Global views of the United States worsened last year as President Donald Trump’s second term began, though most people still had a more positive opinion of the U.S. than China. This year, that is no longer the case.

Views of China have improved in recent years while opinions of the U.S. have worsened, to the point where China is now seen more positively than the U.S. in most of 36 countries surveyed.

Confidence in these countries’ respective leaders to do the right thing regarding world affairs has followed a similar pattern. In the latter half of Joe Biden’s presidency, confidence in him was higher than confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping across most countries surveyed, though Biden’s rating declined in many places from 2023 to 2024.

During the first two years of Trump’s second term, ratings of the U.S. president worsened significantly. While many people still lack confidence in Xi, positive views of him have become more widespread, and more overall now say they have confidence in Xi than in Trump.

One area where the U.S. still gets higher ratings than China has to do with personal freedoms: More say the U.S. government respects the personal freedoms of its people than say the same of the Chinese government. Still, the gap has been narrowing – driven by large drops in the shares saying the U.S. government respects personal freedoms.

As China and the U.S. compete for influence around the world, we also examined how people in six Latin American countries see their foreign policy roles. People in these nations previously tended to see the U.S. as a more reliable partner than China, but several publics are now split. For more, read “How do views of the U.S. and China compare in Latin America? ”

In the sections below, we compare international public opinion on the U.S. and China, their leaders, their foreign policy roles and more. Results are based on surveys of 42,151 adults conducted Feb. 8-May 13, 2026.

• Views of the U.S. and China
• Views of Trump and Xi
• Do the U.S. and Chinese governments respect the personal freedoms of their people?
• How people in middle-income countries view U.S. and Chinese roles in foreign policy

Views of the U.S. and China

In most of the 36 countries surveyed, more people have a favorable view of China than of the U.S. The gap is especially large in several Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern countries.

Americans’ nearest neighbors – Canadians and Mexicans – also view China more positively than the U.S.

The U.S. is viewed more positively than China in just six countries, including four in the Asia-Pacific region: India, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea.

Related: China’s image in the Asia-Pacific region

Views of the U.S. and China over time

China being assessed more positively than the U.S. is a relatively recent shift in most countries surveyed. This reversal in favorability is often driven by shifting views of both superpowers: improving views of China coupled with worsening views of the U.S.

For example, a majority of Canadians (57%) had a positive view of the U.S. in 2023, while 14% viewed China positively. In 2025, Canadians were equally favorable toward the U.S. and China. Now, more Canadians have a favorable view of China (44%) than the U.S. (33%).

We see the same pattern in a number of other countries.

Confidence in Trump and Xi

Confidence in both Trump and Xi is generally low. But people in many of the 36 countries surveyed view Xi more favorably.

In European countries, for example, neither leader gets a majority-positive rating, but views of Xi tend to be more favorable than views of Trump. In Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Xi leads Trump by double digits, though his highest favorability rating is just 37%, from the U.K.

In several nations that neighbor China – India, the Philippines and Japan – Trump receives higher ratings than Xi. While South Koreans now view the two leaders similarly, this reflects a dramatic shift from last year, when that public was around twice as confident in Trump (33%) as in Xi (15%).

More say the U.S. respects the freedoms of its people than China, but that gap is shrinking

For more than a decade, we have asked people if they think the U.S. and Chinese governments respect the personal freedoms of their people. Our data has consistently shown a gap, with people more likely to say the U.S. government respects its people’s freedoms than to say the same of the Chinese government.

But this gap is shrinking, driven largely by the fact that people in nearly every country surveyed have become less likely to say the U.S. government respects its people’s personal freedoms since we last asked this question in 2021.

In Sweden, for example, the percentage saying the U.S. respects personal freedoms has declined from 61% in 2021 to 27% today. There were similar drops of 25 percentage points or more in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, South Korea and Spain.

In many countries, this pairs with an increasing share who say China respects personal freedoms. For example, 11% of Australians hold this view, up 6 percentage points from 2021.

As a result, few now say that the U.S. and Chinese governments respect the personal freedoms of their people across the 36 countries surveyed this year. This is especially true in Europe and Latin America. In Mexico, for example, around a third (35%) say the Chinese government respects its people’s personal freedoms, while 20% say the same about the U.S. government. For more on how these views have changed in Latin America, see “How do views of the U.S. and China compare in Latin America?”

A few countries stand out for the difference they perceive between the U.S. and Chinese governments:

• 80% of Israelis say the U.S. respects the freedoms of its people, while just 15% say the same of China. Japan shows another sizable difference (61% vs. 6%).
• The gap is fairly large in the other direction in places including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where more say China respects personal freedoms than the U.S.

Views on how Chinese and U.S. foreign policy affect the world

Both Chinese and U.S. foreign policy have focused significantly on middle-income countries in recent years. China, for example, has close economic and security ties with Brazil and Peru, among other countries. And the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy stressed the importance of countering China’s significant exports to Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

Given this dynamic, we asked additional questions about perceptions of American and Chinese foreign policy in the middle-income countries we surveyed – located across Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific.

Related: How do views of China differ across high- and middle-income countries?

People in 17 middle-income countries raise more concerns about the United States’ foreign policy than China’s. A median of 75% say that the U.S. interferes in the affairs of other countries a great deal or a fair amount, while 45% say the same of China. In nearly every country surveyed, more people see the U.S. as an interferer than China.

Similarly, people in many of these middle-income countries see China as a more reliable partner than the U.S. and are more likely to say China contributes to peace and stability around the world.

In South Africa, for example, 72% say China is a reliable partner to their country, while 46% say the same of the U.S. And South Africans are much more likely to say China (64%) accounts for the interests of countries like their own in making international policy decisions than they are to say the same of the U.S. (42%). Meanwhile, the share of South Africans saying China contributes to peace and stability around the world has increased from 47% in 2023 to 64% in 2026.

In some countries, views of China’s role in the world have not changed significantly over the last several years. But in Indonesia, the shares saying that the U.S. and China contribute to global peace and stability have both decreased since we last asked.

In several Latin American countries – Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru – similar shares describe the U.S. and China as reliable partners. The largest differences in perception of the two countries, in either direction, tend to be in the Asia-Pacific region. In Pakistan, for example, people are much more likely to say China is a reliable partner than the U.S. (84% vs. 36%). And in the Philippines, many more see the U.S. as a reliable partner than China (81% vs. 42%).

A new Pew Research Center survey finds that views of the United States have grown more negative over the last year in five of six Latin American countries surveyed. Views of China, on the other hand, have mostly held steady. As a result, ratings of the two countries are now fairly close in several places throughout the region.

The U.S. and China have both spent significant resources to exert influence over Latin America. China, for example, is South America’s top trading partner and has developed close economic and security ties with countries including Brazil and Peru. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, declared at the Shield of Americas summit in March 2026 that the U.S. would “not allow hostile foreign influence to gain a foothold in this hemisphere,” which prompted a response from China’s foreign minister.

In this report, we compare views of the U.S. and China based on a new Pew Research Center survey of 6,132 people in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. These findings are part of a broader report on how people in 36 countries see the U.S. and China.

Across Latin America, we find that:

• Views of China are now slightly more positive than views of the U.S., due largely to worsening views of the U.S.
• People generally lack confidence in both Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs.
• People are much more likely to say the U.S. interferes in the affairs of other countries than they are to say the same of China, but the two superpowers are seen in a fairly similar light when it comes to their reliability as a partner and contributions to global peace and stability.

Views of the U.S., China and their leaders

In four of the six Latin American countries surveyed – Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Peru – people now view China more favorably than the U.S. In Brazil and Colombia, views of the two countries are about even.

This marks a significant change from older surveys. In 2014, people in each of these countries (except Argentina) viewed the U.S. more positively than China.

In Brazil, Chile and Peru, views of the U.S. today are on par with 2017 levels, which are the least favorable we have measured in our surveys.

In Brazil, people on the ideological right are much more likely than those on the left to have a positive view of the U.S. (58% vs. 30%). The opposite is true for China, with Brazilians on the right less favorable than those on the left (40% vs. 57%). Views in Colombia follow the same ideological pattern.

In several of these countries, views of the U.S. and China also differ by age. Younger adults in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru are more likely than older adults to view both superpowers positively. In Mexico, for example, 52% of people ages 18 and 34 view the U.S. positively, and 70% view China positively. In Brazil, around six-in-ten people under 35 have a positive view of both countries, compared with around four-in-ten of those ages 50 and older.

People in these six countries generally lack confidence in both U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs. In none of the six nations does either leader receive a majority-confident rating.

But views vary here. Mexican adults are about three times more likely to have confidence in Xi than Trump (35% vs. 11%). Colombian adults, on the other hand, are more positive toward Trump than Xi (43% vs. 33%). For more on how these leaders compare in the full 36-country survey, refer to “Confidence in Trump and Xi.”

Views of U.S. and Chinese foreign policy role

In each of the six Latin American countries surveyed, large majorities say the U.S. interferes in the affairs of other countries, while fewer say China does this. In Colombia, for example, 75% say the U.S. interferes a great deal or a fair amount, compared with 30% who say the same about China.

In Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, we asked this same question in 2023. Since then, the shares saying the U.S. interferes in the affairs of other countries have not changed significantly, but the shares saying China interferes have decreased in Brazil and Mexico.

When it comes to which country is a more reliable partner, views are more divided. In Mexico and Chile, more say that China is a reliable partner than the U.S.

In the other four Latin American countries surveyed, there is no clear difference. In Argentina and Brazil, around four-in-ten say the U.S. and China are reliable partners. In Peru and Colombia, roughly half or more describe them this way.

Similarly, in four of the six countries surveyed, there is no significant difference in the shares who say that the U.S. and China account for the interests countries like theirs when making international policy decisions. In Mexico and Peru, more say China accounts for other countries’ interests.

And people in these six countries feel differently when it comes to views that the U.S. and China contribute to peace and stability around the world. In Mexico, people are more likely to say China contributes to peace than the U.S. (47% vs. 28%). But in Colombia, people are slightly more likely to say the U.S. contributes to peace than China (34% vs. 26%).

Views of the U.S. and Chinese governments’ respect for personal freedoms

In Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Colombia, more people still say the U.S. government respects its people’s personal freedoms than say the Chinese government does. Though half or more say each government does not respect its people’s freedoms. And the gap between the U.S. and China on this question has generally shrunk.

In 2014, people in all six Latin American countries surveyed were much more likely to say the U.S. government respects the personal freedoms of its people than to say the same of the Chinese government. In Chile, for example, around half (53%) said this of the U.S., while just 20% said the same of China.

Now the gap is smaller, driven largely by declines in the shares saying the U.S. government respects personal freedoms. Since we last asked these questions in 2018, the percentage saying the U.S. respects its people’s freedoms has declined in all of these countries except Argentina, where it has held steady.

In most of these countries, the shares saying China respects its people’s freedoms have not changed since we last asked the question. Colombia is the exception, where the share saying China respects personal freedoms increased from 19% in 2017 to 30% in 2026.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Jonathan Schulman, Research Associate
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst
William Miner, Research Analyst

Julia Armeli, Research Assistant
Dorene Asare-Marfo, Senior Panel Manager
Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and UX
Ethan Charlip, Communications Associate
Janakee Chavda, Associate Digital Producer
Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Sneha Gubbala, Research Analyst
Sofia Hernandez Ramones, Research Assistant
Anna Jackson, Editorial Specialist
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate
Jordan Lippert, Research Analyst
John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer
Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
Georgina Pizzolitto, Research Methodologist
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Andrew Prozorovsky, Research Assistant
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate
David Tully, Senior Researcher
Brianna Vetter, Senior Program Coordinator
Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research

About Pew Research Center’s Spring 2026 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on a mix of telephone, face-to-face and online interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup, Langer Research Associates and Social Research Centre. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. Read more about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs.

Some, but not all, of our international analyses and reports use demographic variables or categorizations based on external data. We explain these more below:

Ideology

We analyze respondents’ attitudes based on where they place themselves on an ideological scale. We asked about political ideology using several slightly different scales and categorized people as being on the ideological left, center or right.

• In most countries, we asked people to place themselves on a scale ranging from “Extreme left” to “Extreme right.” The question was asked this way in Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the U.K.
• In Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand ideology was measured on a scale from “Extremely progressive” to “Extremely conservative.”
• In the U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).
• Ideology was not asked about in Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka or the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 

Religious identification

In each country surveyed, people were asked about their current religious identification. We then analyzed religious groups with sample sizes large enough to be reliable. Respondents of other religious backgrounds are still included in the national totals, even if we were not able to analyze their religious group separately.

Education

To compare educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the United Nations’ International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

High- and middle-income countries

Countries are classified as either high or middle income based on categories from the World Bank that rely on per capita gross national income. This is a classification we have used in other Pew Research Center analyses, including when looking at global views of China, satisfaction with democracy, globalization and national identity.

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 190 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 23 to March 29, 2026. A total of 3,507 panelists responded out of 4,046 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 87%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,507 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes an oversample of Muslim, Jewish and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,377) and live telephone (n=130) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “About the American Trends Panel.”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Muslim, Jewish, and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 23 to March 29, 2026. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing. 

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 23.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 23. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 24.

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 20. Soft launch took place on March 23 and involved dialing until a total of three interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, five ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates