Pew Research Center

FOR RELEASE SEPTEMBER 18, 2012

U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies

Public Deeply Concerned about China's Economic Power

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Pew Research Center, September 2012, "U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies"

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Table of contents

  • About Pew Research Center
  • U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies
  • Foreword
  • About the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project
  • Chapter 1. How Americans View China
  • Chapter 2. Threats and Concerns
  • Chapter 3. U.S. Policy Toward China
  • Chapter 4. U.S. Leadership and the Global Balance of Power
  • Survey Methods

U.S. Public, Experts Differ on China Policies

Public Deeply Concerned about China's Economic Power

Overview

With China a key foreign policy issue in the 2012 presidential contest, and both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney promising to “get tough” with the Asian power, the American public expresses both positive and negative views about China and U.S. policy towards it.

Nearly two-thirds describe relations between the U.S. and China as good, and most consider China a competitor rather than an enemy. At the same time, majorities say the U.S. cannot trust China and that the Asian nation does not consider the interests of other countries when making foreign policy decisions.

When it comes to dealing with China, as many say being tough with China on economic issues is a very important priority for the U.S. as say the same about building a strong bilateral relationship.

Despite generally positive assessments of U.S.-China relations, Americans are clearly concerned about China’s growing economic strength and its impact on the United States. Most consider the large amount of American debt held by China, the loss of U.S. jobs to China and the U.S. trade deficit with China to be very serious problems, and about half say the Asian nation’s emergence as a world power poses a major threat to America.

In contrast to the general public, American foreign affairs experts are far less concerned about China’s rising power. With the exception of retired military officers, only about three-in-ten among the experts surveyed consider China’s emergence as a world power to be a major threat. Fewer than four-in-ten experts consider the U.S. trade deficit with China to be a very serious problem, compared with about six-in-ten of the broader public; and even fewer experts express concern about the loss of U.S. jobs to China. Moreover, unlike the general public, experts are far more likely to support building a strong relationship with China than to back being tough with Beijing on economic issues.

The public and experts also offer divergent views of how assertive America should be in the world. When asked whether the U.S. should play a shared leadership role, be the single world leader, or not play any leadership role, majorities of the public and experts choose a shared leadership role. Among those who do so, 62% of the public say the U.S. should be no more or less assertive than other leading nations. In contrast, majorities of retired military officers, scholars, government officials, and business and trade leaders who favor a shared leadership role say the U.S. should be the most assertive of the leading nations; views are more mixed among members of the news media.

These are among the key findings of a survey of U.S. foreign affairs experts in government, business, academia, the military and the news media and the American public conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. The survey is part of the broader U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project, conducted in collaboration with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association and the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University.

The general public survey was conducted April 30-May 13, 2012, among 1,004 adults. The elite survey was conducted March 1-May 20, 2012, among 305 foreign affairs experts, including 54 government officials in the executive and legislative branches, 52 retired military officers, 74 business and trade leaders, 93 academics, think tank experts and NGO leaders, and 32 reporters, editors and commentators. Although not representative of all U.S. foreign affairs experts, the elite survey findings are indicative of attitudes among high-ranking individuals responsible for matters related to national security or foreign policy.1

Most See China as a Competitor, Say U.S. Can’t Trust It

The American public, as well as majorities across the five expert groups, describe China as a competitor of the United States. Few see China as either a partner or an enemy. However, the public is more likely than the experts to label China as an enemy; 15% of the public offer this negative view, compared with 3% or less among the five expert groups.

China is also largely seen as untrustworthy by both the American public and the experts. Only 26% of the public and about a third or less across the expert groups surveyed say the U.S. can trust China a great deal or a fair amount. By comparison, at least half among the public and the experts say the U.S. can trust Britain, Japan, France, Israel and India.

Moreover, just one-third of the public and even fewer among most expert groups believe China takes the interests of other countries around the world into account when making foreign policy decisions. Scholars are more likely than other foreign affairs experts to say this, but 59% in that group say China does not consider the interests of other countries. By comparison, solid majorities among the public and experts believe the U.S. considers the interests of other nations.

Views of China are generally more positive among young people. More than four-in-ten respondents younger than 30 see China as trustworthy (43%), compared with fewer than a quarter in older age groups. Younger people are also more likely than older respondents to say China takes the interest of other countries into account when making foreign policy decisions. And while about two-thirds across all age groups describe China as a competitor of the U.S., more 18- to 29-year-olds (22%) and 30- to 49-year-olds (19%) see China as a partner than do 50- to 64-year-olds (12%) and those 65 or older (7%).2

Obama’s China Policy

Nearly nine-in-ten government officials, and at least six-in-ten members of the news media, scholars, and business and trade leaders, approve of the way Obama is handling foreign policy. However, Obama receives lower marks among retired military officers, with a majority saying they disapprove of the president’s performance.

Asked to assess the Obama administration’s handling of China in particular, retired military officers also express more critical views than their counterparts. About half of retired military officers say Obama is not being tough enough with China, while 35% say his policy is about right. In contrast, majorities among the other four expert groups endorse the administration’s handling of China, including about two-thirds or more of government officials, scholars, and the news media.

Among the public, slightly more say Obama is not being tough enough with China than say his policy is about right (45% vs. 39%). Republicans are nearly twice as likely as Democrats to say the president should be tougher (65% vs. 35%); 49% of independents think Obama is not being tough enough with China.

Partisan Divisions on Views about China’s Rise

Republicans are considerably more concerned than Democrats about the impact of China’s rise. Six-in-ten Republicans believe China’s emergence as a world power poses a major threat to the U.S., compared with 48% of Democrats. Moreover, far more Republicans than Democrats see the U.S. trade deficit with China, the loss of U.S. jobs to China and the large amount of American debt held by the Asian nation as very serious problems.

Republicans are also far more likely to favor toughness with China on economic and trade issues, while Democrats are more likely than Republicans to say building a strong relationship with China is a top priority. About two-thirds of Republicans (68%) say it is very important for the U.S. to be tough with China, compared with 53% of Democrats; 48% of Republicans believe building a strong bilateral relationship should be a top priority, while 59% of Democrats offer this opinion.

Also of Note

  • Americans view China primarily as an economic threat rather than a military one; 59% say the Asian nation’s economic strength worries them the most, while 28% say its military might is a greater concern.
  • Majorities across all expert groups believe China will become more democratic as a result of economic growth.
  • At least seven-in-ten Americans describe the Chinese people as hardworking (93%), competitive (89%) and inventive (73%). Most also associate these traits with the American people, but fewer say Americans are hardworking (78%) than say the same about the Chinese.
  • About a quarter of the public (26%) names China as the country that represents the greatest danger to the U.S., more than volunteer any other country; 16% name Iran and 13% cite North Korea as the greatest danger. Opinions of which country represents the greatest danger vary across the five expert groups.
  • Most experts would support the use of U.S. military force to defend Taiwan if China used military force against the island without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. If an attack from China followed a unilateral declaration of independence, however, half or more would oppose the use of U.S. military force to defend Taiwan.
  • Majorities across the five expert groups say the world will be more stable in the long run if the U.S. remains the dominant power, but sizeable minorities, including 45% of business and trade leaders, say a balance of power between the U.S. and China would lead to more stability.

Foreword

China’s rise on the world stage is one of the most significant developments of the 21st century. As that nation expands its influence in Asia and elsewhere, America’s economic, diplomatic and military policymakers are wrestling with the implications for the United States and the international distribution of power. Among the general public, continued concern about the global economy and recognition of China’s growing economic might have contributed to a mounting sense of uncertainty about America’s status as a world leader. Signs suggest that China’s military power and diplomatic clout will continue to grow, making the security relationship between these two major powers a centerpiece of foreign policy debates during the 2012 presidential campaign and in years to come.

Against this backdrop, a unique, collaborative undertaking between leading research institutions in Washington and Beijing – the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project – was launched in 2011. The members of the project team include, on the U.S. side, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), the Pew Research Center, and the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. On the Chinese side, the members include the China Strategic Culture Promotion Association (CSCPA), a national non-profit civil society group that does security-related analysis, and the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University.

This project emerged from an awareness of the growing influence, in both the United States and especially China, of both public and elite attitudes on what many analysts recognize as the increasingly turbulent bilateral security relationship. Its objective is to obtain non-partisan policy-relevant data and insights on the evolving content and influence of such attitudes, as policymakers seek to reduce the likelihood of serious future bilateral crises or conflicts. The project intends to discover and analyze the views of the public and elites in five distinct categories – government, business, academia, the military and the media – regarding a wide range of national security issues, from the nature of American and Chinese power, both globally and in Asia, to the images held of one another’s national character.

On the U.S. side, the Pew Research Center has conducted, in consultation with CEIP and the Kissinger Institute, the elite and public surveys, while the RCCC and CSCPA have together performed similar tasks in China. This project report by the Pew Research Center conveys the initial findings of the U.S. surveys, including the views of the American public and U.S. foreign affairs experts. Future reports by the project will include findings from parallel surveys in China.

In addition, as part of the broader project, workshops are planned in both Washington and Beijing that will bring together leading experts on U.S.-China relations, as well as representatives of the expert groups polled by the project, to discuss in detail the survey findings and their implications for policy in the United States and China. Following the workshops, CEIP, the Kissinger Institute, and CSCPA will issue a final report on the project. In the longer term, the aim is to make the surveys and workshops a regular event, charting changes over time in how Americans and Chinese see one another in the national security realm.

We believe the surveys in the United States and China bring a unique perspective to an important topic in international affairs and will provide insights on the reasoning behind each country’s security policies and behavior over time. We hope the findings will thereby help to inform policymakers, the media and the global public about important issues in these two countries.

About the U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project

The U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project is a partnership among five organizations in the United States and China. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace provided the funding for the U.S. public and foreign policy expert surveys and secured additional funding from the China-United States Exchange Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

The following organizations have partnered together in this endeavor:

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Carnegie is pioneering the first global think tank, with flourishing offices now in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels. These five locations include the centers of world governance and the places whose political evolution and international policies will most determine the near-term possibilities for international peace and economic advance. The Carnegie Asia Program in Beijing and Washington provides clear and precise analysis to policymakers on the complex economic, security, and political developments in the Asia-Pacific region.

Formed in 2004, the Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. A neutral source of data and analysis, it does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts. The Center’s work is often cited by policymakers, journalists and academics, as well as advocates from across the political spectrum. The Pew Global Attitudes Project conducts public opinion surveys around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people’s assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day. More than 300,000 interviews in 59 countries have been conducted as part of the project.

Inaugurated in 2008, the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is dedicated to promoting greater awareness of the U.S.-China relationship and its impact on both countries and the world. It does so by exploring the political, economic, historical, and cultural factors that underlie the respective behavior patterns and world views of China and the United States. The Institute is non-partisan and committed to improving American expertise about China as well as Chinese knowledge about the United States.

The China Strategic Culture Promotion Association is a national non-profit civil society group composed of experts, scholars and social activists who are engaged in studies of international issues, the Taiwan issue and cultural issues. The association was founded in Beijing on January 5, 2011, aiming at promoting security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and encouraging peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait through studies, dissemination and exchange of Chinese strategic culture.

Founded in 1988, the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University is a self-financed nonprofit academic institution that conducts statistically rigorous interviews and polling in China on a wide variety of subjects, including issues related to China’s foreign relations. The RCCC focuses on promoting rigorous social science scholarship in China; generating systematic social and economic data for scholars, government agencies, and the business community; integrating Chinese social science into the international scholarly community; and providing institutional assistance for Chinese and international scholars conducting research in China.

Chapter 1. How Americans View China

Americans offer a positive overall assessment of U.S. relations with China; nearly two-thirds say relations between the two countries are generally good. Yet, a majority describes China as a competitor and few say the U.S. can trust the Asian nation.

Moreover, just one-third of Americans believe China considers the interests of other countries around the world when making foreign policy decisions. In contrast, eight-in-ten say the U.S. takes the interests of other countries into account.

Among the five expert groups surveyed, majorities share the public’s distrust of China and see that country as a competitor of the U.S. Most also say China does not consider other countries’ interests when making foreign policy decisions.

When asked whether they associate a series of positive and negative traits with the Chinese people, more than seven-in-ten among the general public say the Chinese are hardworking, competitive and inventive. Few say negative characteristics like arrogance, selfishness, rudeness and violence describe the Chinese.

China Seen as a Competitor

Most Americans see China as a competitor of the United States; 66% express this view, while about the same number describe China as a partner (16%) as say it is an enemy (15%).

The view that China is a competitor is especially widespread among college graduates. Nearly eight-in-ten (78%) describe China this way, compared with 67% of those with some college experience and 56% of those with a high school education or less.

Like the general public, experts also tend to see China as a competitor of the U.S.; about three-quarters or more across all groups describe China this way, while 22% or less say China is a partner. Virtually nobody among the expert groups labels China an enemy of the U.S.

Most Say U.S. Cannot Trust China

About two-thirds of the public (68%) say the U.S. cannot trust China too much or at all; just 26% say China can be trusted a great deal or a fair amount. Of the nine countries tested, only Pakistan is seen as less trustworthy than China – 10% of Americans say the U.S. can trust Pakistan. Saudi Arabia ranks about as low as China when it comes to the number of Americans who trust that country. Half or more say the U.S. can trust Britain (78%), Japan (62%), France (59%), Israel (56%) and India (50%).

Young people are far more likely than older respondents to see China as trustworthy. More than four-in-ten people younger than 30 say the U.S. can trust China (43%) compared with fewer than a quarter in older age groups.

Similarly, Democrats are more likely than Republicans and independents to say China can be trusted, although at least 60% across all three partisan groups say the U.S. cannot trust China. More than one-third of Democrats (36%) say China is trustworthy, compared with 24% of Republicans and 21% of independents.

Trust in China is also lacking across the five expert groups; about a third or less say the U.S. can trust China, while solid majorities of at least 65% say China cannot be trusted. In contrast, nearly all respondents across the five groups see Britain and Japan as trustworthy, and majorities say the same about France, Israel and India.

Contrary to views among the general public, half or more of government officials, retired military officers, business and trade leaders, and members of the news media say the U.S. can trust Saudi Arabia; more than four-in-ten scholars also share this view.

China’s Approach to Foreign Policy

About six-in-ten Americans (59%) say China does not take the interests of other countries around the world into account when making foreign policy decisions; just one-third say China considers the interests of other nations. In contrast, 80% say the U.S. considers other countries’ interests, while just 17% say it does not.

The view that China takes the interests of other countries into account is more common among young people; 41% of people younger than 30 offer this view, compared with one-third or less of those ages 30 to 49 (31%), 50 to 64 (33%) and 65 or older (29%).

Education is also a factor in perceptions of China’s approach to foreign policy. Only 23% of college graduates say China takes other countries’ interests into account, while 72% believe it does not. By comparison, 34% of those with some college and 40% of those with a high school education or less say China considers the interests of other countries around the world; 56% of those with some college and 54% with high school or less believe China does not take the interests of other countries into account when making foreign policy decisions.

Majorities of the expert groups surveyed also say China does not take the interests of other countries into account, although a sizable minority of scholars (41%) believe it does. Among the other four groups, fewer than three-in-ten say China considers the interests of other nations, including just 21% of business and trade leaders and former military officials. Like the public, solid majorities of experts say the U.S. takes the interests of other countries into account when making foreign policy decisions.

Chinese Seen as Hardworking and Competitive

At least seven-in-ten Americans describe the Chinese people as hardworking (93%), competitive (89%) and inventive (73%); smaller majorities also say the Chinese are nationalistic (63%) and modern (57%), while a 49%-plurality see them as sophisticated.

Fewer attribute negative traits like aggressiveness (43%), greed (40%), arrogance (36%), selfishness (31%), rudeness (28%) and violence (24%) to the Chinese people. Similarly, not many associate positive traits such as honesty (44%), tolerance (38%) and generosity (28%) with the Chinese.

Americans also think of themselves as hardworking (78%), but fewer describe the American people this way than say the same about the Chinese. On the other hand, more say Americans are modern (84%) and inventive (82%) than say the Chinese are, while about the same percentage describes the American and the Chinese people as competitive and nationalistic. Most Americans attribute positive characteristics like generosity (78%), tolerance (68%), honesty (64%) and sophistication (61%) to the American people. However, more than half also say Americans are greedy (68%), arrogant (63%), selfish (62%), aggressive (58%) and rude (51%).

Chapter 2. Threats and Concerns

Americans express far more concern about China’s economic strength than about its military strength. This is reflected in the solid majorities that say the large amount of American debt that is held by China, the loss of U.S. jobs to China and the U.S. trade deficit with China are very serious problems for the United States.

Still, Americans do not rank China’s emergence as a world power as the greatest threat to the U.S. More describe global issues such as Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs, Islamic extremist groups, international financial instability and drug-related violence in Mexico as major threats to the U.S. than describe the challenges posed by China this way.

When asked which countries in particular represent the greatest danger to the U.S., about a quarter of the public names China, more than cite any other country; 16% mention Iran and 13% volunteer that North Korea poses the greatest danger.

Like the general public, more retired military officers name China than name any other nation as the country that represents the greatest danger to the U.S. In contrast, Iran is cited more frequently than any other country by government officials, business and trade leaders and members of the news media. Scholars are evenly divided, with the same number volunteering China and Iran as the country that poses the greatest danger.

The experts surveyed generally express less concern than the public about China’s emergence as a world power. International financial instability tops the list of major threats across the five groups, but majorities in all of the groups also consider Islamic extremism and political instability in Pakistan a major threat to the U.S.

Global Threats

About half of Americans (52%) consider China’s emergence as a world power a major threat to the well-being of the United States, while 35% say it is a minor threat and 9% say it is not a threat. Compared with other possible international threats, however, China’s ascent does not rank among the public’s top concerns; at least six-in-ten see Iran’s nuclear program (70%), Islamic extremist groups (70%), North Korea’s nuclear program (69%), international financial instability (65%) and drug-related violence in Mexico (61%) as major threats to the U.S.

Older Americans and Republicans are especially concerned about China’s emergence as a world power. About six-in-ten people ages 50 to 64 (62%) and 65 or older (59%) consider this a major threat to the U.S., compared with 48% of 30- to 49-year-olds and 43% of people younger than 30. Similarly, 60% of Republicans consider the rise of China as a world power a major threat, while 48% of Democrats share this view.

With the exception of retired military officers, few among the expert groups surveyed consider China’s emergence as a world power a major threat. Fewer than a third of government officials, business and trade leaders, scholars and members of the news media see this as a threat, while 46% of former military officers express this view.

Across the five groups, international financial instability tops the list of concerns, with at least eight-in-ten saying this is a major threat to the U.S. Experts are also generally more concerned than the public about political instability in Pakistan, while drug-related violence in Mexico and North Korea’s nuclear program rank considerably lower as major threats among foreign affairs experts than among the general public.

China Seen as Country that Poses Greatest Danger

When asked which country represents the greatest danger to the U.S., more Americans volunteer China (26%) than name any other country. Iran, the country that receives the second-most mentions, is viewed as the greatest danger by 16% of the public, while 13% name North Korea.

In a January 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, more volunteered Iran than any other nation as the country that posed the greatest danger to the U.S.; 28% cited Iran, while 22% named China (see “Public Priorities: Deficit Rising, Terrorism Slipping,” released January 23, 2012, by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press).

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to name China as the greatest danger. About three-in-ten Republicans (31%) name China, compared with 21% of Democrats; 28% of independents offer this view. Republicans are also more likely than Democrats and independents to cite Iran as the country that poses the greatest danger to the U.S. (26% vs. 13% and 16%, respectively).

Opinions about which country represents the greatest danger to the U.S. vary across the five expert groups surveyed. Retired military officers are more likely than any other group to volunteer China; half do so, compared with fewer than three-in-ten among the other four groups; 38% of retired military officers cite Iran. Among scholars, the same number names China as cites Iran, while about twice as many business and trade leaders and members of the news media name Iran over China as the most dangerous nation. More in government also name Iran than any other country.

China’s Economic Strength

The public views China primarily as an economic threat rather than a military one; 59% are more troubled by China’s economic strength, while 28% say the country’s military strength is a greater concern.

College graduates are four times more likely to express concern about China’s economic strength than its military strength (70% vs. 16%), and those with some college experience are more than twice as likely to view China as an economic rather than a military threat (63% vs. 26%). Opinions are more divided among those with no more than a high school education; 49% are more concerned about China’s economy, while 38% see that country’s military strength as a greater threat.

Despite the public’s concern about China’s economic strength, majorities across the five expert groups see a positive outcome to the Asian nation’s growing economy. Majorities in all five groups believe China will become more democratic as a result of economic growth.

Debt, Trade Deficit and Loss of Jobs Top Concerns

Nearly eight-in-ten people (78%) say the large amount of American debt that is held by China is a very serious problem for the U.S.; majorities also consider the loss of U.S. jobs to China (71%) and the U.S. trade deficit with China (61%) to be very serious problems for their country.

Beyond these economic concerns, about half also see China’s impact on the global environment (50%), cyber attacks from China (50%), China’s growing military power (49%) and China’s policies on human rights (48%) as major problems. Just 27% express similar concern about tensions between China and Taiwan.

Republicans and independents are more concerned than Democrats about economic issues related to China. For example, while 71% of Republicans and 66% of independents say the U.S. trade deficit with China is a very serious problem, just over half of Democrats (54%) express similar concern. And while solid majorities across partisan groups see the loss of U.S. jobs to China and the large amount of American debt held by China as very serious, somewhat fewer Democrats say this is the case.

In contrast, Democrats and independents are considerably more likely than Republicans to say China’s impact on the global environment is a major problem; 54% of Democrats and 53% of independents share this view, compared with just 41% of Republicans.

For the most part, foreign affairs experts are far less concerned than the general public about issues related to China. For example, fewer than four-in-ten in each group say the loss of U.S. jobs to China, the U.S. trade deficit with China, China’s growing military power and China’s policies on human rights are very serious problems for the U.S.

Of the 11 issues tested, including three that were asked of the experts but not of the general public – China’s intellectual property infringement, territorial disputes over the South China Sea, and China’s exchange rate policy – only cyber attacks from China are considered a very serious problem by at least half across all five groups. Retired military officers are especially concerned about this, with nearly nine-in-ten saying it is a very serious problem. Majorities of retired military officers and business and trade leaders and half of government officials also see China’s intellectual property infringement as a major problem for the U.S.; about four-in-ten scholars and members of the news media express similar concern.

Chapter 3. U.S. Policy Toward China

The public wants the U.S. to be tough with China on economic and trade issues. At the same time, most Americans say it is very important for their country to build a strong relationship with China, including about three-in-ten who say this should be the most important priority for the U.S. in regards to the Asian nation. About one-in-five believe that promoting human rights in China is the most important priority.

Across the five expert groups surveyed, there is a far greater consensus than among the general public that building a strong relationship with China should be the most important priority for the U.S. Being tough with China on economic issues is considered a much lower priority, even among retired military officers and trade and business leaders, who largely believe toughness on economic and trade issues is very important for the U.S.

When asked about the Obama administration’s handling of China, slightly more of the public say it is not being tough enough than say the administration is handling it about right; virtually no one says Obama is being too tough with China. In contrast, solid majorities among most expert groups endorse Obama’s China policy.

Among the public and the experts, few say continuing to sell arms to Taiwan and advocating for more freedom for Tibet are very important priorities for the U.S. A small number across the five expert groups say promoting human rights in China should be the most important priority.

Americans who have heard a lot about relations between China and Taiwan are somewhat divided on whether the U.S. should use military force to defend Taiwan if China were to attack the island, with only slightly more saying the U.S. should use force than saying it should not. Among the experts surveyed, most say the U.S. should use force to defend Taiwan if China were to attack it without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. There is far less support for U.S. military intervention if an attack from China followed a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan.

Obama’s China Policy

The Obama administration’s handling of China receives somewhat mixed reviews from the public — 45% say Obama is not being tough enough, while 39% say Obama’s China policy is about right. In May 2001, in a survey conducted just weeks after a U.S. spy plane landed on the Chinese island of Hainan after colliding with a Chinese fighter jet, more of the public endorsed George W. Bush’s dealings with China than said Bush was not being tough enough (46% vs. 34%) (see “Public Behind Bush On Key Foreign Issues,” released June 11, 2001, by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press).

As was the case in 2001, views of the administration’s dealings with China are divided along partisan lines. Nearly two-thirds of Republicans (65%) say Obama is not being tough enough, while 27% say his policy is about right. Among Democrats, about half (51%) endorse the president’s policy and 35% believe Obama has not been tough enough. A decade ago, 57% of Republicans said the Bush administration’s handling of China was about right and 32% believed the president wasn’t being tough enough; Democrats were somewhat divided, with 40% saying Bush wasn’t tough enough and 34% saying his China policy was about right.

Of the foreign affairs experts surveyed, retired military officers are the most critical of Obama’s handling of China; about half in this group say the administration is not being tough enough, while about a third believe it is about right. In contrast, majorities among the other groups endorse Obama’s policies, with scholars and government officials being particularly supportive.

When asked to describe in their own words what they believe Obama has done best when dealing with China, experts most often mention the president’s general diplomatic approach to the bilateral relationship. Obama is commended for being balanced and consistent – combining aggressiveness when necessary with cooperation when possible.

Government officials, scholars and retired military officers, in particular, also applaud the Obama administration for refocusing efforts on Asia and regional allies, including the increase of military capabilities in the Pacific. They also believe military-to-military communication between China and the U.S. has improved during Obama’s time in office.

Yet, there are concerns that the president has not made much progress on the trade imbalance; business and trade leaders especially fault him for protectionist policies. Experts across the board are also concerned that the Obama administration has inadequately responded to the theft of intellectual property and cyber attacks on businesses.

Policy Priorities

Most Americans (56%) say it is very important for the U.S. to be tough with China on economic and trade issues. Yet, about the same number (55%) say building a strong relationship with China should be a top policy priority. More than half (53%) also consider promoting human rights in China as very important, while considerably fewer say the same about advocating for more freedom for Tibet (36%) and continuing to sell arms to Taiwan (21%).

The view that promoting human rights in China is very important is more widespread than it was in January 2011, when 40% believed this to be a top priority for the U.S. (see “Public’s Global Focus Turns from Europe to Asia,” released January 12, 2011, by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press). Democrats and Republicans alike are more inclined than they were in 2011 to say promoting human rights in China should be a very important priority; 58% of Democrats and 56% of Republicans currently express this view, compared with 43% and 33%, respectively, in 2011; opinions have been more stable among independents (50% now vs. 41% in 2011).3

Across the five expert groups, majorities of at least eight-in-ten consider building a strong relationship with China a very important priority for the U.S. However, there is less consensus regarding other aspects of U.S. policy. For example, about six-in-ten government officials and business and trade leaders want the U.S. to be tough with China on economic and trade issues, but fewer than half in the other three groups consider this a top priority. And while promoting human rights in China is seen as very important by 46% of government officials and 41% of members of the news media, about one-third of business and trade leaders and about one-in-five scholars and former military officers share this view. Just 30% or fewer across the five groups consider advocating for more freedom for Tibet and continuing to sell arms to Taiwan to be very important priorities for the U.S.

When describing in their own words what they believe should be the top priorities for U.S. policies toward China, experts across the board cite economic issues such as the bilateral trade imbalance, the theft of intellectual property and economic espionage through cyber attacks by China. Among business and trade leaders, China’s currency valuation is also mentioned as a major issue.

Experts also consider managing the international balance of power between the two nations a top priority, though they are divided on the best approach. While many say it is important to contain China by preventing a build-up of its military and limiting its growing influence in other areas of the world, there is also a desire to avoid conflict between the two by increasing military-to-military communication and learning to accommodate China’s growth as a world power.

Partisan Differences on Key Priorities

For the most part, among the general public, Republicans, Democrats and independents offer similar views of U.S. policy priorities toward China. There are partisan differences, however, when it comes to the importance of building a strong relationship with China and being tough with the Asian nation on economic and trade issues.

Republicans are far more likely than Democrats and independents to say it is very important for the U.S. to be tough with China on economic and trade issues. About two-thirds (68%) of Republicans express this view, compared with 53% of Democrats and independents.

Conversely, about six-in-ten Democrats and independents (59% each) believe building a strong relationship with China should be a top priority for the U.S., while 48% of Republicans agree.

Areas of Collaboration and Sources of Conflict

Across the five expert groups, the economy is most frequently offered as the best arena for cooperation between the U.S. and China. Given the size of the two nations’ economies, many believe that it is in both countries’ interests to collaborate on fostering global economic stability as well as developing equally beneficial interdependence.

Many also mention the possibility of the U.S. and China jointly addressing common threats, such as climate change, terrorism, health epidemics, instability in the Middle East, and security on the Korean Peninsula as an avenue for cooperation. And all the expert groups agree that the exchange of ideas and people between the two world powers – from cultural interactions to joint scientific research – can improve the bilateral relationship.

On the other hand, when asked about the most likely sources of conflict, the top concern is that regional territorial disputes, such as in the South China Sea, could lead to escalating tensions. Many also say that U.S. efforts to maintain its leadership in the region or Chinese attempts to assert itself militarily could result in a competition for dominance in the Pacific.

Respondents in all expert groups also express concerns about power struggles for influence in other areas of the world, and many raise the possibility of a clash between the U.S. and China over third-party actions, such as North Korea or Iran. Retired military officers and business leaders in particular mention the need for scarce natural resources as a key source of conflict both within the region and other areas of the world.

Among business and trade leaders, economic issues – such as a trade war, theft of intellectual property and currency valuation – are most often cited as likely causes of deteriorating relations between the U.S. and China.

Using Force to Defend Taiwan

Just 10% of Americans say they have heard a lot about relations between China and Taiwan; 54% have heard a little and 34% have heard nothing at all about this issue.

About half (48%) of those who have heard a lot about relations between China and Taiwan say the U.S. should use military force to defend Taiwan if China were to use force against the island; 43% say the U.S. should not use military force to defend Taiwan.

Among the expert groups surveyed, views on whether the U.S. should use military force to defend Taiwan depend on the circumstances of a potential attack by China. Majorities across the five groups would support the use of U.S. military force to defend Taiwan if China moved against the island without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan.

At least six-in-ten government officials, scholars and retired military officers express this opinion, as do somewhat smaller majorities of business and trade leaders and members of the news media.

If China were to use military force following a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, however, at least six-in-ten government officials, business and trade leaders, scholars and members of the media say the U.S. should not use military force to defend Taiwan; half of the retired military officers surveyed share this view.

Chapter 4. U.S. Leadership and the Global Balance of Power

The American public, as well as majorities across the five expert groups surveyed, say the U.S. should play a shared leadership role in the world, while few believe the U.S. should be the single world leader or not play any leadership role at all. There is less consensus, however, on whether the U.S. should be the most assertive of the leading nations or whether it should be about as assertive as other leading nations.

There is also little consensus on views of the extent to which the U.S. relies on military strength to achieve its foreign policy goals. The public is nearly evenly divided between those who say their country relies on military might too much and those who say it does so about the right amount. Business and trade leaders and retired military officers also express mixed views, while solid majorities of the news media, scholars and government officials believe the U.S. relies on its military strength too much.

When asked what would make the world more stable in the long run – the U.S. remaining the world’s leading superpower, China replacing the U.S. as the world’s leading superpower, or a balance of power between the two nations – more than half in all expert groups choose a scenario in which the U.S. maintains its position as the dominant power. Still, considerable minorities say a balance of power would lead to more stability.

U.S. Leadership Role

About three-quarters (74%) of the public favor a shared leadership role for the U.S.; 9% say the U.S. should be the single world leader, while 12% say it should have no leadership role at all.

Among those who say the U.S. should play a shared leadership role, nearly twice as many think the U.S. should be no more or less assertive than the other leading nations as say it should be the most assertive of the leading nations (62% vs. 33%).

Experts also believe the U.S. should play a shared leadership role in the world; at least eight-in-ten in each group express this view. Retired military officers are somewhat more likely than those in the other four groups to say the U.S. should be the single world leader, but few retired military officers offer this opinion.

Contrary to the opinion expressed by the general public, however, majorities of retired military officers, scholars, government officials and business and trade leaders who favor a shared leadership role say the U.S. should be the most assertive of the leading nations; still, sizable minorities in each group believe the U.S. should be no more or less assertive than other leading nations.

Members of the news media who say the U.S. should play a shared leadership role are about evenly divided between those who believe the U.S. should be the most assertive of the leading nations and those who think it should be no more or less assertive than other leading nations.

Global Balance of Power

More than half across the expert groups surveyed believe the world will be more stable in the long run if the U.S. remains the leading superpower, but sizable minorities in each group say a balance of power between the U.S. and China would lead to greater stability. None of the experts surveyed believe the world will be more stable if China replaces the U.S. as the leading superpower.

The view that the world will be more stable if the U.S. continues to be the global superpower is somewhat more common among retired military officers, but at least six-in-ten government officials, scholars and members of the news media share this view. Opinions are somewhat more divided among business and trade leaders.

U.S. Use of Military Strength

Four-in-ten Americans believe the U.S. relies on military strength too much to achieve its foreign policy goals, and about the same number (44%) say their country relies on its military strength about the right amount; only 10% of Americans say the U.S. relies on military might too little.

Republican views on U.S. reliance on military strength differ sharply from those of Democrats and independents. Most Republicans (54%) say the U.S. relies on military strength about the right amount, while the rest are about evenly divided between those who say their country relies on military strength too much (22%) and those who say it relies on military strength too little (20%).

In contrast, close to half of Democrats and independents (47% and 46%, respectively) say the U.S. relies too much on its military might, while about four-in-ten Democrats (42%) and independents (40%) say their country relies on military strength about the right amount. Just 6% of Democrats and 9% of independents would like to see the U.S. rely on its military more than it currently does.

Among the experts surveyed, members of the news media are particularly inclined to believe the U.S. relies on military strength too much to achieve its foreign policy goals; about eight-in-ten say this is the case. More than six-in-ten scholars and government officials also agree that that U.S. relies excessively on its military might. Retired military officers and business and trade leaders offer more mixed views. Among retired military officers, only slightly more say the U.S. relies on military strength too much than say the U.S. relies on it about the right amount; among business and trade leaders, just slightly more say U.S. reliance on military might is about right than say it is excessive.

Survey Methods

General Public Survey

Results for the general public survey are based on telephone interviews conducted April 30 – May 13, 2012, among a national sample of 1,004 adults 18 years of age or older living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia (600 respondents were interviewed on a landline telephone, and 404 were interviewed on a cell phone, including 195 who had no landline telephone). The survey was conducted by interviewers at Princeton Data Source under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI). Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. A combination of landline and cell phone random digit dial samples was used; both samples were provided by Survey Sampling International. Respondents in the landline sample were selected by randomly asking for the youngest adult male or female who is now at home. Interviews in the cell sample were conducted with the person who answered the phone, if that person was an adult 18 years of age or older.

The combined landline and cell phone samples are weighted using an iterative technique that matches gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin and nativity and region to parameters from the March 2011 Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey and population density to parameters from the Decennial Census. The sample is also weighted to match current patterns of telephone status, based on extrapolations from the 2011 National Health Interview Survey. The weighting procedure also accounts for the fact that respondents with both landline and cell phones have a greater probability of being included in the combined sample and adjusts for household size within the landline sample. Sampling errors and statistical tests of significance take into account the effect of weighting. The error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for the full sample is plus or minus 3.7 percentage points; the margin of error for Form 1 (n=477) and Form 2 (n=527) is plus or minus 5.3 percentage points. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Foreign Affairs Experts Survey

Results for the survey of American foreign affairs experts are based on 305 web and telephone interviews conducted March 1-May 15, 2012, with respondents from five subgroups: 54 government officials; 52 retired military officers; 74 business and trade leaders; 93 scholars, think tank experts and NGO leaders; and 32 members of the news media.

The goal of the survey was to identify high-ranking individuals with titles or positions that denote responsibility for matters related to national security or foreign policy. Among retired military personnel, those with ranks of colonel or captain or above, depending on the service, were included; in civilian or non-governmental agencies, those with ranks equivalent to that of a deputy office director or higher were surveyed. The survey was conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI). Interviewing was primarily self-administered online, but a phone interview option was made available to any respondent who requested it (215 interviews were completed online and 90 by telephone).

Sampling procedures for each subgroup are outlined below.

Government

The government sample includes government officials in the legislative and executive branches. A total of 300 people in the legislative branch were invited to participate in the survey, including members of Congress and senior professional staff (177 from the U.S. House of Representatives and 123 from the Senate). The sample was designed to reflect the party composition of each body. While 91 Representatives and Senators were contacted, no elected official completed the survey.

An additional 300 people from various executive departments, as well as the Office of the President and independent federal agencies, were invited to participate. The main source of names for the sample of officials in the legislative and executive branches was the online Leadership Library database.

Retired U.S. Military Officers

A total of 269 retired military officers were invited to participate in the survey. The main sources used were the Leadership Library and LexisNexis. The LexisNexis search identified retired military officers who were quoted in news articles about East Asia, China, national security and other foreign policy issues.

Scholars, Think Tank Experts and NGO Leaders

A total of 250 invitations to participate were sent to people in this segment, with Leadership Library as the primary source. The list from Leadership Library was supplemented using a Google Scholar search with the key words “U.S. China security.” Articles written since 2010 were reviewed for relevant names. In addition, faculty from top graduate schools in international politics with an emphasis on China or Asia were selected.

Business and Trade Leaders

A total of 450 business and trade leaders were identified using the Leadership Library as the primary source. In addition, a list of the Fortune 500 top executives was used to identify business executives with international responsibilities, especially in China and Asia more broadly.

News Media

A total of 250 members of the news media were invited to participate. The list was compiled using the Leadership Library as the primary source. The list was supplemented with names from the Cision MediaSource database and from Google Scholar and EBSCO searches. Reporters, editors, bureau chiefs and commentators with a focus on China, Asia, or other foreign policy topics were selected.

Contact Procedures

Requests for participation were sent to a total of 1,819 experts. Selected individuals were mailed an advance letter explaining the purpose of the study and encouraging their participation. The advance letter included the web address where the survey was hosted online by PSRAI and a unique username so each respondent could log into and complete the interview online. Advance letters were printed on specialized letterhead showing the three U.S. sponsors of the study: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Pew Research Center, and the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Correspondingly the letter was signed by the three representatives of these institutions: Jessica Tuchman Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center; and J. Stapleton Roy, director of the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Advance letters were mailed out to 1,455 potential respondents on February 24, 2012. A second batch of advance letters was sent to an additional 364 experts on March 7, 2012.

Following the advance letter, subsequent requests for participation were sent primarily by email to selected individuals who had an available email address, had yet to complete the survey, and who had not explicitly refused to participate. Following the first batch of advance letters, initial email contact was made on March 6, 2012 (n=1,086). Subsequent to the second batch, an email was sent on March 21, 2012 (n=253). An additional email reminder was sent to all selected individuals who had not yet participated and had not explicitly refused on April 25, 2012 (n=774). On March 7, 2012, phone calling began to individuals from the first batch of advance letters who lacked email addresses, as well as those whose email invitations were returned as undeliverable, in an effort to gather working email addresses and encourage participation online. Phone calls to the second batch of contacted individuals began on April 2, 2012. Calls to both groups continued until the end of the field period. On March 14, 2012, phone calling began to selected individuals with email addresses who had not yet completed the survey, but not explicitly refused to participate.

The overall response rate for the survey of experts was 20%. The response rates for each subgroup were as follows: 11% for government officials, 25% for retired military officers, 18% for business and trade leaders, 40% for scholars, and 16% for members of the news media.