How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to measure Americans’ opinions on how the U.S. should engage with and provide aid to other countries. The report also examines how Americans see the United States’ global standing and how they view other countries. This analysis builds on the Center’s previous study of Americans’ opinions on the most pressing foreign policy issues of the day, including major world conflicts and trade and tariffs.

For this analysis, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

A new Pew Research Center survey finds substantial public support for several forms of U.S. foreign aid.

Around eight-in-ten Americans say the United States should provide medicine and medical supplies, as well as food and clothing, to people in developing countries. Roughly six-in-ten believe the U.S. should give aid that supports economic development and helps strengthen democracy in other nations. There is less support, however, for providing military aid or funding art and cultural activities.

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are consistently more supportive of foreign aid than Republicans and Republican leaners. Still, majorities of Republicans say the U.S. should give developing nations medicine and medical supplies, along with food and clothing. And more than four-in-ten Republicans support aid meant to boost economic development and strengthen democracy.

The survey was conducted after President Donald Trump and his administration ended most activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

In general, 45% of U.S. adults disapprove of ending most USAID programs, while 35% approve. (For more, read “Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews.”)

The new survey also finds that Democrats and Republicans hold different views about the value of international engagement and cooperation.

For instance, when asked which comes closer to their opinion – “It’s best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs” or “We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home” – 62% of Democrats choose the former. In contrast, 67% of Republicans favor a domestic focus.

A majority of Americans (64%) say the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries when dealing with major international issues, even if it means making compromises. This compares with 34% who say the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when other countries strongly disagree.

Around eight-in-ten Democrats (83%) think the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries. Republicans are divided: 47% say the U.S. should consider other countries, while 52% say it should follow its own interests.

Which nation poses the greatest threat to the U.S.?

When asked to name the country they believe poses the greatest threat to the U.S. in an open-ended question, 42% of Americans say China, while 25% say Russia. No other country is named by more than 5% of adults, and roughly a quarter say either that they are not sure or that no country poses the greatest threat.

Responses to this question have shifted somewhat since we last asked it two years ago. In 2023, both Republicans and Democrats named China as the top threat to the U.S. That’s still the case among Republicans (a 58% majority name China), but Democrats now say Russia is the greatest threat (39% vs. 28% who name China).

Do Americans have positive or negative views of major countries?

We also asked respondents whether they have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of several countries and international organizations, including the European Union.

The countries receiving the highest ratings are the six that, along with the U.S., compose the G7: Japan, Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Over six-in-ten rate each of these countries favorably, including roughly half or more among both Democrats and Republicans.

Americans also give the EU generally positive ratings.

In contrast, few see China (21%), Russia (13%) or Iran (10%) positively.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to rate most countries we asked about favorably. Republicans, however, are more than twice as likely as Democrats to give Israel a positive rating (62% vs. 29%). The only other country that Republicans rate more highly than Democrats is Russia (16% vs. 9%).

Which countries are gaining or losing influence?

We also asked respondents whether they believe the influence of certain countries has been getting stronger, getting weaker or staying about the same in recent years. Americans are more likely to say their own country is losing influence than they are to say this about any other nation.

Roughly half of Americans (52%) say the influence of the U.S. has been getting weaker in recent years, including 67% of Democrats and 37% of Republicans. Partisan views are essentially reversed from last year: In 2024, 67% of Republicans said the United States’ influence has been declining, compared with 44% of Democrats.

Far fewer Americans overall say U.S. influence is getter stronger, though the share who feel this way has grown since last year (22% vs. 14% in 2024).

In their assessments of other countries, Americans are particularly likely to believe China is gaining influence in world affairs (73%). Nearly half say Russia’s influence is getting stronger, while roughly four-in-ten say this about Israel.

Perceptions of Iran, which has suffered a number of military and strategic setbacks over the past year, have changed since 2024. More Americans think Iran’s influence is waning (28% vs. 16% in 2024) and fewer say it is getting stronger (26% vs. 39% in 2024).

These are among the findings of a Pew Research Center survey conducted March 24-30, 2025, among 3,605 U.S. adults. The survey followed the Trump administration’s ending of most USAID programs, and while it was in the field, the administration announced plans to cut nearly all of the agency’s staff. It took place before Trump announced sweeping tariffs on many countries in April.

In addition to the topics above, the survey explores U.S. public opinion on a variety of other foreign policy issues.

How important is it that the U.S. is respected around the world?

• 91% of Americans believe it is important that the U.S. is respected around the world, including 57% who say this is very important.
• Fewer, however, think the U.S. actually is respected (56%). Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to express this view (72% vs. 39%).

Military and economic power

• Though many believe the U.S. is losing global influence, 76% still say the U.S. is the world’s leading military power and 48% say it is the top economic power.
• 14% say China is the top military power, while 8% say Russia. And 38% say China is the world’s leading economy, while 7% say Japan and 6% say the countries of the EU.
• Republicans are more likely than Democrats both to see the U.S. as the leading military power (80% vs. 73%) and as the leading economic power (58% vs. 40%).

Top U.S. allies

• When asked which country is the United States’ most important ally in an open-ended question, respondents name the UK (18%) more often than any other nation, followed by Canada (12%) and Israel (9%).
• Nearly four-in-ten U.S. adults (37%) say they are not sure.

Pew Research Center has released several publications based on the March 2025 survey that explore U.S. attitudes on a variety of foreign policy issues:

• Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews
• How Americans view Israel and the Israel-Hamas war at the start of Trump’s second term
• How Americans view trade between the U.S. and China, Canada and Mexico
• Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans
• Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War

As the U.S. pursues new directions in foreign policy under Trump in his second term, Americans have mixed opinions about how the U.S. should engage with other countries.

• 47% of U.S. adults say it is best for the future of the country to be active in world affairs.
• 64% think the U.S. should be willing to compromise with other countries on major international issues.
• Most Americans say the U.S. should give foreign aid, but support varies widely based on its purpose.

Related: Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews

Should the U.S. be active in world affairs?

Just under half of Americans (47%) believe it is best for the future of the country to be active in world affairs. A slightly larger share (52%) say the U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on domestic issues.

There has been an increase in the share saying it’s best for the country to be active in world affairs since 2024, when 42% of Americans held this view.

Views by age, education and party

Older Americans are more likely to prefer the U.S. play an active role in world affairs. A majority of those ages 65 and older (57%) take this stance, as do roughly half of those ages 50 to 64.

Younger adults are more likely to say the U.S. should concentrate on problems at home, rather than problems overseas. A 58% majority of adults under 50 say this, while 41% prefer the U.S. be active in world affairs.

Support for international engagement is higher among Americans with more education: 65% of those with a postgraduate degree say it’s best for the U.S. to be active in world affairs, while 53% of those with a four-year college degree and 41% with some college or less education agree.

Roughly six-in-ten Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say the U.S. should be active in world affairs, compared with about one-third of Republicans and Republican leaners (32%). This share rises to 72% among Democrats who identify as liberal.

For their part, Republicans consistently favor a domestic focus. About two-thirds of Republicans say the U.S. should focus on problems at home, regardless of ideology.

Should the U.S. take other countries’ interests into account?

Most Americans (64%) say that when dealing with major international issues, the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries, even if it means making compromises. About a third (34%) say the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when other countries strongly disagree.

The share favoring international compromise has increased significantly since 2023, when 59% of Americans held this opinion.

Views by party

A large majority of Democrats (83%) say the U.S. should take other countries’ interests into account when handling major international issues. This includes 76% of moderate or conservative Democrats and 91% of liberal Democrats.

Republicans are more split. Roughly half (52%) say the U.S. should follow its own interests, even when other countries strongly disagree. This share rises to 58% among conservative Republicans.

For what reasons should the U.S. give foreign aid?

Americans’ support for foreign aid varies depending on its intended purpose. More than three-quarters say that aid should be given to developing countries for medicine and medical supplies (83%) or food and clothing (78%).

Smaller majorities support aid for economic development (63%) or for strengthening democracy (61%) in other countries.

Fewer Americans approve of aid supporting other countries’ militaries (39%) or art and cultural activities (34%).

Related: What the data says about U.S. foreign aid

Opinions on foreign aid relate to views of general international engagement: Americans who think the U.S. should be active in world affairs are more likely than those who say the country should focus on domestic issues to support foreign aid for each purpose.

Views by party

Opinions about foreign aid vary widely by party. Democrats are more supportive than Republicans of every type of foreign aid we asked about.

The partisan gap is largest on aid for art and cultural activities in other countries. A 54% majority of Democrats say the U.S. should give this kind of assistance, compared with 15% of Republicans. 

Democrats are also at least 30 percentage points more likely than Republicans to approve of aid that supports economic development and strengthens democracy.

And though partisan gaps still appear, majorities of both Democrats and Republicans say the U.S. should give medicine and medical supplies as well as food and clothing to developing countries.

Views by age

Older Americans are generally more supportive of giving foreign aid for various reasons. Those ages 50 and older are about 8 points more likely than adults under 50 to say the U.S. should provide aid for medicine and medical supplies, food and clothing, strengthening democracy, and military support.

Notably, this pattern flips when it comes to aid for art and cultural activities. Adults under 50 are 10 points more likely than their older counterparts to say the U.S. should give this type of assistance (39% vs. 29%).

On foreign aid that supports economic development, adults ages 50 and older and those under 50 express similar support (64% vs. 62%).

Views by education

Americans with more education, when compared with those who have less, are more supportive of providing most types of foreign aid we asked about. For example, 73% of Americans with a postgraduate degree say the U.S. should give aid to strengthen democracy in other countries, compared with 65% of people whose highest attainment is a four-year college degree. A smaller majority of those with some college or less education (56%) support giving foreign aid to strengthen democracy.

There is a very similar pattern on aid for economic development. Almost three-quarters of adults with a postgraduate degree say this is something the U.S. should give, compared with 66% of people with a four-year degree and 60% of people with some college education or less.

For most other types of foreign aid asked about, people with at least a four-year degree are more supportive than those without one.

Americans generally see their country as respected and powerful on the world stage, but they think the United States’ global influence is waning.

• While 91% say it is important for the U.S. to be respected around the world, a much smaller share (56%) say it is respected.
• 52% of Americans say their country’s influence in the world is getting weaker, roughly the same share as in 2024. But compared with last year, Democrats are much more likely – and Republicans less likely – to say U.S. influence is declining.

How important is it that the U.S. is respected globally? Is it respected?

About nine-in-ten Americans say it is important that the U.S. is respected around the world. In fact, a 57% majority say this is very important.

Fewer, though still a majority of 56%, think the U.S. actually is respected around the world. A relatively small share say the U.S. is very respected (10%), while the same share say it is not respected at all.

The share of Americans who believe it’s important that the U.S. is respected has not changed since last year. Nevertheless, opinions vary somewhat by party and age.

• Party: Republicans (92%) and Democrats (91%) agree that global respect of the U.S. is important. However, roughly seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (72%) say the U.S. is respected, compared with about four-in-ten Democrats and Democratic leaners (39%).
• Age: Regardless of age, Americans say it is important that the U.S. is respected globally, but older Americans are more likely to hold this view. Older adults are also more likely than their younger counterparts to say that the U.S. is respected.

Views of the United States’ influence in the world

While a majority of Americans feel their country is respected around the world, 52% say its global influence has been getting weaker in recent years.

Around a quarter of Americans say U.S. influence has stayed about the same (24%) or that it has been getting stronger (22%) in recent years.

By comparison, almost three-quarters think China’s influence is on the rise (73%), while almost half say the same about Russia (47%).

And more people say that the international influence of Israel, India and Iran are growing than that U.S. influence is getting stronger.

The belief that U.S. influence in the world is getting weaker was also the most common view in April 2024. But Americans are somewhat more likely now to say their country’s influence is growing (22% vs. 14% last year). 

This increase is at least partly driven by Republicans, who have become much more positive in their views of U.S. global influence: 34% say the country’s influence is getting stronger, compared with 10% in 2024. They’ve also become much less likely to say U.S. influence is getting weaker this (37% vs. 67% last year).

Democrats’ views have moved in the opposite direction. Compared with 2024, there’s been a slight decrease in the share of Democrats who say U.S. influence is getting stronger (11% vs. 19% last year), and a large increase in the share who say it’s getting weaker (67% vs. 44%).

Adults ages 65 and older (32%) are more likely than those ages 50 to 64 (20%) or under 50 (19%) to say U.S. influence in the world is getting stronger.

When rating other countries, one of the biggest shifts since 2024 is in how Americans see the influence of Iran on the world stage. Compared with last year, more Americans now say Iran’s influence is waning (28% vs. 16% then) and fewer Americans say it’s getting stronger (26% vs. 39%).

The U.S. as the world’s leading economic and military power

Despite the belief of many Americans that the U.S. is losing global influence, most still say the U.S. is the world’s leading military power (76%), and roughly half say it is the leading economic power (48%). The next highest shares say China is the world’s leading economic (38%) and military (14%) power.

As with other ratings of the U.S., Republicans generally have more positive views of their country’s standing: 58% say it is the top economic power (compared with 40% of Democrats) while 80% say it is the top military power (73% of Democrats).

For more U.S. assessments of the world’s top powers, read “Negative Views of China Have Softened Slightly Among Americans.”

• When asked which country poses the greatest threat to the U.S., China remains at the top of Americans’ list. Since we last asked this question in 2023, however, the share who name China as the biggest threat has declined, while the share who name Russia has grown.
• Roughly four-in-ten Americans (37%) say they are unsure which country is the United States’ greatest ally. As in the past, the United Kingdom is mentioned more than any other nation. But the shares who call Canada or Israel the top ally have increased since 2023.

Which country poses the greatest threat to the U.S.?

Roughly four-in-ten Americans (42%) say China poses the greatest threat to the U.S. when asked in an open-ended question. Russia is named by the next-largest share (25%).

Smaller shares say no country (4%), the U.S. itself (3%) or Iran (2%) is the greatest threat. One-in-five say they are not sure.

The share who name China as the greatest threat has declined from 50% in 2023. Conversely, the share who see Russia as the United States’ greatest threat has grown from 17%.

Views by party

Whether China or Russia is viewed as the top threat to the U.S. varies by party affiliation.

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are most likely to say that China is the United States’ greatest threat (58% vs. 12% who name Russia). Conversely, Democrats and Democratic leaners are most likely to call Russia the top threat (39% vs. 28% who name China).

In 2023, China was the top choice among both Republicans and Democrats.

Conservative Republicans are especially likely to see China as a threat (68%) compared with their moderate or liberal peers (45%). Among Democrats, liberals are more likely to name Russia (46%) than those who are moderate or conservative (34%). 

Do China and Russia present economic or security threats? 

After respondents named the country they see as the greatest threat to the U.S., we asked them to rate how much of a threat that country poses to the U.S. economy and to U.S. national security.

Among those who name China as the country’s greatest threat, overwhelming majorities say it threatens the U.S. economy (97%) and U.S. security (94%) at least a fair amount. Indeed, most think China poses a great deal of threat to each.

Among those who name Russia, more see it as a security threat (98%) than an economic threat (71%).

Who is the United States’ most important ally?

We also asked Americans which country they think is the United States’ most important ally. Roughly four-in-ten (37%) say they are unsure. Among those who do give an answer, the United Kingdom is mentioned most often (by 18% of adults), followed by Canada (12%) and Israel (9%).

The share naming Canada as the top U.S. ally has doubled from 6% since we last asked this question in 2023. In that time, the share naming Israel has also roughly doubled – from 4% in 2023.

These shifts over time in large part reflect changes in partisan attitudes. Republicans have become more likely to say Israel is the United States’ top ally (17% vs. 8% in 2023), while views among Democrats have not changed.

At the same time, Democrats have become more likely to say that Canada is the most important ally (19% vs. 9% in 2023), while Republicans’ views have not shifted.

Today, opinions also vary somewhat by age and religion:

• Age: Americans ages 50 and older most frequently point to the UK as the top U.S. ally (24%). In contrast, the UK is named by half as many adults under 50 (12%), and a similar share also name Canada (11%). Younger adults are much more likely than older adults to say they are not sure who the country’s most important ally is (44% vs. 29%).
• Religion: Around a quarter each among White evangelical Protestants (25%) and Jews (26%) say Israel is the country’s most important ally.

Americans’ ratings of other countries

Majorities of Americans give positive ratings to fellow G7 member countries Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK.

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to see these allies in a favorable light, though. Between 75% and 87% of Democrats rate these countries positively, compared with 51% to 76% of Republicans. Japan is the only country in this group that gets similar – and overwhelmingly positive – ratings from both parties.

Americans also give the EU a favorable rating (60%). Once again, Democrats rate the EU more positively than Republicans (78% vs. 44%).

Half of Americans have positive views of Mexico, up from 37% last year.

Favorable ratings of the United States’ southern neighbor have increased among both Democrats and Republicans, though a large gap remains: Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans to have a positive view of Mexico (67% vs. 32%). Adults under 50 also tend to have more positive views of Mexico when compared with those ages 50 and older (55% vs. 44%).

Roughly half of Americans have a positive opinion of India (49%), a slight increase from 43% in 2024.

Israel stands out among the countries included in our survey: Though 9% of Americans say it is the United States’ most important ally – making it the third-most commonly named – fewer than half have a favorable view of the country (45%). This is down from 55% since we last asked in 2022.

Israel is also one of the only countries asked about that Republicans are more likely to rate positively than Democrats. In fact, Republicans are about twice as likely as Democrats to say they have a positive opinion of Israel (62% vs. 29%). And adults ages 50 and older are more likely to say this than younger adults (54% vs. 37%).

Related: How Americans view Israel and the Israel-Hamas war at the start of Trump’s second term

Few Americans hold positive views of China, Russia and Iran. Around one-in-five rate China positively, and roughly one-in-ten have a favorable opinion of Russia or Iran.

Along with Israel, Russia is the only other country that Republicans rate more favorably than Democrats (16% vs. 9%).

Younger adults tend to have more positive views of all three of these countries. Roughly a quarter of adults under 50 (27%), have a favorable opinion of China, compared with 15% of adults ages 50 and older; 16% of younger adults rate Russia positively, compared with 9% of older adults; and 14% of younger adults have a positive view of Iran, as do 6% of older adults.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research
Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst
Jordan Lippert, Research Analyst

Dorene Asare-Marfo, Senior Panel Manager
Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production
Janakee Chavda, Associate Digital Producer
Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Shannon Greenwood, Digital Production Manager
Sneha Gubbala, Research Analyst
Sofia Hernandez Ramones, Research Assistant
Christine Huang, Research Associate
Anna Jackson, Editorial Assistant
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate
John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer
William Miner, Research Analyst
Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
Georgina Pizzolitto, Research Methodologist
Maya Pottiger, Communications Associate
Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Andrew Prozorovsky, Research Assistant
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate
Kelsey Jo Starr, Research Analyst
Brianna Vetter, Administrative Associate

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 24 to March 30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes oversample of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “About the American Trends Panel.”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com.  Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24 to March 30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing. 

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates