As NATO approaches its 75th anniversary, Americans are increasingly divided in their views about the alliance. Most continue to believe the United States benefits from its membership, but partisan differences on ratings of NATO have widened in recent years.

Three-quarters of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents rate the organization favorably, while only 43% of Republicans and Republican leaners agree – down from 55% in a 2022 survey conducted soon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Attitudes toward the war in Ukraine have evolved to reflect the partisan polarization found across so many issues in U.S. politics. Democrats and Republicans differ sharply on views about aid to Ukraine, ratings of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and whether supporting Ukraine helps or hurts U.S. interests.

The share of Americans who believe the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine has risen slightly in recent months, following setbacks for Ukraine on the battlefield and prolonged congressional debate over sending aid. (The survey was conducted before President Joe Biden signed into law an aid package sending nearly $61 billion to the Ukrainian war effort.)

Roughly one-quarter of Americans (24%) now say the U.S. is not providing enough aid, up from 18% in November 2023, when we last asked this question. Still, more Americans (31%) think the U.S. is providing too much aid, and 25% believe it’s giving the right amount.

However, views on this issue vary considerably by party. While the share of Democrats who believe the U.S. is not doing enough to help Ukraine declined after the initial onset of the war, it has increased more recently. Currently, 36% of Democrats say the U.S. is not providing enough aid.

In contrast, just 13% of Republicans say the U.S. is not giving enough support to Ukraine, while 49% believe it is giving too much. At the beginning of the war, Republican attitudes were essentially the reverse: 49% said the U.S. was not providing enough aid and 9% said it was providing too much. Among Republicans, conservatives are more likely than moderates and liberals to say the U.S. is providing too much aid to Ukraine.

In addition to shifting views about NATO and Ukraine over the past few years, Americans have increasingly come to believe that U.S. power is declining on the global stage: 54% say the country’s influence has been getting weaker recently, up from 47% two years ago. The shares saying the same about the United Kingdom, France and Germany – key U.S. allies in Europe – have also increased since 2022.

Meanwhile, about four-in-ten or more see China, Russia and Iran – nations often considered adversaries of the U.S. – as increasingly influential, including a 71% majority who say this of China. And about a third say India’s influence is getting stronger.

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to believe China, Russia and Iran are gaining strength. They are also more likely to believe the U.S., France and Germany are becoming weaker.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted April 1-7, 2024, among 3,600 U.S. adults.

Below we describe some of the key findings from the survey, which explored attitudes toward NATO, Ukraine, trans-Atlantic relations, Russia and the shifting balance of power in global politics. For more in-depth analysis of these topics, read:

• Chapter 1:  Views of Ukraine and U.S. involvement with the war
• Chapter 2: Americans’ opinions of NATO
• Chapter 3: Views of trans-Atlantic allies and U.S.-Europe relations
• Chapter 4: Views of Russia and Putin

Ukraine

• There is no public consensus on whether supporting Ukraine is in America’s national interests: 36% say it helps U.S. national security, 36% say it hurts and 24% believe it has no impact. Democrats are particularly likely to think it helps, while Republicans are especially likely to say it hurts.
• Concerns about Russia defeating Ukraine and Russia invading other countries in the region are higher today than in September 2022, the last time we asked this question. These concerns are more common among Democrats than Republicans.
• Opinions about Zelenskyy also divide sharply along partisan lines. A 55% majority of Republicans now lack confidence in Zelenskyy to do the right thing in world affairs, up from 48% a year ago. In contrast, 65% of Democrats say they are confident in the Ukrainian leader, although this is down from 71% in 2023.

NATO and trans-Atlantic relations

• In addition to partisan divisions over NATO, there are also substantial differences by education. For instance, 73% of Americans with a postgraduate degree have a favorable view of NATO, compared with just 51% of those with a high school degree or less education.

• 66% of Americans believe the U.S. benefits a great deal or fair amount from being a NATO member; 51% of Republicans hold this view, compared with 81% of Democrats.
• Majorities of Americans have favorable views of the UK (70%), France (64%) and Germany (64%); Democrats are more likely than Republicans to see these key U.S. allies positively.
• Large majorities of both Democrats and Republicans believe economic and trade ties, security and defense ties, and shared democratic values are important for strong relations between the U.S. and Europe. However, while 45% of Democrats believe shared democratic values are very important, only about a third of Republicans (31%) say the same.
• Despite overall positive views of European allies and the nature of trans-Atlantic relations, roughly half of U.S. adults (47%) say European allies need to increase their defense spending. Older Americans and conservative Republicans are particularly likely to believe this.

Russia

• Americans became significantly more likely to consider Russia an enemy after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In January 2022, 41% considered Russia an enemy of the U.S.; two months later, 70% held this view. Today, roughly six-in-ten (61%) see Russia as an enemy.
• Compared with the other issues in this study, partisan divisions over Russia are relatively muted. Democrats (67%) are more likely to describe Russia as an enemy, but most Republicans (58%) share this view. In 2022, these partisan differences were not as wide.

• Attitudes toward Russian President Vladimir Putin remain extremely negative among Americans: 88% say they do not have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs.

A shifting balance of global power

• Since 2022, Americans have become more likely to believe China, India and Russia are growing stronger in world affairs. In contrast, they have become more likely to say France, Germany, the UK and the U.S. are losing influence on the world stage.  
• Two-thirds of Republicans think the U.S. is losing influence; 44% of Democrats agree. The share of each partisan group who say U.S. influence is declining has increased since 2022.
• Large majorities in both parties believe China’s power is rising, although Republicans (78%) are somewhat more likely than Democrats (68%) to hold this view.

International engagement and foreign policy issues

• Many questions on the survey correlate with general views about international engagement. For example, 56% of those who think it’s best for the U.S. to be active in world affairs say supporting Ukraine helps American national security. That share is just 17% among those who say the U.S. should pay less attention to problems in other countries and concentrate on domestic problems.

Related: What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?

Note: For more recent survey data on the U.S. role in Ukraine, read our July 2024 report “War in Ukraine: Wide Partisan Differences on U.S. Responsibility and Support.”

Here are key takeaways regarding attitudes on U.S. involvement with the war in Ukraine:

• Just over two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Americans are divided on their views of U.S. aid for Ukraine and the effect that support to Ukraine might have on U.S. national security.
• Concerns about Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia and about Russia invading other countries in the region are somewhat higher than in the fall of 2022. However, levels of concern are still lower than they were at the start of the war.
• Americans are more confident in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy than not, but confidence in Zelenskyy has decreased significantly over the past year.

Views of U.S. support to Ukraine

About a third of Americans (31%) say the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine. Roughly equal shares of U.S. adults say the U.S. is providing about the right amount (25%) or not enough support (24%) to Ukraine, while 18% say they are not sure.

In March 2022, shortly after the invasion, about four-in-ten Americans said the U.S. was not providing enough support to Ukraine (42%). This share has since decreased by nearly 20 percentage points. Meanwhile, the share of those saying that the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine has grown from 7% in March 2022 to 31% in April 2024.

Partisanship

Roughly half of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine, compared with 16% of Democrats and Democratic leaners.

In March 2022, almost half of Republicans said the U.S. was not providing enough support to Ukraine, 11 points more than the share of Democrats who said this. Today, that same share of Republicans (49%) say that the U.S. is providing too much assistance to Ukraine.

After some decline over the last two years, the share of Democrats saying the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine has returned to roughly the same proportion as at the start of the war. Now, 36% of Democrats believe the U.S. is not providing enough support, up from 24% in November 2023 – when we most recently asked this question – but comparable to the 38% who said this in March 2022.

Partisan views vary by ideology, with conservative Republicans (54%) more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans (40%) to say the U.S. is providing too much assistance to Ukraine. Conservative and moderate Democrats are more likely than liberal Democrats to say the U.S. is providing too much support to Ukraine (54% vs. 11%).

Partisans also differ by age, with younger Republicans and Democrats more likely than their older counterparts to say the U.S. is giving too much aid to Ukraine. Younger partisans are also significantly more likely to answer “Not sure” on this question.

Concerns about Russia taking over Ukraine, invading other countries

Two years into Russia’s war with Ukraine – and two months after Zelenskyy announced plans to reshuffle Ukraine’s military and political leadership – 44% of Americans say they are extremely or very concerned about a Russian victory and takeover in Ukraine. This share has increased by 6 percentage points since we last asked in September 2022, but it’s still below the 55% who said this in April 2022.

There are wide partisan gaps on this topic. A majority of Democrats (55%) are extremely or very concerned about the possibility of Ukraine being defeated and taken over by Russia, up 10 points since September 2022. About a third of Republicans (35%) hold this view, little changed from 32% in fall 2022.

Among Democrats, liberals are more likely than conservatives and moderates to express concern about a Ukrainian defeat. There is no ideological difference among Republicans.

Older Americans are much more worried about this outcome than younger adults. Six-in-ten adults ages 65 and older report they are extremely or very concerned, compared with 35% of adults under 30.

Concerns that Russia poses a threat to other countries in the region have also increased: 48% of Americans now say they are extremely or very concerned about Russia invading another country, up from 41% in September 2022. But this is also down from the 59% who said this in April 2022, a few months into the war.

Around six-in-ten Democrats (58%) are extremely or very concerned about a Russian invasion elsewhere in the region, an 11-point increase from September 2022. Roughly four-in-ten Republicans (41%) are extremely or very concerned, up from 35% in September 2022. Concerns are especially high among liberal Democrats and are less common among conservative Republicans.

Older Americans are 20 points more likely than younger Americans to say they are extremely or very worried about Russia invading other countries (61% vs. 41%).

Impact of supporting Ukraine on U.S. national security

Americans are divided on the potential security effects of supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia. Equal shares say that supporting Ukraine helps and hurts U.S. national security (36% each). About a quarter (24%) believe support for Ukraine has no impact on U.S. national security.

Democrats (49%) are more likely than Republicans (24%) to say that supporting Ukraine helps national security. Democrats ages 50 and older are especially likely to view U.S. support of Ukraine as a benefit to national security, with 59% saying this. In comparison, only 41% of Democrats ages 18 to 49 agree. Liberal Democrats (57%) are also particularly likely to consider U.S. assistance to Ukraine as a positive for national security.

Among Republicans, those ages 18 to 49 are more likely to say that supporting Ukraine hurts U.S. national security (54%) than those 50 and older (40%).

Confidence in Zelenskyy

About half of Americans (48%) say they have some or a lot of confidence in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a decrease of 8 points since 2023. Roughly four-in-ten (39%) have little or no trust in him to do the right thing.

Adults ages 65 and older are more likely to evaluate Zelenskyy positively than any other age group. For example, they are about 20 points more likely than adults under 30 to have confidence in Zelenskyy (60% vs. 38%). Meanwhile, two-in-ten Americans ages 18 to 29 say they have never heard of the Ukrainian leader.

Democrats are about twice as likely as Republicans to have at least some confidence in Zelenskyy.

When looking at partisans by ideology, liberal Democrats are especially likely to express confidence in Zelenskyy. Even conservative and moderate Democrats are much more likely to hold this view than either moderate and liberal Republicans or conservative Republicans. In contrast, about six-in-ten conservative Republicans lack confidence in the Ukrainian leader.

Here are several key takeaways when it comes to Americans’ opinions of NATO:

• Americans continue to hold a largely favorable view of NATO, with a majority expressing a positive opinion of the alliance. However, ratings have dipped slightly over the past year, driven largely by declining favorability among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents.
• About two-thirds of U.S. adults see a benefit to NATO membership, but fewer say this today than in 2022. This change has also largely occurred among Republicans.
• The share of Americans who believe the alliance’s influence is getting stronger dropped 11 percentage points over the past two years, with similar declines among both Democrats and Republicans.
• Those who have more knowledge of NATO are more inclined to see the organization favorably.

Views of NATO

While a majority of Americans (58%) have a favorable opinion of NATO, positive views of the alliance dropped 4 points – a statistically significant decline – since this question was last asked in 2023.

The well-established partisan divide on views of NATO has grown wider in 2024. Republicans have become less favorable of the alliance over the past year: 43% have a positive view of NATO, down from 49% who said the same in 2023. Meanwhile, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents remain positive about NATO into 2024: Three-quarters of this group see the alliance in a favorable light (comparable to 76% in 2023).

Those with at least a four-year college degree are more likely than those with less education to express a positive opinion of NATO, though those with less education are slightly less likely overall to offer an opinion.

Americans who say security and defense ties are important for strong relations between the U.S. and Europe are almost twice as likely to have a favorable view of NATO when compared with those who do not consider security ties to be important (60% vs. 33%).

Views of U.S. support for Ukraine are also linked to opinions about NATO. About eight-in-ten U.S. adults (82%) who believe the U.S. is not providing enough support to Ukraine have a favorable opinion of NATO, compared with 34% favorability among those who say the U.S. is providing too much support.

U.S. membership in NATO

About two-thirds of Americans (66%) say membership in NATO benefits the U.S., compared with 31% who believe it does not. The share who see a benefit has dropped slightly, from 69% in 2022.

Of the three multilateral organizations asked about in the survey (NATO, the United Nations and the World Health Organization), the U.S. public sees NATO membership as most beneficial. In comparison, 60% say UN membership benefits the country, and 58% say the same about WHO membership.

Related: Fewer Americans view the United Nations favorably than in 2023

The partisan divide seen in overall views NATO is present here as well: 81% of Democrats say the U.S. benefits from being a member of NATO, while 51% of Republican say the same. Liberal Democrats are more likely than any other ideological group to see a benefit to NATO membership.

Additionally, those who think shared security and defense ties are important for strong relations between the U.S. and Europe are much more likely to believe the U.S. benefits from NATO membership than those who do not think these ties are important.

NATO’s influence in the world

The share in the U.S. who see NATO’s influence in the world as getting stronger declined 11 percentage points since this question was last asked in May 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Only 23% of Americans believe NATO’s influence is getting stronger. Meanwhile, 45% say its influence is staying about the same, up from 39% in 2022. And 28% believe the alliance is getting weaker, a slight increase from the 25% who said the same two years ago.

Democrats have been consistently more likely than Republicans to say NATO’s influence in the world is getting stronger.

Americans’ knowledge of NATO

Americans have a varying level of knowledge about where NATO members are located, the organization’s central focus and Ukraine’s nonmember status. A majority (56%) can correctly identify Europe and North America as the two regions from which the alliance draws membership. And about half (51%) recognize promoting the security of its members as a central tenet of the alliance. Fewer (41%) are able to correctly identify Ukraine as a nation that is not a member of NATO.

Overall, 30% of Americans answered all three NATO knowledge questions correctly. About a fifth each answered two correctly (19%) or one correctly (20%). And 31% of U.S. adults did not answer any question correctly (including the share who chose “Not sure” at least once alongside incorrect answers).

Americans ages 65 and older are 20 percentage points more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to answer all three NATO knowledge questions correctly (38% vs. 18%). Previous Center research has found that older adults tend to have more knowledge of international affairs than their younger counterparts.

Americans with more education are more likely than those with less to answer all three questions correctly: Half of those with a postgraduate education gave three correct answers, compared with 17% of those with a high school education or less.

Notably, Democrats and Republicans were equally likely to answer all three questions correctly.

People who knew more about NATO tended to have different views of the alliance than those who did not know as much about it. For example, 73% of those who answered all three quiz questions correctly believe the U.S. benefits from NATO membership, compared with 57% of those who answered no questions correctly.

Additionally, a higher share of those who gave three correct answers have a favorable view of NATO (68%), compared with 46% of those who gave no correct answers. Respondents with a higher level of NATO knowledge are also more likely to say the organization’s influence is on the rise.

Here are key takeaways regarding U.S. views of European countries, relations between the U.S. and Europe, and European defense spending:

• Majorities in the U.S. have a favorable view of the UK, France and Germany. Most consider economic and security ties, as well as shared democratic values, to be important for strong U.S.-Europe relationships.
• However, few see British, French or German world influence as on the rise. In fact, many Americans see French and British influence declining.
• Roughly half believe allies in Europe should increase spending on national defense. (About a quarter do not express a view either way.)

Views of the UK, France and Germany

American views of three key NATO allies – the UK, France and Germany – are positive overall. Roughly two-thirds or more of U.S. adults express a favorable view of each country, including 70% who say this of the UK. (Prior Center surveys have found that Americans see the UK as their most important foreign policy partner.)

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to express a positive view of each country. For example, three-quarters of Democrats see France favorably, compared with 53% of Republicans.

Americans ages 65 and older are more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to express a favorable opinion of Germany and the UK.

Views of British, French and German power

Despite positive views of the UK, France and Germany, few say each ally’s influence in the world has been getting stronger in recent years. Half or more of Americans believe these countries’ influence has stayed about the same. About a third say the UK has been getting weaker in recent years, and roughly a quarter say this about France.

The share who say the influence of each country has been getting weaker has increased since this question was last asked in 2022 – up 8 points for the UK, 7 points for France and 4 points for Germany.

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to think French and German influence are getting weaker. Views of European influence are also connected to views of NATO’s strength: People who say NATO’s influence is on the decline are more likely to say the same about the UK, France and Germany.

Trans-Atlantic relations

Americans see several elements as important to maintaining strong relations between the U.S. and Europe. Over nine-in-ten see economic and trade ties, as well as security and defense ties, as at least somewhat important for strong relations across the Atlantic. A majority of Americans consider economic and security ties to be very important.

While about eight-in-ten in the U.S. see shared democratic values as important to maintaining a good relationship with Europe, fewer overall consider this element very important.

While 45% of Democrats believe shared democratic values are very important, only 31% of Republicans agree.

European defense spending

About half (47%) of Americans say that European allies’ spending on national defense should increase. Roughly two-in-ten (18%) say European defense spending should stay the same, 8% believe it should decrease, and 26% are not sure either way.

U.S. adults 65 and older are more likely than younger adults to say allies in Europe need to increase their defense spending: 66% hold this view, compared with 31% of those ages 18 to 29 who say the same.

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say allies should increase defense spending: 58% of Republicans believe this, compared with 42% of Democrats. Among Republicans, conservatives are most likely to hold this view, with 64% saying European allies should up their defense spending.

Here are key takeaways of how Americans see Russia and its president:

• Negative ratings for Russian President Vladimir Putin remain very high: 67% of Americans have no confidence at all in the Russian leader to do the right thing in world affairs.
• Americans continue to see Russia in a negative light, but an increasing share see Russia’s influence in the world getting stronger.
• Roughly six-in-ten believe Russia is an enemy of the U.S., rather than a partner or competitor, but the share who say Russia is an enemy has declined over the past two years.

Confidence in Putin

Americans overwhelmingly rate Putin negatively: 88% say they do not have confidence in the Russian president to do the right thing regarding world affairs, with two-thirds saying they have no confidence in him at all. A similar share lacked confidence in him in 2023 (90%).

Partisan gaps are relatively small on this question, with Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents only slightly more negative toward Putin than Republicans and Republican leaners. While liberal Democrats are the most likely to say they lack confidence in Putin (95%), about eight-in-ten or more hold this view among conservative and moderate Democrats, moderate and liberal Republicans, and conservative Republicans.

Attitudes toward Russia

Americans continue to hold strong negative opinions of Russia more than two years after Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine. More than eight-in-ten say they have an unfavorable view of the country, including 57% who say they have a very unfavorable view. Only around one-in-ten Americans rate Russia favorably.

While more than eight-in-ten express an unfavorable opinion across all age groups, older adults are particularly likely to hold this view.

Republicans and Democrats are about equally likely to say they view Russia unfavorably (88% vs. 87%), although Democrats are more likely to have very unfavorable opinions of Russia.

Russia’s influence in the world

About half of Americans (48%) see Russia’s influence in the world increasing – up 10 percentage points since March 2022, just after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The share who say Russia’s influence is getting weaker (24%) declined 13 points over the same period.

People ages 65 and older are more likely than those ages 18 to 29 to see Russia’s power on the rise (57% vs. 46%).

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say Russia’s influence is getting stronger. Among Republicans, a majority of conservatives say Russia’s influence has been getting stronger, more than any other ideological group. Republicans were also more likely than Democrats to believe Russia’s influence was increasing in 2022.

Russia as an enemy, competitor or partner of the U.S.

Roughly six-in-ten Americans (61%) label Russia an enemy of the U.S., while 32% call it a competitor and just 4% see it as a partner. The share of Americans who consider Russia an enemy increased dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but has dropped 9 points between March 2022 and today.

Majorities of Republicans and Democrats see Russia as an enemy, though Democrats are more likely to say this than Republicans (67% vs. 58%). Liberal Democrats are the most likely to see Russia in this way, with nearly three-quarters labeling it an enemy. In turn, moderate and liberal Republicans are the least likely to hold this view: Around half say Russia is an enemy of the U.S. Overall, the share of Republicans who call Russia an enemy has decreased slightly since last year (by 5 points) but is down 11 points since March 2022.

Older Americans are much more likely than younger Americans to consider Russia an enemy: 79% of adults ages 65 and older say this, compared with 48%% of adults under 30. Half of Americans also say limiting the power and influence of Russia should be a top priority in U.S. long range foreign policy.

Related: Americans Remain Critical of China

Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Sneha Gubbala, Research Assistant
Sarah Austin, Research Assistant

Dorene Asare-Marfo, Panel Manager
Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production
Janakee Chavda, Assistant Digital Producer
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst
Manolo Corichi, Research Analyst
Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher
Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher
Shannon Greenwood, Digital Production Manager
Christine Huang, Research Associate
Anna Jackson, Editorial Assistant
Hannah Klein, Senior Communications Manager
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate
Jordan Lippert, Research Assistant
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
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Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
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Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Sofia Hernandez Ramones, Research Assistant
Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate
Kelsey Jo Starr, Research Analyst
Brianna Vetter, Administrative Associate

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from ATP Wave 145, conducted from April 1-7, 2024, among a sample of ATP members who had previously completed both of ATP Waves 132 and 143. It includes an oversample of non-Hispanic Asian adults, non-Hispanic Black men and Hispanic men in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 3,600 panelists responded out of 3,776 who were sampled, for a response rate of 95%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,600 respondents is plus or minus 2.1 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based sampling (ABS) recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is asked to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.²

We have recruited a national sample of U.S. adults to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to boost sample size with underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Across the six address-based recruitments, a total of 23,862 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 20,917 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. Of the 30,859 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,906 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample of active ATP members who completed both ATP Wave 132 and Wave 143. Among the panelists who met these criteria, Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was April 1-7, 2024. Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset of ATP panelists with a known residential address on April 1.³

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on April 1. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on April 2.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center’s researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, one ATP respondent was removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights are then rescaled and adjusted to account for changes in the design of ATP recruitment surveys from year to year. Finally, the weights are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 2nd and 98th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. This trimming is performed separately among non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, Hispanic and all other respondents. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

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