Views of China are broadly negative across 24 countries in a new Pew Research Center survey: A median of 67% of adults express unfavorable views of the country, while 28% have a favorable opinion.

Negative views extend to evaluations of China’s international actions. Despite several high-profile diplomatic initiatives by Beijing over the past year – such as brokering a peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran and issuing a 12-point proposal for the end of violence in Ukraine – a median of 71% think China does not contribute to global peace and stability.

Most people also think China does not take into account the interests of other countries in its foreign policy (76%) and a median of 57% say China interferes in the affairs of other nations a great deal or fair amount.

Still, attitudes toward China are somewhat rosier in middle-income than high-income countries. Across eight middle-income countries – places Pew Research Center has not surveyed since 2019 due to the challenges of conducting face-to-face interviews during the pandemic – India stands out as the only middle-income country in which a majority has unfavorable views of China. And in three middle-income countries – Kenya, Mexico and Nigeria – a majority even gives China a positive rating.

Fewer in these middle-income countries also criticize China’s global behavior, and many more see China’s “soft power” appeal. Indeed, publics in these middle-income countries offer relatively favorable ratings for China’s entertainment products, its universities and its standard of living – while few in most high-income countries agree.

Across all 24 countries surveyed, however, there is more agreement about China’s technology. A median of 69% describe China’s technological achievements as the best or above average relative to other wealthy nations, with similar shares in high- and middle-income countries. A median of 54% also see China’s military as among the best in the world.

But views of the country as the world’s foremost economic power have faltered somewhat in recent years. More people now name the United States as the top economic power than China (a median of 42% vs. 33%, respectively). Much of this shift has come in high-income countries, where the share naming China has fallen in nearly every surveyed country – including by double digits in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden.

In the U.S., where equal shares (43%) called China and the U.S. the world’s leading economic power in 2022, views have shifted significantly over the past year; now, Americans are 10 percentage points more likely to name the U.S. than China (48% vs. 38%). (For more on American views of China, read “Americans are Critical of China’s Global Role – as Well as Its Relationship With Russia”.)

These findings come from a new Pew Research Center survey conducted from Feb. 20 to May 22, 2023, among more than 30,000 people in 24 countries. Below are some of the other findings regarding China’s overall image, views of Chinese foreign policy, ratings of President Xi Jinping, opinions about Chinese soft power and its economic power.

Overall ratings for China

Across many high-income countries surveyed, which are in North America, Western Europe and parts of the Asia-Pacific region, a large majority has unfavorable views of China, as has been the case for multiple years. Indeed, in almost every high-income country surveyed, negative views currently stand at or near historic highs. In most countries, this does not reflect a significant increase over last year; rather, negative views have simply remained high in recent years. One notable exception is Poland, where negative views have increased 12 points during a period of strained bilateral relations, perhaps related to China’s handling of the war in Ukraine.

Views of China in middle-income countries are relatively more positive. Still, negative ratings in most of these countries have also grown since the countries were last surveyed, pre-pandemic. In South Africa and Mexico, for example, opinions have turned somewhat more negative since 2019, and in Argentina, Brazil and India, negative views have even reached historic highs. In India, military conflicts along a contested border may have contributed to the 21 percentage point increase in unfavorable opinion.

China’s role on the world stage

Majorities in most countries do not think China takes into account the interests of countries like theirs. In Canada, France, Israel, Spain and Sweden, around half or more say China doesn’t consider them at all. Only in the three sub-Saharan African countries surveyed, as well as in Indonesia, does around half or more of the public feel like China listens to their country.

A median of 71% also think China does little or nothing at all to contribute to global peace and stability, compared with a median of 23% who say it is doing a great deal or a fair amount. Australians, Canadians, Indians, Israelis and South Koreans are particularly likely to say China is doing nothing at all to help with global peace and stability.

Most also see China as an interventionist power. A median of 57% say China does interfere a great deal or a fair amount in the affairs of other countries, while a median of 35% say it does not do so much or at all. Around seven-in-ten or more in Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Spain and the U.S. see China getting involved in the affairs of other countries – and many of these places also stood out for the high share who said China’s involvement in domestic politics in their own country was a very serious problem in a 2022 Pew Research Center survey.

But the country which is most likely to see China interfering in the affairs of other countries in this year’s survey is Italy (82%). Italy, which was the only G7 country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was debating leaving the initiative at the time that the survey was conducted, but treading delicately for fear of stoking possible Chinese retribution against Italian businesses.

Attitudes toward Xi

Few in the 24 countries surveyed have confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Across most of Western Europe, the U.S., Canada and much of the Asia-Pacific region, around half in each country say they have no confidence in him at all. Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa stand out as the only countries where a majority or plurality have confidence in his leadership.

Confidence in Xi is closely related to views of China more broadly. In each country surveyed people with unfavorable views of China are more likely to have little confidence in the Chinese president, and vice versa.

Chinese soft power

When it comes to elements often considered part of a country’s “soft power,” China’s technological achievements receive high marks, though fewer say the same about its universities, entertainment products or standard of living.

In fact, outside of South Korea, nearly half or more in every country say Chinese technological advancements are the best in the world or above average relative to other wealthy nations. And in many of the middle-income countries, around four-in-ten call Chinese technology the best in the world.

Middle-income countries – many of which are increasingly reliant on Chinese companies like Huawei for components of their 4G and 5G systems – were also asked specifically about technology such as phones, tablets or computers made by Chinese companies. Across these eight countries, there is a relatively widespread sense that these products are well-made. Middle-income publics are more divided when it comes to their cost: A median of 50% describe them as inexpensive, while 44% call them costly.

They are also somewhat divided when it comes to whether technological products made by Chinese companies protect people’s personal data (a median of 45%) or make their data unsafe (40%). (Americans were asked a different but related question about Chinese social media companies; large majorities have little confidence that they will use personal information responsibly or follow privacy policies.)

In every country, at least a plurality – and often a majority – also see China’s “hard power,” its military, as one of the best in the world or above average.

Chinese economic power

Fewer name China as the world’s leading economic power than the U.S. (a median of 33% vs. 42%). And, in many countries, the share naming China as the world’s leading economy has gone down in recent years.

Interestingly, China’s image as an economic superpower is stronger in high-income countries than middle-income ones. Italy, for example, is the only country where a majority (55%) calls China the leading economic power.

Still, people in middle-income countries do recognize economic benefits from their relations with China. A different survey question, asked only in these countries, finds that around half or more in six middle-income countries say their nation’s economy has benefited a great deal or a fair amount from Chinese investment. In Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, around seven-in-ten or more say this.

In the U.S., Americans were also asked to name the country which poses the top threat to the U.S. Not only was China the top answer, by far, but Americans see it as both an economic and a national security threat – in sharp contrast to Russia, which is primarily seen as a security threat. To read more about this related analysis, see “Americans name China as the top threat facing the U.S.”

Road map to the report

The chapters that follow discuss these findings and others in more detail:

• Chapter 1 looks at overall opinion of China across the countries surveyed, including how perceptions have shifted over the years

• Chapter 2 considers the negative and positive roles China plays in international affairs

• Chapter 3 reviews global public opinion about which country is the world’s leading economic power

• Chapter 4 explores perceptions of Chinese soft power, summarizing how people across 24 countries rate China compared with other wealthy nations

• Chapter 5 examines confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing in world affairs

Attitudes toward China are largely negative across the 24 countries surveyed. A median of two-thirds say they have an unfavorable opinion of the country and a median of just 28% offer positive ratings.

Half or more in each of the North American and European countries surveyed have somewhat or very unfavorable opinions of China. This includes majorities of three-quarters or more in Sweden, the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands and Germany.

In the Asia-Pacific region, views vary widely. While Australia and Japan stand out as the countries with the highest unfavorable ratings (87% each), just a quarter of Indonesian adults offer negative evaluations of China. And in India, where two-thirds have a negative view of China, half of adults offer very unfavorable opinions of the neighboring country (the largest share in any country surveyed).

Opinion of China in the Latin American countries surveyed – Brazil, Argentina and Mexico – varies as well, though the spread is much smaller. While a slim majority of Mexicans say they have positive views of China, a plurality of Brazilians offer negative ratings and views in Argentina are more split.

The sub-Saharan African populations surveyed offer some of the highest ratings of China. Nigeria and Kenya stand out for their shares of favorable views (80% and 72%, respectively), and a plurality of South Africans hold favorable opinions as well.

How views of China have changed in recent years

In many countries surveyed, the shares who say they have an unfavorable opinion of China are at or near their historic highs in Pew Research Center’s nearly two decades of polling on this topic. Among the middle-income countries – last surveyed in 2019 because of the coronavirus pandemic – Indians stand out for their increasingly negative opinion of China, similar in pattern to many of the high-income countries surveyed in recent years. Negative views in India rose from 46% in 2019 to 67% in 2023. During this same time period, a conflict along the India-China border has repeatedly flared up.

The shares offering unfavorable evaluations of China also grew in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and South Africa. In Brazil, the public went from being net favorable toward China in 2019 to net unfavorable in 2023.

Notably, in Mexico, favorable views of China have also risen in the last four years. Since 2019, China’s rate of foreign direct investment in Mexico has markedly increased, driven in part by “nearshoring,” or the trend of establishing foreign-owned means of production closer to major consumer populations – in this case, the U.S. The simultaneous increase in both positive and negative evaluations of China among Mexicans is the result of an 18-point decrease in the share who chose not to offer an opinion on the topic.

Likewise, positive ratings of China have grown significantly in Nigeria, Kenya and Indonesia.

In countries that were also surveyed in 2022, unfavorable views of China are largely similar to last year. Significant year-over-year change in negative ratings only occurred in three countries. In Poland and Canada, views have turned more negative (+12 and +5 percentage points, respectively). In Italy, opinion of China warmed modestly, though the survey concluded amid discussions that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was interested in breaking ties with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Views of China by age group

In 11 countries – mostly high-income ones – older adults have more negative views of China than their younger counterparts. In the United Kingdom, for example, 76% of those ages 40 and older say they have an unfavorable opinion of China, compared with 59% of those ages 18 to 39. Significant age differences are also present in Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.S., Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Mexico and Australia.¹

A median of 76% say China does not take into account the interests of countries like theirs when making international policy decisions. Only a median of 22% say China does account for such interests.

Countries in North America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region are especially likely to say Chinese foreign policy does not heed their interests. In most of these countries, more than six-in-ten hold this view. The sense that China ignores their country’s interests is strongest in Sweden, where 93% say China does not account for their country’s interests. This includes 64% who say China does not at all consider Swedish interests when making foreign policy decisions.

Views in the three Latin American countries surveyed are more tempered. While half or more in all three say China does not account for their country’s interests, 44% in both Mexico and Brazil say that China does account for their interests.

The three sub-Saharan African countries surveyed stand out for having majorities who think China does consider their interests in its foreign policy decisions. At least a quarter in each say that China considers their country’s interests a great deal.

Those on the ideological left are more likely than their right-leaning counterparts to say China does not consider their national interests in Germany, Hungary and Spain. The opposite is true in Israel and the U.S., where those on the right are more likely to hold this view.

In 14 countries, more education is associated with a greater sense that China discounts the interests of other countries. For example, 66% of Hungarians with less education think China does not take into account the interests of countries like Hungary when making international policy decisions, compared with 79% of those with more education.

How views of China’s international behavior have changed over time

Over the last decade, people in some countries surveyed have become increasingly likely to think China does not account for their country’s interests. India has seen the largest change, with only 28% of Indians saying that China disregarded their country’s interests in 2013, compared with 58% in 2023 (+30 percentage points).

The sense that China does not account for their country’s interests has even increased in Kenya and South Africa, where most still say China does factor in their national interests.

However, people have become less likely to think Beijing disregards their country’s interests in Argentina, Indonesia, Italy and Japan since 2013.

Most say China does not contribute to world peace and stability

Across the countries surveyed, people largely do not think of China as contributing to global peace and stability. This view is widely held across North America and much of Europe, and, outside of these regions, around three-quarters or more say the same in Australia, Israel, Japan and South Korea.

Indonesia and the sub-Saharan African countries surveyed stand out for having more positive views of China’s contributions to the world order. About two-thirds in Nigeria and more than half in Indonesia say China contributes at least a fair amount to peace and stability around the world. Kenyans are also slightly more inclined than not to say that China does contribute to peace and stability.

Adults ages 40 and older in Australia, Germany, Mexico, the UK and the U.S. are more likely than younger adults to say China does not contribute to peace and stability around the world. They are also less likely to answer the question in some cases. In Argentina, Brazil, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and the U.S., more education is associated with greater skepticism about China’s contributions to international peace and stability.

Hungarians and Argentines on the left are more inclined to see China as not contributing to world stability than those on the ideological right. Conversely, conservatives in the U.S. are more likely to see China as not contributing to world stability than liberals are.

China seen as interventionist

Most in the countries surveyed – including nearly all of the middle-income countries – say China is prone to interfering in the affairs of other countries. A median of 57% hold this view, while a median of 35% say China does not interfere too much or at all. Two-thirds or more in Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the U.S. believe China meddles in other countries’ affairs.

Argentines and Hungarians stand out on this issue: Both are about as likely to say China does interfere in other countries’ affairs as they are to say China does not.

In North America, older adults are more likely than younger adults to see China as interventionist. The opposite holds true in South Africa and the Latin American countries surveyed: Younger adults in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa are more likely than older adults to say China interferes at least a fair amount in the affairs of other countries. In 10 countries, those with more education are more inclined to say China interferes in the affairs of other countries compared with those with less education. They are also more likely to offer an opinion on the issue.

In Israel, Spain and the U.S., greater shares of those on the right than on the left say China interferes in the affairs of other countries. Conversely, right-leaning Hungarians are less likely than left-leaning Hungarians to see China as interventionist.

Only around a third of the 24 countries surveyed see China as the world’s leading economic power.  Most other countries – including all middle-income countries surveyed – give that title to the U.S.

People in Australia, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain – all high-income countries – name China as the world’s top economy. In France and the UK, equal shares name China and the U.S. Italy especially stands out as the only country where more than half say that China is the world’s leading economic power. Italy switched to seeing China and not the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power in 2020, one year after the country’s ascension into the Belt and Road Initiative.

South Koreans are the least likely to see China as the preeminent economy, choosing the U.S. by 75 percentage points. Differences of more than 40 percentage points on this question, in favor of the U.S., are also present in Israel (+41), Poland (+41) and Japan (+42).

Views are somewhat mixed in Argentina, Canada, France, the Netherlands, South Africa and the UK. In these six countries, roughly equal shares name both the U.S. and China as the top economy.

How opinions about which country is the world’s top economy have changed in recent years

In around half of the countries surveyed, people are less likely than they were a few years ago to name China as the world’s leading economic power. These changes have primarily occurred in high-income countries. In Sweden, for example, 32% say China is the top economy, down from 47% in 2019. Swedes are now more likely to name the U.S. than China as the world’s leading economic power. Even in Australia, where more name China than the U.S. as the top economy, the share who holds this view has gone down by 5 percentage points since June 2020.

Views of the international balance of economic power have changed little in most middle-income countries surveyed. As was the case in 2019, those in Brazil, India, Kenya and Mexico continue to see the U.S. as the top economy, while those in South Africa and Argentina are about as likely to name the U.S. as they are China. Indonesia stands out for an 8-point decline in the share who considers China the leading economy.

The sense that China is the leading economic power around the world is tied to pessimism about domestic economics. People who say their country’s economic situation is bad are more likely to name China as the world’s leading economic power in 11 countries, all of which are high-income countries. (They are also less likely to name the U.S. as the world’s top economy.)

In Italy, the only country where a majority says China is the world’s leading economy, for example, 59% of those who think the Italian economy is doing poorly say China is the world’s greatest economic power, compared with 44% of those who think Italy’s economy is doing well. And 29% of Italians who feel negatively about their economy consider the U.S. the top economic power compared with 39% of those who feel positively.

Many who see China as the world’s leading economic power also see it as a good thing

In 12 countries, people who named China as the world’s leading economic power were asked if that is more of a good or bad thing for their country.² On balance, more say this is a good than bad thing for their country. Substantial shares of a fifth or more in most countries also offer that China’s position as the leading economic power makes no difference.

Among those who see China as the world’s leading economic power, Kenyans, Nigerians and Indonesians are most likely to view China’s economic preeminence as good for their country. About half or more in the three countries hold this view.

Australians who think China is the world’s leading economic power are the most likely to say this is a bad thing for their country.

Chinese investment seen as an economic benefit

In most of the of eight middle-income countries surveyed, at least half say investment from China has benefited their country’s economy. People in the three African countries surveyed are particularly enthusiastic about investment from China. About two-thirds or more in each country consider Chinese investment a benefit to their domestic economy, including at least a third who say the investment has benefited their economy a great deal.

India and Argentina stand out for having more than half who believe Chinese investment has not been good for their country’s economy. Indians are the most skeptical of Chinese investment: 40% say investment from China has not at all benefited India’s economy.

Perceptions of China’s investments are related to views of its economic power and its overall image. In nearly all middle-income countries surveyed, those who say Chinese investments benefit their economy at least a fair amount are more likely to name China as the world’s leading economic power. They are also more likely to hold favorable views of China than those who do not see Chinese investment as a benefit for their economy.

In many countries, those with more education are more likely than those with less to see investment from China as a benefit for their economy. They are also more likely to offer a response to the question. In Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, younger adults ages 18 to 39 are more likely to see Chinese investment as a benefit than adults 40 and older.

Americans, for their part, think Chinese foreign aid and investment from Chinese companies both benefits and harms developing countries. While they broadly say the same about American investment, they are more likely to see American money benefiting developing countries than Chinese money. For more, read “Americans see U.S. aid to developing countries as more beneficial than Chinese assistance.”

When asked to rate some elements of Chinese soft and hard power against other wealthy nations, most in the countries surveyed recognize China’s technological achievements: A 24-country median of 69% say they are the best or above average among wealthy nations. Large shares also acknowledge China’s military (a median of 54%) and a sizable minority say Chinese universities are above average (35%).

China’s entertainment (such as movies, TV and music) and standard of living are not highly regarded: Medians of 17% and 14%, respectively, call them the best or above average. Instead, a median of 37% say Chinese entertainment is below average or the worst relative to wealthy nations, and 48% say the same about China’s standard of living. Roughly three-in-ten call both average.

Among two of China’s neighboring wealthy countries – Japan and South Korea – evaluations of Chinese soft power are, on average, lower than other places. South Korea also stands out as the lone country where considerably fewer than half (40%) rate China’s technology as at least above average. They also are the only place to rate China’s military higher than its technological achievements.

When looking at perceptions of Chinese soft power writ large, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa stand out for their positive ratings. Across the five measures, averages of 69%, 58% and 55% call China the best or above average in each country, respectively. No other country’s evaluations of these facets of China’s image average above 50%. Adults in Kenya and South Africa are also the most likely to rate each element as the best: For example, about a third of Kenyans and South Africans say China’s universities are the best relative to other wealthy nations’, more than any other population surveyed.

How views of Chinese soft power vary by age

Younger adults – those ages 18 to 39 – are more likely than those 40 and older to offer positive ratings of China’s entertainment, technological achievements and universities in roughly half of the countries surveyed. In Japan, for example, young adults are 15 percentage points more likely to call China’s universities the best or above average compared with older adults, 13 points more likely to say the same for technological achievements and 8 points more likely on entertainment.

Views of Chinese technology

We asked additional questions about Chinese technological products in the middle-income countries surveyed. A median of 62% across the eight countries say Chinese technology is well-made as opposed to 28% who say poorly made. Half call the products inexpensive, while 42% say they are expensive. And 45% say Chinese technological products protect your personal data, whereas 40% say they make your personal data unsafe.

Ratings of Chinese technology are highest in Nigeria, where roughly eight-in-ten Nigerians call Chinese products well-made and a similar share says they protect your personal data. Conversely, about half of adults in India say Chinese technology is poorly made and that it makes your personal data unsafe. Chinese companies currently have control of much of the mobile market share in both countries, as well as Indonesia and Kenya; this is not the case in the Latin American countries surveyed.

In the U.S., where we recently asked Americans’ confidence in data privacy practices on Chinese social media platforms, large majorities say they have little trust that privacy policies are followed or that their personal information is used in ways they are comfortable with.

Confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs is low across most surveyed nations, with the notable exception of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Majorities in three-quarters of the countries surveyed have little or no confidence in Xi, including Australia, Canada and France where majorities say they have no confidence at all.

But, Xi receives relatively high ratings in Kenya and Nigeria where majorities say they have at least some confidence in his actions on the world stage.

Ratings are also more positive than negative in Indonesia and South Africa, but in both countries, a large minority (33% and 22%, respectively) offers no opinion on this question, as do about a quarter of adults in Argentina and Hungary.

How confidence in Xi has changed over time

In 2022, before he entered an unprecedented third term in power, the shares with little or no confidence in Xi little or no confidence in Xi were at record highs in many countries surveyed. In most countries surveyed again this year, views are just as negative. Poles and Britons, however, are even less confident in Xi this year compared with last year (the share who say they have no confidence in him is up 9 and 5 points, respectively).

In most of the countries last surveyed in 2019, ratings of China’s leader have also worsened. In India, the share who has little or no confidence in Xi went up 21 percentage points over the last four years. Double-digit increases also occurred in Mexico (17 points), Brazil (15 points), Argentina (12 points) and Nigeria (10 points).

How confidence in Xi varies by age

In about a third of countries surveyed, adults ages 40 and older have less confidence in Xi than those ages 18 to 39. This gap is greatest in the UK, where just 15% of older adults have at least some confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs compared with 33% of younger adults.

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

Laura Silver, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Christine Huang, Research Associate
Laura Clancy, Research Analyst

Dorene Asare-Marfo, Panel Manager
Sara Atske, Digital Producer
Sarah Austin, Research Assistant
Janakee Chavda, Assistant Digital Producer
Moira Fagan, Research Associate
Janell Fetterolf, Senior Researcher
Sneha Gubbala, Research Assistant
Hannah Klein, Senior Communications Manager
Nam Lam, Intern
Gar Meng Leong, Communications Manager
Clark Letterman, Senior Survey Manager
Carolyn Lau, International Research Methodologist
Jordan Lippert, Research Assistant
John Carlo Mandapat, Information Graphics Designer
Gracie Martinez, Senior Administrative Coordinator
Patrick Moynihan, Associate Director, International Research Methods
Jacob Poushter, Associate Director, Global Attitudes Research
Sofi Sinozich, International Research Methodologist
Richard Wike, Director, Global Attitudes Research

About Pew Research Center’s Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for this survey are based on telephone, face-to-face and online interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup, Kantar Public, Langer Research Associates and Social Research Centre. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. Read more details about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs. Results for the U.S. survey are based on data from the Center’s American Trends Panel.

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from ATP Wave 124, conducted from March 20 to March 26, 2023, and includes an oversample of Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 3,576 panelists responded out of 4,058 who were sampled, for a response rate of 88%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 4%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,576 respondents is plus or minus 2.0 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. In 2020 and 2021, another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that did not respond to the online survey were sent a paper version of the questionnaire, $5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults who returned the paper version of the survey were invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults received a follow-up mailing with a $10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the five address-based recruitments, a total of 23,176 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 20,341 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, one adult was selected and asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 30,283 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 12,432 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.³ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from $5 to $20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 20 to March 26, 2023. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on March 20.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 20. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 21.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center’s researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, eight ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights are then rescaled and adjusted to account for changes in the design of ATP recruitment surveys from year to year. Finally, the weights are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists are invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

© Pew Research Center, 2023