The American public continues to express more positive opinions of “capitalism” than “socialism,” although the shares viewing each of the terms positively have declined modestly since 2019.

Today, 36% of U.S. adults say they view socialism somewhat (30%) or very (6%) positively, down from 42% who viewed the term positively in May 2019. Six-in-ten today say they view socialism negatively, including one-third who view it very negatively.

And while a majority of the public (57%) continues to view capitalism favorably, that is 8 percentage points lower than in 2019 (65%), according to a national survey from Pew Research Center conducted Aug. 1-14 among 7,647 adults.

Much of the decline in positive views of both socialism and capitalism has been driven by shifts in views among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents.

In 2019, nearly two-thirds of Democrats and Democratic leaners (65%) had a positive view of socialism. Today a smaller majority of Democrats (57%) say they have a positive impression.

There has not been significant change among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents since 2019. Today, just 14% say they have a positive impression of socialism, while about four times as many say they have a very negative view of the term.

There is a similar pattern on views of capitalism. Today, fewer than half of Democrats (46%) have a positive view of capitalism, down 9 points from the 55% who said this in 2019.

Among Republicans, there has been a modest decline in the share who have positive views of capitalism, although a large majority still have a positive impression (78% in 2019, 74% today).

Americans see capitalism as giving people more opportunity and more freedom than socialism, while they see socialism as more likely to meet people’s basic needs, though these perceptions differ significantly by party.

While 36% of adults say “gives all people an equal opportunity to be successful” describes capitalism extremely or very well, fewer (23%) say that about socialism. And roughly twice as many say the phrase “makes sure everyone’s basic needs, such as food, health care, and housing, are met” describes socialism at least very well as say the same of capitalism (38% vs. 18%).

Consistent with the wide partisan differences in opinions of socialism and capitalism, Republicans and Democrats characterize the terms in very different ways. For example, Republicans widely think socialism “restricts people’s individual freedoms” – 62% say this describes socialism extremely or very well, compared with 19% of Democrats. Democrats, by contrast, are far more likely than Republicans to say socialism meets people’s basic needs (56% extremely or very well vs. 19% of Republicans).

These differences echo findings from Americans’ open-ended descriptions of the terms in the 2019 study, which found that critics of socialism were more likely to mention stifled innovation and restrictions of freedom in their responses and to cite countries like Venezuela as examples. Those with a positive view of socialism were more likely to describe it as a fairer system – and to mention countries like Finland and Denmark as examples.

Democrats and Republicans also have markedly different views of self-described democratic socialists. In a survey conducted this July, 33% of Democrats say they like political leaders who identify as democratic socialists, while 18% dislike such leaders; Republicans largely express a negative view of leaders who identify as democratic socialists (78% dislike).

Demographic differences in views of socialism and capitalism

There are sizable demographic differences in views of these terms – especially capitalism.

Opinions of both terms differ widely by age. While younger adults are more likely than older adults to say they have positive impressions of socialism, the opposite is true for capitalism.

Just 40% of those ages 18 to 29 view capitalism positively; that is the lowest share in any age group and 33 percentage points lower than the share of those 65 and older.

Adults younger than 50 also are more likely than those 50 and older to have a positive impression of socialism (41% vs. 30%).

Men and women are about equally likely to have positive impressions of socialism. However, men are far more likely than women to have a favorable impression of capitalism: 68% of men have a positive impression of capitalism, compared with 48% of women. Men are also roughly twice as likely as women to say they have a very favorable impression of capitalism (28% vs. 15%).

About half of Black (52%) and Asian (49%) Americans have a positive impression of socialism, as do 41% of Hispanic Americans – compared with just 31% of White Americans. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Asian (59%) adults and 54% of Hispanic adults have a positive impression of capitalism. By comparison, 40% of Black adults view capitalism positively.

People with higher family incomes are more likely than those in the lowest income tier to view capitalism positively (70% vs. 45%). By contrast, those with lower family incomes are more positive about socialism than are those with middle and upper incomes.

Both Democrats and Republicans differ by age and income in their opinions about these terms. Among Democrats and Democratic leaners, there are stark differences in views of capitalism by age: 64% of Democrats 65 and older say they have a positive view of the term, as do about half of Democrats ages 50 to 64. By comparison, 42% of Democrats ages 30 to 49 and just 29% of those under 30 say the same.

There are more modest age differences among Democrats in views of socialism. Democrats under 50 are somewhat more likely to have a positive view of the term than those 50 and older (60% vs. 54%).

Lower-income Democrats are also less likely to have positive views of capitalism (39%) than middle- (47%) and upper-income Democrats (55%). Similar majorities of Democrats across income tiers view socialism positively.

Among Republicans and GOP leaners, majorities in all age groups have positive views toward capitalism, but younger Republicans are less likely to say this than older Republicans. Six-in-ten Republicans under the age of 30 say they have a positive view of capitalism. Among Republicans ages 30 to 49 71% say they have a positive view toward capitalism, as do eight-in-ten Republicans 50 and older.

And while just 6% of Republicans 65 and older say they have positive views toward socialism, a larger share of those under 30 (23%) say the same thing.

There are also income divides among Republicans: While a majority of lower-income Republicans (61%) have favorable views of capitalism, the share who say this is smaller than among middle- (75%) and upper-income Republicans (87%). About three-in-ten Republicans in the lower tier of household income (29%) have positive views toward socialism, compared with about one-in-ten who are middle (9%) and upper income (8%).

Among the public overall, roughly four-in-ten (39%) have a positive view of capitalism and a negative view of socialism. That is about double the share who have a positive view of socialism and a negative view of capitalism (18%). About one-in-five adults either have positive impressions of both terms (18%) or neither one (21%).

Adults under the age of 30 are about as likely to only have a positive view of socialism (28%) as they are to have a positive view of only capitalism (24%). Among those 65 and older, a majority (53%) have a positive view of capitalism and not socialism, while just 9% only have a positive view of socialism.

Adults under 30 are about twice as likely as those 65 and older to have a positive view of neither term (27% vs. 14%).

A clear majority of Republicans (66%) have a positive impression of capitalism and a negative view of socialism.

Younger Republicans are less likely than older Republicans to view capitalism positively and also view socialism negatively: 47% of Republicans under the age of 30 hold this combination of views. By comparison, 79% of Republicans 65 and older and 71% of those ages 50 to 64 hold this combination of views.

Among Democrats, views are more mixed: Three-in-ten have a positive view toward socialism but not capitalism, 19% express a positive view toward capitalism only, 27% of Democrats view both socialism and capitalism positively, and about two-in-ten (21%) do not have a positive view of either term.

Views toward socialism and capitalism also differ across age groups among Democrats. About four-in-ten Democrats under the age of 30 express a positive view toward socialism and a negative view of capitalism (41%), while 21% of Democrats 50 and older hold this combination of views. Democrats under 30 are about twice as likely as those 65 and older to say they have negative views of both socialism and capitalism (28% vs. 15%).

Wide partisan gaps in descriptions of socialism, capitalism

Republicans and Democrats also have different impressions of the ways capitalism and socialism affect society. 

While about a third of Democrats and Democratic leaners (34%) say the phrase “gives all people an equal opportunity to be successful” describes socialism extremely or very well, just 11% of Republicans and say the same. Nearly seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican leaners (69%) say this phrase does not describe socialism well, with 44% saying it does not describe socialism at all well.

Conversely, while a majority of Republicans (56%) associate capitalism with giving people an equal opportunity for success, just 20% of Democrats say this phrase describes capitalism extremely or very well. Nearly half of Democrats (48%) say it characterizes capitalism not too or not at all well.

The pattern of partisan responses to the phrase “makes sure everyone’s basic needs, such as food, health care, and housing, are met” is largely similar to that of equal opportunity. Democrats are far more likely than Republicans to say this phrase describes socialism extremely or very well (56% vs. 19%) and to say this does not describe capitalism (62% vs. 38%).

And Republicans are 43 percentage points more likely than Democrats to say “restricts people’s individual freedoms” describes socialism extremely or very well (62% vs. 19%). Partisan differences in the shares using this description for capitalism are more modest, with 14% of Republicans and 19% of Democrats saying it describes capitalism extremely or very well.

Democrats who view socialism negatively are skeptical it makes sure that people’s basic needs are met

The majority of Democrats who view socialism positively (57% of all Democrats and Democratic leaners) are much more likely than those who view it negatively to say it gives all people a chance to succeed and ensure their needs are met.

Among Democrats with a positive impression of socialism, nearly half (48%) say the phrase “gives all people an equal opportunity to be successful” describes socialism extremely or very well, while just 10% say it describes socialism not too or not at all well.

By comparison, only 14% of those with a negative impression of socialism say this phrase characterizes socialism at least very well.

An even larger share of Democrats with a positive impression of socialism (71%) say “makes sure everyone’s basic needs, such as food, health care, and housing, are met” describes socialism extremely or very well. Only about a third of Democrats with a negative impression of socialism (34%) say the same.

Conversely, Democrats with a negative impression of socialism are more likely to say that socialism restricts people’s individual’s freedoms. Roughly three-in-ten (29%) say this, compared with just 12% of Democrats who have a positive impression of socialism.

Democrats’ views of leaders who identify as democratic socialists

Overall, a third of Democrats and Democratic leaners say they like political leaders who identify as democratic socialists, while 18% dislike such leaders, a separate Pew Research Center survey conducted June 27-July 4 found. Nearly half of Democrats (47%) say they neither like nor dislike political leaders who call themselves democratic socialists. These shares are essentially unchanged over the past year.

Among Democrats, ideology and age are both closely associated with views of political leaders who identify as democratic socialists. This mirrors the pattern of opinion on the term “socialism” – with younger Democrats and liberal Democrats more positive about both democratic socialists and the overall term “socialism” than older Democrats and conservative or moderate Democrats.

Half of liberal Democrats express favorable views of those who identify as democratic socialists, including 26% who like such leaders “a lot.” Only about one-in-ten liberal Democrats (12%) say they dislike leaders who say they are democratic socialists, while another 38% neither like nor dislike such leaders.

By contrast, conservative or moderate Democrats are somewhat more likely to say they dislike (24%) than like (19%) such leaders; 55% neither like nor dislike leaders who use this term to describe themselves.

On balance, younger Democrats like leaders who describe themselves as democratic socialists: Among those under 50, 37% like such leaders while 15% dislike them. By comparison, opinion of democratic socialists is more divided among those 50 and older: 28% like political leaders who identify as democratic socialists, while 22% dislike such leaders.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals:

Research team

Carroll Doherty, Director, Political Research
Jocelyn Kiley, Associate Director, Political Research
Baxter Oliphant, Senior Researcher
Andrew Daniller, Research Associate
Hannah Hartig, Research Associate
Gabe Borelli, Research Associate
Amina Dunn, Research Analyst
Ted Van Green, Research Analyst
Andy Cerda, Research Assistant

Communications and editorial

Nida Asheer, Communications Manager
Talia Price, Communications Associate
David Kent, Senior Copy Editor

Graphic design and web publishing

Peter Bell, Design Director
Alissa Scheller, Information Graphics Designer
Reem Nadeem, Associate Digital Producer

Methodology

Andrew Mercer, Senior Research Methodologist
Dorene Asare-Marfo, Panel Manager
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Arnold Lau, Research Methodologist

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from Aug. 1 to Aug. 14 and included oversamples of Hispanic, Asian and Black adults, as well as 18-29 year old Republicans and Republican leaning independents in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 7,647 panelists responded out of 13,221 who were sampled, for a response rate of 65%. This included 6,025 respondents from the ATP and an oversample of 1,622 Hispanic respondents from Ipsos’ KnowledgePanel. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 2%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 7,647 respondents is plus or minus 1.7 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020 another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, $5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a $10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,651 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.¹ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Hispanic, Asian and Black adults, as well as 18-29 year old Republicans and Republican leaning independents were selected with certainty were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

The ATP was supplemented with an oversample of self-identified Hispanic respondents from the KnowledgePanel who were of Mexican origin, Central American ancestry or who had no more than a high-school education.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Ipsos operates an ongoing modest incentive program for KnowledgePanel to encourage participation and create member loyalty. The incentive program includes special raffles and sweepstakes with both cash rewards and other prizes to be won. Typically, panel members are assigned no more than one survey per week. On average, panel members complete two to three surveys per month with durations of 10 to 15 minutes per survey. An additional incentive is usually provided for longer surveys. For this survey, during the last few days of data collection, KnowledgePanel members were offered 10,000 points (equivalent to $10) in addition to the regular incentive program in an attempt to boost the number of responses from panel members of Central American ancestry.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was Aug. 1 to Aug. 14, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on Aug. 1, 2022.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty ATP panelists and 909 KP panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on Aug. 1, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation.

All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on Aug. 3, 2022.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to four email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to four SMS reminders.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center’s researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, 12 ATP and seven KP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The data was weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist began with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights were then adjusted to account for each panelist’s probability of being sampled to participate in this wave.

Next, respondents were placed into one of five sample groups: 1) Hispanic adults of Mexican origin 2) Hispanic adults of Central American origin 3) Other Hispanic adults with no more than a high school education 4) Other Hispanic adults with more than a high school education 5) Non-Hispanic adults. Separately within each group, the weights for ATP and KnowledgePanel respondents were scaled to be proportional to their effective sample size within that group. The ATP and KnowledgePanel respondents were then recombined and the weights were poststratified so that the weighted proportion of adults in each of the five groups matched its estimated share of the of the U.S. adult population.

The weights were then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table. These include a set of weighting parameters for the total U.S. adult population as well as an additional set of parameters specifically for Hispanic adults. Separately for each sample group, the weights were then trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for most ATP members were measured in 2022. A small number of panelists for which 2022 measures were not available use profile variables measured in 2021.For KnowledgePanel respondents, many of the weighting variables were measured on this wave.

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made these more recent measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted to an estimated benchmark that attempts to account for possible changes in behavior.

The weighting parameter is estimated using the volunteerism profile variable that was measured on the full American Trends Panel in 2021 but weighted using the profile variable that was measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements were used. For American Trends panelists recruited in 2021, the 2020 volunteerism measure was imputed using data from existing panelists with similar characteristics.

This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Additional wave methodology

This report also features a question fielded in an earlier survey. Further information for that question can be found here.

Dispositions and response rates

Adjusting income and defining income tiers

Family income data reported in this study is adjusted for household size and cost-of-living differences by geography using a similar methodology to Pew Research Center’s previous work on the American middle class. The income tiers used in this analysis are also created following methodology previously used in the Center’s work on the middle class.

Prior to these adjustments, American Trends Panel members were assigned to the midpoint of the income range they selected during the survey to provide an exact income figure for adjustment.

The metropolitan area cost-of-living adjustment is based on price indexes published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. These indexes, known as Regional Price Parities (RPP), compare the prices of goods and services across 384 metropolitan statistical areas as well as non-metro areas with the national average prices for the same goods and services. The most recent available data is from 2020.

The national estimates presented in the analysis encompass the U.S. adult population. Those who fall outside of the 381 metropolitan statistical areas in which current ATP panelists reside are assigned the RPP for their state’s non-metropolitan area.

Family incomes are then adjusted for the number of people in a household using the methodology from Pew Research Center’s previous work on the American middle class. That is done because a four-person household with an income of say, $50,000, faces a tighter budget constraint than a two-person household with the same income.

“Middle-income” adults are in families with annual incomes that are two-thirds to double the median family income in the full ATP sample after incomes have been adjusted for household size and the local cost of living. The median family income for the panel is roughly $65,800 for an average family of three. Using this median income, the middle-income range is about $43,800 to $131,500 annually for a three-person family. Lower-income families have incomes less than roughly $43,800 and upper-income families have incomes greater than roughly $131,500 (all figures expressed in 2021 dollars).

Of the 6,025 ATP panelists that completed the Wave 113 survey, there were 326 who had not yet completed the ATP’s 2022 annual profile survey that collects updated demographic data on all ATP panelists. Because updated measures of family income and place of residence were not available for these respondents, they are assigned their income tier from the previous year(based on their 2020 family income, 2020 place of residence and 2019 regional price parity). Based on these adjustments, 31% of respondents in Wave 113 are lower income, 47% are middle income and 16% fall into the upper-income tier. An additional 6% either didn’t offer a response to the income question or the household size question.

Two examples of how a given area’s cost-of-living adjustment was calculated are as follows: the Florence-Muscle Shoals metropolitan area in Alabama is a relatively inexpensive area, with a price level that is 17.6% less than the national average. The San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley metropolitan area in California is one of the most expensive areas, with a price level that is 17.4% higher than the national average. Income in the sample is adjusted to make up for this difference. As a result, a family with an income of $41,200 in the Florence area is equivalent to a family with an income of $58,700 in San Francisco. 

© Pew Research Center, 2022