As Joe Biden navigates the first few weeks of his presidency, Americans have distinctly different views of which groups will gain influence – and which ones will lose influence – in Washington during his administration.

Nearly two-thirds of U.S. adults (65%) say Black people will gain influence in Washington with Joe Biden taking office. Just 14% say Black people will lose influence, while 20% say they will not be affected.

Large shares of adults also expect women (63%) and gay and lesbian people (60%) to gain influence over the next four years. Only about one-in-ten expect each of these groups to lose influence.

Other groups expected to gain influence include younger people (54%), Hispanic people (53%), poor people (50%) and unions (48%). Relatively small shares – no more than about quarter – say any of these groups will lose influence during Biden’s presidency.

By contrast, evangelical Christians are expected to lose influence with Biden as president: 50% say they will lose influence, while just 9% expect them to gain influence; 39% say they will be unaffected. 

By sizable margins, more Americans also say business corporations and the military will lose than gain influence, though about a quarter (24%) say corporations will be unaffected and 32% say the same about the military.

While larger shares expect Black, Hispanic and Asian American people to gain rather than lose influence, more than twice as many Americans say White people will lose (38%) influence in Washington as say they will gain it (15%); nearly half (46%) say that White people will be unaffected.

The Pew Research Center survey, conducted on the Center’s nationally representative American Trends Panel from Jan. 8-12, 2021, among 5,360 adults, finds a contrast between the public’s views of the groups that will gain or lose influence today with opinions four years ago, at the start of Donald Trump’s presidency. Many of the groups of people who are now expected to gain influence under Biden, including women, Black people, Hispanics and gays and lesbians, were expected to lose clout with Trump as president.¹

As was the case on the eve of Trump’s presidency, more Americans say “people like yourself” will lose (36%) than gain (24%) influence in Biden’s presidency; 39% say they will not be affected.

The public’s views of how various groups will be impacted by Biden’s presidency are more similar to expectations for Barack Obama’s administration shortly before he became president in 2009. At that time, majorities thought younger people, poor people and Black people would gain influence.

Wide partisan gaps over whether the poor – and wealthy – will gain or lose influence with Biden as president

Republicans and Democrats differ significantly about which groups stand to gain or lose influence in Washington during Biden’s presidency. With the Democratic Party in control of Congress and the presidency, large majorities of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say that a number of groups will gain influence over the next four years. For example, at least six-in-ten Democrats say women (77%), Black people (76%), poor people (69%), Hispanic people (68%), gay and lesbian people (63%), and younger people (62%) will gain influence under Biden.

Republicans and Republican leaners are more divided in expectations for most of these groups, with gay and lesbian people a notable exception. Comparable shares of Democrats (63%) and Republicans (60%) say gays and lesbians will gain influence, though 12% of Republicans say they will lose influence versus just 5% of Democrats.

Republicans are less likely than Democrats to say women and Black people will gain influence, though on balance, more Republicans say both groups will gain influence than say they will lose it.

There are more striking differences in views of how poor people will be affected. Roughly seven-in-ten Democrats (69%) say poor people will gain influence under Biden, while just 29% of Republicans say the same. In fact, 42% of Republicans say poor people will lose influence, with 27% expecting the poor to be unaffected.

And Republicans (48%) are far more likely than Democrats (13%) to say wealthy people will gain influence with Biden as president. Larger shares of Democrats than Republicans say wealthy people will either lose influence or not be affected by a Biden presidency. 

In 2017, White people and men were two of the groups that were widely expected to gain influence with Trump as president. Today, Republicans and Democrats have very different expectations for these groups. A majority of Republicans (58%) expect White people to lose influence over the next four years. In contrast, a similar share of Democrats (60%) expect that White people’s influence will not be affected.

There is a similar pattern in views of men. While a majority of Democrats say men’s influence in Washington will not be affected by a Biden presidency (66%), Republicans are more divided: 41% expect men to lose influence, while 42% say their influence will not be affected.

Differences by race and ethnicity in views of how White people will be affected by Biden’s election

While majorities of adults say they think Black and Hispanic people will gain influence in Washington now that Biden is president (65% and 53%, respectively), the public is more divided on how White people will be affected.

On balance, more than twice as many adults say White people will lose influence (38%) rather than gain influence (15%) in the Biden administration, with a plurality saying their influence will not be affected. But there are sharp divides in these views by race: 44% of White adults say they think White people will lose influence in Washington, while far smaller shares of Black and Hispanic adults say the same (23% and 28%, respectively).

Similarly, while just 9% of White adults say White people will gain influence in the Biden administration, about a quarter of Black (27%) and Hispanic (25%) adults expect White people’s influence to grow.

Overall, about two-thirds of adults say that Black people will gain influence in the Biden administration; this includes about two-thirds of Black (67%) and White (65%) adults, as well as 61% of Hispanic adults. A majority of adults (53%) also expect Hispanic people to gain influence, including 56% of Hispanic adults, 62% of Black adults and 50% of White adults.

Wide partisan differences over whether ‘people like yourself’ will gain or lose influence

Overall, large shares across many groups of Americans say the influence of “people like yourself” will not be affected with Biden taking office, but there are some notable differences by race, partisanship and ideology.

Among the public overall, 39% of adults say the influence of people like them will not be affected, while a slightly smaller share (36%) say they will lose influence in Washington. About a quarter (24%) say people like them will gain influence.

Nearly half of White adults (45%) say people like them will lose influence in Washington, while only 16% say they will gain influence and 39% say they will not be affected.

Black adults, by contrast, are far more likely to say people like them will gain (53%) than lose (7%) influence. Fewer Hispanic (33%) and Asian American adults (30%) expect that people like them will gain influence.

The widest gaps in perceptions of how people like them will be affected by the new president are by partisanship. Republicans and Republican leaners generally feel like they will lose influence in Washington with Biden as president: 66% say people like them will lose influence, while 27% expect to not be affected and just 7% say they will gain influence.

Among Republicans, conservatives are more likely than moderates and liberals to say people like them will lose influence (75% vs. 52%, respectively).

Democrats are far less likely than Republicans to say that people like them will lose influence, but most do not expect to gain influence. Half of Democrats and Democratic leaners say people like them will not be affected with Biden as president, while 40% say they will gain influence; just 10% expect to lose influence. Liberal Democrats are more likely than conservative and moderate Democrats to say people like them will gain influence in Washington (45% vs. 36%, respectively).

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals:

Research team

Carroll Doherty, Director, Political Research
Jocelyn Kiley, Associate Director, Political Research
Baxter Oliphant, Senior Researcher
Andrew Daniller, Research Associate
Bradley Jones, Research Associate
Hannah Hartig, Research Associate
Amina Dunn, Research Analyst
Ted Van Green, Research Assistant
Vianney Gomez, Research Assistant

Communications and editorial

Nida Asheer, Communications Manager
Calvin Jordan, Communications Associate
David Kent, Senior Copy Editor

Graphic design and web publishing

Alissa Scheller, Information Graphics Designer
Reem Nadeem, Associate Digital Producer

Methodology

Andrew Mercer, Senior Research Methodologist
Nick Bertoni, Senior Panel Manager
Arnold Lau, Research Analyst

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted Jan. 8 to Jan 12, 2021. A total of 5,360 panelists responded out of 6,107 who were sampled, for a response rate of 88%. This does not include two panelists who were removed from the data due to extremely high rates of refusal or straightlining. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 4%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 5,360 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a random, address-based sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Across these three address-based recruitments, a total of 17,161 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 15,134 (88%) agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 25,076 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 13,561 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.² The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

This study featured a stratified random sample from the ATP. The sample was allocated according to the following strata, in order: tablet households, U.S.-born Hispanics, foreign-born Hispanics, high school education or less, foreign-born Asians, not registered to vote, people ages 18 to 34, uses internet weekly or less, non-Hispanic Black adults, nonvolunteers and all other categories not already falling into any of the above.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data which was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $15 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was Jan. 8 to Jan. 12, 2021. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on Jan. 6, 2021.

An initial soft launch was conducted on Jan. 6, 2021. Those cases are excluded from the final dataset and analysis due to significant questionnaire changes after the soft launch. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the survey launch and were sent an invitation on Jan. 8, 2021. All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to one SMS reminders. Interactive voice recording (IVR) reminder calls were made to 58 tablet households that previously provided consent to receive these reminders on Jan. 11, 2021.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center’s researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, two ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data was weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey (and the probability of being invited to participate in the panel in cases where only a subsample of respondents were invited). The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort. To correct for nonresponse to the initial recruitment surveys and gradual panel attrition, the base weights for all active panelists are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table to create a full-panel weight.

For ATP waves in which only a subsample of panelists are invited to participate, a wave-specific base weight is created by adjusting the full-panel weights for subsampled panelists to account for any differential probabilities of selection for the particular panel wave. For waves in which all active panelists are invited to participate, the wave-specific base weight is identical to the full-panel weight.

In the final weighting step, the wave-specific base weights for panelists who completed the survey are again calibrated to match the population benchmarks specified above. These weights are trimmed (typically at about the 1st and 99th percentiles) to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and test of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates