on candidates who focus on finding common ground with Democrats on policies, even if it means giving up some things Republican voters want.

Voters who support Democratic candidates are more evenly split: 52% want a candidate who would prioritize their voters’ policy preferences, while 48% prefer a candidate who would prioritize finding common ground with Republicans.

How voters differ

Voters who prefer candidates who would focus on pushing hard for policies their side wants are more engaged with the 2026 midterms so far than those who prefer candidates who seek common ground. This pattern is evident in both coalitions.

Republican voters

Among all registered voters who prefer a Republican candidate for Congress this fall, 69% say it “really matters which party wins control of Congress.”

Among pro-GOP voters who want a candidate who would focus more on fighting for the policies they want, this jumps to 80%. By comparison, a far smaller share (54%) of those who place more importance on seeking common ground say the outcome in November really matters.

Republican voters who prefer a candidate who would push hard for GOP policies have also given more thought to the election than those who want a candidate who would focus more on seeking common ground (30% vs. 15%).

Democratic voters

Among voters who support Democrats, there is a similar pattern – though it is slightly less pronounced.

Eight-in-ten Democratic voters who want a candidate who would prioritize fighting for their policies say it really matters which party wins. Among those who place more importance on compromise, 71% say this.

There is a similar gap when it comes to attention: 46% of Democratic voters who want a candidate who would focus on pushing for their own policies have given a lot of thought to the midterms so far. This drops to 39% among those who place more emphasis on compromise.

Demographic differences in both coalitions in candidate preferences

There are also differences within each voting coalition on this question.

Among those who support Republican candidates – and strongly identify with the party – 67% want a candidate who will focus on pushing hard for policies rather than compromising with Democrats.

Republicans who are less strongly attached to the GOP are more likely to favor a candidate who would seek common ground.

Among those who support Democratic candidates, there is a similar pattern by partisan attachment.

In the Democratic coalition, there also are demographic differences in whether voters prefer candidates who place more importance on compromise or on pushing hard for policy priorities. 

By a large margin, voters under 35 who back Democratic congressional candidates want an elected official who would focus on pushing for what Democrats want (70%). Older Democratic voters are far more split in their preferences.

Among those who back Democrats, Black voters are more likely than those in other groups to prefer candidates who would focus on pushing hard for priorities. Two-thirds say this, compared with a narrower majority of Hispanic Democratic voters (57%). White Democratic voters are roughly evenly split on this question, while Asian Democratic voters (38%) are less likely to prefer candidates who push hard over those who seek common ground.

The groups in Pew Research Center’s political typology – which goes beyond political party to place Americans into groups based on their political values and attitudes – vary a great deal in how much attention they are paying to the midterm elections, what their early voting preferences are, and how their views of Donald Trump have changed over the course of his second term.

This analysis is a companion to the Center’s 2026 Political Typology. To learn more about the typology, start with the main report’s overview.To find which group is your best fit, take the quiz.

Engagement with the November elections follows a similar pattern to the overall interest and engagement with politics of the typology groups – with some exceptions.

Three of the most partisan and ideologically consistent groups (Leftward Progressives and Loyal Liberals on the left, No Apologies Right on the right) continue to be the most invested in elections, but Faith First Conservatives are not paying as much attention as the other highly ideological groups.

Three groups with more mixed partisan affiliation and political values (Pragmatic and Polite Right, Order and Opportunity Left and Left-Out Left) are modestly engaged with the elections at this point. At least half of voters in each of these groups say the outcome really matters, and between 26% and 30% say they have given the elections a lot of thought.

But one Republican-oriented group with a mix of political values, Unconventional Right, are considerably less engaged than others in this year’s elections: Just 11% of Unconventional Right registered voters say they have thought much about it, and 43% say the outcome really matters.

Tuned-Out Middle – a group largely defined by their low interest in politics – are hardly thinking about the elections at all and are largely unconcerned with which party has control of Congress next year.

Midterm preferences

Across the typology groups, support for candidates in the 2026 congressional elections among registered voters broadly parallels the groups’ overall partisan affiliations (and how they voted in 2024 for president).

About a quarter of voters in the more politically and ideologically mixed groups say they will support a candidate from a third party or are unsure of how they will vote. Nearly as many voters who are Faith First Conservatives (18%) also say this.

Trump’s job approval over time among the typology groups

President Donald Trump’s job approval remains highest among the most consistently Republican and conservative groups (89% of No Apologies Right and 77% of Faith First Conservatives), though smaller shares of these groups approve now than in the weeks after he took office in 2025.

Trump’s job approval has fallen most sharply among the groups that are right-oriented but ideologically mixed:

Among Unconventional Right – a group that voted for him by an overwhelming margin in 2024 – 51% now approve of the way he is handling his job as president, down from 78% at the start of this second term.

Among Pragmatic and Polite Right – a group that also broke for Trump in 2024 by a narrower margin – just 34% now approve of his performance, down from 50% at the beginning of his term.

Tuned-Out Middle’s approval of Trump’s performance has also declined over this period, to 35% approving today.

Relatively few Americans in the typology groups that are left of center (Order and Opportunity Left, Left-Out Left, Loyal Liberals and Leftward Progressives) approve of Trump’s job performance.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals:

Research team

Jocelyn Kiley, Director, Political Research
Steven Shepard, Associate Director, Political Research
Hannah Hartig, Senior Researcher
Baxter Oliphant, Senior Researcher
Gabe Borelli, Research Associate
Andrew Daniller, Research Associate
Andy Cerda, Research Analyst      
Shanay Gracia, Research Analyst
Ted Van Green, Research Analyst

Communications and editorial

Nida Asheer, Senior Communications Manager
DeVonte Smith, Communications Associate
David Kent, Senior Editorial Specialist

Graphic design and web publishing

Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production
Carson TerBush, Associate Information Graphics Designer
Reem Nadeem, Digital Producer

Methodology

Andrew Mercer, Senior Research Methodologist
Dorene Asare-Marfo, Senior Panel Manager
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Arnold Lau, Research Methodologist

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 196 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from July 6 to July 12, 2026. A total of 3,554 panelists responded out of 4,173 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 85%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,554 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes oversamples of non-Hispanic Asian adults, 18- to 29-year-old validated voters and Hispanic validated voters in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,428) and live telephone (n=126) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “About the American Trends Panel.”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which non-Hispanic Asian adults, 18- to 29-year-old validated voters and Hispanic validated voters were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $15 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was July 6 to 12, 2026. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing. 

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on July 6.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on July 6. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on July 7.

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on July 2. Soft launch took place on July 6 and involved dialing until a total of three interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, two ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates