For the fifth year in a row, about eight-in-ten Americans report an unfavorable view of China, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. Today, 81% of U.S. adults see the country unfavorably, including 43% who hold a very unfavorable opinion. Chinese President Xi Jinping receives similarly negative ratings.

Still, many Americans agree that China’s influence in the world has been getting stronger in recent years (71%). This sense is accompanied by concern about how China interacts with other nations: 61% of Americans are at least somewhat concerned about China’s territorial disputes with neighboring countries. (For more U.S. views of China’s role in the world, go to Chapter 1.)

When it comes to China’s relationship with the United States, few see China as a partner (6%) and most Americans instead label it a competitor (50%) or an enemy (42%) of the U.S. They are likewise critical of China’s impact on the U.S. economy, describing its influence as large and negative. Roughly half of Americans think limiting China’s power and influence should be a top U.S. foreign policy priority, and another 42% think this should be given some priority. (For more assessments of China’s relationship with the U.S., go to Chapter 2.)

According to the Center survey, which was conducted April 1-7, 2024, among 3,600 U.S. adults, Republicans are more wary of China than Democrats are.

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are about twice as likely as Democrats and Democratic leaners to hold a very unfavorable view of China and to consider China an enemy of the U.S. They are also more likely to say that China has recently become more influential.

Republicans also have wider ideological differences within their party, and conservative Republicans stand out on many measures:

• Conservative Republicans are 25 percentage points more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans to express a very unfavorable view of China (68% vs. 43%). There is no difference between liberal Democrats and moderate and conservative Democrats on this question.
• Conservative Republicans are also 31 points more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans to see China as an enemy of the U.S. No ideological difference is present among Democrats.
• While 83% of conservative Republicans say China’s influence in the world has been getting stronger in recent years, 68% of moderate and liberal Republicans say the same. The latter is similar to the shares of moderate and conservative Democrats (67%) and liberal Democrats (69%) who hold this view.

Older Americans are generally more critical of China. A 61% majority of adults ages 65 and older have a very unfavorable view of China, compared with 27% of adults under 30. Adults ages 65 and older are also more than twice as likely as those ages 18 to 29 to see China as an enemy of the U.S. For their part, younger adults are more likely than older ones to label China as a competitor and as a partner.

Older Americans also perceive more growth in China’s international influence. Roughly three-quarters of adults ages 65 and older say China’s influence has been getting stronger in recent years, while about two-thirds of adults under 30 say the same.

Americans with a sour view of the U.S. economy have more critical opinions of China. Those who say the current U.S. economic situation is bad are more likely to hold an unfavorable opinion of China and to say China has a great deal or fair amount of negative influence on the U.S. economy. They are also more likely to see China as an enemy when compared with those who see the economy positively.

Americans have overwhelmingly negative opinions of China, a nation they see as becoming increasingly influential. This image of China is accompanied by concern about its relationship with its neighbors and widespread distrust in its president.

Unfavorable views of China prevail

U.S. views of China have not changed significantly since last year. Most Americans still hold an unfavorable view of the country (81%), including 43% who say their opinion is very unfavorable. In contrast, only 16% see China favorably. China has been seen unfavorably by three-quarters or more of U.S. adults since 2020.

Age and education

Unfavorable views of China are more common among older Americans, especially those ages 65 and older. Among this group, 61% report a very unfavorable view of China, while only 27% of adults under 30 say the same.

Though Americans of all education levels see China unfavorably, views are more negative among those with more education. Some 87% of Americans with a four-year college degree have a negative opinion of China, compared with 78% of adults without a college degree.

Party and ideology

Republicans and Republican-leaning independents view China more unfavorably than Democrats and Democratic leaners do (90% vs. 77%). Conservative Republicans are particularly critical: About seven-in-ten (68%) hold a very unfavorable view of the country.

Economic attitudes

At least three-quarters of Americans hold unfavorable views of China regardless of how they rate the U.S. economy. Still, unfavorable views of China are more common among those who say the U.S. economy is doing poorly. Among Americans who think the current economic situation is bad, 84% have an unfavorable view of China, including 48% with a very unfavorable view. In comparison, 75% of those who think the U.S. economic situation is good see China unfavorably.

China’s international influence

How Americans evaluate China is tied to how they see China’s role in the world. Unfavorable views of China are more common among those who think China’s influence has grown in recent years (85%) than among those who think China’s influence has waned (72%) or stayed about the same (75%). Similarly, Americans who think China has at least a fair amount of influence on the U.S. economy are more negative on China than those who see not too much economic influence or no influence at all (84% vs. 71%).

China’s role in the world

Roughly seven-in-ten Americans (71%) think China’s influence in the world has been growing in recent years. This is a modest but significant increase from the 66% who said the same in 2022.

China’s economic influence

Americans’ evaluations of the change in China’s global influence are related to their ratings of its economic influence on the U.S.: 75% of those who say China has at least a fair amount of impact on the U.S. economy see China’s general influence in the world getting stronger. In comparison, 51% of Americans who do not see a significant economic impact on the U.S. say the same.

Age, gender and education

A number of demographic factors play a role in evaluations of China’s influence. Older Americans – those ages 50 and older – are more likely than those ages 18 to 49 to say China’s influence has grown recently (75% vs. 67%). A greater share of men than women hold this view, and older men stand out in particular. Eight-in-ten men ages 50 and older say China’s influence is on the rise, compared with 71% of older women and 72% of younger men. For their part, women ages 18 to 49 are least likely to say China’s influence has been growing (63%).

Americans with a four-year college degree are also more likely to believe China’s global influence has recently gotten stronger. Roughly eight-in-ten say this (77%), compared with 68% of adults without a college degree.

Party and ideology

Republicans are 10 percentage points more likely than Democrats to say China’s influence in the world is getting stronger (78% vs. 68%).

This opinion is notably concentrated among conservative Republicans: 83% say China’s influence has been getting stronger in recent years, compared with 68% of moderate and liberal Republicans. In fact, moderate and liberal Republicans are about as likely as conservative and moderate Democrats or liberal Democrats to hold this view.

China’s territorial disputes

We also asked Americans how concerned they are about territorial disputes between China and its neighboring countries. Roughly six-in-ten say they are at least somewhat concerned, including 20% who describe themselves as very concerned. About a quarter (24%) are not too concerned or not concerned at all, and 14% of Americans say they are not sure.

When this question was last asked in 2015 – as part of a phone survey – 72% were at least somewhat concerned with China’s territorial disputes, including 30% who were very concerned.

Age

Age plays a significant role in Americans’ level of concern about territorial disputes between China and its neighboring countries. Adults ages 65 and older are more concerned than any other age group: About eight-in-ten older Americans are concerned, compared with no more than roughly seven-in-ten in younger age groups.

Party and ideology

While concerns about territorial disputes are roughly equal among Republicans and Democrats, there are ideological differences within the Republican Party. Seven-in-ten conservative Republicans are at least somewhat concerned about China’s territorial disputes, including 30% who say they are very concerned. By comparison, 56% of moderate and liberal Republicans are concerned, including only 18% who are very concerned.

Americans lack confidence in Xi Jinping

About eight-in-ten Americans have little or no confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs (79%). Only 9% report some or a lot of confidence in Xi, and another 10% say they have never heard of him.

Age and education

Confidence in the Chinese president is lower among older Americans. A majority of those ages 65 and older have no confidence at all in Xi (59%), compared with 36% of those ages 18 to 29. Young adults are nearly four times more likely than those in the oldest age group to say they have never heard of the Chinese president (18% vs. 5%).

Americans with at least a four-year college degree report less confidence in Xi than those without a college degree. Among adults with a college degree or more education, 51% have no confidence at all in Xi; 44% of those without agree.

Party and ideology

Republicans express less confidence in Xi than Democrats do. About six-in-ten Republicans have no confidence at all in Xi (57%), more than the 39% of Democrats who say the same. Among Republicans, conservatives are significantly more likely than moderate and liberal Republicans to have no confidence whatsoever in Xi (65% vs. 43%). There is no significant difference between conservative and moderate Democrats and liberal Democrats on this question.

When asked about the state of U.S.-China relations, Americans offer mostly negative assessments: A substantial share consider China an enemy of the U.S., and most think limiting China’s power and influence should be a top foreign policy priority for the U.S. About two-thirds of Americans think China is having a great deal or fair amount of negative influence on the U.S. economy.

Americans increasingly see China as an enemy

Around four-in-ten Americans (42%) say China is an enemy of the U.S. This is fewer than the 50% who describe China as a competitor but a slight increase from the 38% of Americans who described China as an enemy last year. It is also the largest share who have described China as an enemy since we began asking the question.

Age

Older Americans are more likely than younger ones to describe China as an enemy. A majority of those ages 50 and older (55%) describe China as an enemy, including 61% of those ages 65 and older. Among adults under 50, three-in-ten say the same – including around a quarter (27%) of adults under 30.

Party and ideology

As has been the case in recent years, Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are significantly more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to describe China as an enemy (59% vs. 28%). Among Republicans, this share has increased 6 percentage points since 2023, from 53%. Among Democrats, views did not change significantly over the past year.

Conservative Republicans (69%) are particularly likely to describe China as an enemy, relative to moderate and liberal Republicans (38%), conservative and moderate Democrats (30%), and liberal Democrats (25%). Aside from conservative Republicans, roughly half or more in each group describe China as a competitor.

Economic attitudes

Assessments of whether China is an enemy, competitor or partner of the U.S. are related to views about the U.S. economy. For example, Americans who think the U.S. economy is currently in poor shape are significantly more likely than those who think it is in good shape to call China an enemy (48% vs. 29%).

Additionally, people who think China has a great deal or a fair amount of influence on economic conditions in the U.S. are much more likely than those who think it has less influence to call China an enemy (45% vs. 25%).

Limiting China’s power and influence

When asked to prioritize 22 possible long-term foreign policy goals, limiting the power and influence of China is given top priority by 49% of Americans. Another 42% say this should be given some priority, and 8% say limiting China’s power should not be a priority at all in U.S. foreign policy.

As with the sense that China’s influence has recently grown stronger, the desire to limit China is more prominent among older Americans and Republicans:

• About seven-in-ten Americans ages 65 and older (72%) say limiting China’s power and influence should be a top priority. That share decreases significantly as the age group surveyed gets younger, with just 28% of those ages 18 to 29 giving this top priority.
• A majority of Republicans (59%) say curbing China’s influence should be a top priority, compared with 42% of Democrats.

Since 2018, the share who prioritize limiting the power and influence of China has grown more than the share prioritizing any other foreign policy goal we asked about. Most of this increase occurred between 2018 and 2021, when American views of China grew precipitously less favorable.

Since 2021, Americans’ prioritization of this foreign policy goal has changed little, but the partisan divide on the issue has shifted. Today, Democrats give more priority to limiting China than they did in 2021 (+6 points), while concern among Republicans has stayed about the same over that period. This brings what was once a 27-point gap between Republicans and Democrats down to 17 points.

China’s economic influence on the U.S.

A large majority of Americans (82%) think China has at least a fair amount of influence on economic conditions in the U.S., including 28% who say it has a great deal of influence. Another 14% say it doesn’t have much influence, and only 3% say it has no influence at all.

Among those who think China has at least some influence on economic conditions in the U.S., a large majority (79%) think that that influence is negative, while 18% say it’s positive.

Taken together, roughly two-thirds of Americans think China has a great deal or a fair amount of negative influence on U.S. economic conditions. Far fewer think it has a great deal or fair amount of positive influence on economic conditions (13%). And small shares see it having limited positive impact (4%) or limited negative impact (10%).

Age

Older Americans are far more likely than younger ones to say that China has a large amount of negative influence on the U.S. economy. Around three-quarters (76%) of those ages 65 and older take this position, compared with only 53% of adults under 30. And, while still a minority position, adults under 30 are significantly more likely to say China has a large positive influence on the U.S. economy, with 19% saying this.

Party and ideology

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say China has a large negative influence on the U.S. economy (78% vs. 58%). This is particularly true for conservative Republicans (83%), relative to moderate and liberal Republicans (69%). Among Democrats, conservatives and moderates (57%) and liberals (61%) largely agree on this issue.

Economic attitudes

Americans who think the U.S. economic conditions are poor are more likely than those who think conditions are good to say China has a large negative influence on America’s economy (72% vs 55%).

Personal economic circumstances are also tied to how people see China’s influence on the U.S. economy. Americans with upper incomes (71%) and middle incomes (73%) are more likely than those with lower incomes (55%) to say China has a large negative impact on the American economy.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Christine Huang, Research Associate
Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst

Dorene Asare-Marfo, Panel Manager
Sarah Austin, Research Assistant
Peter Bell, Associate Director, Design and Production
Janakee Chavda, Assistant Digital Producer
Manolo Corichi, Research Analyst
Jonathan Evans, Senior Researcher
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher
Shannon Greenwood, Digital Production Manager
Sneha Gubbala, Research Assistant
Anna Jackson, Editorial Assistant
Hannah Klein, Senior Communications Manager
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Kirsten Lesage, Research Associate
Jordan Lippert, Research Assistant
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer
William Miner, Research Assistant
Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
Georgina Pizzolitto, Research Methodologist
Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Dana Popky, Associate Panel Manager
Sofia Hernandez Ramones, Research Assistant
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Maria Smerkovich, Research Associate
Kelsey Jo Starr, Research Analyst
Brianna Vetter, Administrative Associate
Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from ATP Wave 145, conducted from April 1-7, 2024, among a sample of ATP members who had previously completed both of ATP Waves 132 and 143. It includes an oversample of non-Hispanic Asian adults, non-Hispanic Black men and Hispanic men in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 3,600 panelists responded out of 3,776 who were sampled, for a response rate of 95%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,600 respondents is plus or minus 2.1 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based sampling (ABS) recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is asked to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.²

We have recruited a national sample of U.S. adults to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to boost sample size with underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Across the six address-based recruitments, a total of 23,862 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 20,917 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. Of the 30,859 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,906 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample of active ATP members who completed both ATP Wave 132 and Wave 143. Among the panelists who met these criteria, Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was April 1-7, 2024. Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset of ATP panelists with a known residential address on April 1.³

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on April 1. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on April 2.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center’s researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, one ATP respondent was removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights are then rescaled and adjusted to account for changes in the design of ATP recruitment surveys from year to year. Finally, the weights are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 2nd and 98th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. This trimming is performed separately among non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, Hispanic and all other respondents. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

© Pew Research Center 2024