How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand how Americans see China and its relationship with the U.S. The report gauges American views of China in terms of both economics and national security. This analysis builds on previous Center research on Americans’ opinions of China and on the most pressing foreign policy issues of the day going back decades, such as major world conflicts, trade and tariffs, U.S. military decisions and other related developments of the times.

For this analysis, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to March 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

Americans hold largely negative views of China: Most have a very or somewhat unfavorable view of the country, and they tend to name China as the nation that poses the greatest threat to the United States.

Still, attitudes toward China have warmed somewhat. For the first time in five years, the share of Americans with an unfavorable opinion of China has fallen from the year before – albeit slightly, from 81% in 2024 to 77% in 2025. And the share who have a very unfavorable opinion of China has dropped 10 percentage points since last year.

The share of Americans who call China an enemy of the U.S., rather than a partner or a competitor, has also fallen. One-third now hold this view, down from 42% last year.

Still, when asked which country poses the greatest threat to the U.S., Americans mention China more often than any other nation (42%). But the share who name China has fallen 8 points since 2023, when we last asked this question.

These are among the findings of a Pew Research Center survey conducted March 24-30, 2025, among 3,605 U.S. adults. The survey took place amid escalating economic tensions between the U.S. and China, caused in part by rapidly shifting tariff policies:

• Before the survey was fielded, U.S. President Donald Trump imposed additional tariffs on China in February and again in early March.
• After the survey concluded, Trump announced sweeping tariffs on many countries, including further tariffs on China, in April.
• China also implemented new tariffs on the U.S., both before and after the survey was fielded.

Views by party

Negative attitudes toward China have softened among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, though they continue to be more critical of the country than Democrats and Democratic leaners. The share of Republicans with an unfavorable view of China is down 8 points since 2024, including a 16-point drop in the share with a very unfavorable view. In comparison, unfavorable views among Democrats saw a 5-point decline.

Republicans are 14 points less likely than they were in 2024 to label China an enemy of the U.S. Since we first began asking this question in 2021, Republicans have generally been more likely to call China an enemy than a competitor, but they are now equally likely to use each label. Among Democrats, the share who consider China an enemy has fallen 6 points since last year.

For their part, Democrats have become less likely to name China as the country posing the greatest threat to the U.S. – 28% say this is the case, down from 40% in 2023. Republicans saw a more muted change in that time (-5 points). For Democrats, much of this change relates to an increasing share naming Russia as the top threat to the U.S.

For more on U.S. views of Russia, read “Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War.”

There have also been pronounced changes from previous years in partisan assessments of China’s international influence:

• In 2024, Republicans were 10 points more likely than Democrats to say China’s global influence was growing. Now, adults in both parties are equally likely to hold this view.
• While Republicans used to be more inclined than Democrats to label China the world’s top economic and military power, Democrats are now more likely to hold these views.

Views on trade and tariffs

Americans do not think the trade relationship between the U.S. and China is balanced. Nearly half (46%) say China benefits more from U.S.-China trade, though a quarter say both countries benefit equally; 10% think the U.S. benefits more.

A majority of Republicans say China benefits more from the U.S.-China trade relationship. Democrats are divided between the view that both countries benefit equally and the view that China benefits more.

We asked the same questions about U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico. Americans consider the U.S.-China trade relationship more unbalanced than the others: 26% of Americans say Canada benefits more than the U.S. from their trade relationship, and 29% say this in Mexico’s case.

Americans are largely skeptical about the effects of increased tariffs on China. About half say these tariffs will be bad for the U.S., and a similar share say the tariffs will be bad for them personally.

Among Democrats, 80% think the tariffs will harm the country, and 75% believe these measures will harm them personally. Republicans are more optimistic. While only 17% say increased tariffs on China will be good for them personally, they are more inclined to say the tariffs will be good than bad for the country (44% vs. 24%).

Related: Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews

Americans hold largely unfavorable opinions of China and Chinese President Xi Jinping, but ratings of both have improved slightly since 2024.

Views of China are mostly negative

More than three-quarters of Americans (77%) have an unfavorable opinion of China. Though a sizable majority, this reflects a decrease from 81% in 2024. It also marks the first time in five years we’ve measured a significant year-over-year decline in the share of Americans with an unfavorable view of China.

The change is even greater when it comes to the share of those with a very unfavorable view of China: Today, 33% of U.S. adults have a very unfavorable view, down from 43% last year.

Views by party

Views of China tend to vary by party. While majorities of adults in both parties have an unfavorable opinion of China, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are significantly more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to hold this view (82% vs. 72%).

Still, views of China are warming across the board. The share of Republicans with a very unfavorable opinion of China has dropped 16 points since 2024, while the share among Democrats has dropped 6 points. 

Conservative Republicans stand out among ideological groups, with about half (51%) saying they have a very unfavorable view of China. That is 20 points more than the share of moderate and liberal Republicans (31%) and roughly double the shares of conservative and moderate Democrats (24%) and liberal Democrats (24%) who say the same.

Views by age

Older Americans are most critical of China. About half of those ages 65 and older have a very unfavorable opinion of China. This share drops to 37% among those ages 50 to 64, 27% among those ages 30 to 49, and 21% among adults under 30.

Americans largely lack confidence in Xi

Three-quarters of U.S. adults have little or no confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs. This includes 39% who have no confidence at all in him.

Only about one-in-ten Americans (11%) say they have some confidence in Xi, and just 1% have a lot of confidence in him. Another 12% say they have never heard of the Chinese president.

Similar to Americans’ overall views of China, the share of those with confidence in Xi has risen slightly since 2024 (+4 points).

Views by party

Opinions of Xi also vary by party. While sizable majorities of both Republicans and Democrats have little or no confidence in Xi’s leadership on the world stage, Republicans are especially likely to lack confidence. Conservative Republicans are the most critical: 86% are not confident in Xi, including 54% who have no confidence at all.

Views by age

Confidence in Xi is lowest among older Americans. Adults ages 65 and older are 21 points more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to have little or no confidence in the Chinese president (85% vs. 64%).

Older adults are also more likely to know who Xi is. When asked, just 5% of those ages 65 and older say they have never heard of him. That share rises to 20% among adults ages 18 to 29.

Most Americans say China’s international influence has been growing stronger in recent years. Still, Americans tend to say the U.S. – not China – is the world’s top economic and military power.

Americans see China’s global influence getting stronger

A 73% majority of Americans say China’s influence in the world has been getting stronger in recent years. A similar share (71%) held this view in 2024.

About two-in-ten (19%) say China’s influence has stayed about the same, while 6% say it’s getting weaker.

Views by party

Unlike many other opinions related to China, there are no significant differences between Republicans and Democrats on this question. About equal shares in both parties say that China is growing stronger (71% vs. 75%).

Views by age

Americans ages 50 and older are slightly more likely than adults under 50 to say China’s global influence is getting stronger (76% vs. 70%).

Which country is the leading economic power?

About half of Americans (48%) think the U.S. is the world’s leading economic power. Another 38% say it’s China, and smaller shares name Japan (7%) or the EU (6%).

These views are largely unchanged since we last asked this question in 2023, though the share naming the U.S. as the world’s top economic power has been as high as 54% in 2020.

Views by party

The stability of these views overall hides major partisan shifts that have occurred over the past two years.

In 2023, Republicans were about equally likely to describe the U.S. (46%) and China (45%) as the world’s leading economy. Among Republicans, the share naming the U.S. as the top economy has gone up 12 points, while the share naming China has fallen by about the same amount. Today, a clear majority of Republicans (58%) name the U.S. as the world’s top economic power, compared with 32% who name China.

Democrats are now about equally likely to name China (43%) and the U.S. (40%) as the world’s leading economic power. By comparison, 52% of Democrats said the U.S. was the top economy in 2023, and 33% said China.

Views by age

Older Americans are less likely than younger people to say China is the world’s leading economic power. Among those ages 65 and older, 27% name China as the top economy – a much larger share (60%) name the U.S. In comparison, adults under 30 are about equally likely to see China and the U.S. as the world’s top economic power.

Which country is the leading military power?

Most Americans (76%) say the U.S. is the world’s leading military power. Fewer say the top military power is China (14%) or Russia (8%).

Compared with 2022, Americans are more likely to see the U.S. as the world’s leading military power (+6 points), but they are still less likely than they were in 2020 to hold this view.

Views by party

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to see the U.S. as the world’s leading military power, though majorities of both parties hold this view (80% and 73%).

This is a reversal from 2022, when Democrats were more likely than Republicans to see the U.S. as the leading military power (75% vs. 67%) and less likely than Republicans to name China (16% vs. 22%).

Americans tend to believe the U.S.-China trade relationship benefits China more than the U.S.: 46% hold this view, while a quarter say both countries benefit equally and 10% say the U.S. benefits more. Nonetheless, Americans are skeptical that increased tariffs on Chinese imports will have a positive effect on the country or on their own lives.

 (The survey was conducted March 24-30, 2025, after President Donald Trump implemented tariffs on China in February and again in early March, but before further tariffs were imposed in April. China responded with tariffs on the U.S. both before and after the survey was fielded.)

Who benefits most from the U.S.-China trade relationship?

When asked whether one country benefits more from U.S.-China trade, the largest share of Americans (46%) say China does, largely unchanged since we last asked the question in 2023. The U.S.-China trade relationship is seen as more unbalanced than the U.S.-Canada or U.S.-Mexico trade relationships.

For more on U.S. assessments of trade with the country’s top trade partners, read “How Americans view trade between the U.S. and China, Canada and Mexico.”

Views by party

Republicans and Democrats see different winners in the U.S.-China trade relationship. Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, a 60% majority say China benefits more from U.S.-China trade. Conservative Republicans are especially likely to hold this view (69%). In comparison, Democrats and Democratic leaners are equally divided between saying China benefits more and saying the two countries benefit equally (34% take each stance).

Views by age

Older Americans are more likely than younger adults to see China as the main beneficiary of trade between the U.S. and China. A majority of those ages 65 and older (56%) say China benefits more than the U.S., compared with 27% of those ages 18 to 29.

How do Americans feel about increased tariffs on China?

As of mid-April, Trump has implemented increasingly high tariffs on imports from China – adding to the tariffs put in place during his first administration.

Many more Americans think increased tariffs on China will be bad for the U.S. – and for them personally – than say these tariffs will be good. Around a quarter say either that increased tariffs will have no effect on the U.S. or that they are unsure about tariffs’ national effects. Over a third say the same about how tariffs will affect them personally.

When we asked similar questions in 2021, people were more likely to say tariffs would have a negative impact on the country than on themselves personally. Now, relatively equal shares anticipate a negative impact on both.

Americans who think the U.S. benefits more than China does from U.S.-China trade are far more likely to see the tariffs as bad than good for the country (68% vs. 18%). The same is true for those who think both countries benefit equally from U.S.-China trade – they tend to say tariffs will affect the U.S. negatively (71%) rather than positively (11%). Those who say China benefits more from U.S.-China trade are about equally likely to say tariffs on China will be bad for the U.S. as to say they will be good (41% vs. 37%).

For more views of increasing tariffs on China, read “Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews.”

When asked if China is an enemy, competitor or partner of the U.S., most Americans say China is a competitor. Even so, Americans most frequently name China as the country posing the top threat to the U.S.

Additionally, a majority of Americans say that tensions in China’s relationship with Taiwan are important to U.S. national interests.

Is China a partner, competitor or enemy of the U.S.?

A majority of Americans (56%) say China is a competitor of the U.S., as opposed to an enemy (33%) or a partner (9%).

For the first time since 2022, the share of people describing China as an enemy has fallen from the year before. In this case, the share has fallen 9 points since April 2024.

Views by party

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are about twice as likely as Democrats and Democratic leaners to describe China as an enemy (45% vs. 22%). 

But the share of Republicans describing China as an enemy has fallen 14 points since last year. Now, relatively equal shares of Republicans describe China as a competitor (47%) and an enemy (45%).

Democrats, too, are less likely to call China an enemy now than they were last year, though the shift has been more muted (22%, down from 28%). Democrats are also slightly more likely to describe China as a partner now than last year (12%, up from 7%).

Views by age

Older Americans are much more likely than younger adults to call China an enemy: 47% of those ages 65 and older hold this view, compared with 40% of those ages 50 to 64, 26% of those 30 to 49 and 19% of those 18 to 29. In comparison, younger Americans are most likely to see China as a competitor: 61% of adults under 30 say this, though some call China a partner (19%) or an enemy (19%).

China as a threat to the U.S.

When asked in an open-ended question which country poses the greatest threat to the U.S., 42% of Americans name China. Another 25% name Russia, and 20% say they are not sure. Still others name the U.S. itself (3%), Iran (2%), North Korea (1%) or Israel (1%).

China was also considered the country posing the greatest threat in 2023, when the question was last asked. At that time, half the U.S. public held this view.

Views by party

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to name China as the country that poses the greatest threat to the U.S. (58% vs. 28%). This view is particularly common among conservative Republicans, who are 23 points more likely than their moderate and liberal counterparts to hold this view (68% vs. 45%). Conservative and moderate Democrats are 6 points more likely than liberal Democrats to consider China the top threat to the U.S. (31% vs. 25%).

Supporters of both parties have become less likely to name China as the country that poses the greatest threat to the U.S., but the decline has been particularly steep among Democrats. Democrats are 12 points less likely than in 2023 to name China as the top threat. In fact, the largest share of Democrats now name Russia, not China, as the country posing the greatest threat to the U.S. (39%).

Republicans have also become less likely to name China as the top threat, but to a lesser extent (-5 points).

What type of threat does China pose to the U.S.?

Of those who named China as the country posing the greatest threat to the U.S., most agree China poses at least a fair amount of threat to the U.S. economy and to its national security.

These assessments are somewhat tempered from 2023. Since then, Americans who say China is the country posing the greatest threat to the U.S. have become 14 points less likely to say China poses a great deal of threat to the U.S. economy and 12 points less likely to say the same of China as a threat to U.S. national security.

Views by age

Older Americans who see China as the top threat to the U.S. are more inclined than their younger counterparts to consider China a major threat to national security. Of those ages 65 and older, 70% say China poses a great deal of threat to national security. In comparison, 46% of adults under 30 agree.

Older and younger Americans who name China as the top threat to the U.S. largely agree in their assessments of China as an economic threat.

Views by party

Republicans are especially inclined to see China as a major threat to national security: 65% of Republicans who consider China as the greatest threat to the U.S. hold this view, compared with 55% of their Democratic counterparts.

Among those who see China as the country posing the greatest threat to the U.S., Republicans and Democrats share similar views of China as a threat to the U.S. economy.

Tensions between China and Taiwan

Roughly two-thirds of Americans (66%) say tensions between China and Taiwan are important to U.S. national interests, including 31% who think the issue is very important. Additionally, 47% say cross-strait tensions are personally important to them.

By way of comparison, similar shares of Americans describe China-Taiwan tensions as important to national interests as say the same of the Israel-Hamas war (66%) and the Russia-Ukraine war (69%). However, fewer say it’s personally important to them than say this of the other two conflicts.

The issue’s importance among Americans has also declined over the last year. Compared with 2024, Americans are 9 points less likely to consider tensions between China and Taiwan important to national interests and 10 points less likely to consider the tensions important to them personally.

For more on Americans’ views of the Israel-Hamas war, read “How Americans view Israel and the Israel-Hamas war at the start of Trump’s second term.” And for more on American views of the Russia-Ukraine war, read “Republican Opinion Shifts on Russia-Ukraine War.”

Views by age

Older Americans are more likely than younger Americans to see cross-strait tensions as important to national interests and to them personally. Among those ages 65 and older, 78% consider the issue important to national interests, compared with 55% of those ages 18 to 29. Likewise, 65% of those 65 and older see tensions between China and Taiwan as important to them personally, compared with 36% of adults under 30.

Views by education

Americans with more education place greater importance on the tensions between China and Taiwan. Those with at least a four-year college degree are 19 points more likely than those without to consider cross-strait tensions important to U.S. interests (79% vs. 60%) and 13 points more likely to say these tensions are important to them personally (56% vs. 43%).

Views by party

Democrats are more likely than Republicans to see tensions between China and Taiwan as important to U.S. national interests. However, Democrats and Republicans aresimilarly likely to consider cross-strait tensions personally important.

This is a reversal from last year, when supporters of each party were equally likely to consider tensions important to national interests, and Republicans were more likely to consider them personally important.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Christine Huang, Research Associate
Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst

Dorene Asare-Marfo, Senior Panel Manager
Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production
Janakee Chavda, Associate Digital Producer
Justine Coleman, Associate Digital Producer
Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher
Shannon Greenwood, Digital Production Manager
Sneha Gubbala, Research Analyst
Anna Jackson, Editorial Assistant      
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate
Jordan Lippert, Research Analyst
John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer
William Miner, Research Analyst
Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
Georgina Pizzolitto, Research Methodologist
Maya Pottiger, Communications Associate
Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Andrew Prozorovsky, Research Assistant
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate
Kelsey Jo Starr, Research Analyst
Brianna Vetter, Administrative Associate
Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 24 to March 30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes oversample of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “About the American Trends Panel.”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com.  Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24 to March 30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing. 

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists’ numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates