How we did this

This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on public opinion of China in 25 countries across the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East-North Africa region, North America and sub-Saharan Africa. Views of China, its president and its role in the world are examined in the context of long-term trend data. 

For non-U.S. data, this analysis draws on nationally representative surveys of 28,333 adults conducted from Jan. 8 to April 26, 2025. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surveys were conducted face-to-face in Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey. In Australia, we used a mixed-mode probability-based online panel. 

In the United States, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology. 

We conducted simultaneous telephone and face-to-face surveys in Hungary and Poland in 2024. Data in our 2024 reports was from the face-to-face survey. The 2024 data in this report comes from the telephone survey for direct comparison to our 2025 telephone data. For this reason, 2024 data for Hungary and Poland may not match earlier reports.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and the survey methodology.

The share of people with a favorable view of China has increased since last year in 15 of the 25 countries Pew Research Center surveyed this spring. In most of these countries, this is the first time since 2020 that views of China have turned more positive. After the COVID-19 pandemic began, opinions of China in some places reached historic or near-historic lows in survey data going back nearly two decades. 

Confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs has also increased in many countries surveyed.

Despite these changes, views of China and Xi remain broadly negative:

• A median of 36% of adults across the 25 countries surveyed have a favorable view of China, while 54% have an unfavorable view.
• A median of 25% have confidence in Xi, compared with 66% who have little or no confidence in him.

While the balance of opinion is negative overall, views of China and Xi vary significantly across the countries surveyed. China and its president receive much more positive marks in the nine middle-income countries surveyed than in the 16 high-income ones.

Jump to Chapter 3 to read more about views of China and Xi in middle-income countries.

Though views of China and Xi have improved in most surveyed countries since last year, the opposite is true for the United States and President Donald Trump. Today, international views of the two superpowers and their leaders are closer than they have been at any point since 2020.

Related: Views of the U.S. have worsened while opinions of China have improved in many countries

Against this backdrop, more people globally see China as the world’s leading economic power now versus when we last asked in 2023. Today, a median of 41% of adults across the countries surveyed see China as the world’s top economy, while roughly the same share (39% median) give that title to the U.S. This is a marked departure from two years ago, when considerably more people saw the U.S. than China as the world’s leading economy.

Despite the growing sense that China is the world’s top economy, people in nearly all countries surveyed prioritize strong economic ties with the U.S. over China. 

This is the case even though the share of people who prioritize economic ties with China has grown in more than half of the countries where we’ve asked this question before. In Mexico, for instance, 45% of adults now say it’s more important for their country to have strong economic ties with China than with the U.S., up from 37% in 2019 and 15% in 2015.

Some of this movement may be related to confidence (or lack of confidence) in Trump to handle global economic problems. In most nations surveyed, people with less confidence in Trump on this issue are more likely to prioritize strong economic ties with China. 

These are some of the key findings from a new Pew Research Center survey of more than 30,000 people in 25 countries conducted Jan. 8-April 26, 2025. Fieldwork in every country except Indonesia began after Trump’s second-term inauguration. Most interviews were conducted before Trump announced sweeping global tariffs on April 2. Refer to Appendix A for more information on our survey fieldwork timeline. 

Attitudes toward China in middle-income nations

Our survey takes a close look at attitudes toward China, as well as the U.S., in nine middle-income countries. 

Investment from China and the U.S.

Around half of adults or more in nearly every middle-income country we surveyed – except Argentina and India – see investment from China as good for their nation. And the share who express this view has increased substantially since 2019 in Turkey (+20 percentage points), Indonesia (+18), Kenya (+11) and India (+9). It has decreased considerably in Nigeria (-18). 

We also asked people about investment from the U.S. In Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey, more people describe investment from China as good for their country than say the same about U.S. investment. By contrast, people in India are more likely to see U.S. than Chinese investment as good.

Problems in bilateral relations with China

People in many of the middle-income countries surveyed say there are serious problems in their nation’s relationship with China. For example, majorities across all nine call the amount of debt their country owes to China at least a somewhat serious problem. And in Brazil, Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria, half or more call this a very serious problem. 

Many people in these nations also see several other issues as problematic. These include China’s military power, its involvement in their country’s politics, its economic competition and its human rights policies. Brazilians and Indonesians tend to be especially concerned about each of these issues.  

Still, with the exception of India, people in these countries see many of the same problems in their relations with the U.S. For example, 65% of South Africans say U.S. policies on human rights are a very or somewhat serious problem; 56% say the same about Chinese policies on human rights. (The South African survey was conducted after Trump signed an executive order halting U.S. aid to South Africa but before a group of White Afrikaners arrived in the U.S. as refugees. The survey was also conducted before South African President Cyril Ramaphosa met with Trump at the White House.)

Related: How people in 9 middle-income countries see relations with the U.S., China

China as an ally or a threat

We also asked respondents to name (in an open-ended question) their country’s most important ally and greatest threat. 

China is not seen as the top threat in any of the middle-income countries surveyed. The U.S., however, is the most commonly named threat in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa – sometimes by a wide margin.

Meanwhile, South Africans and Indonesians both name China as their country’s top ally. 

In all three Latin American countries surveyed (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) the U.S. is the most frequently named ally.

Jump to Chapter 4 to read more about views of top allies and threats.

Related: People in Many Countries Consider the U.S. an Important Ally; Others See It as a Top Threat

Views of China are more unfavorable than favorable in the 25 countries surveyed. In most countries, people also lack confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs. 

However, positive views of China have increased in 15 of the 25 countries since last year, and confidence in Xi is up in 16 countries. Views of both China and Xi tend to be more positive in the nine middle-income countries surveyed than in the 16 high-income countries.

Favorability of China

A 25-country median of 36% of adults have a favorable view of China, compared with 54% who have an unfavorable view. 

• Views are among the most negative in the Asia-Pacific region. In Japan, only 13% of people have a favorable view of China, as do around a quarter or fewer in Australia, India and South Korea. Indonesia, however, is an exception, with roughly two-thirds reporting a favorable opinion of China.
• The balance of opinion in Europe is also negative. About four-in-ten adults or fewer have a positive view of China in most of the European countries surveyed. Only in Greece do a majority have a favorable opinion.
• In both Turkey and Israel, around a third have favorable views of China.
• In the three sub-Saharan African countries surveyed (Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) majorities have a favorable view of China.
• And in each of the three Latin American countries surveyed (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) more people have a positive view of China than a negative one. 

The more positive views in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America reflect a broader pattern: In countries with lower gross domestic products per capita, people tend to have more positive views of China.

Views of China over time

Views of China have become more favorable since 2024 in 15 of 25 countries surveyed. This includes double-digit increases in places like Canada and France (+13 points) as well as Italy and South Africa (+10).

In South Korea, however, the share of adults with a favorable view of China decreased from 25% in 2024 to 19% in 2025. This is the only country surveyed where this share has dropped significantly since last year.

Related: Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans

Views by age

In most countries, younger people have more favorable opinions of China than older people. 

Some of the largest gaps are in Poland, the United Kingdom and Canada, where adults under 35 are 27 or 28 points more likely than those ages 50 and older to view China positively. 

Views by ideology

In most countries, ideology is not closely related to views of China. (For more on how we measure ideology in our cross-national surveys, read this report’s methodology.)

But in Israel, Mexico, South Korea and the U.S., people who place themselves on the ideological left (“liberals” in the U.S.) have more positive views of China than those on the ideological right (“conservatives” in the U.S.). For example, 28% of South Koreans on the left view China positively, compared with 12% of those on the right.

In Hungary, however, the opposite is true. Roughly two-thirds of Hungarians on the right have favorable views of China, compared with 43% in the center and 37% on the left. 

Confidence in Xi

Relatively few people surveyed have confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs. A 25-country median of 25% of adults have a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in him, while 66% have not too much or no confidence at all. 

• Ratings of Xi are highest in Kenya and Nigeria, where about two-thirds of adults have confidence in the Chinese president. Views are more mixed in South Africa.
• In Europe, Latin America and North America, assessments of Xi are more negative than positive. The same is true in Turkey and Israel.
• People in four of the five Asia-Pacific countries surveyed mostly lack confidence in Xi. For instance, only 8% in Japan have confidence in him. But in Indonesia, more have confidence in Xi than not (53% vs. 41%). 

Overall, confidence in Xi is lower in high-income countries than in middle-income ones.

Views of Xi over time

While majorities in most countries surveyed have little or no confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs, confidence in him has increased since last year in 16 of the 25 countries surveyed.

This includes increases of 10 points in Canada and Turkey.

These changing attitudes toward Xi reflect another pattern: The share saying they “don’t know” whether they have confidence in him has fallen in some countries. And in South Africa the share who are unsure or decline to answer has dropped so significantly since 2024 that both positive (+10) and negative (+12) ratings of Xi have increased. 

We asked people in 25 nations whether they think the U.S., China, Japan or the European Union is the world’s leading economic power. We also asked with which country – the U.S. or China – they see as a more important economic partner to their own nation.

• In most countries, people either view China as the world’s top economy or their opinions are split between China and the U.S.
• In 10 countries, the share of people who view China as the top economy has increased significantly since 2023.
• In most places surveyed, people prioritize close economic ties with the U.S. over China, though the share who prioritize China has increased in most countries while the share who prioritize economic ties with the U.S. has shrunk as of recently.
• People on the ideological left are more likely than those on the right to prioritize a close economic relationship with China.

Which country is the world’s top economy?

China is viewed as the top economy in 12 countries spanning regions and income levels. This is the most common view in most European countries surveyed, held by majorities in Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain, and by roughly half of adults in France, Hungary and Poland.

By comparison, the U.S. is seen as the top economy in nine countries –including the U.S. itself, where 48% of adults hold this view. Majorities in Israel, Japan and South Korea agree.

Opinion is split in Brazil, Kenya, the Netherlands and the UK, where similar shares call China and the U.S. the top economy. 

Relatively few in any country surveyed point to Japan or the EU as the world’s top economic power.

Views over time

The balance of opinion on which country is the world’s leading economic power has shifted toward China in recent years.

• In 10 countries, the share of people who say China is the world’s top economy has increased since 2023. In India and Turkey, where we last asked this question in 2019, the share of adults who see China as the top economy has also increased slightly.
• In eight countries, the share of people who see the U.S. as the world’s top economic power has decreased since 2023. In India, it has decreased since the last time we asked in 2019.
• Canada is a notable exception. Today, Canadians are 10 points more likely than in 2023 to call the U.S. the leading economic power – and 9 points less likely to name China.

When comparing the share of people in each country who name China as the top economy and the share who name the U.S., a clear trend emerges: In many countries with available data, the balance of opinion is shifting in China’s direction. 

For example, in 2023, 35% of Indonesians said the U.S. was the world’s leading economic power, while 16% said China – a gap of 19 points in favor of the U.S. This year, 23% of Indonesians name the U.S., while twice as many (46%) name China – a gap of 23 points in favor of China.

In 2023, people in Argentina, France and South Africa were about equally likely to name the U.S. and China as the world’s top economy. Today, they are significantly more likely to name China than the U.S. And in Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain, people were already more likely to name China in 2023, but the gap is even wider today.

In Sweden, people still view the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power, but the margin over China has shrunk significantly. And in Kenya, the gap has disappeared entirely. 

In India and Turkey, we last asked this question in 2019. Adults in both countries were, and remain, more likely to view the U.S. is the top economy, though the margin is now smaller. 

In some countries, the balance of opinion increasingly favors the U.S. This is true in Canada, Japan and Nigeria. Canadians were about equally as likely to name China and the U.S. as the top economy in 2023. Now, they’re 23 points more likely to name the U.S. (The Canadian survey was conducted during a time of rapidly shifting policies affecting U.S. tariffs on Canada and Canadian tariffs on the U.S. For more on our survey fieldwork timeline, refer to Appendix A.)   

There has been no significant change in the balance of opinion in the Netherlands, where China and the U.S. are seen as equally powerful economies. And adults in Israel, South Korea and the U.S. itself have been consistent in their belief that the U.S. is the world’s leading economy.

Economic ties with the U.S. seen as more important than ties with China

Though China is increasingly seen as the world’s top economy, people in most nations surveyed say it is more important for their country to have strong economic ties with the U.S. 

Majorities in nine countries say ties with the U.S. are more important, while roughly half of adults say the same in another nine. 

In Kenya and Mexico, opinion is split: Roughly equal shares prioritize close economic ties with the U.S. and with China. 

Only in Australia, Indonesia and South Africa do the largest share of adults say economic ties with China are more important than ties with the U.S.

Notably, roughly a quarter of adults or more in Germany, Hungary, Israel and Nigeria volunteer that ties with both China and the U.S. are important to their country.

Views over time

In nearly all of the high-income countries surveyed, majorities continue to prioritize close economic ties with the U.S. Though in most of these places the shares who say ties with China are more important has grown since 2021.

In several middle-income countries, the balance of opinion has shifted since 2019, when the question was last asked. 

For example, Indonesians and South Africans in 2019 were as likely to prioritize economic ties with the U.S. as they were to prioritize ties with China. Now, their economic relationship with China holds significantly more importance. 

In Kenya and Mexico, where the U.S. was once seen as a more important economic partner by a substantial margin, opinions are now split. And in Brazil, the share who prioritize ties with China has grown (though a larger share still consider U.S. ties more important). 

The opposite is true in Argentina and Nigeria, where adults are significantly less likely to prioritize economic ties with China now than in 2019. 

Related: Views of the U.S. have worsened while opinions of China have improved in many countries

Views by ideology and confidence in Trump

People on the ideological left are more likely than those on the right to prioritize economic ties with China. 

The difference is largest in Australia, where a 64% majority of adults who place themselves on the left prioritize ties with China over the U.S., compared with a third of those on the right. 

Conversely, people on the right tend to prefer partnership with the U.S. over China. Indeed, those on the ideological right tend to have more positive views of the U.S. and Trump, and more confidence in him to handle the global economy. 

In most countries surveyed, people who are not confident in Trump’s handling of the global economy name China as their key economic partner (over the U.S.) at a higher rate than those who are confident. For example, 42% of Argentines who lack confidence in Trump’s handling of the economy say it’s more important for Argentina to have strong ties with China; among those who have confidence in Trump, 19% say this. Conversely, Argentines with confidence in Trump on economic issues are 27 points more likely to prefer close ties with the U.S.

In nine middle-income countries, we asked additional questions about relations with China and the U.S. 

• People in most of the middle-income countries surveyed say investment from China is more of a good thing than a bad thing for their nation.
• In four countries, people are more likely to describe investment from China as a good thing than to say the same about investment from the U.S. In India, the reverse is true.
• Out of five specific issues we asked about, people are most likely to describe the debt their country owes to China as a very serious problem. Other problems – including economic competition with China – tend to be seen as less serious for their nation.
• In most countries and across most issues, people are more likely to describe problems with the U.S. as very serious than to say the same about problems with China, or otherwise view problems with the U.S. and China in a similar light.

Views of investment from China

Across the nine middle-income nations surveyed, a median of 58% say investment from China is a good thing because it creates jobs in their country. In comparison, a median of 35% say such investment is a bad thing because it gives China too much influence over their domestic affairs.

Kenyans are the most positive about investment from China: 71% see it as good for their country. Around six-in-ten adults or more agree in five other countries.

Conversely, people in Argentina and India are more likely to describe investment from China as bad than good. Opinions in Indonesia are roughly divided.

Views over time

Evaluations of investment from China have changed in some countries since the question was last asked in 2019. For example, people in Turkey have become 20 points more likely to say investment from China is good for their country. Views have also turned more positive in Indonesia, Kenya and India.

Nigeria stands out as the only country that has soured on investment from China. The share of Nigerians who call it a good thing has declined 18 points since 2019.

Comparing views of investment from China and the U.S.

People see investment from China more favorably than investment from the U.S. in four of the nine countries where we asked these questions. For instance, Turks are 19 points more likely to say investment from China is good for their country than to say the same about investment from the U.S. Chinese investment also gets higher ratings in Mexico, Indonesia and South Africa.

The opposite is true in India, where 33% say investment from China is a good thing, compared with 59% who say the same about investment from the U.S.

In four countries, investment from both countries is seen in a similar light.

Related: How people in 9 middle-income countries see relations with the U.S., China

Views of bilateral issues with China

In the middle-income countries surveyed, we also asked about five potential problems that might exist in their relations with China. People were asked whether each issue is very serious, somewhat serious, not too serious or not at all serious. 

Overall, around half of adults or more tend to say each issue is at least somewhat serious. But far fewer describe each as very serious. (The latter responses are what we analyze here, consistent with our 2022 study based on a similar survey question that was asked in high-income countries.) 

In five countries, people are most likely to describe the amount of debt their country owes to China as a very serious issue. These include Kenya, Indonesia, Nigeria and Brazil, where six-in-ten adults or more say debt to China is a very serious problem. Overall, a median of 50% across all nine middle-income countries consider debt to China a very serious problem.

Aside from debt, no problem is seen as very serious by a majority in any country. In general, only around a third of adults or fewer see each of the other problems as very serious. 

A median of 35% consider China’s military power to be a very serious problem for their country. The shares describing China’s military power as a very serious issue range from 50% in Brazil to 22% in Mexico. 

A similar median of 34% consider China’s involvement in their country’s politics to be a very serious problem. This view is most widely held in Indonesia (45%) and Brazil (44%). 

Conversely, people in Mexico (17%) and Turkey (18%) are the least likely to say China’s involvement in their politics is a very serious problem.

A 32% median consider economic competition with China to be a very serious problem. Again, these views are particularly common in Indonesia (49%) and Brazil (46%). 

China’s human rights policies tend to be one of the issues of least concern in the middle-income countries surveyed, with a median of 28% saying they are a very serious problem. In Brazil, 39% describe China’s human rights policies as a very serious problem, but elsewhere, around a third of adults or fewer take this stance.

People in India were additionally asked about China’s territorial disputes with India, which 46% say are a very serious problem. This issue and China’s military power concern Indians the most, labeled very serious problems by around four-in-ten or more. Their views of these territorial disputes are largely unchanged since we first asked this question in 2016: At that time, 45% called them a very serious problem. (Trend data for other countries is not available.)

Comparing concerns about China and the U.S.

We asked these same questions about the U.S., too, and can compare what problems people see in their country’s relationship with each superpower. 

In most countries and across most issues, people are more likely to describe problems with the U.S. as very serious than to say the same about problems with China – or otherwise view them in a similar light.

For example, more adults in Mexico, South Africa and Turkey say U.S. human rights policies are a very serious problem for their country than say the same about Chinese human rights policies. In Mexico, this gap is particularly sizable at 20 points. 

(The South African survey was conducted after President Donald Trump signed an executive order halting U.S. aid to South Africa, but before a group of White Afrikaners arrived in the U.S. as refugees. The survey was also conducted before South African President Cyril Ramaphosa met with Trump at the White House.)

In Indonesia, Kenya, Brazil, Argentina and Nigeria, similar shares see each superpower’s human rights policies as a very serious problem for their country. Only in India do more people describe Chinese human rights policies than U.S. policies as a very serious problem.

Similar patterns appear on other issues we asked about, including economic competition. In Turkey, Mexico and South Africa, more say economic competition with the U.S. is a very serious problem for their country than say the same about economic competition with China. In Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria and Kenya, economic competition with the U.S. and China are seen in a similar light. Only in India do more see economic competition with China as a very serious problem.

To see how views of U.S. and Chinese military power, political influence and debt ownership compare, refer to Appendix B.

For more about views of these bilateral issues with the U.S., read “How people in 9 middle-income countries see relations with the U.S., China.”

We asked respondents in 25 nations to name the country they see as the most important ally to their own and, separately, which country poses the greatest threat. Both questions were open-ended, so respondents were able to name anything that came to mind.

In many countries, China ranks among the top allies and top threats. 

• In every country surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, China is one of the top three most-mentioned allies.
• In some middle-income nations, China is more likely to be seen as an ally now than it was in 2019, when we asked a similar question.
• China particularly stands out as a top threat in the Asia-Pacific countries surveyed. Still, it’s among the top three threats named in most places surveyed.
• In general, people who think China poses the greatest threat to their nation tend to see it as both an economic and security threat. 

China as an ally

China ranks among the top three most-mentioned allies in eight countries, including all of those surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 

In Indonesia and South Africa, China is named more than any other country. 

In Kenya and Nigeria, similar shares name China and the U.S.

In Brazil and Mexico, about a quarter of adults name China as their top ally (second to the U.S.). Fewer Argentines see China as an important ally, though it is still the second most-mentioned country (tied with Brazil). 

Views over time

We asked a similar question in 2019: “Which country can your country most rely on as a dependable ally in the future?” 

While the 2019 question is a bit different than this year’s version, the balance of opinion has shifted markedly in some countries.

For instance, South Africans today are significantly more likely to name China than the U.S. as their country’s most important ally. (45% vs. 28%). But in 2019, the U.S. was the most common response, followed by China. 

The trend in Indonesia is similar. In 2019, Indonesians were more than twice as likely to name the U.S. than China as their country’s top ally (16% vs. 6%). But today, more name China than the U.S.

China as a threat

When asked which country poses the greatest threat to their own, relatively large shares in several countries name China. 

This is especially the case in the Asia-Pacific region: About half of adults in Japan and Australia say China poses the greatest threat to their country, making it by far the most common response. In South Korea and India, one-third call China their top threat, second to North Korea and Pakistan, respectively. And roughly two-in-ten Indonesians say China is their greatest threat, second to the U.S. 

In each of the Latin American countries surveyed, China ranks in the top three threats, though never as the top threat. China is the second-most commonly named threat in Brazil (15%) and Argentina (13%), after the U.S. In Mexico, a notable 68% majority say the U.S. poses the greatest threat to their country, compared with 5% who say it’s China. 

China is the third-most commonly mentioned threat, behind Russia and the U.S., in several high-income European countries surveyed. In the U.S. and Canada, it ranks first and second, respectively. 

For more on perceived threats across regions, read “People in Many Countries Consider the U.S. an Important Ally; Others See It as a Top Threat.”

Views over time

We asked a similar question in 2019: “What country or group poses the greatest threat to your country in the future?” In some countries, how China ranks relative to the U.S. has shifted. For example:

• In Indonesia, more called China a threat than the U.S. in 2019. Today, the opposite is true.
• In South Africa, roughly equal shares in 2019 described China and the U.S. as threats. Now, the U.S. is far and away the most commonly named threat.
• In Canada, more named China than the U.S. in 2019, while the opposite is true – and by a sizable margin. 

In the U.S., where we asked the same question in both 2023 and 2025, views of China as a threat have tempered slightly, though in both years it was named more than any other country. This decline is particularly steep among Democrats and Democrat-leaning independents (-12 points). In fact, Democrats are now more likely to name Russia as the greatest threat to the U.S., rather than China.

Related: Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans

China as an economic and security threat

We asked those who name China as their country’s greatest threat to rate how much of an economic threat China poses to their own and, separately, how much of a security threat it poses. In most countries where China is a common enough response for us to analyze, it’s seen as both an economic and security threat. 

For example, 64% of Americans who say China is their country’s greatest threat say it poses a great deal of economic threat, while 61% say it’s a threat to national security. Views are similar in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Kenya, South Africa, South Korea and the UK. 

In Italy and Nigeria, China is perceived as more of an economic threat than a threat to national security. For instance, 43% of Nigerians who see China as the top threat think it poses a major threat to their country’s economy; just 19% say it poses a major threat to national security. 

Japan is the lone country where there is greater concern about China as a security threat an economic one (54% vs. 41%, among those who name China as their top threat). 

There were many events, meetings and announcements that occurred shortly before and during our fieldwork period that may have impacted how people perceive China and its president. We highlight a few prominent events here that were relevant across multiple countries and directly relate to the questions included in our survey.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst
Jonathan Schulman, Research Associate
William Miner, Research Analyst
Christine Huang, Former Research Associate

Dorene Asare-Marfo, Senior Panel Manager
Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production
Janakee Chavda, Associate Digital Producer
Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher
Shannon Greenwood, Digital Production Manager
Sneha Gubbala, Research Analyst
Sofia Hernandez Ramones, Research Assistant
Anna Jackson, Editorial Assistant
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate
Jordan Lippert, Research Analyst
John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer
Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
Georgina Pizzolitto, Research Methodologist 
Maya Pottiger, Communications Associate
Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Andrew Prozorovsky, Research Assistant
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate
Kelsey Jo Starr, Research Analyst
Brianna Vetter, Administrative Associate
Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research

About Pew Research Center’s Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on a mix of telephone, face-to-face and online interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup, Langer Research Associates and Social Research Centre. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. Read more about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs.

We conducted both telephone and face-to-face surveys in Hungary and Poland in 2024. Data in our 2024 reports was from the face-to-face survey. The 2024 data in this report comes from the telephone survey for direct comparison to our 2025 telephone data. For this reason, 2024 data for Hungary and Poland may not match earlier reports.

Some, but not all, of our international analyses and reports use demographic variables or categorizations based on external data. We explain these more below:

Ideology

We analyze respondents’ attitudes based on where they place themselves on an ideological scale. We asked about political ideology using several slightly different scales and categorized people as being on the ideological left, center or right. 

• In most countries, we asked people to place themselves on a scale ranging from “Extreme left” to “Extreme right.” The question was asked this way in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK.
• In Japan and South Korea, ideology was measured on a scale from “Extremely progressive” to “Extremely conservative.” 
• In the U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).
• Ideology was not asked about in India, Indonesia or Kenya.  

Religious identification

In each country surveyed, people were asked about their current religious identification. We then analyzed religious groups with sample sizes large enough to be reliable. Respondents of other religious backgrounds are still included in the national totals, even if we were not able to analyze their religious group separately.

Education

To compare educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the United Nations’ International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

High- and middle-income countries

Countries are classified as either high or middle income based on categories from the World Bank that rely on per-capita GDP. This is a classification we have used in other Pew Research Center analyses, including when looking at global views of China, satisfaction with democracy, globalization and national identity.

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted March 24-30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%. 

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish. 

To learn more about the ATP, read “About the American Trends Panel.”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey. 

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities. 

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24-30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing. 

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders. 

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis. 

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey. 

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates